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ARTICLES

A NEW EXPERIENCE FOR ROMANIA: IMMIGRANTS ON THE LABOR MARKET

Mihail Ungheanu¹

ABSTRACT

Like many other countries Romania is confronted with the phenomenon of immigration and its impact on the labor market. This is a relatively new reality for Romania, although for 2024 the authorities are expecting some 140.000 migrant workers to enter the country. The number contains an extra 40.000 in comparison with 2022 and 2023. Sooner or later, this will impact the labor market and the situation of the indigenous workforce. The paper presents some ways to look at these issues, even though the results in this domain are often considered to be contradictory.

Keywords: immigrants, labor force, labor market.

SHORT INTRODUCTION

Romania is confronted with a double experience: loss of population and workforce and the importation of foreign nationals to work in the empty places left by Romanian emigrants and unoccupied by a population that is getting older and cannot reproduce itself. Since many a young people emigrated in search of a better life, Romania is presented with a conundrum.

According to official statistics, the Romanian active workforce had these features in 2022: from a total of 7.6 million people, 5.5 were employed. Most of the employees belong to the area of services (3.5 million) whereas in industry and construction, only 1.8 million people were employed. In other areas such as agriculture, forestry, and fish-farming only 0.1 million².

For the third year continuously, the Ministry of Labor plans to bring hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to Romania in order to supplant the dwindling workforce of the country. In 2023, over 100.000 workers stemming from Turkey, Africa, Asia, and India have been brought from abroad. In 2024 are expected over 140.000 such workers to arrive from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Vietnam, the

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² EUROpean Employment Services, „Informații privind piața muncii. România. (2023)” [“Labor market information. Romania (2023)”], in *EURES*, July 4, 2023, Available at: https://eures.europa.eu/living-and-working/labourmarketinformation/labourmarketinformation_romania_ro, Accessed on: January 1st, 2024.

Philippines, etc. Only in 2022 there were issued over 100.000 work permits by the authorities, a number that goes well beyond the one registered between 2010–2021. The same number was registered for 2023, but 2024 comes with an extra 40.000. Only last year, the Romanian state had lost 50.000 members of the workforce that migrated. Since there is no solution to bring them back, the state has opted for bringing in a cheap labor force. Some sectors, such as food delivery had been occupied by a labor force from Asia³.

IMMIGRATION

The understanding and evaluation of the migration effects on a country is an important tool for grasping the situation in which it found itself and its population. The study of the effects of migration is based upon the presuppositions that it has effects on the market, but also in other areas such as international commerce, fiscality, investments, tourism, innovation, entrepreneurship, or social cohesion (75). Some areas that are not quantifiable, especially the effects at a cultural level, but not only there. Even concepts such as “lack of workforce” or “lack of competencies” seem to be as ambiguous and hard to define as the aforementioned impact exerted by immigration on the cultural level.

Evaluating the quality of the adaptation and integration of migrants on the labor market depends on a mix of different features that are hard to separate from each other: individual features (level of education, country of origin, reason for migration, mobility on the labor market, etc.), the conditions present on the labor market, the quality of institutions and work policies in the host country, etc. Such studies are difficult because they imply or need comparison between the observed outcomes of a real immigration process and outcomes from a counterfactual scenario. According to present-day estimates, nearly 300 million people – 3.5% of the world’s population – reside not in their country of origin. The immigration flows are not arbitrary, they usually go one route, namely, disproportionately in the direction of the richer countries – net permanent migration flows⁴.

This is combined with the reality of a lower population growth associated with these countries, a fact that explains why there is a population increase in those countries from 7% in 1990 to more than 12% in 2020. In countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand the percentage is 25% of immigrants in the workforce while

³ Oleg Ghilas, „Statul român vrea să permită accesul pentru încă 140.000 de muncitori străini, în 2024, pentru a acoperi deficitul de muncă” [“Romania wants to allow 140.000 more foreign workers in 2024 to fill labor shortages”], in *Monitorul de Cluj*, November 21, 2023, Available at: <https://www.monitorulcj.ro/economie/114893-statul-roman-vrea-sa-permita-accesul-pentru-incea-140000-de-muncitori-straini-in-2024-pentru-a-acoperi-deficitul-de-fora-de-munca>, Accessed on: February 1st, 2024.

⁴ Anthony Edo, Lionel Ragot, Hillel Rappaport, Sulin Sardoschau, Andreas Steinmayr and Arthur Sweetman, “An introduction to the economies of immigration in OECD countries”, in *Canadian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 30, 2020, pp. 1–39.

in Germany and the United States is around 15%. This triggered debates about immigration and its impact on these lands. There are concerns that immigration will take jobs away from the native labor force and that it will put negative pressure on wages and would negatively affect the public finances; other concerns regard crime and the potential of increasing it. Some immigrant supporters that see those as economic assets and as enrichment to a so-called multicultural society. The presence of the immigrants can be seen as a kind of mechanism that stimulates economic growth through the increase of productivity and international trade⁵.

According to this paradigm the immigration policy should be shaped in such a manner that would allow it to function as a mechanism that increases economic welfare, which is sometimes proxied construed in the terms of an immigration-induced GDP. Some voices, voices that think immigrants are a kind of saints, contend that immigration flows should not be analyzed. Overall economic studies of the problem have indicated that the impact of immigration on the average wage and the employment levels of the native workforce is zero or even slightly positive in the medium and long term. In the short term though, the impact can be negative, and regaining the levels of the average wages and employment extant before the immigration impact requires some adjustments; the detrimental effects can be distributional, so in some areas where previous immigrants and native work with the same skill sets are occupied will have their wages reduced.

But different studies, done with different methodologies/ paradigms, can lead to different conclusions. If the immigrants have the same set of skills as the native workers their presence may lead to a decrease in the average wage, although, if those skills are not entirely substitutable, their presence would lead to a slight increase of the said wage, both this groups tending to become specialized in areas that are somewhat different. One group would tend to specialize in a domain that favors quantitative and analytical skills, while the native workgroup would prefer to work in a domain requiring interactive and communication skills⁶. From the point of view of the labor market, the entry of new workers – immigrants that is – may affect productivity thus wages, and the returns on physical capital. In Europe, most immigrants are less skilled on average than the natives, so one can expect that their entry into the labor market might exert negative pressure on the wages of native low-skilled workers thereby increasing the pressure on them to go and acquire new skills⁷.

Can migration exert good a positive influence on the country where the migrants settle? One possible answer is yes. Migrants could shape in a positively the comparative advantage of both the receiving and the sending country⁸. Such an example is given by South Africa, a country that received Huguenot refugees in the

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

⁸ Dany Bahar and Hillel Rappaport, "Migration, Knowledge Diffusion and the Comparative Advantage of Nations", in *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 128, Issue 612, July 1st, 2018, p. 1.

seventeenth century; those have founded a small town in the Western Cape province – Franckshoeck Valley. They build up renowned wineries that sell worldwide. This entailed first that South Africa began to produce enough to export. So, the presence of immigrants – skilled immigrant that is – can explain variation in good-specific productivity, which is defined as the capacity of countries to exports the said goods, for products that are exported intensively by both the destination and home countries of the migrants – in the above case of South Africa – wine. A 10 percent increase in the number of migrants from a country that exports a product in the destination country would lead to an increase of 2 percent in the probability that that country would export that product in the next ten years. The marginal effect of exploiting the skilled immigrants is ten times larger than in the case of an unskilled ones; also, from the point of view of expanding exports, the presence of skilled immigrants is considered worth 100.000 USD as opposed to 25.000 of unskilled immigrant workers⁹.

The presence of skilled migrants might lead to the apparition of new industries in the exports area of a country due partially to skill and local knowledge diffusion. Productivity is increased by a kind of nonmodifiable or tacit knowledge that follows a highly localized geographically diffusion pattern. This knowledge is not transmitted by writing but by minds, by persons, and by direct human interactions. It follows that diffusion of knowledge follows the pattern of international migration¹⁰. Skilled immigrants bring tacit knowledge and know-how, and they could bring new and better labor and management techniques, and they could contribute to the boosting of productivity by means of innovation and by bringing new technologies with them.

What is a migrant? According to the definition used by the U.N. an international migrant is a person who changes her country of residence to live be it temporarily or permanently in a country she was not born irrespective of the motivation of the migration. Short-term migration means a period between 3–12 months and permanent migration means a period extended over 12 months¹¹. According to these statistics, there are more than 244 million people worldwide who do not reside and work in their homelands. It is considered that 3.3% of the world population consists of migrants¹².

In the past decades the number of international migrants in developing countries is considered to be relatively stable, being about 1.7%. The number of international immigrants has nevertheless increased in developed countries from 7.2% in the nineties to 11.2% in 2015. In Europe, the foreign-born population had

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

¹⁰ “Thus, if tacit knowledge can induce sector-specific productivity shifts as measured by new exports, then migrants who are naturally carriers of tacit knowledge, would shape the comparative advantage of their sending and receiving countries.”, in *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹¹ Anthony Edo and Hillel Rappaport, “Minimum Wages and the Labor Market Effects of Immigration”, (pre-publishing) in *Labor Economics* 2019, Vol. 61, p. 1.

¹² *Ibidem*.

doubled during this period reaching a percentage of 12.9 in 2015. Due to these facts, some voices contend that the developed world consists increasingly of nations made up of immigrants. Although there are studies about the effects of the presence of the immigrant workers on the labor markets (upon the wages of the natives, upon the employment opportunities of the natives, etc.), many conclusions remain controversial¹³.

Of the 244 million migrants, 76 thereof are living in Europe, according to U.N. statistics in 2016. However, due to the existing geopolitical conditions, the number of immigrants in the world has increased in the last few years, a trend that might continue. Many come from Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.¹⁴ Most migrants are present, when the situation is seen from the point of view of the target country of the immigrants, to be present mostly in the United States (47 million), Germany, Russia (12 million), and Saudi Arabia (circa 10 million). According to some U.N. documents about the 2000–2015 time period, without the migrant flux the population of Europe would be going downward; this, of course, can be used to justify importing foreign populations into Europe.

How can be estimated the impact of migrants upon the market forces in Romania and elsewhere? The estimation depends on the type of theory and paradigms that are used to select and interpret the data since there are no brute facts; even what counts as a relevant fact or proof depends on a paradigm. According to the main economic theory the impact of migrants upon the labor market. The most basic assertion regarding this problem is that the increased number of migrants affects the labor market by reducing the physical capital per worker, which in turn affects labor productivity and, thus, reduces the average wage of workers¹⁵. There are also other approaches. Work immigration can affect the employment opportunities of the native workers and also the wages and the level of employment¹⁶.

As in other cases, the results of an inquiry depend on the paradigms and presuppositions it is based on. Such a result is based on an underlying assumption that the capital stock stays the same – one has to distinguish between short and long-term effects, too. But if capital is used productively, immigration can be an incentive for accumulating capital, or it can be used to lead to the increase of capital that can be later employed to mitigate the initial negative effects on the labor market. If a firm chooses to change its technology, it can absorb new incoming immigrants and

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹⁴ Luciana Lăzărescu (coord.), Cristina Șerbănică, Roxana Mihaela Prisacariu and Smaranda Witec, „Impactul imigrației asupra pieții muncii din România. Raport de cercetare calitativă” [“The impact of immigration on the Romanian labor market. Qualitative research report”], Bucharest, 2016, Available at: https://cdmir.ro/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/EMINET_Raport_Impactul_migratiei_pe_piata_muncii.pdf, Accessed on: February 12, 2024.

¹⁵ Anthony Edo and Hillel Rappaport, *quoted work*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁶ “Although total employment in the economy increases, the employment level of native workers (as opposed to immigrant workers) may decline in response to immigration. Indeed, the initial negative impact of immigration on wages can lead some natives to exit the labor force.”, in *Ibidem*, p. 4.

thus mitigate the negative effects of immigration on wages. Such predictions assume of capital-skill complementarity.

There are other ways to approach this problem: structural, empirical, or based on skill distribution across a group. From an analysis that starts based upon the idea of skill distribution, the impact of immigration on the labor market and on the wages or employment of natives will fall differently according to the distribution of the skills across these groups. If a country and labor market are disproportionately affected by the immigration of high-skilled people, this will affect and lower the wages and perhaps the employment of the high-skilled workers in that domain, but this won't hold the workers from not so high-skilled based activities. High-skilled immigrants, when they belong to the STEM group, have contributed to patenting and innovation in the United States. They also brought ideas and technologies from wherever they came from. In this case, they exerted a positive influence on the productivity and wages of the native workers.

One could say that heterogeneous skilled work immigration will produce heterogenous effects on the labor market and workforce.

THE SITUATION IN ROMANIA

The legal frame pertaining to the immigration of foreign nationals in Romania is defined by the international engagements and treaties the Romanian State has adhered to, like the Geneva Convention from 1951 regarding The Status of The Refugees and The Additional Protocol to it and the international norms adopted by the European Union, especial the one pertaining to the Space of Freedom, Liberty, Security, and Justice from the fifth title of the Treaty Pertaining to the Workings of the European Union and the Schengen Space¹⁷. The Romanian legislation has as its target the management of the immigration by actions and use of public resources to coordinate and control the whole flux of foreign nationals coming from other states that come legally or illegally on Romanian territory.

One motivation behind the Romanian immigration policies is to honor the international treaties Romania adhered to but also the attempt to satisfy the needs of foreign employment expressed by public institutions, which have to maintain and buttress the relationships with the Romanian nationals from abroad and that have to insure the national cohesion by integrating foreigners that are already present on Romanian territory. The (strategic) goals of immigration policies are to promote legal migration that works to the advantage of all parts implied in the process (Romanian society, the migrants themselves and their homelands, etc.), the enhancement of the control of the legality of the presence of foreign nationals on Romanian territory and the enforcement of the necessary measures to remove illegal

¹⁷ Luciana Lăzărescu (coord.), Cristina Șerbănică, Roxana Mihaela Prisacariu and Smaranda Witec, *quoted work*, p. 26.

present foreigners, etc. Some of the strategic goals are important for the policies regarding the labor market: making it easier for foreign citizens to get access to Romanian territory, citizens that have the features that are needed to respond to the needs of the labor market, facilitating the access of foreign nationals to high-learning institutions or to domains that lack the necessary personnel to function properly, facilitating the access and the presence of foreign citizens whose economic activities on Romanian territories are going in harmony with the Romanian national interest, etc.¹⁸.

According to quality research published in 2016 by researchers working under the seal Swiss-Romanian Cooperation Programme, the impact of migration on the labor market was deemed to be of not a great significance. The presence of foreign workers/migrants was not significant due to their reduced numbers¹⁹. Their presence was no threat to the wages of native workers (in that period Romania lost another 10% from its workforce, 500.000 workers who migrated). Their presence can be construed as positive since Romania still loses its workforce. Also, the financial costs generated by the migration are inferior to the monetary gains originated by issuing the work permits and the fines generated by breaching the law regarding migration²⁰. There are many monetary gains to be cashed in at the levels of the state and local budgets and the contributions to the social insurance budgets.

CONCLUSION

The openness of the Romanian people regarding immigration was deemed to be at mid-level, with hostile attitudes being recorded in the context of the immigration crisis from 2015, though most of the Romanians interviewed considered that the migrants do the jobs that were left by the Romanian emigrants and that when the migrants work legally and pay taxes, they exert a positive influence on the economy. The negative perception of migrants pertains to migrants that do shady and illegal business, exploit their employees, and work illegally. Besides that, Romanians differentiate clearly between foreigners/migrants from outside the European Union and the ones from the EU.

The immigrants that stem from countries outside EU foreigners are seen as normal people by the Romanian citizens, although they are not considered as having an important effect on the situation of the country since they come to study or to find jobs that are better paid than in their homelands but underpaid in comparison with the Romanian standards.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 26–27.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 79.

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ROMANIAN DIASPORA IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN LIGHT OF THE 2010 AND 2020 POPULATION CENSUSES

Vlad Cubreacov²¹

ABSTRACT

Among the 27 member states of the European Union, Romania has the second largest kin-minority in the Russian Federation. Between the 2010 and 2020 censuses, the Romanian diaspora in Russia recorded the largest quantitative decrease after World War II, making it increasingly difficult to organize it and preserve its cultural-linguistic identity, given the absence of any important support from the Romanian kin-state. Hardly known in their ethnic homeland, Romanians in Russia do not have national institutions (schools teaching in Romanian, churches, press), being subjected to an intense process of acculturation and denationalization, gradually melting into the Russian mass or preferring to emigrate abroad.

Keywords: Russia, Romanian diaspora, demography, Romanian language, assimilation.

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

The Romanian diaspora within the current Russian Federation was formed between the 15th and 21st centuries from successive waves including nobles and courtiers, politicians, clergy and scientists, Cossacks, soldiers (hussars and pandors), settlers, deportees and economic migrants.

This diaspora has its beginnings in 1483, when the daughter of the Prince of Moldavia Stephen the Great, Elena (1464–1505)²², accompanied by a large retinue of courtiers, arrives in Moscow to marry Prince Ivan the Younger, the heir son of the great Prince of Moscow Ivan III. Elena's suite, surnamed Voloshanka [the Romanian], also included her supposed half-brother, Ioan Vecinul/Sused [the Neighbour], who had two sons, Ioan Voloh [the Romanian] and Vasili Rahman [the Gentle One], from whom descended, as the famous composer Sergei Rachmaninoff (1873–1943) constantly claimed²³.

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²² Евгений Владимирович Пчелов, *Российские дворяне молдавского происхождения*, Москва, Гербовед, 2006, с. 147 [Eugeny Vladimirovich Pchelov, *Russian nobles of Moldavian origin*, Moscow, Gerboved, 2006, p. 147].

²³ Василенко Николай Прокофьевич, *Исторические сведения о роде дворян Рахманиновых (С прил. герба и родослов. табл.)*, Киев, тип. Г. Т. Корчак-Новицкого, 1895 [Vasilenko Nikolai Prokofievich, *Historical information about the noble race Rachmaninoff (With coat of arms and genealogical tables in annex)*, Kiev, Korchak-Novitsky Publishing House, 1895].

A personality of Romanian origin, settled in Russia in 1671, pioneer in Russian culture and diplomacy, was Nicolae Milescu-Spatar (1636–1708)²⁴, Romanian scholar, translator, traveler and geographer, former representative of the Principality of Moldavia in the Ottoman Empire (1660–1664), envoy of Moldavia in Berlin and Stockholm, but also the first ambassador of Russia to China and educator and adviser to Tsar Peter I Romanov²⁵. One of Nicolae Milescu-Spatar's descendants was Ilya Mechnikov, name translated into Russian after Spatar (1845–1916), Russian microbiologist and immunologist with Romanian roots, winner of the Nobel Prize in Medicine (1908):

“On his paternal line, I. I. Mechnikov is a nobleman, more precisely a Romanian boyar. The founder of his nation, like the founders of many other nations in Russia, was a foreigner. Among the Mechinikovs this was the Romanian Nicolae Spataru (1635/36–1708/09), who was born in Milesti (on the territory of present-day Romania) and studied in Padua (Italy)”²⁶.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, several thousand Romanians from the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and even from Transylvania and Banat settled in Russia, joining the Zaporozhian Cossack army, in which they often formed Romanian companies (called *rota*)²⁷. Many of them held high leadership positions, of which the most famous is Danila Apostol (1654–1734)²⁸, hetman of Ukraine (1727–1734), descendant of the Romanian noble families Apostol from Moldova and Catargiu from Wallachia. An important Romanian ethnic spread occurred between the Dniester and Dnieper, especially under the rule of the Moldavian Prince:

“Following the death of Jure Khmelnytskyi, the Ukrainian Hetmanate under suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, largely inhabited by Romanians; is entrusted to Duca Vodă, Prince of Moldavia, in 1681. The border of Moldavia moved from the Dniester to the Dnieper, Moldavians crossed the Dniester unhindered, and Duca Vodă is awarded the title ‘Gospodar zemli Moldavskoy i zemli Ukrainskoy’ (The Lord of the Land of Moldavia and Ukraine)”²⁹.

²⁴ Евгений Владимирович Пчелов [Eugeny Vladimirovich Pchelov], *quoted work*, p. 148.

²⁵ Ion Neculce, *O samă de cuvinte. Letopisețul Țării Moldovei [A set of words. Chronicle of Moldova]*, Bucharest, 1986, pp. 31–33.

²⁶ «По отцовской линии И.И. Мечников – дворянин, а точнее, румынский боярин. Основателем его рода, как и многих других дворянских родов России, был иностранец. В роду Мечниковых это был румын Николай Спафарий (1635/36–1708/09), родившийся в г. Милешты, (территория современной Румынии) и получивший образование в Падуе (Италия)», in Российская академия наук, Российские нобелевские лауреаты: Илья Ильич Мечников, Москва, Архивы Российской академии наук, с. 4 [Russian Academy of Sciences, *Russian Nobel Laureates: Ilya Ilyich Mechnikov*, Moscow, Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences, n. d., p. 4].

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

²⁸ Nichita P. Smochină, *Danila Apostol-hetman of Ukraine [Dănilă Apostol-hatmanul Ucrainei]*, Bucharest, Romanian Book Publishing House, 1929, p. 18.

²⁹ „După moartea lui Jure Hmelnițki, hătmănia Ucrainei de sub suzeranitatea Turciei, locuită în mare parte de români, este încredințată Domnului Moldovei Duca Vidă, la 1681. Granița Moldovei este strămutată de la Nistru la Nipru; moldovenii circulau de pe un mal pe altul al Nistrului fără dificultăți, iar Duca Vodă primește noua titulatură de «Gospodar zemli Moldavskoi i zemli Ukainskoi» (Domnul Țării Moldovei și al Ucrainei)”, in Anton Golopenția, *Români de la Est de Bug [Romanians East of the Bug River]*, Vol. II, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2006, p. 573.

An important wave of Romanians in Russia was recorded in 1711, when the Prince of Moldavia Dimitrie Cantemir (1673–1723), great Romanian scholar, encyclopedist, ethnographer, geographer, philosopher, historian, linguist, musicologist, composer and polyglot, member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, retired to Russia, initially to Kharkov, and then near Moscow, on an estate that would be called Dimitrievka. Prince Dimitrie Cantemir was accompanied to Russia by “over 4.000 male and female souls” by

“Romanian people who today for the Christian faith are forced to leave their homeland and come to the Russian kingdom”³⁰.

as Prince Dimitrie Cantemir himself writes in a report to Tsar Peter the Great on July 27, 1711. Among the over 4.000 Romanians who left for Russia were 448 boyars³¹ and officials³².

The military campaign of Tsar Peter I Romanov in 1711 in Moldavia was also attended by 6 Romanian regiments from Russia, called *Horongva Voloha* [Wallachian flags], reorganized in 1707 and placed under the command of colonel Filip Apostol-Chigheci, successor of the Romanian hetman Danila Apostol. These military units made up of Romanian fighters continued the tradition of the older Romanian regiments from the army of Rzeczpospolita, whose existence is documented in the seventeenth century. These would later form the basis for the famous regiments of Romanian hussars and pandors (called *Volochs*) of the Russian army. For example, in 1738, the Moldo-Wallachian Hussar Regiment of 800 cavalrymen was established within the Russian army, headed by Constantin Cantemir³³, son of Prince Antioh Cantemir. In the eighteenth century, Romanian hussar regiments from the Russian army participated in the Russian-Turkish (1735–1739) and Russian-Swedish (1741–1743) wars, in the raid on Berlin (1760), as well as in military raids in Crimea.

The Romanian element was colonized in Russia with the abolition of serfdom (1861) and after the Circassian genocide (1864). Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century, several thousand Romanian settlers from Bessarabia were displaced to the southern governorate of Chernomorskaya and the Kuban region (today in Krasnodar Krai) in the North Caucasus, where they founded several localities: Moldovanskoe, Mekerstuk, Solonets, Thamaha, Shabanovskoe, Moldovanovka, Subsân, Moldovka, Bujor (today a suburb of Sochi) and others³⁴.

³⁰ Ștefan Ciobanu, *Dimitrie Cantemir în Rusia [Dimitrie Cantemir in Russia]*, Bucharest, Romanian Academy-Memoirs of the Literary Section, Ser. III, Vol. II, Mem. 5, 1924, p. 86.

³¹ Among the well-known boyar families that left traces in Russian history were: Abaza, Aga, Bănaru, Bantâș, Banul, Bragă, Buhuș, Cămăraș, Caraiman-Culicovschi, Cârțan, Ciutea, Codreanu, Dubaș, Gafencu, Hâncu, Hrisescul, Merescu, Mogâldea, Moțoc, Mutul, Neguriță, Nour, Pascaliu, Rameliș, Rugină, Nacul, Scherlet, Spătarul, Sulger, Ursuliță, Vătav, Zărul etc.

³² Ștefan Ciobanu, *quoted work*, p. 86.

³³ Christoff Herman Mannstein, *Beytrag zur Geschichte Russlands vom Jahr 1727 bis 1744 [Contribution to the history of Russia from 1727 to 1744]*, Hamburg and Bremen, 1771, p. 350.

³⁴ Владимир Фёдорович Шишмарёв, *Романские поселения на юге России*, Ленинград, Наука, 1975, с. 91 [Vladimir Fyodorovich Shishmariov, *Romanesque settlements in southern Russia [Roman settlements in southern Russia]*, Leningrad, Nauka Publishing House, 1975, p. 91].

Another wave of Romanian colonization in Russia took place after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, in which Romanians from Bessarabia had a massive participation³⁵. Thus, between 1906 and 1913, in the Primorsky Krai of the Far East, Romanians founded near Vladivostok localities such as: Moldovanovka, Aur, Chișinău (Kishiniovka), Logănești, Orheevka, Vălcineț, Dunărea (Dunaievka), Zâmbreni, Logăneștii Noi, Novo-Bessarabka, Moldovan-derevnia, Furmanovo, Olga and others³⁶. Only in 1907 in Primorye county were colonized over 1.000 Romanian families from Bessarabia. During the same period, other groups of Romanians (150 + 60 families) founded the villages of Kutuzovka and Larga in Omsk Governorate in Siberia³⁷.

Between 1921 and 1940 a significant number of Romanians from the Dniester-Bug interfluvium, known as Transnistria, were deported on political and ideological grounds to the GULAG in Siberia and other remote places. The deportations of Romanians to Siberia continued in 1940 and after 1944 from the territories of Romania occupied by the USSR (Bessarabia, Herta County and Northern Bukovina).

Directed migration was an important element of the Soviet policy aimed at the mixing of nations and the formation of the *new man* and the *Soviet people*. Only in August of the first year of the Soviet occupation, the **General Directorate of Labor Reserves of the Moldavian SSR**³⁸ recruited 36.356 people for work in the Eastern regions of the USSR³⁹. After the Second World War and until the collapse of the USSR, tens of thousands of Romanians from the Moldavian SSR and Ukrainian SSR were lured to well-paid work in remote areas of the Urals, the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East. In the period 1948–1954, the **General Office of the Moldavian Republic for the organized recruitment of workers**⁴⁰ sent 66.000 people to the remote regions of the USSR, to which were added about 10.000 families (about 40.000 people), and in the period 1954–1966, the **General Directorate for Displacement and organized Recruitment of workforce under the Soviet of Ministers of the Moldavian SSR**⁴¹ sent to the remote soviet regions another 62.000 people and 13.000 families (about 50.000 people)⁴².

³⁵ Anatol Leșcu, *Românii basarabeni în istoria militară a Rusiei de la războaiele din Caucaz la Războiul Civil* [Bessarabian Romanians in the military history of Russia from the Caucasus wars to the Civil War], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2009, p. 59.

³⁶ Rubin Udler, „Unele totaluri ale expediției dialectologice în ținutul Primorsk și regiunea Omsk din R.S.F.S.R., R.S.S. Kirghiză și R.S.S. Kazahă” [“Some totals of the dialectological expedition in Primorsk Krai and Omsk region of the SFSR, Kyrgyz SSR and Kazakh SSR”], in *Limba și literatura moldovenească*, Chișinău, No. 1/1964, pp. 64–68.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ In russian: Главное управление трудовых резервов Молдавской ССР.

³⁹ Elena Șișcanu, *Regimul totalitar-bolșevic în RSS Moldovenească (1940–1952)* [The totalitarian-bolshevik regime in the Moldavian SSR (1940–1952)], Chișinău, Civitas Publishing House, 1997.

⁴⁰ In russian: Молдавская Республиканская контора по организованному набору рабочих.

⁴¹ In russian: Главное управление по переселению и организованному набору рабочих при Совете Министров МССР.

⁴² National Archive of the Republic of Moldova, d. 102, f. 93; d. 131, ff. 124–125.

The flow of Romanian economic migrants from Moldova and Ukraine continued after 1991, reaching its peak in 2016, when, besides Russian citizens of Romanian origin (about 160.000), according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin:

“700.000 Moldovans work as economic migrants here, in the Russian Federation”⁴³.

In recent years, the number of economic migrants from the Republic of Moldova to Russia has registered a negative trend. Between 2014 and 2022, this number decreased 7.3 times and was, according to data provided by Federal Migration Service and General Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation⁴⁴, as follows:

Date	04.05. 2014	01.05. 2016	01.05. 2018	01.05. 2019	01.05. 2020	01.05. 2021	01.05. 2022 ⁴⁵
Migrants from RM	562.939	489.694	376.079	320.115	270.082	132.875	76.645
Percentage difference		– 13%	– 23%	– 14.88%	– 15.62%	– 50.8%	– 42.3%

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSISTANCE TO KIN-MINORITIES

The bilateral legal framework between Romania and the Russian Federation on minorities is defined by: a) *the Treaty on friendly relations and cooperation between Romania and the Russian Federation*⁴⁶, signed in Moscow on July 4, 2003, and b) *the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of culture, science and education*⁴⁷, signed in Moscow, on September 27, 1993.

The 2003 Treaty provides that the signatory parties respect, ensure and protect, under conditions of full equality before the law, without any discrimination, the ethnic,

⁴³ Дмитрий Рогозин, «700 тысяч молдаван работают в России, а Молдавия подписывает соглашение с Евросоюзом», 2 февраля 2017 г, в Правда, Доступно по адресу: <http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/moldova/03-07-2014/1214642moldavia0/>, Доступно 31 апреля 2024 года [Dmitry Rogozin, “700 thousand Moldovans work in Russia, while Moldova signs an agreement with the European Union”, February 2nd, 2017, in *Pravda*, Available at: <http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/moldova/03072014/1214642moldavia0/>, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

⁴⁴ Юлия Флоринская и Никита Мкртчян, «Миграция: основные тенденции в январе-феврале 2021 года», в *Мониторинге экономических перспектив России. Тенденции и вызовы социально – экономического развития*, Москва, № 10/2021, сс. 1–13 [Yulia Florinskaya and Nikita Mkrтчyan, “Migration: main trends in January–February 2021”, in *Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook. Trends and Challenges of Socio-Economic Development*, Moscow, No. 10/2021, pp. 13–16].

⁴⁵ Павел Трунин и др., «Мониторинг перспектив развития экономики России. Тенденции и вызовы социально-экономического развития», в *Мониторинг перспектив развития экономики России. Тенденции и вызовы социально-экономического развития*, Москва, № 7/2022, с. 23 [Pavel Trunin et al., “Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook. Trends and Challenges of Socio-economic Development”, in *Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook. Trends and Challenges of Socio-Economic Development*, Moscow, No. 7/2022, p. 23].

⁴⁶ *** *Official Monitor of Romania*, No. 194 of March 4, 2004.

⁴⁷ *** *Official Monitor of Romania*, No. 364 of December 29, 1994.

cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons living in Romania who consider themselves, according to their origin, to belong to the Russian minority and, respectively, **to persons living in the Russian Federation who consider themselves, according to their origin, as belonging to the Romanian minority, irrespective of the appellation used in respect of them in society and of the regions in which they live** in the territory of each Contracting Party. The contracting parties also undertook to apply UN, OSCE and Council of Europe norms and standards in the field of rights belonging to national minorities⁴⁸.

The Romanian-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement of 1993 stipulates, inter alia, that each of the parties will make efforts to popularize the cultural and art values of the other side, that they will hold talks on opening, on a reciprocal basis, cultural centers⁴⁹ and that they will encourage the **study and dissemination of the Romanian language in Russia**⁵⁰ and Russian language in Romania. The parties also pledged to support the creation of favorable conditions for the preservation of their mother tongue, culture and national traditions by citizens of Romanian and Russian origin, respectively, permanently residing on their territory.

The internal legal framework of the Russian Federation in the field of minorities is defined in particular by the *Federal Law on National Cultural Autonomy*, an extremely permissive law favorable to the preservation and development of national, linguistic and cultural identity of Russian citizens of various ethnicities. Unfortunately, so far, no Romanian national-cultural autonomy has been organized and registered in the Russian Federation using its own ethnonym, that of Romanians. This is reparable and should be the subject of constant concern of the Romanian authorities.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF POPULATION CENSUS RESULTS

In all general censuses of the Soviet population in the postwar period, Romanians were included in the category of “most numerous nationalities”. They were registered with various names, especially with the Romanian infranym *Moldoveni*, but also with the ethnonym *Romanians*, as well as with various crimes and exonyms. This is not an exception, given that in the Russian Federation the practice of subordinating various ethnic names (infranym, exonyms, glossonyms) to an ethnonym considered basic is valid. This practice is also valid in the case of the majority ethnicity, whose representatives were registered under various names⁵¹, subordinated to the ethnonym Russians.

⁴⁸ Article 11 of the Treaty.


⁴⁹ Article 9 of the Agreement.

⁵⁰ Article 18 of the Agreement.

⁵¹ Russians, burtasy, vedrussians, velikorussians, goryuns, gorens, gurans, doukhobors, dymniks, tundra peasants, indigirs, karyms, kerzhaks, kolymchans, krasnovers, khulugurs, lipovans, molokans, nuucha, old inhabitants of the Obi, Russian-Ustians, family, Siberians, skobars, smolyaks, starovers,

The dynamics of the Romanian diaspora in the Russian Federation, according to census data in the last century, was as follows:

Year	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002	2010	2020
Romanians	20.525	26.139	65.614	91.631	105.979	178.667	177.683	159.601	79.379



In the 2020 population census of the Russian Federation, 79,379 ethnic Romanians were certified⁵². They were registered with both the ethnonym *Romanians* (1,850) and the Romanian infranym *Moldovans* (77,419), *Moldavians* (4), *Basarabi* (48), *Bessarabians* (38), as well as with the exonyms *Vlachs* (13) and *Volofi* (7). The gender structure of the Romanian diaspora in Russia was as follows in 2020: 43,232 men (representing 54.59%) and 36,036 women (representing 45.4%)⁵³. Depending on the living environment, the distribution was in 2020: urban 53,022 people (representing

tyutnars, choldons, cheldons, yakuts, cossacks, pomors, ust'-tsil'mans. In Russian: русские, бургасы, ведрусы, великороссы, горюны, горяне, гураны, духоборы, дырники, затундренные крестьяне, индигирцы, карымы, кержаки, колымчане, красноверцы, кулугуры, липоване, молукане, нуукча, обские старожилы, русско-устыинцы, семейские, сибиряки, скобари, смоляки, старoverы, тютняры, чалдоны, челдоны, якутяне, казаки, поморы, усть-цилемы.

⁵² Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и знание языков. Таблица 1. Национальный состав населения», в *Итоги Всероссийской переписи населения-2020*, том 5, Доступно по адресу: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Том5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladienie_yazykami, Доступно апреля 31 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), "National composition and knowledge of languages. Table 1. National composition of the population", in *All-Russian population census totals-2020*, Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Том5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladienie_yazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

66.81%) and rural 26.337 people (representing 33.18%)⁵⁴. Rosstat does not provide data on gender or living environment for 20 people (13 Vlachs and 7 Volofs).

Having an appreciable age and being dispersed in a huge space, the Romanian diaspora population in the Russian Federation was in a continuous and drastic decline (– 50.27%) compared to the 2010 census, when 159.601 Romanians were registered.

The decrease in the number of ethnic Romanians in the Russian Federation occurred in the context of the spectacular increase, on the occasion of the last two censuses, of the number of people whose questionnaire forms did not indicate nationality. Thus, the 2002 census did not indicate the nationality of 1.460.751 persons, compared with 5.629.429 persons in 2010 and 16.594.759 persons in the 2020 census. This calls into question the accuracy of the results of the latest census in Russia. The population census of the Russian Federation, round 2020, was actually held in October – November 2021, in the middle of the pandemic, and had a number of differences from the censuses of 2002 and 2010. For at least the 6th citizen, the data was obtained from administrative sources.

However, the Romanian national minority in Russia was and maintained itself numerically in second place among those related to a Member State of the European Union.

No.	EU member state	Size of kin-minority 2010	Size of kin-minority 2020
1	Germany	394.138	195.256
2	Romania	159.601	79.379
3	Greece	85.640	53.972
4	Poland	47.125	22.024
5	Lithuania	31.377	13.230
6	Bulgaria	24.038	11.851
7	Latvia	18.979	8.516
8	Estonia	17.875	7.859
9	Finland	20.267	7.778
10	Italy	1.370	1.460
11	Hungary	2.781	1.460
12	France	1.475	1.457
13	Czech Republic	1.898	1.214
14	Spain	1.162	1.175
15	Slovakia	324	193
16	Croatia	304	177
17	Slovenia	1.008	108
18–27	Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden	0	0

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ROMANIAN DIASPORA POPULATION IN RUSSIA⁵⁵ AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The Romanian national minority in the Russian Federation is unevenly distributed, with the top five largest concentrations in: a) the city of Moscow and the bordering regions of Moscow and Kaluga; b) Tyumen Oblast (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Khanty-Mansi-Yugra Autonomous Okrug); c) the city of Saint Petersburg and the adjacent region of Leningrad; d) Rostov region; e) Krasnodar Krai.

Between the last two population censuses of the Russian Federation, the Romanian national minority decreased drastically in all territorial-administrative units of level III (national republics, counties (including autonomous national counties), regions (including autonomous national regions), with one exception – Kaluga region of the Central Federal District, where the number of ethnic Romanians increased between the last two censuses from 2.542 to 4.061 people. This was an increase of 60.66%.

We present below a table with data by region provided by the Federal State Service for Statistics Rosstat with reference to members of the Romanian minority:

No.	Federal subject	Federal District	Romanians 2010	Romanians 2020	Percentage difference
1	City of Moscow	Center	21.965	8.264	– 62.37%
2	Moscow region	Center	19.771	12.957	– 34.46%
3	Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra, reg. Tyumen	Ural	9.608	5.365	– 44.16%
4	City of Saint Petersburg	Northwestern	7.296	2.976	– 59.21%
5	Rostov region	South	6.912	2.117	– 69.37%
6	Krasnodar Krai	South	5.351	2.135	– 60.10%
7	Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, reg. Tyumen	Ural	4.760	2.264	– 52.43%
8	Volgograd region	South	3.205	729	– 77.25%
9	Saratov region	Volga	3.076	1.410	– 54.16%
10	Krasnoyarsk Krai	Siberia	2.798	1.032	– 63.11%
11	Leningrad region	Northwestern	2.733	1.490	– 45.48%
12	Kaluga region	Center	2.542	4.061	+ 60.66%
13	Sverdlovsk region	Ural	2.429	1.117	– 54.01%

⁵⁵ Cumulative data by Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и владение языками, гражданство», в *Томах официального опубликования итогов Всероссийской переписи населения 2010 года*, том 4, Доступно по адресу: https://rosstat.gov.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612-tom4.htm, Доступно 20 марта 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and language proficiency, citizenship”, in *Volumes of the official publication of the results of the All-Russian Population Census 2010*, Vol. 4, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612-tom4.htm, Accessed on: March 20, 2024].

(Continued table)

14	Komi Republic	Northwestern	2.383	1.021	- 57.15%
15	Voronezh region	Center	2.320	986	- 57.50%
16	Vladimir region	Center	2.315	912	- 60.60%
17	Tula region	Center	2.155	1.532	- 28.90%
18	Belgorod region	Center	2.081	1.057	- 49.20%
19	Tver region	Center	1.940	1.047	- 46.03%
20	Nizhny Novgorod region	Volga	1.934	790	- 59.15%
21	Samara Region	Volga	1.932	861	- 55.43%
22	Stavropol Krai	South	1.865	758	- 59.35%
23	Ryazan region	Center	1.716	1.082	- 36.94%
24	Tyumen Oblast without autonomous districts	Ural	1.675	1.053	- 37.13%
25	Chelyabinsk region	Ural	1.672	605	- 63.81%
26	Republic of Sakha-Yakutia	Far East	1.671	773	- 53.74%
27	Irkutsk region	Siberia	1.515	579	- 61.78%
28	Primorsky Krai	Far East	1.493	425	- 71.53%
29	Bryansk region	Center	1.462	826	- 43.50%
30	Perm Krai	Volga	1.459	600	- 58.87%
31	Murmansk region	Northwestern	1.328	661	- 50.22%
32	Kemerov-Kuzbass region	Siberia	1.276	448	- 64.89%
33	Omsk region	Siberia	1.273	540	- 57.58%
34	Lipetsk region	Center	1.265	815	- 35.57%
35	Altai Krai	Siberia	1.236	414	- 66.50%
36	Orenburg region	Volga	1.229	572	- 53.45%
37	Ivanovo region	Center	1.205	500	- 58.50%
38	Smolensk region	Center	1.195	717	- 40.00%
39	Kursk region	Center	1.143	682	- 40.33%
40	Kirov region	Volga	1.079	548	- 49.21%
41	Kaliningrad region	Northwestern	1.069	467	- 56.31%
42	Novosibirsk region	Siberia	1.047	400	- 62.79%
43	Tomsk Region	Siberia	1.042	414	- 60.26%
44	Tatarstan Republic	Volga	981	538	- 45.15%
45	Vologda region	Northwestern	958	420	- 56.15%
46	Khabarovsk Krai	Far East	944	337	- 64.30%
47	Arkhangelsk region without autonomous district	Northwestern	932	419	- 55.04%
48	Yaroslavl region	Center	923	526	- 43.01%
49	Bashkortostan Republic	Volga	917	489	- 46.67%
50	Ulyanovsk region	Volga	889	295	- 66.81%
51	Orlov region	Center	878	504	- 42.59%
52	Kostroma region	Center	864	450	- 47.91%
53	Udmurt Republic	Volga	842	391	- 53.56%
54	Kurgan region	Ural	842	300	- 64.37%
55	Novgorod region	Northwestern	818	271	- 66.87%
56	Amur region	Far East	757	283	- 62.61%
57	Pskov region	Northwestern	736	441	- 40.08%
58	Tambov region	Center	680	321	- 52.79%
59	Transbaikals Krai	Siberia	617	217	- 64.82%

(Continued table)


60	Penza region	Volga	587	370	- 36.96%
61	Sakhalin region	Far East	587	186	- 68.31%
62	Astrakhan region	South	534	289	- 45.88%
63	Karelia Republic	Northwestern	510	293	- 42.54%
64	Kamchatka Krai	Far East	495	205	- 58.58%
65	Chuvash Republic	Volga	471	226	- 52.01%
66	Jewish Autonomous region	Far East	454	289	- 36.34%
67	Khakassia Republic	Siberia	383	110	- 71.27%
68	Magadan region	Far East	373	133	- 64.34%
69	Republic of Buryatia	Siberia	317	157	- 50.47%
70	Mari-El Republic	Volga	295	181	- 38.64%
71	Republic of Adygea	South	288	178	- 38.19%
72	Mordovian Republic	Volga	283	195	- 31.09%
73	Kabardino-Balkarian Republic	North Caucasus	235	92	- 60.85%
74	Altai Republic	Siberia	150	98	- 34.66%
75	Republic of North Ossetia - Alania	North Caucasus	141	67	- 52.48%
76	Dagestan Republic	North Caucasus	139	93	- 33.09%
77	Kalmykia Republic	South	137	62	- 54.74%
78	Karachay-Cherkess Republic	North Caucasus	103	42	- 59.22%
79	Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	Far East	91	57	- 37.36%
80	Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Arkhangelsk region	Northwestern	50	23	- 54.00%
81	Ingushetia Republic	North Caucasus	36	2	- 94.44%
82	Chechen Republic	North Caucasus	34	25	- 26.47%
83	Tuva Republic	Siberia	29	9	- 68.96%
84	TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 2014		Romanians 2014	Romanians 2020	
85	Republic of Crimea	Occupied territory	2573	1550	- 39.75%
86	City of Sevastopol	Occupied territory	836	349	- 58.25%

Cumulating these data, the distribution of ethnic Romanians in Russia by federal districts in the 2010 and 2020 censuses was as follows:

Federal district	Far East	Siberia	Ural	Northwest	Center	Volga	South	North Caucasus
Romanians 2010	6.865	11.367	20.968	18.813	66.420	15.066	18.292	688
Romanians 2020	2.844	4.261	10.702	8.482	37.239	7.466	6.268	321
Percentage difference	- 58.57%	- 62.51%	- 48.96 %	- 54.91%	- 43.93%	- 50.4%	- 65.7%	- 53.34%

With reference to the territories occupied by the Russian Federation in 2014 and 2022, we note that the cumulative sum of the number of Romanians hypothetically represents 20.859 people, including the data of the last census of Ukraine’s population. This number is presumed to have diminished by negative natural growth as well as massive emigration due to the war. Thus, the latest official data showed the following number of Romanians: Crimea and Sevastopol – 1.899, Donetsk region – 7.543, Luhansk region – 3.252, Kherson region – 4.179 and Zaporizhzhia region – 2.476.

Regarding the age structure of ethnic Romanians registered in the 2020 Russian census with the Romanian infraction Moldovans, considered to belong to “the most numerous nationalities”, the picture is as follows: 5.575 (0–15 years), 2.448 (15–19 years), 7.264 (20–29 years), 13.809 (30–39 years), 15 795 (40–49 years), 7.545 (50–54 years), 7.899 (55–59 years), 7.571 (60–64 years), 4.724 (65–69 years), 4.878 (70+ years)⁵⁶. Thus, 53.381 people are of working age and 18.142 people have reached or exceeded retirement age. Rosstat, the Federal Service for State Statistics, has not made public data on ethnic Romanians registered with the ethnonym Romanians, who are classified as “other nationalities”.



⁵⁶ Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и знание языков. Таблица 8. Население наиболее многочисленных национальностей по возрастным группам и полу», в *Всероссийских итогах переписи населения 2020*, том 5, Доступно на: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Доступно 31 апреля, 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and knowledge of languages. Table 8. The population of the most numerous nationalities by age groups and sex”, in *All-Russian population census totals-2020*, Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

In terms of the degree of education, for the sample registered with the Romanian offender “Moldovans” in the 2020 census, Rosstat presents the following situation: 71.348 people indicated the level of education, and 4.388 people refused to indicate it⁵⁷. Of those who indicated the level of education, 524 people have postgraduate education (high qualification), 10.620 – university education, 1.458 – incomplete higher education, 29.428 – secondary vocational education, 15.051 – secondary education of general culture, 7.278 – secondary education, 3.014 – primary education, 1.447 – pre-school education (of which 1.165 aged 6–9 years), 527 are without education (of which 317 are aged 6–9 years), and 52 people are illiterate.

KNOWLEDGE OF ROMANIAN LANGUAGE

As for the language Romanian in the language picture of the Russian Federation, the reviewers were guided by a “*Nomenclature of Russian languages*”⁵⁸ developed by the Institute of Linguistics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The nomenclature distinguishes between Romanian, included in category “**B. Other languages**”, and the so-called “Moldovan language”, included in category “**A1. The Living Languages of Russia**”⁵⁹. The Romanian language and its taxonomic doublet “Moldovan” are among the 155 living languages of the Russian Federation, along with two other “dormant” languages and 13 extinct languages.

“The Romance languages of Russia are represented by the Moldovan language (Romanian). Linguistically, ‘Moldovan’ and ‘Romanian’ are names of one and the same language, although Romanian is listed in Romanian legislation as a state language, and in the Moldovan constitution-Moldovan. Part of Moldovan carriers and Moldovan originators call their language Moldovan, and another part-Romanian. The

⁵⁷ Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и знание языков. Таблица 10. Население наиболее многочисленных национальностей по возрастным категориям, полу и уровню образования», в *Всероссийских итогах переписи населения 2020*, том 5, Доступно на: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladienie_yazykami, Доступно 31 апреля, 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and knowledge of languages. Table 10. The population of the most numerous nationalities by age categories, sex and educational attainment”, in *All Russian population census totals 2020*, Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladienieyazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

⁵⁸ Ю Коряков и др., *Список языков России и статусы их витальности. Монография-препринт*, Москва, Институт языкознания РАН, 2022, с. 80 [Yu Koryakov *et al.*, *Nomenclature of Russian languages and their degree of vitality. Preprint monograph*, Moscow, Institute of Linguistics of ASR, 2022, p. 80].

⁵⁹ Юрий Борисович Коряков и Евгения Ивановна Давидюк, «Список языков России в итогах Всероссийской переписи населения», в *Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат)*, Доступно на: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Tom5_Spisok_yazykov.doc, Доступно 31 марта 2024 года [Yuri Borisovich Koryakov and Yevgeniya Ivanovna Davidiyuk, “List of languages of Russia in All-Russian population census totals”, in *Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat)*, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Tom5_Spisok_yazykov.doc, Accessed on: March 31, 2024].

2010 census distinguished between these languages: 96.061 persons indicated knowledge of the ‘Moldovan’ language (90.034 persons indicated it as their mother tongue and 156.400 persons registered as Moldovans), and 21.201 persons indicated knowledge of ‘Romanian’ (2.641 persons indicated it as mother tongue and the number of Romanians was 3.201 persons). However, 35% of Romanian-speakers registered as Moldovans and only 6% as Romanians”⁶⁰.

Overall, in 2020, a number of 49.341 people indicated Romanian as their mother tongue, of which 45.233 opted for the infraglossonym “Moldovan” and 4.108 for the glossonym “Romanian”. Of all persons with Romanian mother tongue, 33.630 live in urban areas and 15.981 in rural areas.

Corroborating the number of persons belonging to the Romanian national minority with that of persons who indicated Romanian as their mother tongue, regardless of glossonym, we find that a number of 30.038 ethnic Romanians (or 37.84% of the entire Romanian minority) indicated another mother tongue, usually Russian. The ratio between these figures shows the advanced degree of acculturation of ethnic Romanians in the Russian Federation.

Regardless of the glossonym used, 54.401 people indicated Romanian as the language they know and speak. In 2020, the knowledge of Romanian language by age categories is as follows: 260 (0–4 years), 541 (5–9 years), 760 (10–14 years), 1.282 (15–19 years), 1.998 (20–24 years), 2.768 (25–29 years), 4.584 (30–34 years), 5.854 (35–39 years), 5.824 (40–44 years), 5.585 (45–49 years), 5.455 (50–54 years), 5.852 (55–59 years), 5.743 (60–64 years), 3.774 (65–69 years), 2.346 (70–74 years), 814 (75–79 years), 659 (80–84 years), 243 (85–89 years), 61 (90–94 years), 17 (95–99 years), 1 (100+ years)⁶¹.

⁶⁰ «Романские языки в России представлены молдавским (румынским) языком. С лингвистической точки зрения «молдавский» и «румынский» являются названиями одного и того же языка, хотя в законодательстве Румынии в качестве государственного языка фигурирует румынский, а в Молдавии – молдавский. В переписи 2010 года эти языки различались, поэтому мы знаем, что на владение «молдавским» языком указало 96 061 чел. (а родным его назвало 90 034 чел., 156 400 чел. записалось молдованами), а на владение «румынским» – 21.201 чел. (родным-2641 чел., румынов было 3201 чел.). При этом, 35% румыноговорящих записались молдаванами и лишь 6%-румынами», in Институт языков Российской академии наук, «Индоевропейские языки: Романские языки», 10 мая 2022 года, в проекте «Языки России», Доступно на: <https://jazykirf.ilingran.ru/groups/Romance.shtml>, Доступно 28 марта 2024 года [Institute of Languages of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Indo-European languages: Romance languages”, May 10, 2022, in *Languages of Russia Project*, Available at: <https://jazykirf.ilingran.ru/groups/Romance.shtml>, Accessed on: March 28, 2024].

⁶¹ Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и владение языками. Таблица 12. Владение языками населением разных возрастных групп», в *Итоги Всероссийской переписи населения-2020*, том 5, Доступно по адресу: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Доступно 31 апреля 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and knowledge of languages. Table 12. Knowledge of languages by the population of different age groups”, in *All-Russian population census totals-2020*, Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

Among the people who were registered with the Romanian infronym “*Moldoveni*” [*Moldavians*], 2.043 did not indicate their mother tongue in the 2020 census. The others indicated the following mother tongues: Romanian (40.049, of which 1.317 with the glossonym “Romanian” and 38.732 with the infraglossonym “Moldavian”), Russian (34.858), Gagauz (138), Gypsy (138), Ukrainian (119), Mordvin (37), Bulgarian (27), Tatar (13), Kazakh (10), Chuvash (9), Yakut (8), Bashkir (4), Tajik (4), Ossetian (3), Udmurt (3), Komi (3), Kalmyk (3), German (2), Avar (2), English (2), Armenian (2), Moksha-Mordvina (2), Uzbek (2), Belarusian (2), Latin (2), Abkhaz (1), Darghinian (1), Hebrew (1), Ingush (1), Karaciaevo-Balkara (1), Karelian (1), Lithuanian (1), Mari (1), Russian sign (mimic-gestural) language (1), Turkish (1) and languages other than those included in the Nomenclator (13)⁶².

It is interesting to note that in 2020 not all Romanian language connoisseurs and speakers are ethnic Romanians. Connoisseurs of Romanian are distributed according to their declared nationalities: 14.234 Russians, 6 Cossacks, 73 Tatars, 2 Chechens, 18 Bashkirs, 23 Chuvash, 3 Avars, 40 Armenians, 1 778 Ukrainians, 9 Dargins, 16 Kazakhs, 12 Kumychs, 3 Kabardins, 9 Lezgins, 9 Ossetians, 183 Mordvins, 17 Mordvins-Erzia, 5 Yakuts-Saha, 15 Azeris, 3 Buryats (Buryath-Mongols), 4 Greeks, 20 Udmurts, 8 Tajiks, 13 Uzbeks, 2 Tuvins, 4 Crimea Tatars, 40 Belarusians, 21 Germans, 219 Gypsies, 9 Komi, 3 Kyrgyz, 2 Turks, 4 Circassians, 7 Georgians, 3 Adyghe people, 1 Nogai, 2 Koreans, 51 Jews, 33.388 “Moldovans” and “Romanians”, 1 Hakas, 1 Komi-Permiak, 24 Greeks, 4 Turkmens, 2 Ruthuls, 1 Karelians, 2.644 “other nationalities” and 1.490 non-nationalities⁶³.

Thusly, out of the 117.262 Russian citizens recorded as Romanian-speaking in 2010, 21.201 have said that they speak Romanian, and 96.061-the “Moldovan language”. In this case, Rosstat did not specify how many of the Romanian-speaking citizens are Romanians, having presented data only for the most numerous ethnicities

⁶² Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и владение языками. Таблица 7. Население наиболее многочисленных национальностей по родному языку», в *Итоги Всероссийской переписи населения 2020*, том 5, Доступно по адресу: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Доступно 31 апреля 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and language proficiency. Table 7: Population of the most numerous nationalities by mother tongue”, in *All Russian population census totals 2020* Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

⁶³ Федеральной службе государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и владение языками. Таблица 4. Владение языками и использование языков населением», в *Итоги Всероссийской переписи населения-2020*, том 5, Доступно по адресу: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Доступно 31 апреля 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “National composition and language proficiency. Table 4. Language proficiency and language use by population”, in *All-Russian population census totals 2020*, Vol. 5, Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/vpn/2020/Tom5_Nacionalnyj_sostav_i_vladenie_yazykami, Accessed on: April 31, 2024].

in the country. In 2010, they recorded that among Romanian-speakers are: 8.757 Russians, 8.146 “Moldovans”, 71 Tatars, 1.473 Ukrainians, 8 Bashkirs, 11 Chuvash, 13 Chechens, 80 Armenians, 6 Avars, 17 Mordvins, 4 Kazakhs, 17 Azerbaijanis, 1 Dargin, 3 Udmurts, 5 Mari, 11 Ossetians, 30 Belarusians. At the same time, those counted as “Moldovan language” speakers were: 18.354 Russians, 142 Tatars, 5.405 Ukrainians, 29 Bashkirs, 43 Chuvash, 4 Chechens, 84 Armenians, 3 Avars, 442 Mordvins, 19 Kazakhs, 53 Azerbaijani, 34 Udmurts, 22 Mari, 19 Ossetians and 101 Belarusians.

The general Russian Federation census of 2010 has shown that 117.262 Russian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, knew Romanian. Rosstat has presented separate data for the Romanian language⁶⁴ and the “Moldovan language”⁶⁵, analogous to how they presented nationalities. Thusly, out of the 117.262 Russian citizens recorded as Romanian-speaking in 2010, 21.201 have said that they speak Romanian, and 96.061-the “Moldovan language”. In this case, Rosstat did not specify how many of the Romanian-speaking citizens are Romanians, having presented data only for the most numerous ethnicities in the country. In 2010, they recorded that among Romanian-speakers are: 8.757 Russians, 8.146 “Moldovans”, 71 Tatars, 1.473 Ukrainians, 8 Bashkirs, 11 Chuvash, 13 Chechens, 80 Armenians, 6 Avars, 17 Mordvins, 4 Kazakhs, 17 Azerbaijanis, 1 Dargin, 3 Udmurts, 5 Mari, 11 Ossetians, 30 Belarusians. At the same time, those counted as “Moldovan language” speakers were: 18.354 Russians, 142 Tatars, 5.405 Ukrainians, 29 Bashkirs, 43 Chuvash, 4 Chechens, 84 Armenians, 3 Avars, 442 Mordvins, 19 Kazakhs, 53 Azerbaijani, 34 Udmurts, 22 Mari, 19 Ossetians and 101 Belarusians.


We must also note that in 2002, Rosstat indicated that 22.663 Russian citizens spoke Romanian, and 147.035 – the “Moldovan language”. Altogether, these numbers, close to those related to ethnic Romanians in the Russian Federation, have shown that this country, as of 2002, had 169.698 people who knew Romanian⁶⁶.

Year	2002	2010	2020
Ethnic Romanians	177.683	159.601	79.379
Romanian speakers	169.698	117.262	49.341

⁶⁴ At position 109.

⁶⁵ At position 92.

⁶⁶ Федеральная служба государственной статистики (Росстат), «Национальный состав и владение языками, гражданство Распространенность владения языками (кроме русского)», в *Всеобщая перепись населения России 2002 года*, том 4, Доступно на: <http://www.perepis2002.ru>, Доступно 31 марта 2024 года [Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), “*National composition and language proficiency, citizenship. Prevalence of language proficiency (except Russian)*”, in *The general census of the population of Russia in 2002*, Vol. 4, Available at: <http://www.perepis2002.ru>, Accessed on: March 31, 2024].



Whereas the share of Romanian-speaking Russian citizens who declared their ethnic belonging to be Russian (14.234 in 2020 compared to 27.108 in 2010) or Ukrainian (1.778 in 2020 compared to 6.878 in 2010) is significant, constituting a cumulative 16.012 persons in 2020 compared to 33.986 in 2010. We can admit that they represent, for the most part, ethnic Romanians from mixed marriages who have assumed in documents the ethnic belonging of their spouse or one of their parents. It is possible, however, that they are in reality ethnic Romanians who, deliberately confusing citizenship with nationality, declared themselves Russians or Ukrainians (in the case of natives from present-day Ukraine).

The fact that at the 2010 population census they declared that they speak “Romanian language”, and not “Moldovan language”, a number of 33.986 people (or 26.13% of all speakers) attested to the emergence of a process of ethnic renewal of the Romanian diaspora community in Russia, but also a process of recovery of national consciousness. Unfortunately, in the 2020 population census, the percentage of those who declared that they spoke “Romanian”, and not “Moldovan”, dropped to 14.5% (or 7.901 people out of 54.401). This could also be explained by the emigration of a significant number of young and educated Romanians. Among those who declared “Romanian” and not “Moldovan” as their mother tongue, the proportion is even lower- 8.32% (or 4.108 people out of 49.341).

THE ROMANIAN ASSOCIATIVE ENVIRONMENT IN RUSSIA

After the collapse of the USSR, 39 associations, cultural centers, foundations, societies and “Moldovan national-cultural autonomies” were launched and active in the Russian Federation, grouping at local or regional level ethnic Romanians, in most cases being used in the name of the legal entity the Romanian infranym

“Moldovan”⁶⁷. The exception is: 1. Romanian Cultural Society of Moscow region, 2. Russian-Romanian Cultural Society, based in Moscow, 3. Regional civic organization Romanian Cultural Center “Casa Mare”, based in Tomsk. Also, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, annexed by the Russian Federation, operates the Moldovan-Romanian Society of Crimea, based in Simferopol.

Paradoxically, the Romanian Embassy in Moscow announces on its official website in Romanian language the absence of any Romanian associative form in the Russian Federation⁶⁸, and the Russian version refers to such associations⁶⁹.

EUROPEAN EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE ON SUPPORT FOR KIN-MINORITIES

EU Member States with kin-minorities in the Russian Federation provide examples of good practice in supporting their kin-minorities. Thus, in addition to the diplomatic missions and consular offices of Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Italy and France, there are kindergartens, schools and lyceums⁷⁰ with full teaching in the languages of these countries and financed by the Ministries of Education of the respective states.

Also, in the Russian Federation there are state schools teaching in Latvian, Lithuanian, Hebrew, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Japanese languages or educational units with national ethno-cultural elements (in-depth study of mother tongue and other subjects related to national specificity).

In Moscow and other major cities there are cultural centers of most culturally important countries⁷¹ or those with diaspora communities in the Russian Federation.

⁶⁷ Government of the Republic of Moldova, “Diaspora – 2024”, in *Diaspora Relations Office*, February 26, 2016, Available at: https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/sn_diaspora_2025_web.pdf, Accessed on: March 30, 2024.

⁶⁸ “The Romanian community in the Russian Federation is not organized in associations, cultural societies or other associative forms” in ***, “Comunitatea românească” [“Romanian Community”], in *The Embassy of Romania in the Russian Federation*, Available at: <https://moscova.mae.ro/node/772>, Accessed on: March 15, 2024.

⁶⁹ ***, «Юридическая регистрация «Румынского Культурного Общества» Московской области», в *ПОСОЛЬСТВО РУМЫНИИ в Российской Федерации*, Доступно по адресу: <https://moscova.mae.ro/ru/local-news/1271>, Доступно 15 апреля 2024 года [***, “Legal Registration of the ‘Romanian Cultural Society’ of the Moscow Region”, in *The Embassy of Romania in the Russian Federation*, Available at: <https://moscova.mae.ro/ru/local-news/1271>, Accessed on: April 15, 2024].

⁷⁰ Deutsche Schule Moskau, Deutsche Schule Sankt Petersburg, Szkoła Polska przy Ambasady RP w Moskwie, The Bulgarian School at the Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria, La scuola paritaria italiana “Italo Calvino” presso il Consolato Generale d’Italia a Mosca, Lycée français de Moscou – Alexandre Dumas.

⁷¹ For example, Polish Cultural Center, Lithuanian Cultural Center (in Moscow, Petersburg and Irkutsk), Hellenic Cultural Center, Czech Cultural Center, Bulgarian Cultural Institute, Moscow Hungarian Cultural Center and Moscow Hungarian Library, Georgian Cultural Center, Azerbaijani Cultural Center, Armenian Embassy Cultural Center and Russian-Armenian Cultural Center, Kazakh Language and Culture Center, Kyrgyz Cultural Center, Tajik Cultural Center, Russian-Uzbek Cultural Center, National Cultural Center of Ukraine, Serbian Cultural Center, Belarusian Center for Cultural

Also, a number of national republics of the Russian Federation or national communities⁷² of this country also have National Cultural Centers in Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Romanians in the Russian Federation represent a silent, barely visible, sometimes chameleonic minority, due to the Europic somatic type, good knowledge of the official Russian language, common Orthodox confession with Russians, as well as easy renunciation of peculiarities.

The older part of the Romanian community in the Russian Federation, coming from the periods of tsarist and Soviet occupation of Bessarabia, is in a profound process of acculturation and assimilation, strongly felt in the case of children and young people.

The newer and younger part of the Romanian diaspora in the Russian Federation, coming from the period after the collapse of the USSR, retains relatively well its ethnic peculiarities and Romanian language.

Romania, as a national state, which assumes through the Constitution and legislation, rights and obligations towards ethnic Romanians living abroad, must capitalize on its natural condition of a kin-state in relation to ethnic Romanians in the Russian Federation. In this respect, guided by the bilateral legal framework, by the Russian legislation in the field and by the European and international legal instruments, Romania could first support its kin-minority in the Russian Federation in this effort to establish and effectively organize national-cultural autonomies in distinct federal subjects where there are maximum concentrations of ethnic Romanians: Moscow city, Moscow region, Kaluga region, St. Petersburg city, Leningrad region, Rostov region, Krasnodar Krai, Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi-Yugra autonomous okrugs.

Also, Romania could establish the Romanian Cultural Institute in Moscow (the largest city in Europe), according to the bilateral agreement signed with the Russian Federation (2013), Law 356/2003 and GD No. 492/2004 regarding the organization and functioning of Romanian cultural institutes abroad through the reorganization of cultural centers abroad, as well as the establishment of new institutes.

Another element of concrete involvement would be the establishment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 61 of the Law on Pre-University Education,

Enlightenment, Austrian Cultural Forum and Austrian Library in Moscow, Portuguese Cultural Center, Italian Institute of Culture, Spanish Cultural Center (Cervantes Institute), French Institute, Finnish Institute, Scandinavian Cultural Center, Turkish Cultural Center, Russian-German House, Goethe German Cultural Center, International Union for German Culture, German Academic Exchange Service, British Council, Jewish Cultural Center, Chinese Cultural Center, American Cultural Center, Japanese Foundation and Japanese House Cultural Center, Korean Cultural Center, Iranian Embassy Cultural Center, India Cultural Center, Egyptian Cultural Center, Arab Cultural Center etc.

⁷² Tatar Cultural Center, Bashkir National Cultural Center, Chechen Cultural Center, Ingush Cultural Center etc.

of a Romanian school attached to the Embassy of Romania in the Russian Federation, following the model of schools operating under other embassies in the Russian Federation or following the model of the Russian School attached to the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Romania.

This measure could be complementary to the establishment and support on the territory of the Russian Federation, under the aegis of diaspora organizations (national-cultural autonomies or cultural centers), of several Sunday schools for the acquisition and preservation of the Romanian language among children. Obviously, it is necessary to provide these Sunday schools and national cultural centres with textbooks and books in Romanian.

Last but not least, the Romanian authorities should consider establishing and maintaining collaboration relations with diaspora organizations in order to monitor the situation of children of Romanian ethnicity and other categories of Romanians in cultural-identity difficulty.

Romania also needs a *Law on Repatriation*, which can benefit especially both Romanians from the Russian Federation and those from other ex-Soviet states to which they were deported by the Soviet occupation regime.

Without Romania's active and positive intervention in support of its kin-minority in the Russian Federation, this minority is doomed to gradual extinction in the coming decades.

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE FINANCING OF ROMANIAN EDUCATION SOUTH OF THE DANUBE

Emanuil Ineoa⁷³

ABSTRACT

Romania's involvement in the Aromanian issue was a novelty for its foreign policy. While in Transylvania or Bukovina, Bucharest was involved in supporting a cultural nationalism, which took various forms and to varying degrees, in the case of the southern Danube Romanians, support was given to communities with which Romania had no direct geographical continuity. Most of the financial resources directed by the Romanian state to the communities south of the Danube were used to set up new schools and to pay the salaries of the teaching staff in the area, as well as to support priests and churches. The Romanian cultural effort in the Balkans was eventually initiated by a number of personalities of Aromanian origin who had emigrated to the northern Danube area and who, in the course of time, held key positions both in the state apparatus (Anastasiu Panu, Alexandru Diamandi, Eugeniu Carada, Tache Ionescu, Gheorghe Manu) and in cultural and economic life (Ioan Caragiani, Dimitrie Cozacovici, Menelau Ghermani, Pericle Papahagi). Under the influence of these personalities of Romanian Aromanian origin, but also at the request of several Aromanian leaders in the Balkans, the support of the Romanian state will be materialized through constant financial allocations from the state budget to the cultural and educational needs of the Aromanian communities in the Balkans.

Keywords: Roumania, Aromanians, Balkans, Financial Aid, Schools, Churches.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Romania's involvement in the Aromanian issue was a novelty for its foreign policy. While in Transylvania or Bukovina, Bucharest was involved in supporting a cultural nationalism, which took various forms and to varying degrees, in the case of the southern Danube Romanians, support was given to communities with which Romania had no direct geographical continuity. This also led to reactions of surprise and suspicion from the Great Powers and real anguish on the part of the surrounding states, namely Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, which did not understand the substance of Romanian actions. Not infrequently, Romania's involvement in the region was seen as having the effect of a detonator on the Balkan scene, already complicated by the wave of radicalised nationalism.

The year 1905 was a watershed for the region. The diplomatic success achieved by Bucharest, that of the recognition by the Ottoman state of a new ethnic community among its frontiers, the Romanians, was the signal of an increasingly consolidated

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effort by the chancellery of King Charles I in the area of the Macedonian and Epirus provinces. The inclusion in an official act of the ethnic denomination of Romanians applied to the Ottoman area also meant a consecration of the legitimacy of Romania's actions, which could now intervene in the area on behalf of the Aromanian communities as a kin-state.

Against this backdrop, Romanian-Greek relations are constantly strained to the point of total cancellation of diplomatic dialogue. This further complicated both Bucharest's involvement in supporting the Aromanians south of the Danube and Athens' support for the Greek communities in Romania.

FINANCIAL AID. EVOLUTION (1864–1934)

The present study attempts to trace Bucharest's official financial effort in the Balkans in support of the Aromanian communities. Outside these transparent routes, less visible corridors of aid often operated.

The annual amount provided for in the Romanian state budget for cultural action south of the Danube came from the Ministry of Public Instruction, under which the schools and churches in the Balkans were subordinated. The latter remitted the amount to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from there, through the National Bank of Romania and private banks in the Ottoman Empire, the funds were exchanged into local currency. After this stage they reached the Romanian consulates where they were distributed through inspectors and revisors to each teacher or priest paid from the aforementioned fund. Between 1906 and 1919, the administration of the Administration of Schools and Churches in the Balkans was transferred from the Ministry of Public Instruction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to better supervise educational activity in the region.

At the end of the 19th century, financial aid came from Bucharest via the Ministry of Public Instruction to the Legation in Constantinople. The latter directed the sums to the consulates, which remitted the money to the bankers (the Kondoff brothers) who in turn sent the sum by bank transfer to other bankers in Bitholia and only then did the money reach the rightful owners. Constantin Kogălniceanu, the Romanian consul in Thessaloniki, complained that this procedure was causing long delays in paying the salaries of the teaching staff⁷⁴.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the budget for the payment of teaching staff was fixed at 60 lei per month for teachers and 50 lei per month for governors. A bonus of 10 lei per month was added for every 5 years of service. Staff working in the vilayet capitals, and 7 other category II towns also received a financial

⁷⁴ Mihai Regleanu and Victor Papacostea, *Documentele redeșteptării macedoromâne [Documents Related to the Awakening of the Macedo-Romanians]*, Bucharest, Predania Publishing House, 2012, p. 220.

allowance for accommodation. Secondary school teachers with the status of beginners were paid 200 lei/month, with an additional 20 lei added to a threshold of 5 years seniority⁷⁵.

These amounts were converted into French francs, until 1921 the teaching staff of Romanian schools in the Balkans were paid in this currency⁷⁶.

The evolution of the budget allocated by the Romanian Kingdom
for schools and churches south of the Danube⁷⁷

Year	Expenditure Budget ⁷⁸	The budget allocated to schools and churches south of the Danube	Percentage %
1864	63.312.000	14.000	0.022
1868	78.432.000	10.000	0.0127
1869	81.073.000	10.000	0.0123
1870	72.430.000	14.000	0.0193
1871	74.235.000	9.920	0.0133
1872	85.222.000	9.996	0.0134
1873	91.568.000	9.996	0.0109
1874	90.062.000	12.996	0.0144
1875	105.394.000	12.996	0.0123
1876	103.132.000	10.000	0.0096
1877	115.985.000	20.765	0.0179
1878	128.126.000	21.000	0.0163
1879	127.097.000	36.560	0.0287
1880–1881	149.562.000	32.000	0.0213
1881–1882	135.974.000	72.000	0.0529
1882–1883	136.854.000	80.000	0.0584
1883–1884	135.557.000	80.000	0.0590
1884–1885	130.364.000	80.000	0.0613
1885–1886	128.971.000	78.687	0.0610
1886–1887	129.418.000	144.500	0.1116
1887–1888	140.093.000	144.500	0.1031
1888–1889	161.173.000	144.500	0.0896
1889–1890	158.770.000	145.180	0.0914
1890–1891	162.116.000	180.000	0.1110
1891–1892	168.404.000	332.500	0.1974
1892–1893	178.532.000	446.754	0.2502
1893–1894	186.734.000	524.922	0.2811

⁷⁵ George C. Ionescu, *De la Românii Macedoneni Lui Spiru Haret – Ale tale dintr-ale tale [From de Romanians in Macedonia to Spiru Haret]*, Bucharest, Graphic Arts Institute, 1911, p. 1202.

⁷⁶ Romanian Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [R.A.M.F.A], Fund Problem 15, Vol. 4, f. 230.

⁷⁷ Alexandre Rubin, *Le Roumains de Macedoine [The Romanians of Macedonia]*, Bucharest, Dem. C. Ionesco Publishing House, 1913, pp. 234–235.

⁷⁸ Victor Axenciuc, *Evoluția Economică a României. Cercetări statistico-istorice 1859–1947 [The Economic Evolution of Romania. Statistical-Historical Research 1859–1947]*, Vol. III, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2000, p. 618 and next.

(Continued table)

1894–1895	203.087.000	525.000	0.2585
1895–1896	211.406.000	495.861	0.2345
1896–1897	208.610.000	543.047	0.2603
1897–1898	217.088.000	538.000	0.2478
1898–1899	224.773.000	519.582	0.2311
1899–1900	229.362.000	724.643	0.3159
1900–1901	236.793.000	548.458	0.2316
1901–1902	216.025.000	300.000	0.1388
1902–1903	216.140.000	300.000	0.1388
1903–1904	218.090.000	335.000	0.1536
1904–1905	225.028.000	400.000	0.1777
1905–1906	233.281.000	729.000	0.3124
1906–1907	239.435.000	780.000	0.3257
1907–1908	269.180.000	1.336.840	0.4966
1908–1909	394.779.000	1.206.482	0.3056
1909–1910	417.966.000	881.408	0.2108
1910–1911	448.006.000	939.547	0.2097
1911–1912	464.664.000	796.250	0.1713
1912–1913	487.591.000	798.789	0.1638
1913–1914	512.253.000	815.000	0.1591
1921	7.406.000.000	7.101.732	0.0958
1922	6.818.000.000	8.527.347	0.1250
1924	21.404.000.000	25.878.659	0.1209
1927	33.137.000.000	32.199.268	0.0971
1929	34.607.000.000	35.345.529	0.1021
1930	31.579.000.000	30.975.503	0.0980
1931	34.702.000.000	26.818.500	0.0772
1932	24.891.000.000	21.215.010	0.0852
1933	20.741.000.000	21.215.010	0.1022
1934	19.864.000.000	21.000.000	0.1057

In 1864, the year taken as the first point of reference because it represents the moment of the establishment of the first school with Romanian funds south of the Danube, the amount allocated from the central budget to the Aromanian cause was 14.000 lei, practically 0.022% of the total state finances.

A document from 1869 issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Instruction mentions two sources of funding south of the Danube: the special budget for schools in Macedonia and the budget for extraordinary annual expenses⁷⁹.

In the period 1864–1881 the figure remains relatively constant with a slight upward trend, thus remaining between 0.01%–0.02%. After the proclamation of the kingdom, even though the Romanian budget was lower than the previous year, the amount allocated to cultural and educational efforts in the Balkans increased by

⁷⁹ Adina Berciu Drăghicescu and Maria Petre, *Școli și biserici românești din Peninsula Balcanică (1864–1948) [Romanian Schools and Churches in the Balkans (1864–1948)]*, Vol. I, Bucharest, University of Bucharest Publishing House, 2004, p. 107.

125% from 32.000 lei to 72.000 lei. The need to increase its representativeness abroad, but also the narrowing of international policy, with Austro-Hungary and Russia forcing Romania, for geopolitical reasons, to look southwards rather than towards Transylvania, Bukovina or Bessarabia are part of the explanation for this percentage increase. The Romanian Kingdom's interest in Balkan Romanity is also visible in terms of the budgetary funds allocated, with the end of the 19th century seeing a gradual increase from 0.05% (1881) to 0.3% (1900).

In order to justify the substantial budgetary increase for the schools in Macedonia for the year 1892–1893, Take Ionescu ironically declared that this was necessary because the funds sent to those areas were similar to those spent for the official reception of a foreign prince⁸⁰.

The same politician considered that the financial effort of the Romanian state south of the Danube is not sufficient when compared to the investment of the other Balkan players in the area: the Serbs with a budget of 70 million sent almost one million to Macedonia, Bulgaria with a budget not exceeding 80 million supported propaganda in Macedonia with more than one and a half million. Romania allocated 215.000 lei to cultural action south of the Danube⁸¹. But none of these states equaled Greek involvement in the Macedonian region. Greek propaganda was quickly organized after 1878 when numerous consulates were established in the Macedonian area in Serres, Skopje, Bitola, Thessaloniki. A multitude of “literacy” associations, subordinate to the Greek Foreign Ministry, and other cultural societies were then established whose aim was to Hellenize the Macedonians by propagating the Greek language, culture and national consciousness. In 1886, the Panhellenic Associations controlled some 836 schools in Macedonia, including three colleges (preparandii) for the training of teachers, several high schools and a theological seminary, all totalling over 45.000 pupils. In addition to teaching activities, the Hellenic associations organised competitions in music, gymnastics, theatre performances and the printing press⁸².

The long Liberal government between 1878–1890 meant numerically 14 boys' schools, 9 girls' schools and 3 secondary schools⁸³. The period of the Conservative government 1890–1893 was a period of great impetus with the opening of 31 new boys' schools and 13 girls' schools, the minister Take Ionescu being an involved supporter of the whole movement at that time, who used the most original means to attract young Aromanian students. Take Ionescu's idea to send bicycles to Macedonia for young Aromanians so that they could go to schools subsidized by the Romanian state, especially in urban areas, delighted the Romanian press⁸⁴. In 1899,

⁸⁰ Simion Țovaru, *Problema școlii românești din Balcani [The Question of the Romanian School in the Balkans]*, Bucharest, 1934, p. 40.

⁸¹ A Conservative (Take Ionescu), *Liberalii și Macedonia [The Liberals and Macedonia]*, Bucharest, 1901, p. 84.

⁸² Andrew Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians. A History*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 75.

⁸³ Simion Țovaru, *quoted work*, p. 95.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 31–32 .

on his return to office, the same minister gave his approval for the establishment of another 24 schools⁸⁵.

Returning to the question of Romanian funds directed south of the Danube, it should be noted that in the budget starting from April 1st, 1903, until April 1st, 1904, the amount of 335.000 lei was divided as follows:

	Nature of expenses ⁸⁶	No. of Schools	No. of Staff	Amount in lei
1	Primary education staff in Turkey	84	161	95.265
2	Primary education staff in Bulgaria	3	17	11.100
3	Secondary education staff in Turkey	4	75	84.500
5	Church staff in Turkey	20	53	17.696
6	Pensioners	–	12	3.814
7	Rent and materials for primary education in Turkey	60	–	12.475
8	Rent and materials for primary education in Bulgaria	2	–	7.360
9	Rent and materials for secondary education in Turkey	4	–	50.202
10	Scholarships awarded to students in Romania, Constantinople and Galatasarai	–	21	7.301
11	Administration of Schools and Churches and the pension of Mr. Apostol Mărgărit	–	4	17.780
12	Grant to the Weigand Institute in Leipzig	–	–	10.000
13	Commission for amounts sent abroad	–	–	3.000
14	Fund for the opening of extraordinary appropriations, etc.	–	–	14.956
Overall Total = 335.000				

Also, from the series of related expenses sent to the Aromanian communities we mention that in the budget for 1907–1908 some 34.380 lei were foreseen for medical dispensaries (Thessaloniki, Bitolia), medical assistance (Veria, Koritsa, Grebena, Vlaho-Iani-Elasona), midwives and free medicines for pupils and the poor⁸⁷.

However, after 1900, there was a decline in the Romanian state's contributions to the area, also due to the increasingly concerted campaigns against diplomatic and

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ R.A.M.F.A., Fund Problem 15, Vol. 4, f. 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 96.

teaching staff who had to manage some money in an inspired way, even though it was considerable for that time. More or less well-founded accusations of embezzlement of public money, unjustified expenditure and the emergence of rival factions within the local Aromanian elite made Minister Spiru Haret particularly circumspect and he decided to drastically cut the budget for the Macedonian-Romanian issue. This decision, which was not accompanied by on-the-spot investigations to remedy any possible deviations, was an image coup, skilfully used by the competing propagandists who attacked Romania's action as lacking in continuity, inconsistent and having the air of an experiment initiated by some unprofessionals. The solution devised by Spiru Haret has seriously undermined the entire infrastructure created by the Romanian state in the area and has raised many questions for the actors involved in the cultural and educational process south of the Danube, who will look with justified circumspection at subsequent actions. Here are the reports of the teachers of the Romanian high school in Bitolia addressed to the Ministry of Cults and Public Instruction:

“Mr. Minister, the Romanian people here, who are now dismayed by the sad news that has spread here like lightning, that Romania wants to leave the Macedonian thing, but does not want to give it the coup de grace at once, but leaves it in an agony, which, fatally, will lead to perdition”⁸⁸.

Returning to the first five years of the early 20th century, there is a downward curve in the funds sent to the Aromanian communities, a process that overlaps perfectly with the liberal government of D.A. Sturdza. Immediately after the change of government and the coming to power of the Conservatives, the funds directed south of the Danube resumed their upward trajectory. However, the documents we consulted do not suggest that the so-called Macedonian question was a political campaign platform of a single party, but that it was arranged according to the priorities of the ruling party and the personalities who were at the head of the relevant ministry at the time.

From 1907 until the First World War, the percentage of the budget allocated to schools and churches in the Balkans fell steadily, without any depreciation of the leu or reduction in the budget, quite the contrary. The year 1913–1914, the year of the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which will be much debated from now on, is the year of the greatest setback. During the Great War, there is no clear record of the sums allocated to the Aromanian communities, the pre-war budget scheme being maintained. For the year 1914–1915, a report found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the amount earmarked for schools south of the Danube was 744.000 lei⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ „Domnule Ministru, poporul român de aici, care acum este consternat de trista știre ce s-a răspândit aici ca fulgerul, că România vrea să părăsească chestia macedoneană, dar nu vrea să-i dea deodată lovitura de grație, ci o lasă într-o agonie, care, fatal, va duce la pieire”, in Adina Berciu Drăghicescu and Maria Petre, *quoted work*, p. 158.

⁸⁹ R.A.M.F.A., Fond Problem 15, Vol. 4, f. 177.

From another source, however, we learn that the general budget for the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Instruction in 1914–1915 amounted to 58.929.752 lei, of which 815.000 lei were to be allocated to schools south of the Danube, i.e., a coefficient of 1.383%⁹⁰.

If until the war, the leu was convertible into gold at parity with the French franc, maintaining a relatively stable, almost fixed rate throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, after 1919 inflation caused the strength of the Romanian currency to depreciate sharply⁹¹.

In the period 1921–1934 for which we have relevant data, the percentage sent to schools and churches in the Balkans is between 0.08%–0.12%.

FINAL REMARKS

Most of the financial resources directed by the Romanian state to the communities south of the Danube were used to set up new schools and to pay the salaries of the teaching staff in the area, as well as to support priests and churches. The Romanian cultural effort in the Balkans was eventually initiated by a number of personalities of Aromanian origin who had emigrated to the northern Danube area and who, in the course of time, held key positions both in the state apparatus (Anastasiu Panu, Alexandru Diamandi, Eugeniu Carada, Tache Ionescu, Gheorghe Manu) and in cultural and economic life (Ioan Caragiani, Dimitrie Cozacovici, Menelau Ghermani, Pericle Papahagi). Under the influence of these personalities of Romanian Aromanian origin, but also at the request of several Aromanian leaders in the Balkans, the support of the Romanian state will be materialized through constant financial allocations from the state budget to the cultural and educational needs of the Aromanian communities in the Balkans.

It can be seen that the involvement of the Romanian state in the Balkans was not conditioned by the political colour of the government in power in Romania. On the contrary, it can be said that it was a constant feature of Bucharest's foreign policy, and even the "competition" between liberals and conservatives was in favour of the cause of the Aromanian question, even if sometimes differences of opinion arose depending on the inherent party affinities.

If until 1913 most of the budgetary stipends went to the Aromanian communities in the Ottoman Empire, after the Peace of Bucharest the budgetary funds will go to the successor states: Greece, Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. Besides the state budget stipends, the Aromanian communities in the Balkans were also financially supported from other sources such as the Macedo-Romanian Cultural Society – very active at the time – and by other institutions or private individuals interested in helping communities under great assimilationist pressure. The role and

⁹⁰ Central National Historical Archives, Fund Microfilms England, R. 253, f. 171.

⁹¹ Victor Axenciuc, *quoted work*, p. 618 and further pages.

amount of these additional funds are not the subject of this study and will be discussed in a separate article.

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Motto:
“From the Nistru to the Tisa/All the Romanian complained to me”⁹².
(Mihai Eminescu)

THE CURRENT VITALITY OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITY LIVING IN HUNGARY

*Narcis-Claudiu Rupe*⁹³
*Samira Cîrlig*⁹⁴

ABSTRACT

One of the Romanian communities living abroad is the one in Hungary. Separated from the Transylvanian Romanians in 1920, though it voted for union with the Kingdom of Romania. The small Romanian community faced then as it does now a serious problem in its own history – the lack of the necessary institutions, which would assure and guard its identity. Without such institutions and the support of the mother country, the small cultural and ethnic enclave is losing its life force with each passing day. The Romanian community from Hungary is feeling abandoned and alone, being forced to confront the onslaught of the host state, and the attempts thereof to undermine the continued existence of the small Romanian community. Among the policies of dissolutions that the Hungarian state is using against these Romanians native to Hungary, the following can be found: the counter-selection of community leaders, the management of self-perception through the falsification of censuses, and the cutting off of access to Romanian-language education at the secondary and higher levels of study. These policies are not only aimed at the Romanian community. Their ulterior gain is to obtain new privileges for the Hungarian community in Romania.

Keywords: Romanian minority in Hungary, social vitality, Romanian-Hungarian relations, abandoned community.

SHORT INTRODUCTION

The European Centre for Ethnic Studies of the Romanian Academy has as its main tasks the investigation and the study of both the situation of Romanian communities inside and outside Romania, and minorities in Romania. The studies it has carried out over the years attest to this. The following studies “The trajectory of young Basarabians coming to study in Romania: between myth and reality”, “The weakening of the Romanian community in Harghita-Covasna: research report”,

⁹² „De la Nistru pân-la Tisa/Tot românul plânsu-mi-s-a”, in Mihai Eminescu, „Doina” [“Doina”], in Mihai Eminescu, *Opere Complete [Complete Works]*, Vol. I., Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, (s.a.), p. 182.

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“Crihana Veche: monographic album” and “The current state of Romania’s north-western border 100 years after the Treaty of Versailles” are a good example of the activities of the Center⁹⁵.

One of the main points of interest is the situation of the Romanian community from Hungary, a historical community since the Romanians there are native to that land. The predicament of this community didn’t find much attention from the part of the researchers studied after the fall of the communist regime. There are some exceptions worth mentioning, such as for researchers from the Research Institute of Romanians in Hungary, especially Maria Berényi⁹⁶ and Laboratory for Analysis of Information Warfare and Strategic Communication (Larics)⁹⁷. Therefore, the Romanian State and Romanian researchers should start to concentrate their investigations and, thus, their inherently political efforts on the serious predicament of this community, if one is to find solutions to the dangers it is exposed to.

COMMUNITY SITUATION – INDICATOR OF VITALITY

This material focuses on the concept of social vitality as proposed by the great Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga. According to him, social vitality represents “the ability of the members of a people to show cohesion in order to achieve a benchmark, both culturally and economically”⁹⁸.

Another necessary tool for understanding the origin of the social vitality of a given community understood as an integrated whole, is the law of sociological parallelism discovered by Dimitrie Gusti:

“Social will, as the motivation of the existence, relations, and processes of social units, is not an arbitrary construction of the spirit. It can be discovered and precisely characterized by relating economic, spiritual, political, and legal manifestations of cosmological, biological, psychological, and historical frames within the aforementioned manifestations take place. The connection between the economic, spiritual, political, and economic manifestations of a given community and the frames that make them possible constitutes the law of sociological parallelism. There are parallelisms within the frameworks themselves, a parallelism between the extra-social frameworks: cosmological and biological, on the one hand, and social and historical, on the other; then a parallelism within the manifestations, between the constitutive ones: economic and spiritual, and the regulative ones – political and legal; finally, a parallelism between the set of manifestations and the set of frameworks. Parallelism

⁹⁵ For more information: <https://www.cespe.ro/en/home-2/>.

⁹⁶ For more details see: <https://www.romanintezet.hu/index.php> and Maria Berényi’s list of publications: <http://mariaberenyi.hu/>.

⁹⁷ For more information: <https://larics.ro/>.

⁹⁸ „abilitatea membrilor unui popor de a da dovadă de coeziune în vederea atingerii unui obiectiv de referință, atât din punct de vedere cultural și economic”, in Ovidiana Bulumac, *Infrastructură și societate. Considerente teoretice și studii de caz [Infrastructure and Society. Theoretical considerations and case studies]*, Bucharest, Ethnological Publishing House, 2018, p. 148.

means that all these categories do not form relations of logical subordination, nor can they be reduced to one another, *i.e.*, they do not form causal chains between them, but only reciprocal, existential conditions; they can only be understood in their structural unity, as sui generis wholes”⁹⁹.

The social will of the Romanian community manifests itself economically, spiritually, politically, and legally in a cosmological, biological, historical, and psychological frame. Community frames and manifestations are not isolated from each other, but rather intertwine and interfere one with the other.

It should be borne in mind that Romanians live in the midst of the Hungarian nation, and the nation is the most complete social unit:

“The nation is the only social unit that is self-sufficient, in the sense that it does not require for its full realization a more comprehensive social unit, being able to create its own world of values, to establish an end in itself and to find the means to achieve it, *i.e.*, the force of organization and progress in its own composition”¹⁰⁰.

Thus, the vitality of the Romanian community is influenced by the manifestations of the Hungarian nation that create the context within which the Romanian community is bound to live and act. The Romanian minority is also linked to the Romanian nation and state to which it is tethered through state institutions of Romania, which have a duty under the Constitution to protect it. As we shall see, the Hungarian authorities apply a certain treatment to the Romanian minority to obtain extended rights for the Hungarian minority from the neighbouring country.

Due to the Gustian methodology, this text makes use of – the parallelism of frames and manifestations – and the fact of analyzing the treatment of two minorities by two states, the presentation of the ideas contained within the text will proceed in a comparative form.

⁹⁹ „Voința socială, ca motivare a existenței, relațiilor și proceselor unităților sociale, nu este o construcție arbitrară a spiritului. Ea poate fi oricând descoperită și precis caracterizată prin raportarea manifestărilor economice, spirituale, politice și juridice, la ansamblul cadrelor, cosmologic, biologic, psihic și istoric, ceea ce constituie legea paralelismului sociologic. Un întreit paralelism: înlăuntrul cadrelor, un paralelism între cadrele extrasociale: cosmologic și biologic, pe de o parte, și cele sociale și istoric, pe de altă parte; apoi un paralelism în sânul manifestărilor, între cele constitutive: economică și spirituală, și regulative – politică și juridică; în sfârșit, un paralelism între ansamblul manifestărilor și ansamblul cadrelor. Paralelism înseamnă că toate aceste categorii nu formează raporturi de subordonare logică și nici nu pot fi reduse unele la altele, adică nu formează între ele înlănțuiri cauzale, ci numai condiții reciproce, existențiale; ele nu pot fi înțelese decât în unitatea lor structurală, ca totalități sui generis.”, in Dimitrie Gusti, *Pagini alese [Selected pages]*, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1965, pp. 117–118, quoted by Ion Ungureanu, *Paradigme ale cunoașterii societății [Paradigms of societal knowledge]*, Iași, Junimea Publishing House, 2002, p. 111.

¹⁰⁰ „Națiunea este singura unitate socială care își ajunge sieși, în înțelesul că nu cere pentru deplina ei realizare o unitate socială mai cuprinzătoare, fiind în stare să-și creeze o lume proprie de valori, să-și stabilească un scop în sine și să-și afle mijloacele de înlănțuire, adică forța de organizare și propășire în propria ei alcătuire.”, in Dimitrie Gusti, *Cunoaștere și acțiune în serviciul națiunii. Cartea Echipelor [Knowledge and action in the service of the nation. Team Book]*, Vol. I, Bucharest, Royal Cultural Foundation “Prince Carol”, 1939, p. 3.

SPATIAL COORDINATES



Fig. 1 – Areas in Hungary with Romanian population in the 2011 census

The Romanian community in Hungary was located in 2011 in the eastern region/area of Hungary (near the border with Romania) and the area of the country's capital – Budapest¹⁰¹. The situation did not change in 2022: approximately 80% of the community lived in Budapest and the eastern part of the country. Most of the Romanian population in Hungary (approx. 48%) lived in the eastern part of the country, *i.e.*, in the Észak-Alföld and Dél-Alföld region¹⁰². Romanians constitute a majority only in Micherechi. In 2011, from the approximately 2000 inhabitants in 2011 approx. 90% declared themselves Romanians¹⁰³. The four Hungarian counties in which most of the Romanian population can be find are: Bechis (Békés), Hajdú-Bihar, Csongrád and Pest. Most live in Bechiș (Békés) county – approx. 3.868¹⁰⁴ on the border with Romania.

¹⁰¹ Embassy of Romania in Hungary, „Comunitatea română din Ungaria” [“Romanian Community in Hungary”], (s.a.) Available at: <https://budapesta.mae.ro/node/797>, Accessed on: July 2nd, 2019.

¹⁰² Calculations based on data provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009>, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

¹⁰³ Andrei Sebastian Csiplo, „Micherechi, localitate în Ungaria unde românii sunt majoritari” [“Micherechi, a village in Hungary where Romanians are the majority”], in *Corbi Albi*, 2019, Available at: <http://corbiialbi.ro/micherechi-%20localitate%20in%20ungaria%20unde-%20romanii-%20sunt-%20majoritari/>, Accessed on: March 10, 2021.

¹⁰⁴ Calculations based on data provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009/N4IgfFpghgJiBcBtEAVaogJQKoBkD6A4mgPIDMIAugDQgDOAljBASgHJoCyAWiDSgJlc0eAAqZ->, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

A suggestive map¹⁰⁵ from 2011 illustrates the geographical position of the community.

According to the latest Hungarian census (2022), approx. 64% of Romanians in the neighbouring country lived in urban areas¹⁰⁶. In the last two decades, the Romanian community has become increasingly urbanised.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY

The Romanians in Hungary is a historical autochthonous community that has remained outside the borders of the Romanian state although the representatives sent to the Great Union (26 in number)¹⁰⁷ in Alba Iulia voted for union with the Kingdom of Romania.

Until the time of the Great Union, the community was composed of Dacoromanians (north of the Danube River)¹⁰⁸ and Aromanians (south of the Danube River), both part of Oriental Romanity (ISR).

“Oriental Romanity is an ethnic Romanic composition on a Traco-Dacian basis stretching from the Adriatic to beyond the Bug in today’s Ukraine, across the Carpathian Mountains – from today’s Bohemia (Czechia) to Timoc (today’s Serbia-Bulgaria), and beyond. (...) From the 6th – 7th century onwards, Eastern Romanity is divided into two, with relatively different evolutions: the Dacoromanians and south of the Danube the Aromanians, the Istroromanians, the Meglenoromanians”¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁵ Dorin Lozovanu, „Hărți ale spațiilor locuite de românii din Serbia (regiunea Voivodina), Ungaria, Ucraina (regiunile Odesa, Cernăuți, Transcarpatia)” [“Maps of areas inhabited by Romanians in Serbia (Vojvodina region), Hungary, Ukraine (Odessa, Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia regions)”], in *Institutul Cultural Român*, November 2nd, 2021, Available at: <https://www.icr.ro/praga/harti-ale-spatiilor-locuite-de-romanii-din-serbia-regiunea-voivodina-ungaria-ucraina-regiunile-odesa-cernauti-transcarpatia>, Accessed on: February 17, 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Calculations based on data provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009/N4IgfGpghgJiBcBtEAVaogJQKoBkD6A4mgPIDMIAugDQgDOAljBAsgHJoCyAWiDSgJic0eAAqZ->, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Ștefan Both, „De ce românii din Ungaria nu au motive să sărbătorească Centenarul. «Această Unire pe noi ne-a lăsat în afara națiunii românești»” [“Why Romanians in Hungary have no reason to celebrate the Centenary. ‘This Union left us outside the Romanian nation’”], in *Adevărul*, December 8, 2018, Available at: https://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/deromaniiungaria-nu-motive-sarbatoreasca-centenarul-aceasta-unire-ne-a-lasat-afara-natiunii-romanesti-1_5c0bed38df52022f754065a1/index.html, Accessed on: October 11, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Gabriel Moisa, „Românii din Ungaria de astăzi. Cronica unui crepuscul programat (I)” [“Romanians in Hungary today. Chronicle of a programmed twilight (I)”], in *Larics*, May 30, 2022, Available at: <https://larics.ro/romanii-din-ungaria-deastazicronicaunui-crepuscul-programat-i/>, Accessed on: August 30, 2022.

¹⁰⁹ „Romanitatea orientală este o alcătuire etnică romanică pe suport traco-dac ce se întinde de la Adriatică până dincolo de Bug, în Ucraina de astăzi, pe toată întinderea Munților Carpați – din Boemia de astăzi (Cehia) până în Timoc (Serbia-Bulgaria de astăzi), și dincolo de aceștia. (...) Începând cu sec. VI–VII, romanitatea orientală este împărțită în două, având evoluții relativ diferite: dacoromânii și la sud de Dunăre aromânii, istroromânii, meglenoromânii.”, in Radu Baltasiu and Ovidiana Bulumac, *Istoria Socială a României. Problematică și actualitate [Social History of Romania. Issues and topicality]*, Bucharest, University of Bucharest Publishing House, 2017, pp. 192–193.

Part of the Romanian community, especially the more educated and wealthier, came from the Balkans, from the city of Moscopole, after its destruction by the Ottoman Empire, contributing massively to the development of Vienna and Budapest¹¹⁰. Notable for their financial support for the Romanian cause were Emanuil Gojdu, Andrei Șaguna, and Atanasiu Grabovsky¹¹¹.

Through the financial support of the Balkan Romanians Buda and Pest (the two cities were united in 1873) became powerful centers of Romanian culture after the 18th century such that “between 1813 and 1825, [Buda] published more Romanian books than Iași or Bucharest”¹¹², and in Pest it was founded by the Romanian parish priest Ioanichie Miculescu “the first Romanian literary magazine with Latin letters”¹¹³.

Macedonian Romanians had a Romanian language school and church after 1809. The school functioned for 80 years, and the church still exists today “near Gojdu Courts”¹¹⁴.

One of the most shining Aromanian personalities in Hungary was Bishop Andrei Șaguna, to whom the Romanians of Transylvania owe the re-establishment of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church through intense lobbying in Budapest and Vienna¹¹⁵. He succeeded in obtaining the independence of the re-established Orthodox Church and the repeal of the “Unio Trium Nationum” act by which the Transylvanian authorities had deprived the Romanians of their rights for several centuries¹¹⁶.

Another group of the community, located mainly on the border between Hungary and Romania, was part of the Transylvanian Romanians until 1920. Even though their representatives voted for union with Romania after the First World War, they remained outside the newly formed Romanian state and had to live within the borders of the newly formed Hungarian state. This is why some of the representatives of the community do not refer to Romania as the Mother Country, but as the Language Country because they were never included within its borders¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁰ Bogdan Stanciu, „Interviu cu directorul Institutului de Cercetări al Românilor din Ungaria, Maria Berényi” [“Interview with the Director of the Research Institute of Romanians in Hungary, Maria Berényi”], in *Sinteza Journal*, 2016, Available at: <https://www.revistasinteza.ro/a-fost-o-vreme-cand-la-buda-se-tiparea-mai-multacaromaneascadecat-la-iasi-sau-bucuresti>, Accessed on: October 8, 2021.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹¹² „între 1813 și 1825, când la Buda s-a publicat mai multă carte românească decât la Iași sau la București”, in *Ibidem*.

¹¹³ „prima revistă beletristică română cu litere latine, „Aurora românească”, in *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁶ Aurel Papari, „Un aromân a salvat Transilvania” [“An Aromanian saved Transylvania”], in *Adevărul*, September 7, 2002, Available at: https://adevarul.ro/news/societate/unaromansalvat-transilvania1_50abe1627c42d5a66381bd9d/index.html, Accessed on: October 9, 2021.

¹¹⁷ Ștefan Both, „De ce românii din Ungaria nu au motive să sărbătorească Centenarul. «Această Unire pe noi ne-a lăsat în afara națiunii românești»” [“Why Romanians in Hungary have no reason to celebrate the Centenary. ‘This Union left us outside the Romanian nation’”], in *Adevărul*, December 8, 2018, Available at: https://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/deromaniungaria-nu-motive-sarbatoreasca-centenarul-aceasta-unire-ne-a-lasat-afara-natiunii-romanesti-1_5c0bed38df52022f754065a1/index.html, Accessed on: October 11, 2021.

Consequences of the 1920 moment

The “1920 moment” negatively affected the Romanian community in Hungary. It was the first time in its history that the community became a minority in a state. The number of Romanians is significantly reduced: from about 2.5 million (Transylvania, Banat, and Crișana) before 1920 to 23 thousand¹¹⁸.

Incorporation into the new Hungarian state meant the loss of ties with the Romanians of Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, and Transylvania¹¹⁹, a loss that made the preservation of their identity much more difficult. The new minorities in Hungary were deprived of the protection of organizations that pursued their interests, such as the Romanian National Party of Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș¹²⁰.

For 25 years they remained without Romanian institutions, the first such institutions having been established, paradoxically, after the establishment of the communist regime in Hungary¹²¹. It was only after 1945 that Romanian schools resumed their activities¹²². The situation was worsened by the fact that not only there were no formal institutions meant to uphold and promote Romanian culture, identity, etc., but there were also no elites capable of creating an organizational infrastructure to support identity because after the Peace of Trianon, the village elites (priests and teachers) left them¹²³.

After the 1990s, and despite receiving help from the Romanian state, the Romanian community from Hungary is still plagued by the issues pertaining to the lack of institutions that make it possible for a community to exist and develop, and to maintain its own identity.

THE PERCEPTION OF THE HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES AND SELF-IMAGE

Romanians in Hungary are still afflicted by the feeling of being abandoned by their “*Language Country*”¹²⁴. The same feeling was experienced during the interwar

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁹ Gabriel Moisa, „Românii din Ungaria de astăzi. Cronica unui crepuscul programat (I)” [“Romanians in Hungary today. Chronicle of a programmed twilight (I)”], in *Larics*, May 30, 2022, Available at: <https://larics.ro/romanii-din-ungaria-de-astazi-cronica-unui-crepuscul-programat-i/>, Accessed on: August 30, 2022.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹²¹ Ștefan Both, „De ce românii din Ungaria nu au motive să sărbătorească Centenarul. «Această Unire pe noi ne-a lăsat în afara națiunii românești»” [“Why Romanians in Hungary have no reason to celebrate the Centenary. ‘This Union left us outside the Romanian nation’”], in *Adevărul*, December 8, 2018, Available at: https://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/de-romanii-ungaria-nu-motive-sarbatoareasca-centenarul-aceasta-unire-ne-a-lasat-afara-natiunii-romanesti-1_5c0bed38df52022f754065a1/index.html, Accessed on: October 11, 2021.

¹²² *Ibidem*.

¹²³ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁴ Sebastian Olaru, „Meleşcanu: În Ungaria avem o comunitate care se confruntă cu probleme reale de supraviețuire” [“Meleşcanu: In Hungary we have a community facing real problems of survival”], in *Agerpres*, February 27, 2017, Available at: <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2017/02/27/melescanu-in-ungaria-avem-o-comunitate-confruntata-cu-probleme-foarte-reale-de-supravietuire-22-06-31>, Accessed on: January 27, 2021.

period when they were deprived of the institutions necessary to preserve their identity. Even if today they “enjoy” churches, schools, civic and political organizations, journalistic investigations in the communes inhabited by Romanians reveal the presence of a feeling of abandonment on the part of the Romanian state¹²⁵ not unlike to the one that the minority Romanians in Covasna and Harghita experience to this very day¹²⁶.

The presence of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest, the Consulates General of Romania in Gyula and Szeged, as well as the branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Budapest are not enough to diminish the feeling since the official organization that “represents” the interests of the community is the “Self-Government of Romanians”, structure created by the Hungarian authorities, which raises suspicions about the loyalty of leaders to their own community¹²⁷.

The feeling of abandonment of the community was reinforced by the commemoration of the Centenary of the Union celebrated in Romania (2018) because about two decades after 1920 they had no Romanian institutions, and since after 1990, according to Mrs. Maria Berényi, director of the Research Institute of Romanians in Hungary¹²⁸, the Romanian state has shown a disinterest, a disinterest on which the Hungarian authorities have imposed their own institutional structure.

Worsening the situation of the Romanian minority is the attitude of the Hungarian authorities, an attitude born out of the Trianon tragedy, which is the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the creation of the Hungarian national state. According to the findings of PhD. Alexandru Ghișa, a historian and former Romanian diplomat at the Romanian Embassy in Hungary, the Hungarian political elites in charge of Hungary blame this “tragedy” on minorities (including the Romanian one)¹²⁹.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁶ Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru and Ovidiana Bulumac, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna. Raport de cercetare [The weakening of the Romanian community in Harghita-Covasna. Research Report]*, Bucharest, Collection of Sociological Studies, Ethnological Publishing House, 2013.

¹²⁷ Sebastian Olaru, „Meleşcanu: În Ungaria avem o comunitate care se confruntă cu probleme reale de supraviețuire” [“Meleşcanu: In Hungary we have a community facing real problems of survival”], in *Agerpres*, February 27, 2017, Available at: <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2017/02/27/melescanu-in-ungaria-avem-o-comunitate-confruntata-cu-probleme-foarte-reale-de-supravietuire-22-06-31>, Accessed on: January 27, 2021.

¹²⁸ Ștefan Both, „De ce românii din Ungaria nu au motive să sărbătorească Centenarul. «Această Unire pe noi ne-a lăsat în afara națiunii românești»” [“Why Romanians in Hungary have no reason to celebrate the Centenary. ‘This Union left us outside the Romanian nation’”], in *Adevărul*, December 8, 2018, Available at: https://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/de-romaniungaria-nu-motive-sarbatoreasca-centenarul-aceasta-unire-ne-a-lasat-afaranatiuniiromanesti1_5c0bed38df52022f754065a1/index.html, Accessed on: October 11, 2021.

¹²⁹ Alexandru Ghișa on the show Nova TV, „Ungaria trebuie ajutată să revină pe calea cea dreaptă. Cum? Prin măsuri de coerciție” [“Hungary must be helped to get back on track. How? By coercive measures”], *Nova TV*, February 7, 2024, Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcshAtrSpDY>, Accessed on: February 20, 2024.

To this demonization of the Romanian community, one can add the conviction of the Hungarian authorities that by squeezing and sabotaging the existence of this community, then they will be able to obtain, through the power of example, new privileges for the Hungarian minority in Romania, the most significant advantage being the granting of autonomy on ethnic criteria for the so-called “Szeklerland”.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND THE ISSUE OF THE LAST TWO CENSUSES

By 2022 of the 9.603.634¹³⁰ of Hungary’s inhabitants, only 18.195 are Romanians according to Hungarian officials¹³¹, *i.e.*, 0.02%. Compared with 2011, the number of ethnic Romanians in Hungary decreased by 31%. As of 2011, they are no longer the third largest ethnic minority in Hungary, falling to sixth place after Roma, Germans, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Croats¹³².

An overview of the demographic development of the Romanian community in Hungary reveals an unusual situation: after 2001 the number of Romanians returned to the level of 1920.

- 1920: 23.695 (0.3%)
- 1930: 16.221 (0.2%)
- 1941: 14.142 (0.2%)
- 1949: 14.713 (0.2%)
- 1960: 15.787 (0.2%)
- 1970: 12.624 (0.1%)
- 1980: 10.141 (0.1%)
- 1990: 10.740 (0.1%)
- 2001: 7.995 (0.07%)¹³³
- 2011: 26.345 (0.26%)¹³⁴
- 2022: 18.195 (0.18%)¹³⁵;

The surprising demographic evolution in the post-communist period raises suspicions about the real number of Romanians in the neighbouring country. In a recent analysis, University of Oradea history professor Gabriel Moisa has shown that

¹³⁰ Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, s.a., Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009/N4IgFgpghgJiBcBtEAVAogJQKoBkD6A4mgPIDMIAugDQgDOAljBAsgHJoCyAWiDSgJlc0eAAqZ->, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

¹³¹ *Ibidem.*

¹³² *Ibidem.*

¹³³ Embassy of Romania in Hungary, „Comunitatea română din Ungaria” [“Romanian Community in Hungary”], (s.a.) Available at: <https://budapesta.mae.ro/node/797>, Accessed on: July 2nd, 2019.

¹³⁴ Numbers taken from Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009/N4IgFgpghgJiBcBtEAVAogJQKoBkD6A4mgPIDMIAugDQgDOAljBAsgHJoCyAWiDSgJlc0eAAqZ->, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

¹³⁵ *Ibidem.*

the 2011 census data is erroneous because the number of Romanians in Hungary was determined by the authorities by adding up the answers to three questions in the census questionnaire. This led to the situation that although the population of Micherechi in 2011 was 2.093 inhabitants, according to the data provided by the census takers 1.637 people declared themselves Romanians and 1.799 Hungarians (*i.e.*, a total of 3.436, not 2.093). In fact, according to the estimates of the professor from Oradea, there are 7.995 Romanians in Hungary, a figure similar to that of the 2001 census¹³⁶.

Also, the 2022 census has raised questions about the validity of the data collected by the Hungarian authorities since, as in 2011, the number of Romanians in Hungary in 2022 is closer to that of 1920, which contradicts the downward trend recorded from 1920 to 2001.

The Romanian community in Hungary is distinguished by its membership of the Orthodox Christian religion. In 2011, out of 13.710 Orthodox believers in Hungary, 37% were Romanians (5.102)¹³⁷, they form the largest Orthodox community in Hungary¹³⁸, a situation found also in 2022: 22% of all Orthodox believers in the neighbouring country – 15.578¹³⁹.

EDUCATION

Compared to the Hungarian minority in Romania, the Romanian community in Hungary does not benefit from a complete structure of mother tongue education. From kindergarten to university, the Hungarian state has managed to create a private

¹³⁶ Gabriel Moisa, „Românii din Ungaria de astăzi. Cronica unui crepuscul programat (I)” [“Romanians in Hungary today. Chronicle of a programmed twilight (I)”], in *Larics*, May 30, 2022, Available at: <https://larics.ro/romanii-din-ungaria-de-astazi-cronica-unui-crepuscul-programat-i/>, Accessed on: August 30, 2022.

¹³⁷ Calculations based on data available here: Andrei Deak, „O enigmă și numeroase «bizarerii» în rezultatele finale ale Recensământului din 2011 în Ungaria!” [“An enigma and many ‘oddities’ in the final results of the 2011 Census in Hungary!”], in *Info Brașov*, July 14, 2018, Available at: <https://www.infobrasov.net/o-enigma-si-numeroase-bizarerii-in-rezultatele-finale-ale-recensamantului-din-2011-in-ungaria/>, Accessed on: October 7, 2021.

¹³⁸ Ioan Weisl, „Interviu PS Siliuan Mănuilă: Comunitatea românească din Ungaria se încăpățânează să existe” [“Interview with PS Siliuan Mănuilă: The Romanian community in Hungary is stubborn to exist”], in *Agerpres*, June 21, 2016, Available at: <https://www.agerpres.ro/social/2014/06/21/interviu-ps-siluan-manuila-comunitatea-romaneasca-din-ungaria-se-incapataneaza-sa-existe-10-37-54>, Accessed on: October 7, 2021.

¹³⁹ Numbers provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population data by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009/N4IgfGpghgJiBcBtAugGhAZwJYwgxIAKgIIBKAygFICiAMrQEwjoBylAsgFohqYQDGAfYwB7AHb4iASXbUA%C2%A0gAVqpKQHkAlj3QAzLABtBEAE4YEoANZYxceCHZQADsxAQxgoIgimkBJPIKKhMFIY2IOQQgs4AblB6AK5ekgwADAxMyAC%C2%A0aARsXCEgltYIEVGx8UneBNQA4nKkqs51zfUAQgCqrXK1Ut21pN0AwoPodYpNY_W11N1k3aRdU3Lks8vkANLd5LTdHVvLmtm5RGRUdIyFxeGR0ehxicIIKTyqkM8OdIzQA===, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

Hungarian language education structure in Romania with its own funds¹⁴⁰. Since neither the Romanian State nor other institutions or private organizations didn't endeavor to understand and find remedies that might help the Romanian community in Hungary, the situation of one of the main institutions preserving the Romanian identity in Hungary – the school – is as follows.

In 2017, Romanians in Hungary could learn in their own language in 25 schools¹⁴¹. As for the lower cycle of study, Romanian children had access to Romanian kindergartens in nine localities¹⁴². In 2021, the construction of a kindergarten-nursery started in Micherechi (Mehkerek). The project has a value of 315.000 Euro and was financed by the County Council of Bichiș (Békés)¹⁴³.

At the next level of education, Romanian children have the opportunity to learn in their own language in 12 general schools, seven of which are bilingual (Romanian-Hungarian)¹⁴⁴, and in five Romanian is taught only as a subject of study¹⁴⁵. As far as the high school level is concerned, the situation is less favourable for the community: there is only one Romanian high school – “Nicolae Bălcescu” High School in Jula (Gyula)¹⁴⁶.

Romanians in Hungary do not receive higher education in their mother tongue, except mother-tongue teacher training programmes at ELTE University (Budapest), the Pedagogical Faculty “Juhász Gyula” of the University of Seghedin and the Pedagogical Faculty of the University of St. Stephen, Szarvas¹⁴⁷.

Despite the lack of an education system in the mother tongue, almost half of the ethnic Romanians manage to graduate from high school or attend a university even though most of them do not do so in their mother tongue, the only Romanian

¹⁴⁰ Radu Ursan, „Secretar de Stat al Guvernului Orban: În Transilvania a fost creată o structură completă de învățământ în limba maghiară” [“State Secretary of the Orban Government: A complete structure of Hungarian-language education has been created in Transylvania”], in *R3media*, June 6, 2022, Available at: <https://r3media.ro/secretar-de-stat-al-guvernului-orban-in-transilvania-a-fost-creata-o-structura-completa-de-invatamant-in-limba-maghiara/>, Accessed on: July 17, 2022.

¹⁴¹ Virtual Library of Romanians in Hungary, „Instituții de învățământ românesc în Ungaria” [“Romanian educational institutions in Hungary”], Available at: <https://bibliotecaromaneasca-hu.ro/institutii-de-invatamant-romanesec-in-ungaria/>, Accessed on: October 7, 2021.

¹⁴² These localities are: Aletea, Apateu, Batania, Bedeu, Cenadul Unguresc, Chitighaz, Jula, Micherechi, Sacal, in *Ibidem*.

¹⁴³ Gheorghe Miron, „Consulul României la Gyula, Florin Vasiloni, a inaugurat nouă creșă pentru copiii românilor din Micherechi Ungaria” [“The Romanian Consul in Gyula, Florin Vasiloni, inaugurated a new nursery for Romanian children in Micherechi Hungary”], in *Ziua de Vest*, May 26, 2021, Available at: <https://www.ziuainvest.ro/consulul-romaniei-la-gyula-florin-vasiloni-ainauguratnouacresa-pentru-copiiromani-din-micherechi-ungaria/>, Accessed on: October 7, 2021.

¹⁴⁴ These schools are located in Aletea, Batania, Bedeu, Chitighaz, Jula, Micherechi, Sacal, in Virtual Library of Romanians in Hungary, „Instituții de învățământ românesc în Ungaria” [“Romanian educational institutions in Hungary”], Available at: <https://bibliotecaromaneasca-hu.ro/institutii-de-invatamant-romanesec-inungaria/>, Accessed on: October 7, 2021.

¹⁴⁵ Namely in the localities Apateu, Cenadul Unguresc, Furta, Leucușhaz, Pocii, in *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

high school being in Jula (Gyula). By the year 2022, the Romanian community in Hungary will look like this, depending on the levels of education graduated:

- 28%: graduated from high school;
- 22%: graduated from secondary school;
- 19%: have graduated from high school incomplete;
- 19%: have completed higher education;
- 4%: have completed primary school¹⁴⁸.

MASS-MEDIA

If the Romanian state grants ethnic Hungarians 48 hours per week for TV broadcasts in their mother tongue by 2023¹⁴⁹, the Hungarian state offered Romanians in Hungary only 52 minutes. This means that they have access to a TV program in their mother tongue twice a week. The programme is called “Our Screen” (26 minutes) and is broadcast on TV channel “m1” and “Duna TV”, both belonging to the Hungarian Public Broadcasting Trust¹⁵⁰. Romanians have also reported since 2015 that they do not have access to private TV channels in Romania¹⁵¹ and between 2010 and 2015 access was conditional on Romanian citizenship, which was difficult to obtain¹⁵².

The press of ethnic Hungarians in Romania is sponsored with approx. 6.1 million euros annually (from the Hungarian government alone, not counting the UDMR)¹⁵³, while the press of Romanians in Hungary is financed with only 120.000 euros from the Hungarian government (situation encountered in 2018)¹⁵⁴. Since

¹⁴⁸ Own calculations based on data provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, “Population data by ethnic attributes, county and type of settlement. Census 2022”, Available at: <https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/en/database/#/table/WBS009>, Accessed on: May 4, 2024.

¹⁴⁹ According to the analysis of the TVR programme schedule for the week of February 27, and March 5, 2023. The grid can be consulted at the following internet address: http://www.tvr.ro/program.html?channel_1=tvrtimisoara.

¹⁵⁰ Embassy of Romania in Hungary, „Comunitatea română din Ungaria” [“Romanian Community in Hungary”], (s.a.) Available at: <https://budapesta.mae.ro/node/797>, Accessed on: July 2nd, 2019.

¹⁵¹ Antena 3 CNN, „Ungaria interzice canalele tv românești pentru românii din Ungaria” [“Hungary bans Romanian TV channels for Romanians in Hungary”], in *Antena 3 CNN*, November 20, 2015, Available at: <https://www.antena3.ro/actualitate/ungaria-interzice-canalele-tv-romanesti-pentru-romanii-din-ungaria-325536.html>, Accessed on: May 18, 2024.

¹⁵² Gazeta de Cluj, „Mii de români din Ungaria vor cetățenie română pentru abonamentul de cablu TV” [“Thousands of Romanians in Hungary want Romanian citizenship for cable TV subscription”], March 22, 2011, Available at: <https://gazetadecluj.ro/mii-deromanidinungariavorcetatenie-romana-pentru-abonamentul-de-cablu-tv/>, Accessed on: May 18, 2024.

¹⁵³ Sipos Zoltan, „Punguța cu doi bani: 5 milioane de euro pe an pentru trustul media maghiar din Transilvania” [“The two-bit bag: 5 million euros a year for the Hungarian media trust in Transylvania”], in *Átlászó Erdély*, July 28, 2021, Available at: <https://atlatsz.ro/ro/important/punguta-cu-doi-bani-5-milioane-de-euro-pe-an-pentru-trustul-media-maghiar-din-transilvania/>, Accessed on: October 6, 2021.

¹⁵⁴ Info Brașov, „Românilor din Ungaria le merge «excelent»” [“Romanians in Hungary are doing ‘excellent’”], December 2nd, 2018, Available at: <https://www.infobrasov.net/romanilor-din-ungaria-le-merge-excelent-trage-sa-moara-si-publicatia-lor-de-suflet-foaia-romaneasca>, Accessed on: January 14, 2021.

2024, the Romanian State, through the Department of Romanians Abroad, has granted financial support to the newspaper “Foaia Românească”¹⁵⁵. Just in one year, based on the data we have, we observe that the (partial) funding of the Hungarian press in Romania is 50 times higher than the (total) funding of the Romanian press in Hungary.

The funding for the local minority press, which is a fixed amount (120.000 euros annually), is shared by the newspapers “Foaia Românească” and “Cronica”, a newspaper set up by the Romanian Self-Government. Instead of doubling the funds, the Budapest authorities decided to split the amount in two, reducing the income of the two magazines¹⁵⁶.

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE-LEGAL ISSUES

While ethnic Hungarians occupied more than 37.000 seats between 1990 and 2021¹⁵⁷ in the state administration, Romanians in Hungary are not represented by any political party in the Hungarian Parliament¹⁵⁸. Moreover, minority representatives do not have the right to vote in Parliament (they only have a consultative role)¹⁵⁹.

The Romanian minority is represented in the Hungarian Parliament by a spokesman, in the person of Traian Cresta, on behalf of the Self-Government of Romanians in Hungary, who does not have the right to vote and who, as the director of the Romanian Leaf in Hungary, Eva Iova Șimon, or the history professor Gabriel Moisa from Oradea claim, is affiliated to the interests of Budapest and not to the Romanian community¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁵ See the first and second issue of the newspaper “Foaia românească” from 2024, Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=960685518970838&set=pcb.960686362304087>, Accessed on: May 18, 2024.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁷ Personal statistics, based on data available here:

1. DW, „Cine sunt europarlamentarii pe care Romania ii trimite la Bruxelles” [“Who are the MEPs that Romania sends to Brussels”], May 28, 2019, Available at: <https://www.dw.com/ro/cine-sunt-europarlamentarii-pe-care-romania-ii-trimite-la-bruxelles/a-48938092>, Accessed on: July 17, 2022.

2. Cosmin Pirv, „Coaliția de guvernare și-a împărțit prefecturile. Care sunt ponderile care revin fiecărui partid aflat la conducere” [“The governing coalition has divided its prefectures. What are the weights for each ruling party”], in *Mediafax*, January 12, 2021, Available at: <https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/coalitia-de-guvernare-si-a-impartit-prefecturile-care-sunt-ponderile-care-revin-fiecarui-partid-aflat-la-conducere19862222>, Accessed on: July 17, 2022.

¹⁵⁸ Nicu Stan, „Vesti proaste pentru românii din Ungaria. Totul este cât se poate de clar” [“Bad news for Romanians in Hungary. Everything is as clear as can be”], in *Playtech*, May 18, 2020, Available at: <https://playtech.ro/stiri/vesti-proaste-pentru-romanii-din-ungaria-totul-este-cat-se-poate-de-clar-127269>, Accessed on: January 27, 2021.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶⁰ Gabriel Moisa, „Oamenii Budapestei din frunte... românilor. Românii din Ungaria de astăzi sau cronica unui crepuscul programat (II)” [“The people of Budapest at the head of... Romanians. Today’s Romanians in Hungary or the chronicle of a programmed twilight (II)”], in *Larics*, June 2nd, 2022, Available at: <https://larics.ro/oamenii-budapestei-din-fruntea-romanilor-romanii-din-ungaria-de-astazi-sau-cronica-unui-crepuscul-programat-ii/>, Accessed on: August 30, 2022.

Hungarians in Romania can obtain dual citizenship faster than Romanians in Hungary. The process was simplified by the Hungarian authorities after 2011. In just six years, more than 515.000 Hungarians with dual citizenship have been registered in Romania¹⁶¹.

Moreover, in recent years, Romanians in Hungary are facing what specialists in the field have called the phenomenon of “ethno-business”. This means that some Hungarian citizens, with the tacit support of the state, declare themselves to be Romanians without actually belonging, ethnically or culturally, to the Romanian minority in Hungary, in order to benefit from the funds intended for Romanian self-governments. This has even led to a situation where the Country Self-Governments (which are the official bodies of the Romanians that are supposed to represent their interests before the Hungarian state) are run by people loyal to Budapest and not to the Romanian national cause¹⁶².

Romanians in Hungary are not and cannot be represented in Parliament by an organization such as the UDMR in Romania. The latter actively participates in the Romanian government and has even had presidential candidates. It should be noted that in the Hungarian Parliament representatives of minorities do not have the right to vote, but only a consultative role¹⁶³.

Even though the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania is not a political party, but a political organization, founded to represent the interests of the Hungarian community, the results obtained in the elections held in Romania from 1990 to date have not exceeded 8%, it is the political party that has been the longest governing party in Romania in the post-December period, more precisely between December 1996 and 2023¹⁶⁴.

The legal status of Romanians in Hungary is that of a national minority. In Hungarian law, there are two types of minorities: national and ethnic. The former, of which there are 13, have a mother state while ethnic minorities (*e.g.*, Gypsies/Roma) do not have a mother state¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶¹ Bianca Felseghi, „Dublul mesaj al lui Viktor Orbán pentru maghiarii cu dublă cetățenie din România” [“Viktor Orbán’s double message for dual Hungarians in Romania”], in *PressOne*, July 26, 2017, Available at: <https://pressone.ro/dublul-mesaj-al-lui-viktor-orban-pentru-maghiarii-cu-dubla-cetatenie-din-romania>, Accessed on: August 16, 2022.

¹⁶² Gabriel Moisa, „Oamenii Budapestei din fruntea... românilor. Românii din Ungaria de astăzi sau cronică unui crepuscul programat (II)” [“The people of Budapest on the... Romanians. Romanians in Hungary today or the chronicle of a programmed twilight (II)”], in *Larics*, June 2nd, 2022, Available at: <https://larics.ro/oamenii-budapestei-din-fruntea-romanilor-romanii-din-ungaria-de-astazi-sau-cronica-unui-crepuscul-progra-mat-ii/>, Accessed on: August 30, 2022.

¹⁶³ Nicu Stan, „Vestii proaste pentru românii din Ungaria. Totul este cât se poate de clar” [“Bad news for Romanians in Hungary. Everything is as clear as can be”], in *Playtech*, May 18, 2020, Available at: <https://playtech.ro/stiri/vesti-proaste-pentru-romanii-din-ungaria-totul-este-cat-se-poate-de-clar-127269>, Accessed on: January 27, 2021.

¹⁶⁴ Bianca Ion, „Ce variante de guvernare ar exista după ultimul sondaj publicat de Politico” [“What the options for government would be according to the latest poll published by Politico”], in *Ziare*, August 21, 2021, Available at: <https://ziare.com/florin-citu/stiri-florin-citu/variante-guvernare-analiza-politico-1695770>, Accessed on: December 14, 2023.

¹⁶⁵ Alexandru Ghișa on the show Nova TV, „Ungaria trebuie ajutată să revină pe calea cea dreaptă. Cum? Prin măsuri de coerciție” [“Hungary must be helped to get back on track. How? By

According to Ph.D. Alexandru Ghișa, historian and former diplomat at the Romanian Embassy in Hungary, through such a legal classification the Hungarian government encourages the movement of territorial autonomy of the Hungarians in Romania. It is trying to obtain a similar status for Hungarians in Romania, which would make it possible, as in the case of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to obtain territorial autonomy. Minorities in the former republic were constituent parts of the state, and when it broke up they were able to establish their own nation states¹⁶⁶.

SOLUTIONS FOR MAINTAINING COMMUNITY VITALITY

The Romanians in Hungary went from the ideal-typical state of a vital community that succeeded in starting the national revival movement in Transylvania to one abandoned to the permanent onslaught of its host state. Without the revitalization of the community through the intervention of the Romanian state, the will of the community will gradually be replaced by that of the Hungarian state, a process that has already begun. Revitalization will not be possible without the adoption of the following solutions:

1. Replacement of the community representative body (ATRU) and support for organisations not affiliated to Budapest's interests;
2. Creation of private secondary and higher education structures;
3. Connecting the community to Romanian radio and TV stations;
4. Making the dual citizenship process more efficient;
5. Support of the Romanian Orthodox Diocese of Hungary.

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¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

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THE HUNGARIANIZATION OF NAMES AND INSCRIPTIONS ON THE CROSSES IN THE CEMETERY OF PLĂIEȘII DE JOS – A FORM OF MANIFESTATION OF ETHNIC ASSIMILATION

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*Narcis-Claudiu Rupe*¹⁶⁸

ABSTRACT

The cemetery of the Romanian community in Plăieșii de Jos testifies by the inscriptions on the funerary monuments to the process of ethnic assimilation that has been going on here for a long time. An extended analysis of these inscriptions may bring new elements for a better understanding of this process of ethnic assimilation of a Romanian community.

Keywords: ethnic assimilation, Transylvania, Plăieșii de Jos, Harghita.

SHORT INTRODUCTION

A previous research¹⁶⁹ noted that the funerary monuments in the Orthodox cemetery in Plăieșii de Jos, Harghita county, are mostly inscribed in Hungarian, even though the Orthodox (or the former Greek-Catholic) believers in the region are historically mostly of Romanian ethnicity. This research highlights the process of ethnic assimilation of the Romanian community, in which the replacement of the Romanian language by Hungarian language in the inscriptions on tombstones is one form of manifestation of this process of ethnic assimilation.

Starting from this, we tried to make an inventory of the funerary inscriptions in the Orthodox cemetery of Plăieșii de Jos, Harghita county, through a field research carried out in June 2023, in order to see to what extent these inscriptions can shed light on the process of ethnic assimilation carried out in this locality.

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¹⁶⁹ Radu Baltasiu, Ovidiana Bulumac and Gabriel Săpunaru, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna [The weakening of the Romanian community in Harghita-Covasna]*, Bucharest, Ethnological Publishing House, 2013, p. 120.

ORTHODOX CEMETERY IN PLĂIEȘII DE JOS

The church and implicitly the cemetery of Plăieșii de Jos are attested in written sources continuously since 1729¹⁷⁰, most probably it was a church that already existed long before and that in 1750 had collapsed since in the Greek-Catholic confessional census of 1750 there is no mention of the existence of a church in this village¹⁷¹, although 433 Greek-Catholic believers were recorded here, but they had no priest. In the same year, 1750, they asked Bishop Petru Aron for support in building a new church¹⁷². In 1760, the new wooden church was registered, with two priests serving a community of 86 families of Greek Catholic believers¹⁷³. The stone church of Plăieșii de Jos, which still exists today, was built between 1880 and 1884 at the expense of the community¹⁷⁴. In 1948 the Greek Catholic church of Plăieșii de Jos changed to the Orthodox confession, which it has kept until today.

At a distance of about 100 meters from the present church is marked with a cross the site of the old wooden church built in 1750, practically in the middle of today's cemetery that surrounds the church on all sides. The oldest cross identified in the course of our research dates from 1874, with very few crosses older than 1900, 7 to be precise, all made of stone. Crosses preserved before 1950 are mostly made of wood, which was probably the rule in the previous century, which explains the preservation of a small number of pre – 1900 funerary monuments, together with the current practice of re-using old graves.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITY IN PLĂIEȘII DE JOS

The commune of Plăieșii de Jos consists of the villages of Cașinu Nou, Iacobeni, Imper, Plăieșii de Jos and Plăieșii de Sus. The presence of Romanians in these villages is attested by written sources from the beginning of the 18th century (although as we have shown above the first wooden church of the Romanians most probably dates from before 1700); the historical names in Romanian of these villages, as recorded in parish registers from the 18th century are: Satu Nou (Cașinu Nou), Iacfalău (Iacobeni), Imper (Imper), Satu de Jos (Plăieșii de Jos) and Satu de Sus (Plăieșii de Sus)¹⁷⁵. The village

¹⁷⁰ Nicoleta Ploșnea, *Biserici, școli, comunități rurale românești din Covasna și Harghita (1850–1918) [Churches, schools, Romanian rural communities in Covasna and Harghita (1850–1918)]*, Romanian Language Publishing House, 2012, p. 438.

¹⁷¹ Augustin Bunea, *Statistica românilor din Transilvania în anul 1750 [Statistics of the Romanians in Transylvania in 1750]*, in *Transilvania*, No. 9/1901, p. 248, Available at: https://www.bcuculuj.ro/synfilebibdigit/periodice/transilvania/1901/BCUCLUJ_FP_279996_1901_032_009.pdf, Accessed on: January 21, 2024.

¹⁷² Ion Ranca, *Românii din scaunele secuiești [Romanians from the Szekler Seats]*, Vol. 2, Pax Historica Publishing House, Târgu Mureș, 1997, p. 196.

¹⁷³ Virgil Ciobanu, *Statistica românilor ardeleni din 1760 – 1762 [Statistics of Transylvanian Romanians from 1760–1762]*, The Institute of National History Yearbook, 3, 1924–1925, p. 681.

¹⁷⁴ Nicoleta Ploșnea, *quoted work*, p. 87.

¹⁷⁵ Harghita County Directorate of National Archives, Parish Registers Fund, Register 302.

of Doboi (where the church and cemetery are located) is now considered a street¹⁷⁶, although it is marked with the name “Doboly” on the military map made by the Austrian Empire in 1769, on which the Romanian church, most probably the wooden church built in 1750, is also represented¹⁷⁷. The Orthodox church in Plăieșii de Jos served the needs of all the Romanians of the villages listed above, a fact also noted on the crosses in the cemetery preserved to this day.




Figure 1. Austrian military map from 1769 showing the village of Doboi (Doboly) and the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church.

Without going into too much detail on the historical demography of the Romanian community of Plăieșii de Jos, which will be the subject of a later study, we will try to sketch an indicative demographic evolution. The pressure of ethnic assimilation of the Romanians in the area has been permanent in the last centuries, but we will record here a few sets of data for the period in which funerary monuments are still preserved in the cemetery studied. In 1900, 1015 believers of the church of Plăieșii de Jos were recorded¹⁷⁸. In 1930 in the village of Imper out of 222 people who declared themselves Romanians only 22 knew Romanian, in the village of Plăieșii de Sus out of 175 only 37, in the village of Plăieșii de Jos out of 73 spoke Romanian 8¹⁷⁹. In 1952 there were still 247 families attending the Orthodox church

¹⁷⁶ Radu Baltasiu, Ovidiana Bulumac and Gabriel Săpunaru, *quoted work*, p. 82.

¹⁷⁷ Josephinische Landesaufnahme, Map available at: <https://maps.arcanum.com/de/browse/country/firstsurvey/>, Accessed on: March 10, 2024.

¹⁷⁸ Alexandru Lupeanu, *Șematismul venerabilului cler al Arhidiecei Metropolitane Greco-Catolice Române de la Alba Iulia și Făgăraș pre anul domnului 1900 [The Sematism of the Venerable Clergy of the Romanian Greek-Catholic Metropolitan Archdiocese of Alba Iulia and Făgăraș for the year 1900]*, Blaj, 1900, p. 573.


¹⁷⁹ Costel Cristian Lazăr, *Românii din județul Ciuc în perioada interbelică [Romanians in Ciuc County in the interwar period]*, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 39–40.

in Plăieșii de Jos, of these only 25 considered themselves Romanian¹⁸⁰. In 2002, 276 people declared themselves Romanians, of which only 126 were Romanian speakers¹⁸¹, in 2021 there were 117 people of Romanian ethnicity, of which only 38 declared themselves Romanian speakers¹⁸².

INVENTORY OF FUNERARY MONUMENTS

The research in June 2023 was aimed at inventorying the funerary monuments in the cemetery of Plăieșii de Jos and transcribing the inscriptions on them, as far as they are still legible. At first glance, the inscriptions on the tombstones here were mostly in Hungarian, but there were also inscriptions in Romanian. By making an inventory of these inscriptions we mainly wanted to verify the evolution of the use of the Hungarian language in a Romanian community over time, especially since the use of a language other than the mother tongue in an intimate matter such as the inscription on a funerary monument is a very strong signal for the process of ethnic assimilation.

A total of 432 crosses were inventoried and the inscriptions on them were transcribed into a database, as far as they are legible. The database was organised according to several variables, including: the cross's call sign, the legibility of the text, the language of the text on the crosses, the year the cross was erected, the name, surname, year of birth and death of those mentioned on the crosses, and their sex. A total of 368 inscriptions are completely or partially readable, 64 of which are unreadable.




¹⁸⁰ Ion I. Russu, *Românii și secuii [Romanians and the Szeklers]*, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1990, pp. 132–133.

¹⁸¹ Radu Baltasiu, Ovidiana Bulumac and Gabriel Săpunaru, *quoted work*, p. 73.


¹⁸² National Institute of Statistics, „Recensământul Populației și Locuințelor 2021. Caracteristici demografice” [“Population and Housing Census 2021. Demographic characteristics”], Available at: <https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-%20rp1%202021/rezultate%20definitive-%20caracteristici-%20demografice/>, Accessed on: March 10, 2024.

When the year of its installation is not noted on the cross, we approximate it by the year of the death of the first person mentioned on the cross. The data show that the cemetery was renewed over time, most of the crosses having been erected after the establishment of the communist regime. At the same time, the evolution over time of the installation of funerary monuments in the cemetery of Plăieșii de Jos reflects the demographic evolution of the Romanian community in this locality.




LANGUAGE OF INSCRIPTIONS AND SPELLING MISTAKES

The language used for the inscriptions on the crosses in the cemetery at Plăieșii de Jos is mainly Hungarian. Among the 345 crosses for which the language used can be identified are 21 crosses on which both Romanian and Hungarian are used.



It draws attention to the fact that many of the inscriptions in Romanian have spelling mistakes or grammatical errors, a signal of the low level of education and knowledge of the Romanian language.




LANGUAGE USE IN DIFFERENT HISTORICAL PERIODS

Perhaps the most interesting graphic representation of the data obtained from the inventory of the burial monuments in the cemetery of Plăieșii de Jos is the one showing the use of a certain language according to the historical period.


For the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the exclusive use of the Hungarian language is evident, a phenomenon that continues after the union of Transylvania with Romania in 1918 – keeping in mind that the number of crosses from the period before 1940–1950 is not representative, given the practice of re-using graves and replacing crosses. However, the post-1950 period is the period of the current graves, which better reflects the custom of using a particular language for funerary inscriptions.

Considering the above, it is obvious that the use of the Hungarian language was overwhelming during the existence of the Hungarian Autonomous Region, while in the other historical periods the use of the Romanian language on the tombstones was close to the statistical figures concerning the knowledge of the Romanian language.



TRADITIONAL SURNAMES

It is worth noting that the family names present on the funerary monuments in the cemetery in Plăieșii de Jos are the same as those in the first written records of the presence of Romanians in the region. Vancea, Simon, Costi, Todoran, Radu, Fekete, Crăciun, Maro, Hosu, Șiloti, Mohan, Tulit, Curta, Geți, Stoica, Șerban, Vasi, Cojoc – these are the names that appear constantly in censuses, parish registers or other archival documents since 1720, which attests to a documented continuity of the same families in the villages of Plăieșii de Jos.



CONCLUSION

The use of a language other than one's mother tongue in a setting as intimate as the inscriptions on a funerary monument is hard to explain. The believers in Plăieșii de Jos who attend the Orthodox church did not offer a clear explanation. V.A. (90 years old) says that the inscriptions on the crosses are made according to the wishes of the family, the text and language are chosen by the family, as does V.M. (72 years old). Nowadays most of the crosses are made of stone and the inscription is made by a specialised company in Târgu Secuiesc, but even before 1989 it was the same situation where the crosses were usually inscribed outside the village, but according to the wishes of the family of the deceased.

According to information from historical sources, the Romanian community of Plăieșii de Jos has a documented continuity from the beginning of the 18th century, there being information that Romanians were present here in previous centuries, but for the subject of this article the relevant information comes from this period. Documents from the 18th century indicate them as Romanians and attest to the fact that they spoke Romanian, as well as for the 19th century. The use of the Romanian language on tombstones in the 20th century coincides with census data on the use of the Romanian language, providing further confirmation for the ongoing process of ethnic assimilation in the region.

An interesting case is the funerary monument of Udrescu Nicolae (?–1962) and his wife Udrescu Eva (1893–1934). According to V.A. (90 years old) Udrescu

Nicolae was not a native of Plăieșii de Jos, only his wife was from the village; in the interwar period Udrescu Nicolae had a general store in Imper, raised two daughters who later went to Bucharest. The data provided by V.A. (90 years old) are confirmed by the school registers of Plăieșii de Jos from the interwar period, which also record the Romanian ethnicity of the Udrescu family. The only difference is that the inscription on the tombstone is in Hungarian and the names of the two husbands are written using Hungarian spelling: Udreszku Nikula and Udreszku Eva. The cross preserved to date was erected in 1962, after the death of Udrescu Nicolae, so it is not clear who made the decision to have the inscription in Hungarian and the names of the deceased written in Hungarian spelling.

A hypothesis worth pursuing in the future should consider the fact that the tombstones are public monuments and to what extent there would be community pressure to conform to the majority language spoken in the region, namely Hungarian.

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- Ranca Ion, *Românii din scaunele secuiești [Romanians from the Szekler Seats]*, Vol. 2, Pax Historica Publishing House, Târgu Mureș, 1997.
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SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITY IN COVASNA, HARGHITA AND MUREȘ COUNTIES

*Dragoș-Dan Burghelia*¹⁸³

ABSTRACT

This paper examines demographic changes and cultural dynamics in Covasna and Harghita counties, Romania, where Romanian citizens constitute a minority. Analysis of census data from 1992–2021 reveals a significant decrease in the Romanian population, with approximately 30.000 fewer people in the last three decades. Furthermore, the study explores the distribution of Romanian communities in these counties, highlighting disparities between larger and smaller settlements. It also investigates the state of the Orthodox church heritage, documenting the loss of numerous churches due to historical events such as the Magyarization processes and the Vienna Dictate. In addition, the study addresses the challenges facing Orthodox parishes in ethnically mixed areas, where dwindling congregations threaten their sustainability. Further, it highlights the impact of the declining school population on Romanian language education, especially in administrative units such as municipalities and cities. Overall, this research highlights the complex interplay between demographic trends, cultural preservation efforts and institutional dynamics in regions characterised by ethnic diversity and historical transformation.

Keywords: administration, multi-ethnic communities, discrimination, legal work.

CURRENT STATISTICAL DATA ON THE ROMANIAN COMUNITY

In Covasna and Harghita counties, where Romanians form a numerical minority, the 2021 population and housing census showed a reduced presence of Romanians, numbering only 76.356 people (42.752 in Covasna – 23.3% and 33.694 in Harghita – 12.6%)¹⁸⁴, compared to 103.534 in 1992, when there were 54.586 Romanians in Covasna county and 48.948 in Harghita¹⁸⁵ (27.178 fewer people). Thus, over the last three decades, the Romanian population in the two counties has decreased by about 30.000 people (an average of 1.000 per year).

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¹⁸⁴ National Institute of Statistics, „Rezultate ale Recensământului din 2021: Tab. 2.2.2. POPULAȚIA REZIDENTĂ DUPĂ ETNIE, PE JUDEȚE, MUNICIPII, ORAȘE, COMUNE, LA 1 DECEMBRIE 2021” [“Results of the 2021 Census: Tab. 2.2.2 RESIDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, BY COUNTIES, MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES, TOWNS, COMMUNES, ON DECEMBER 1ST, 2021”], Available at: https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate_rpl_2021/rezultate_definitive_caracteristici-etno-cultural-demografice/, Accessed on: March 20, 2024.

¹⁸⁵ National Institute of Statistics, „Rezultate ale Recensământului din 1992: Tab. 2. POPULAȚIA PE NAȚIONALITĂȚI” [“Results of the 1992 Census: Tab. 2. POPULATION BY NATIONALITIES”], Available at: https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate_recensamant_1992/, Accessed on: March 20, 2024.

Of the 45 localities in Covasna county (5 municipalities and towns and 40 communes), about half (21 localities) are home to Romanian communities with more than 100 inhabitants, while the other half (24 localities) is composed of small and very small communities with less than 100 Romanian inhabitants. In Harghita county, out of the 67 localities (9 municipalities and towns and 58 communes), about one third (19 localities) host Romanian communities with more than 100 inhabitants, while in two thirds (48 localities) the Romanian ethnic population is made up of small and very small communities with less than 100 inhabitants. All these communities, regardless of their size, face a lack of resources and adequate institutionalisation to maintain their Romanian identity¹⁸⁶.

At present time, the Orthodox church patrimony in the Diocese of Covasna and Harghita comprises 158 churches built between 1658 and 2023, including 14 monastic settlements (nine monasteries, three hermitages and two metoques) and 10 chapels in military units, hospitals and in the Miercurea Ciuc Penitentiary. This number would have been much higher if the 31 Orthodox and Greek-Catholic churches had not disappeared along with the respective communities as a result of the Magyarization process, and the 25 churches that were demolished during the Vienna Diktat period, most of which were built in the centre of the villages, which was not accepted by the Horthy administration¹⁸⁷.

A significant problem is the future situation of Orthodox parishes in towns with a mixed ethnic population, where the number of believers is low. Currently, there are 33 Orthodox parishes in Harghita and Covasna counties with less than 30 worshippers. Due to the old age of the parishioners in these communities and the impact on the natural increase of the population, there is a risk that most of these communities will disappear ethnically and confessionally in the next 20–30 years¹⁸⁸.

As a result of the decrease in the school population, there are currently 46 territorial administrative units in Harghita County and 24 in Covasna County, including some towns (Vlăhița, Băile Tușnad), where Romanian language schools are no longer operating. We continue to witness the perpetuation of the phenomenon of Hungarian pupils not learning Romanian within the national education system, which encourages segregation along ethnic lines and the accumulation of unnatural tensions in inter-ethnic relations¹⁸⁹.

¹⁸⁶ Ioan Lăcătușu, *Spiritualitate românească și conviețuire interetnică în Covasna și Harghita [Romanian spirituality and inter-ethnic coexistence in Covasna and Harghita]*, St. Gheorghe, Eurocarpatica Publishing House, 2002, p. 13.

¹⁸⁷ Ioan Lăcătușu, *Structuri etnice și confessionale în județele Covasna și Harghita [Ethnic and confessionnal structures in Covasna and Harghita counties]*, Târgu-Mureș, “Petru Maior” University Publishing House, 2008, p. 203.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 177.

¹⁸⁹ Address ISJ Covasna with No. 12 R.S./28.06.2024 and Address ISJ Harghita with No. 2925/07.06.2024, documents that I obtained from the county inspectorates after sending several requests in this regard.

ASPECTS OF INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE

Romanians in Covasna and Harghita counties face a lack of legal means and effective instruments to counteract the negative impact of the decentralisation process in their relations with local public administration authorities, which are perpetually subordinated to ethnic Hungarian groups. The Romanian community has completely lost the capacity to promote its interests at local level and to influence important decisions affecting it, as its low degree of representation does not allow it to do so. In many administrative territorial units, Romanians have no representatives in local councils.

Local authorities and public institutions organise their daily activities satisfactorily, but the interests of the Romanian community are addressed only accidentally and only when imposed by external constraints. The feeling of powerlessness, accompanied by fear and discouragement, defines the mentality of the Romanian community today. The fundamental structures of the Romanian community, represented by the Church, the school and the town hall, are almost destroyed in more than half of the localities in Covasna county and in two thirds of those in Harghita. In addition, Romanians, as a numerical minority, face a lack of support from society and the state, bitterly noting that they do not see themselves in the area's vision for the future and wondering whether they should continue their existence there or seek other destinations.

Another major risk for the Romanian community in these counties is that they see their community framework destroyed, without resources and means to sustain and protect their Romanian ethnic identity. Sociological studies have shown that the Hungarian majority in Covasna, Harghita and partly Mureş counties is protected by obvious and excessive measures of positive discrimination, while the Romanian community is condemned to denationalisation, assimilation or emigration¹⁹⁰.

In Covasna and Harghita counties, public cultural institutions do not pay attention to the history and culture of Romanians in these areas. Local monographs, cultural heritage albums and tourist brochures reflect the mono-ethnic character of these counties, ignoring the contribution and existence of the Romanian population. Local history volumes, tourist albums and leaflets also promote separatism and territorial autonomy of the so-called "Szeklerland", thus neglecting ethnic diversity and Romanian identity.

In addition, books continue to be published that downplay the contribution of Romanians in the former Szekler seats and distort the historical truth. The previous example is relevant, with the history textbook of the "Szeklerland" where they seriously insult the Romanians and falsify historical events. The republication of the "History of the Szeklers" textbook by the Harghita and Covasna County Councils,

¹⁹⁰ Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru and Ovidiana Bulumac, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna: raport de cercetare [Weakening Romanian community in Harghita-Covasna: research report]*, Bucharest, Sociological Studies Collection, Ethnological Publishing House, 2013, p. 47.

with public funds, cultivates the denial of responsibility for the past and promotes separatism, with serious consequences for the education of young people. Thus, these practices encourage the formation of a generation of young Secessionists with a separatist and segregationist attitude, preventing natural communication and collaboration with young Romanians.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND PARALLEL PERCEPTIONS OF THE PAST

We can observe that in multi-ethnic communities, the perception of controversial, violent or painful events for the collective mind comes to be perceived in completely different, even parallel, forms. To this day, many Romanian villagers from Gurghiului Valley or Hungarians from Nirajului Valley prefer to remain anonymous or not to discuss the days of March 1990 at all, for example. An important step in this direction must be taken to identify mistakes on both sides and then accept and ultimately forgive and reconcile. Casting a shadow, tabooing the subject only provides fertile ground for those who wish to politically speculate and divide communities.

In this context, identifying the “truth” and accommodating the collective memory with it becomes extremely difficult as the two communities have completely different perceptions not only of historical events but also of recent moments in their common past. The case of March 1990 is a perfect illustration of these antipodal conceptions. Finding “common ground” in Transylvanian politics has never been an easy objective, especially when it comes to recovering the truth and confronting the past. Inevitably “what is the middle way?” becomes the most difficult question to answer¹⁹¹. However, more often than not, this is a question that political partisans use tendentious rhetoric to argue that a mutually agreed upon settlement, in which all past wrongs are acknowledged and documented, is impossible.

One possible method for dealing with the past is to set up truth commissions. One of the most common and obvious political and moral justifications for the use of truth commissions in post-conflict societies is that they offer a non-adversarial, temporary, non-judicial and non-combative method of resolving difficult questions about the violent past. Truth commissions can have significant social, cultural and political power. Governments, policy-makers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the general public in societies in transition often invest great hope in the ability of truth processes to build post-conflict “meaning”¹⁹² and, consequently, to make sense of the chaos of political violence.

¹⁹¹ Kirk Simpson, *Truth recovery in Northern Ireland: critically interpreting the past*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2009, p. 25.

¹⁹² *Ibidem*, p. 33.

Unfortunately, the elites of the minority community, in their efforts to preserve cultural identity, often apply methods that isolate the members of the two ethnic groups, in some cases leading to enclave and, in the common perception of the majority, to an unhealthy separation, especially for the younger generation. If the Târgu Mureş phenomenon was an isolated episode, the minority-majority relationship must also be analysed in the immediate vicinity, where the demographic relationship is clearly changing. The local reality is characterised by a symbolic imbalance, which then leads to the development of all other administrative, economic, educational and cultural imbalances. Instead of an open dialogue and mutual support, we observe in these areas that the Hungarian majority are over-strengthening their community while the Romanian minorities, lacking the general support of society and the state, remain without a real community¹⁹³. Thus, ethnic Romanian minorities are encouraged through non-specific fear and by promoting a partial pragmatism, to forget their collective identification elements of the community. The inevitable result is a collective sense of insecurity and mutual suspicion.

This lack of effective engagement in dealing with sensitive issues and establishing bodies that actively work to heal the wounds of the past and bring communities together will generate widening rifts. Without cultural interference and honest dialogue, misinformation will reach new heights and parallel narratives will continue to develop. Victims of violence need to be heard and understood and oral history becomes an easy means for this. As part of the process of critically interpreting the past, people need to create and maintain shared spaces and places of remembrance where relevant social and political meanings are produced. In the context of a discussion about confronting the past and coming to terms with painful truths, political and social public memory must be shaped as a necessary part of post-conflict transition and democratic reconstruction.

Particularly in the case of an event that has caused major wounds and rifts between communities, the role of sociological study and oral history becomes even more important by treating and comparing points of view. Thorough analysis of the personal experiences of victims or ordinary participants can provide new insights into the wrongs that occurred at the time and how we can understand the unfolding of events. Oral history is inherently subjective: its subjectivity is both inevitable and necessary to understand the meanings we attribute to our past and present. The great task of qualitative research, especially sociological interviews, is to expose the meaning of lived experience. The value of the in-depth interview is that it allows us to experience the world of another person and even a community in all its complexity¹⁹⁴. And by compiling the in-depth interviews and combining the insights

¹⁹³ Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru and Ovidiana Bulumac, *quoted work*, p. 46.

¹⁹⁴ Valerie Raleigh Yow, *Recording oral history: a guide for the humanities and social sciences*, 2nd ed., California, AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, 2005, p. 41.

gained from them with various types of information from other types of documents, we can get a better picture of how we have come to interact as communities.

Interaction between multi-ethnic communities is often complicated by divergent interpretations of the past. Finding common ground in confronting sensitive historical events is a persistent challenge. The establishment of truth commissions could provide an appropriate framework for managing and reconciling divergent perceptions. To better understand divergent perspectives, sociological study and oral history are valuable tools. Detailed analysis of personal experiences and individual recollections can reveal important nuances and contexts in interpreting the past. By listening to and understanding personal stories, we can gain a more comprehensive picture of the impact of events on individuals and communities. This approach allows us to approach a deeper understanding of the complexity of the past and build bridges of communication and empathy between different social groups.

MARKING THE TERRITORY IN AN ETHNIC SENSE BY PLACING AND MODIFYING PUBLIC MONUMENTS. CASE STUDY – EREMITU COMMUNE, MUREȘ COUNTY

The work carried out as president of the Civic Forum of Romanians from Covasna, Harghita and Mureș included observing, documenting and reporting to the competent institutions about certain buildings, monuments, statues or other symbols that were illegally placed, modified from the original project or even moved or transformed entirely, all without respecting the legal provisions in the field. A relevant example of how the local authorities led by representatives of the Hungarian minority understand to relate to the legal and legal framework of the Romanian state is the Hungarian monument in Eremitu commune, Mureș county.

In fact, we are talking about an obelisk located in the commune of Eremitu, on County Road 153, near street number 313 in Mureș County, entitled “Millennium Monument”, respectively the legal conditions under which it was placed, the way it was intervened on and subsequently completed with new elements. Following the reply received from the local authorities in Eremitu after a long time, its representatives told us in an address dated July 2022 that the monument had been erected in the commune in 1896, without providing any concrete evidence in this regard, such as documents from the town hall archives, relevant deeds or minutes.

It is also mentioned that alterations and additions were made to the monument after it was built, and the year 1996 is mentioned for the application of the plaque which reads “*1.100 éve itt vagyunk*” – (*we have been here for 1.100 years*). Of course, the Mayor of Eremitu deliberately refuses to give details of the other elements of the monument, which were clearly added after the year of adoption of Law No. 120/2006 on public monuments, Law No. 50/1991 on the authorisation of building works and Law No. 350/2001 on planning and urban development. In this regard, photographic

evidence was even obtained on the condition of the monument from 2008, 2012 and 2014, at which time the bird “Turul”¹⁹⁵ was missing from the top of the obelisk, the coat of arms of Hungary had a different shape and elements, and notably, the map of “Greater Hungary” was missing from the monument! It should be pointed out that changes to the monument were made extremely recently, as recently as 2019, when the plaque where “Greater Hungary” was depicted was replaced from a rectangular piece into a plaque cut out with only the borders, as can still be seen today. In this context, we observe the fulfilment of the constitutive elements of the offence of material forgery of official documents provided for in Article 320 of the Criminal Code, an offence committed by the author of the address, the mayor of the municipality of Eremitu. In the very vicinity of the monument, an informative poster mentions that in 2013 works were carried out to modernize the space and modify the monument, information presented by the authors themselves on the spot, a fact intentionally omitted and contrary to the law in the documents communicated.

It should be noted that for the location of the elements added later on the monument, the necessary urban planning documentation was not obtained, the approval of the Ministry of Culture was not received and no rules in this field were respected, they are pure elements of marking the territory in an ethnic sense by elements that make obvious reference to identity themes such as “the millenary homeland”, “the Turul bird” “Greater Hungary”. Also, in total defiance of the law, the monument underwent massive structural changes by placing the so-called “tower bird”, the top of the obelisk was cut and modified, also without requesting and obtaining the necessary documentation according to the law. Such chauvinist symbols have been placed on Romanian territory with the even illegal complicity of local authorities who have no regard for the Romanian Government, the relevant ministries and, in particular, the laws of the state and the country’s constitution. In these circumstances, the constituent elements of the crime of destruction provided for in Article 253 of the Criminal Code by permanently and irreparably altering the original state of the monument are met. It also meets the specific elements of the intervention on historical monuments provided for by Law No. 422/2001 as well as the execution without building or demolition authorization or with disregard of the provisions in the field provided for by art. 24 of Law No. 50/1991.

Administrative complaints and even a criminal complaint were filed on all these facts so that the Public Ministry can act on the one hand to restore the monument to its original state and remove the irredentist elements from it, but also to identify the perpetrators and bring the criminal investigation procedure to a successful conclusion. It is important to understand the true significance of these facts, the subtle and often unknown way in which local authorities in areas ethnically

¹⁹⁵ “the falcon or turul, which in shamanic tradition rested above the tree of life that connects the earth to the world beyond and to heaven, has remained longer [than other clan totems] as a symbol belonging to the ruling (Arpadian) house. But even this was soon eclipsed by the symbol of the double cross and, around 1200, by the red and white striped shield of the Passion of Christ”, in Martyn C. Rady, *Nobility, land and service in medieval Hungary*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 12.

dominated by the Hungarian minority place and alter monuments with irredentist symbolism. At the same time, it is difficult to understand how such offensive and insulting elements towards the Romanian state are tolerated on the national territory by the central authorities.

Such actions illustrate not only a violation of the law, but also subtly express the symbolism and cultural identity of the communities involved. They highlight a deep attachment to another state, an identification with a “great – millennial” nation. At the same time, these manifestations also show a complex relationship with national history and their minority status in the host country. By placing and altering monuments with irredentist symbolism, local authorities in areas ethnically dominated by minorities seek to express their affinity with neighbouring countries and to underline their cultural and historical belonging to these nations. Such actions can be interpreted as attempts to assert identity in the context of a minority community but can also be perceived as challenges to central authorities and the host state.

These symbolic manifestations show that the relationship of minority communities with their countries of origin and national history is complex and nuanced. They reflect a desire to preserve cultural identity and to assert ethnic belonging, but also a struggle for recognition and rights within the host society. At the same time, they can fuel tensions and conflicts within communities and between communities and central authorities, highlighting the fragility of the inter-ethnic balance and the need for deeper dialogue and mutual understanding.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the observations made in this analysis, the complexity and sensitivity of inter-ethnic relations in the regions mentioned becomes evident. Issues of cultural identity, recognition of minority communities and interpretation of history are often subjects of dispute and tension. Each community seeks ways of affirming and protecting its identity, and this can be expressed through symbols, monuments and actions that may be perceived differently by the various parties involved. Each community has the right to express and promote its own values and traditions, subject to respect for the laws of the state and the rights of the majority ethnic group in the state but the minority in the region. Open dialogue and mutual understanding are fundamental to overcoming inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts.

On the other hand, it is essential that the symbolic manifestations and actions of local authorities are consistent with democratic principles and respect for the law. The use of irredentist symbols or challenges to the host state can fuel tensions and hinder progress towards harmonious and cooperative coexistence. The authorities must therefore act responsibly and promote a climate of understanding and tolerance in ethnically diverse regions. Finally, solving inter-ethnic problems and strengthening social cohesion requires sustained efforts from all parties involved –

local authorities, minority and majority communities, civil society and state institutions. It is essential to encourage dialogue, promote mutual respect and value diversity as a source of cultural and social richness, not as a reason for division and conflict.

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ATTACHMENTS



Figure 1. Photo of the Monument in Eremitu in 2008.




Figure 2. Photo of the Monument in Eremitu in 2012.



Figure 3. Photo of the Monument in Eremitu in 2014.



Figure 4. Photo of the Monument in Eremitu in 2019. (see the Turul bird, the rectangular plaque and the cross on the crown added).



Figure 5. Photo of the Monument in Eremitu in 2022 (map of "Greater Hungary" added in place of the previous rectangular plate with the same content).



Figure 6. On-site information poster about the changes to the monument: (the relocation and modernisation of the monument is mentioned as well as the location of the bird "tour").

SHEPHERDS IN COVASNA DURING COLLECTIVIZATION

Florentina Teacă¹⁹⁶

ABSTRACT

Transhumant pastoralism, the most complex type of traditional pastoralism, was practiced in a series of centres, spread over a relatively narrow area, starting from Brețcu and Covasna and extending along the Transylvanian Subcarpathians through Săcele, the Bran region, the Olt region and the area of Marginimea Sibiului, up to the Hațeg region. In many studies dedicated to transhumant shepherding, the shepherds from Covasna and Brețcu, nicknamed Bârsanii from the Secuime, are mentioned as some of the leaders in their community. However, after hundreds of years of transhumant shepherding, the shepherds of Covasna had to adapt to the period of communism, a sad memory in the history of Romania. The collectivization process put an end to the old transhumance, but favoured “transhumance by train”, with the sheep of the C.A.P.s. From the memories of the shepherds interviewed, it appears that this period also had advantages: it was the first time that they were employed “with papers”, with a work card, with seniority recorded, with a salary, a secure income. In addition to the state-owned sheep, they were allowed to keep their own animals, whose products were then in great demand. What’s more, their reputation as good professionals had spread across the country, so they were sought out by the C.A.P.s in other counties, where they stayed for years, sometimes bringing their families with them. All informants are from Covasna, Voinești.

Keywords: Covasna, Voinești, sheep, transhumance, collectivization.

SHORT INTRODUCTION

“Mocans have been given several names, according to their place of origin, but true mocani must be considered only those from Țara Bârsei (bârsanii) and those from Mărginimea Sibiului (mărginenii), who were *shepherds par excellence*. To these, however, it is necessary to add the Romanian shepherds of the Covasna – Brețcu or Treiscaune area, who fell into the same category”¹⁹⁷.

So, here is a synonymous link between the terms “shepherd(s)” and “shepherds par excellence”, and the fact that the shepherds from Covasna also have these laurels

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¹⁹⁷ „Mocanilor li s-au atribuit mai multe denumiri, după locul de origine, dar mocani adevărați trebuie socotiți numai cei din Țara Bârsei (bârsanii) și cei din Mărginimea Sibiului (mărginenii), care au fost ciobani prin excelență. La aceștia este necesar totuși să fie adăugați și păstorii români din zona Covasna – Brețcu sau Treiscaune, care intrau în aceeași categorie”, in Tudor Mateescu, *Păstoritul mocanilor în teritoriul dintre Dunăre și Marea Neagră [Shepherding the Mocans between the Danube and the Black Sea]*, Bucharest, 1986, p. 5.

on their foreheads only confirms what the shepherds from Voinești¹⁹⁸. Covasnei often say:

“At that time, almost all the people from Voinești had sheep. I don’t know how many there could have been in total; the shepherds of Voinești were then more numerous than the shepherds from Sibiu, Voinești was strengthened. Our ancestors had many sheep, but we can’t find them in the archives, they didn’t write them all down in the deeds, because of taxes. It was rare to have a thousand sheeps, very rare. Nobody knew them (...)”¹⁹⁹.

Covasna’s location in an area where the depression meets the mountain, with vast areas of alpine pastures not very far away, in mountains like those of Buzau and Vrancea, led the ethnologist Sabin Opreanu to say:

“You can rarely find villages of transhumant shepherds better adapted to the natural conditions of the region than Voinești Covasnei (...). Starting with the surrounding mountains and ending with every drop of water, the roads and mountain paths and the needs of the people in the surrounding villages and towns, all seem to have been specifically designed from time immemorial to give the type of pastoral villages where everything happens harmoniously, and life follows its secular rhythm”²⁰⁰.

Here, the shepherd’s trade was handed down from father to son, the sons entering as shepherds with pay to their parents’ sheep, from whom they received annually seven sheep, sheepskins, *suman*, cap, two pairs of yarmulkes, a winter serge and food. As they increased their flocks, they joined their parents’ flocks as associates, and if they were more skillful and learned shepherding more quickly, they joined other sheep owners as *baci*²⁰¹.

It is recognized that

“the native areas of transhumant shepherding are Țara Bârsei, Brețcu, Covasna, Bran, Mărginimea Sibiului”²⁰².

¹⁹⁸ Voinești is a district of Covasna, inhabited by Romanians, who, especially in the past, had as their main occupation shepherding.

¹⁹⁹ „Pe atunci, cam toți voineștenii aveau oi. Nu-mi dau seama câte ar fi putut să fie în total; ciobanii voineșteni erau pe atunci mai mulți decât sibienii, Voineștiul a fost întărit. Moșii noștri aveau multe oi, dar nu găsim în arhive, nu le scriau în acte pe toate, din cauză de taxe. Rar care n-avea mia de oi, foarte rar. Numa’ nu-i știa nimeni (...)”, Informant: Constantin (Din) Costea, born in 1939. People from other parts of the country also talk about the importance of the shepherds from Covasna: *We know that the shepherds from Voinea had more sheep, in more mountains and more sheepfolds than the people from Brabant or Siberia. The people of Voinsburg did not make this known.* (Dragoș Mlăjiceanu, from Gura Teghii, Buzău, comment on Facebook).

²⁰⁰ „Mai rar sate de păstori transhumați mai bine adaptate la condițiile naturale ale regiunii ca Voinești Covasnei (...). Începând cu munții din jur și terminând cu fiecare picur de apă, drumurile și potecile munților și nevoile oamenilor din târgurile și orașele din jur, toate par că din vecie au fost anume întocmite, să dea tipuri de sate păstorești, în cari totul se petrece armonios și vieța își urmează ritmul ei secular.”, in Sabin Opreanu, *Contribuțiuni la transhumanța din Carpații Orientali [Contributions to Transhumance in the Eastern Carpathians]*, 1930, p. 33.

²⁰¹ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

²⁰² „zonele de baștină ale păstoritului transhumant sunt Țara Bârsei, Brețcu, Covasna, Bran, Mărginimea Sibiului”, in Ion Vlăduțiu, *Etnografia românească [Romanian Ethnography]*, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1973, p. 258.

After hundreds of years of transhumant shepherding's heyday, during which Romanian shepherds adapted to various historical changes, after the Second World War they had to live through the times of collectivization. The present material aims to highlight how the Soviet model of "socialist transformation of agriculture" – collectivization – was met and experienced by the shepherds of Covasna.

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA

In 1949 it was decided to adopt the Soviet model of "socialist transformation of agriculture": collectivization, which consisted in the establishment of C.A.P.s (Collective Agricultural Holdings). It should be noted that the land of the peasants registered in the C.A.P.s remained the collective property of these peasants by law. In order to compensate for the shortage of food in the towns and the need to pay war compensation to the Soviet Union, but also to ruin the wealthy peasant households, the quota system was introduced. Under this system, peasants were obliged to hand over to the state a significant part of their household production. The size of this tax in kind varied. Often peasants were left with only the seed wheat for the following year, and sometimes none at all.

As a result of this Soviet import experiment, the more affluent shepherds from Voinești were labelled as "greedy" and the aim was to equalize people: but not to make them all affluent, on the contrary! The property should be shared, so that everyone, practically, should have nothing.

Private individuals had fewer sheep than in the past, but they still had enough for those who had always been involved in this profession. The problem was that they were subject to so-called *quotas*, a kind of tax on products. Old people tell how hard it was to be a shepherd-boy in those days:

"In those days, there were high quotas – for meat, wool (...) They took the cows from the stable and the horse; in Brasov, once, he put about 180 sheep (my father's) to slaughter. It was hard (...) They sent from the Council to see how many sheep they had sheared. Mummy, poor thing, would tear a sheep's fleece into two or three, so there would be more. And if you couldn't pay the quota, they didn't ask, they took what they could find (...) It was hard, very hard (...) Parents could barely pay the taxes, they had quotas (...) hundreds of lei to give"²⁰³.

But the shepherds have also adapted to those times. They always will – they have so much experience. We learn that

²⁰³ „Pe atunci, erau cote mari – de carne, de lână (...) Au luat vacile din grajd și cal; la Brașov, odată, i-a băgat la abator vreo 180 oi (lui tata). A fost greu (...) Trimiteau de la Sfat să vadă câte lăni s-au tuns. Mămica, săraca, rupea o lână de la o oaie în două sau trei, ca să fie mai multe. Și dacă nu puteai să plătești cota, nu te întreba, îți lua ce găsea (...) Greu a fost, foarte greu (...) Părinții abia puteau să plătească impozitele, aveau cote (...) sute de kilograme de dat.”, Informant: Maria Sandulea, Covasna, b. 1933.

“We suffered, but things got better afterwards; we took a bunch of sheep from the collective, it worked out. They even paid you, they gave you 70 lei for lambing and 7 kg of corn; 1000 sheep = 70,000 lei, 7 tons of corn! Ceaușescu’s man went to the sheepfolds, he saw how hard life was for the shepherds, so the law was passed in the 1980s, the shepherds were paid”²⁰⁴.

But the law on shepherds’ wages was much older. As early as the 1960s, shepherds were employed on a “work card” basis. Here is a page from one such work card, belonging to Constantin Leu from Voinești, employed on September 1st, 1960, at G.A.S. Cristur, Odorhei district, Mureș region, with a monthly salary of 646 lei.

Nr. crt.	Unitatea, organizația sau persoana unde a lucrat sau la care lucrează	Motivul intervenției	Data		
			Anul	Luna	Ziua
0					
1	G.A.S. Cristur Haci. Ceorchei 1. Hagi. Odorhei	angajat	1960	09	01
1	idem	angajat la G.A.S. Lăzarea	1963	06	30
		Director Gospodăria Agrară G.A.S. Lăzarea Comuna Lăzarea Regiunea Mureș, A. M.			
2	Responsabilă Agr. de Hagi Lăzarea	angajat prin stăruie	1963	07	01
2	idem	angajat ca activitate 4. a m. nr. 19	1963	10	02
	Comitetul Superior al FRONTUL CENTRAL Gospodăria Agrară LĂZAREA Comuna Lăzarea Regiunea Mureș, Aut. Regiunii Mureș				

Meseria sau funcția	Salariu lunar	Denumirea unității, nr. și data actului pe baza cărui se face înscrisura	Denumirea, semnătura și stampila unității care face înscrisura
cioban	646	G.A.S. Cristur Măsurătoare de 1960/19.09.1960	GYÖRKE ALBERT Director
idem	646	G.A.S. Cristur Măsurătoare de 2573/10.08.1963	GYÖRKE ALBERT Director
Cioban	646	Postul Lăzarea Receps nr. 1130 din 19.09.1963	PERENCZY Director
Idem	646	Postul Lăzarea Receps nr. 1131 din 20.10.1963	PERENCZY Director

Source: Constantin Leu

Shepherds were employed for an indefinite period. Shepherds, on the other hand, were employed only during the summer season, *i.e.*, after the sheep began to be milked and until autumn, when they came down from the mountains. In another work booklet, we find a reconstruction of the seniority in sections from the period of the summer season: from 01.05.1951 to 01.11.1951, from 01.05.1952 to 01.11.1952 and so on. Employer: Covasna Consumer Cooperative.

²⁰⁴ „Am suferit, dar lucrurile s-au îndreptat apoi; am luat un cârd de oi de la colectiv, treaba a mers. Te-au și plătit, îți dădea 70 lei de fătare și 7 kg porumb; 1000 oi = 70.000 lei, 7 tone de porumb! A umblat omul lui Ceaușescu pe la stâni, a văzut ce viață grea duc ciobanii, așa că s-a dat lege prin '80, s-a dat salariu la ciobani.”, Informant: Mircea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1952

Source: Ioan Teacă, paternal grandfather of the author

Now, the community's sheep were managed by the Agricultural Production Cooperative (formerly called the *Întovărășire*, then the Collective Agricultural Household). That is, the C.A.P., called by the locals “*ceapeu*” or “*collective*”. The mountains, which had previously belonged to the inhabitants of Covasna, now belonged to the state. But, as before, there was a sheepfold on each mountain. And the shepherds... the same as before!

“The sheepfolds were not in property. We (n.n.: the Cojan family) came from '62. It was the C.A.P., we went to the C.A.P. sheep. All over the mountains. Well, the C.A.P. had 11 sheepfolds then: in Chișoara, in Goru, in Dealu Negru, in Nioaca, in Meneșberț, in Borta (...) Exactly what I was telling you earlier: before the war, the mountains belonged to some grofs or to someone else, leased or rented by our mocans. After the war, after collectivization, all those mountains (...) Collectivization came and then all the mountains were nationalized, taken away. And then, those mountains that were previously owned by those mocans, they were also baci there, only they were baci from the C.A.P. They were not theirs. They leased them. They belonged to the Romanian state now, they no longer belonged to the grofs, but Florea, if he was a shepherd or a baci there, was still on that mountain. They were not in the patrimony of the town halls, they belonged to the C.A.P.s or the farms, the I.A.S.-uri. Yes, it went into their patrimony. Well, the C.A.P. had all the mountains then”²⁰⁵.

²⁰⁵ „Stânele nu erau în proprietate. Noi (n.n.: familia Cojan) am venit din '62. Era C.A.P.-ul, noi am fost la oile C.A.P.-ului. În toți munții. Păi avea C.A.P.-ul 11 stâne atunci: în Chișoara, în Goru, în Dealu Negru, în Nioaca, în Meneșberț, în Borta (...) Exact ce vă spuneam mai devreme: înainte de



Source: Gheorghe Cojan

The sheepfold at Piliș, 1965. From left to right:
Țică Ucă, Ion from Vrancea, Florea Cojan, Gheorghe Cojan.

“Then he took the C.A.P. and they took over the mountains. It was a bit better during Ceaușescu’s time. During the C.A.P., the shepherds modernised and lived a little better, but the sheep were many then, when they were our elders. Then, on the Plaiul (...) I think there were 100.000 sheep. How many were there? 100.000. That’s how I knew. All over (...) all over the mountains, in this area”²⁰⁶.

So, the shepherds and the shepherd boy remained the same in the “collective”. We can catch a glimpse of this time when we read in the press of the time the classic phrases, with their wooden language, about “overachieving”, “leading places”:

război, munții erau ai unor grofi sau ai cuiva, luați în arendă sau chirie de mocanii noștri. După război, după colectivizare, toți munții ăia (...) A venit colectivizarea și atunci toți munții s-au naționalizat, s-au luat. Și-atunci, acei munți care i-au stăpânit înainte mocanii respectivi, tot ei erau baci acolo, numai că erau baci de la C.A.P. Nu erau ai lor. I-au arendat. Erau ai statului român acuma, nu mai erau ai grofilor, dar tot Florea, dacă a fost cioban sau baci acolo, tot el era pă muntele ăla. Nu erau în patrimoniul primăriilor, erau a C.A.P.-urilor sau a fermei, I.A.S.-uri. Da, a intrat în patrimoniul lor. Păi C.A.P.-ul avea atunci munții toți.”, Informant: Florea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1956.

²⁰⁶ „Apoi a luat C.A.P.-ul și au stăpânit munții. A fost un pic mai bine în timpul lui Ceaușescu. În timpul C.A.P.-ului, ciobanii s-au modernizat și au trăit un pic mai bine, dar oile multe au fost atunci, când au fost bătrânii noștri. Atuncea, pă Plaiul (...) Cred că erau 100.000 de oi. Cât erau? 100.000. Așa știam și eu. Pă toate (...) pă toți munții, pă zona asta.”, Informant: Constantin Furtună, Covasna, b. 1970.

“The shepherds of Covasna put all their skill into achieving a goal: obtaining a high income from sheep breeding, aware that by doing so they would contribute to increasing the wealth of the community and, implicitly, the cooperators’ wages. Year after year, the co-operators here, by means of methods of making this branch profitable, obtained increasingly beautiful results, up to that 1.245.145 lei in 1968. (Almost 200.000 lei more than planned at the beginning of the year.) These results did not take long to bring satisfaction to the members of the Covasna production co-operative: first place in the county in the sheep sector for 1968”²⁰⁷.

But, as I said, the shepherds were the same as before, and with the same long-standing trade at hand – they were also keeping the wheels turning:

“If we have achieved good results in sheep breeding so far, the shepherds deserve special credit. Perhaps in no other species are the conditions of care so faithfully reflected in the condition of the animals as in sheep. Among them we mention the cooperators Gheorghe Cojan, G. Șerban, G. Furtună, Enea Ioan, Nicolae Costea and others, who have been breeding sheep in our establishment for more than 8 years”²⁰⁸.

And another news, from 1972, from the C.A.P. of the voineșteni:

“A particular concern is given to the care of animals. Covasna sheep breeders are famous for the fact that the core of the mountain *cova*, a breed that is widespread throughout the country, has become best adapted to the soil and climate conditions of our country. Among the keepers of the sheep sector, which currently numbers more than 6.600 heads (including 1.500 lambs born this spring) are Gheorghe Cojan, Constantin Furtună Dinis, Nicolae Costea, Constantin Șerban Țârdea”²⁰⁹.

²⁰⁷ „Oierii din Covasna și-au pus toată priceperea lor în atingerea unui scop: obținerea de venituri mari din creșterea ovinelor, conștienți că prin aceasta vor contribui la creșterea averii obștești și implicit a retribuției cooperativelor. An de an, cooperativii de aici, prin metode de rentabilizare a acestei ramuri, au obținut rezultate tot mai frumoase, până la acel 1.245.145 lei din anul 1968. (Cu aproape 200.000 lei mai mult decât se planificase la începutul anului.) Aceste rezultate nu au întârziat să aducă satisfacții membrilor cooperativei de producție Covasna: locul I pe județ în sectorul ovin pe anul 1968”, in Antal Kiss, „«Secretul» oierilor din Covasna” [“The secret of Covasna sheep farmers”], column „Din experiența C.A.P. fruntașe” [“From the experience of leading PAAs”], in *Cuvântul nou*, No. 80, July 12, 1969.

²⁰⁸ „Dacă am obținut până acum rezultate bune în creșterea oilor, un merit deosebit îl au în acest sens ciobanii. Poate că la nici o altă specie condițiile de îngrijire nu se reflectă atât de fidel în starea animalelor, ca la ovine. Dintre aceștia amintim pe cooperativii Gheorghe Cojan, G. Șerban, G. Furtună, Enea Ioan, Nicolae Costea și alții, care se îndeletnicesc cu creșterea ovinelor în unitatea noastră de mai bine de 8 ani.”, in *Ibidem*.

²⁰⁹ „O preocupare deosebită este acordată îngrijirii animalelor. Crescătorii de oi covășneni sunt vestiți pentru faptul că nucleul țigăii de munte, rasă răspândită în toată țara, a devenit adaptabilă cel mai bine condițiilor de sol și climă ale țării noastre. Dintre îngrijitorii sectorului ovin, care numără în prezent peste 6.600 capete (din care 1.500 miei fătați în această primăvară) se evidențiază Gheorghe Cojan, Constantin Furtună Dinis, Nicolae Costea, Constantin Șerban Țârdea.”, in Aurel Vasile Hulpoi, „Vești de la C.A.P. Covasna” [“News from C.A.P. Covasna”], in *Cuvântul nou*, No. 603, April 1st, 1972.



Source: Lucian Papuc

“Remembrance/Of when I went/With sausages to Lăcăuț(i)/On August 1954/Papuc Ioan/Covasna”

TRANSUMANCE WITH C.A.P. SHEEP

In the hilly areas and throughout the Romanian Plain, regardless of the area, the so-called collectivization in the C.A.P. continued. Later, after the 70's, the industrialization of livestock farms in I.A.S. followed, where the entire agricultural area was nationalized (starting in '49). During this period, people were taken both the agricultural area and the animals or were forced to give it up, having nothing to feed them in the absence of summer pastures or fodder in winter²¹⁰. Thus, all the land and wintering places used in the past by the shepherds of Covasna were now the property of the state, of the C.A.P.

Deals were made between the Cooperative leaderships in different counties. The “engineer”, the “president” were the key people. And the deals? Not infrequently they included a few bottles of wine

“We used to carry wood. Against grazing. My wife knows better, she was an accountant at the C.A.P. back then”²¹¹.

²¹⁰ Iulian Vlad, Mirela (Stanciu) Cărătuș and Marius Laurian Maftci, „Transhumața, parte integrantă a pastoralismului național românesc. Element ocupațional plurivalent, economic, ecologic, social și cultural-identitar” [“Transhumance, an integral part of Romanian national pastoralism. A plurivalent occupational, economic, ecological, social and cultural-identity element”], in Lucian David and Ionuț Semuc (coord.), *Păstoritul carpatic. Tradiție și continuitate [Carpathian shepherding. Tradition and continuity]*, Bucharest, Ethnological Publishing House, 2022, p. 113.

²¹¹ „Duceam noi lemne. Contra pășunat. Nevasta știe mai bine, că doar era contabilă la C.A.P. pe-atunci.”, Informant: Gheorghe Cojan, Covasna, b. 1945.

His wife adds:

“The people from Covasna used to carry firewood. There, at the C.A.P., they talked to the engineer, to the president. They got along. There was a farm manager, Gicu, who would bring them a barrel of wine, a demijohn, they drank for a week! They were there, in the cabbage patch, for four or five years. (...) When they were at the C.A.P., they went to the Bărăgan with the sheep. We were also married, and we went there by car. That was in the '70s. There were sheep below Buzău, in the Bărăgan, there, I don't know what they call that commune, I don't know how they call it anymore (...) and we went to see them. And... drink up! All of them! They had wine in milk jugs, they drank by the cup!”²¹².

These wintering trips to the lowlands were necessary because the large number of sheep required a large amount of food over the winter, which the mountain area could not provide.

“One thing to remember: they were all *baci* and had C.A.P. herds. They were sent with the C.A.P. Theirs were also included in the C.A.P., so at the time Ceaușescu started to (...) when that regime started to put a very high price on products and on (...) exports from Romania started to go and they were (...) they demanded *superproduction*, they bred a lot of animals, sheep, in this area. The C.A.P.s had many, many, many sheep. They couldn't afford to graze them here because there wasn't enough fodder. Yes, they had the cow herds, those were the priority wintering. And then the shepherds, the shepherds who were in the C.A.P. were also employees with work cards, some of them or at least the shepherd's shepherd, the boss (...) Then he distributed them. He used to say: 'Florea's flock. Where are you sending him? We're sending him to Lehliu, like he said. So, where do we send that Mircea's flock? That's where they'd send him. And they'd send him. Because they trusted that people were good at it’”²¹³.

Many times, the road was made on foot, as in the old days, on the same paths.

“We went with the sheep. I went with the sheep to Lehliu, to Constanta. (...) around '78. At Lehliu (...) there at Gălbiori. The Sun Highway or what they look like over there (...) I walked the sheep from here to there for a month. With five donkeys, six

²¹² „Covășnenii duceau lemne de foc. Acolo, la C.A.P., vorbeau cu inginerul, cu președintele. Se înțelegeau. Era un șef de fermă, nea Gicu, le aducea câte un bidon de vin, câte-o damingeană, beauăștia câte-o săptămână! Au fost acolo, la varză, vreo patru, cinci ani. (...) Când erau la C.A.P., s-au fost dus în Bărăgan cu oile. Eram și noi căsătorii și ne-am fost dus cu mașina la ei, acolo. În '70 era asta. Erau oile mai jos de Buzău, în Bărăgan, acolo, nu mai știu cum îi zice la comuna aia (...) și ne-am dus să-i vedem. Și (...) beți cui! Toți! Aveau vin în bidoane d-alea de lapte, beau cu cana!”, Informant: Maria Cojan, Covasna, b. 1949.

²¹³ „De reținut un aspect: ei toți erau baci și aveau câduri de la C.A.P. Au fost trimiși cu C.A.P. Și ale lor erau incluse în C.A.P., dar C.A.P.-urile, deci la momentul când Ceaușescu a început să (...) când regimul respectiv au început să pună foarte mare preț pe produse și pe (...) au început să meargă exporturile din România și erau (...) se cereau superproducție, au înmulțit foarte mult animalele, oile, în zona asta. C.A.P.-urile aveau foarte foarte multe oi, extrem de multe. Nu făceau față să le ierneze aici, fiindcă nutreț nu era de ajuns. Da, aveau ciurzile de vaci, alea le iernau cu prioritate. Și-atunci ciobanii, baci care erau în cadrul C.A.P.-ului erau și angajați cu carte de muncă, unii dintre ei sau cel puțin baci, șeful (...) Atuncia îi distribuia. Zicea: «Cârdul' lu' Florea. Unde-l trimitem? Îl trimitem la Lehliu, cum a zis. Așa, cârdul' lu' ăla, lu' Mircea, unde-l trimitem? P-ăla îl trimiteau la așa. Și-l trimiteau. Pentru că aveau încredere că oamenii erau buni la așa ceva»”, Informant: Constantin Furtună, Covasna, b. 1970.

donkeys. A month and a day I walked the sheep. We went from here to Constanța with the sheep on foot. Now cars kill you (...) I'n the mountains, not that I went through the city. I went to the mountains here and (...) in the mountains. Buzău, I got as far as Urziceni, Horezu, Căzănești, Lehliu. I spent a whole winter there. That's where [the old men] used to go. To Buzău, to the cabbages, to (...) that's how I heard them talking. They used to leave in autumn after they had finished milking.”²¹⁴;

“I was in Teleorman, Alexandria, Turnu Măgurele. I've been to Ialomița, to Drajna, to Lehliu Gară. We were leaving around October 20. During the Revolution, I remember, the Revolution caught me in Tecuci. I went with Ceaușescu and I came with Iliescu.”²¹⁵;

“Well, I was once at the farm, at Vlădeni (...) I went to the cabbage patch in Buzău. Six days, six nights we walked”²¹⁶.

As in the old days, there were also various conflicts with the locals. Sometimes they even ended up with fines. Or “peace was made”:

“Fines? I paid, I paid. In Dor Mărunt they caught us there, by a wheat field. The storm hit hard, and we went to Dor Mărunt, to the shelter. We stayed 3 days, 3 nights and when we left, when the storm hit, we went away. ‘Come on, let's go, we're going to get some wheat’. And you couldn't see, it was the president, he came that way, he caught us by the wheat. He was with about 6 people in Aro, what else! We left him alone: ‘We'll give you some sheep’. ‘No, we don't need money!’. ‘How much?’ ‘2.000 lei!’. ‘That's a lot, God damn it! It's a salary’. In the end, I gave him 5.000, then he called me, I made friends with him, he let me stay day and night. I gave him 5.000. I had about 40.000 on me. Our shepherds used to have money, no problem! And he let us go everywhere. Then we became friends, he came here to Covasna, to the baths”²¹⁷.

²¹⁴ „Am fost cu oile. Am fost cu oile la Lehliu, la Constanța. (...) prin '78. La Lehliu (...) 'colo la Gălbiori. Autostrada Soarelui sau cum arată ăștia pe-acolo (...) Am plecat cu oile pe jos de-aicea până acolo, o lună dă zile. Cu cinci măgari, șase măgari. O lună dă zile am plecat cu oile pă jos. Am mers de-aici la Constanța cu oile pă jos. Acuma te omoară mașini (...) Pă munți, nu că m-am dus prin oraș. Am plecat pe munte pe-aicea și (...) pă munți. Buzău, am ajuns până la Urziceni, la Horezu, la Căzănești, în Lehliu. Am prins o iarnă întregă acolo. P-acolo [prin Bărăgan] să duceau [bătrânii]. P'în Buzău, pă la varză, pă la (...) așa i-auzeam vorbind. Plecau toamna după ce terminau mulsu””, Informant: Nicolae Calșuneanu, Covasna, b. 1945.

²¹⁵ „Eu am fost în Teleorman, Alexandria, Turnu Măgurele. Am fost în Ialomița, la Drajna, la Lehliu Gară. Plecam prin 20 octombrie. La Revoluție, țiu minte, m-a prins Revoluția la Tecuci. M-am dus cu Ceaușescu și-am vinit cu Iliescu.”, Informant: Florea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1956.

²¹⁶ „Păi și eu am fost odată la fermă, la Vlădeni (...) am fost la varză, la Buzău. Șase zile, șase nopți am mers pe jos”, Informant: Ion Bâscean, Covasna, b. 1946.

²¹⁷ „Amenzi? Am plătit, am plătit. În Dor Mărunt ne-a prins acolo, pă un grâu. A bătut crivățul tare și ne-am dus în Dor Mărunt, la adăpost. Am stat 3 zile, 3 nopți și când am plecat, când a stat crivățu', am plecat îndărăt. «Hai, ne dăm drumu' și pă grâu!». Și nu se vedea, era președintele, a venit pă partea aia, ne-a prins pă grâu. Era cu vreo 6 oameni în Aro, ce să mai! Am dat-o la pace: «Vă dăm niște oi». «Nu, nu ne trebuie, bani!». «Câți?». «2.000 de lei!». «Ăi că-s mulți, dă-i dreacu'!». E un salariu. Păi până la urmă i-am dat 5.000 lui, după aia m-a mai chemat, m-am mai împrietenit cu el, m-a lăsat și ziua și noaptea. 5.000 i-am dat lui. Io aveam vreo 40.000 la mine. Aveau ciobanii noștri mocani înainte bani, nu era problemă! Și ne-a lăsat să umblăm peste tot. Dup-aia m-am împrietenit cu iel, a venit aici, la Covasna, la băi”, Informant: Florea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1956.

During the C.A.P., the people of Covasna also experimented with a new (and much easier) way to transport sheep quickly and safely: by train!

“I was about 8 years. I used to take them to the Bărăgan, to the I.A.S. at Dragalina, at Ciulnița, that’s what they called it. There we got off in Ciulnița. I don’t know how the hell it came there, because it was (...) so Ciulnița station, but Ciulnița village was like here in Zăbala. And there was Dragalina commune, it was a big commune. I used to take them by train. No, no, we didn’t do transhumance by foot, no. So, when we took them to Halchiu, from Vlădeni, which was 20 kilometres away, or to Râșnov or to Bod, we took them there on foot, you know? But there wasn’t so much traffic, it wasn’t like that. You were going around with them, you had no work”²¹⁸;

“How was the farm (...) discuss, for example, how we were at I.A.S. Homorod there, at I.A.S. Călărași (...) it was in Ceaușescu’s time. And he used to take them by train”²¹⁹.

Shepherds stayed with the sheep in their wintering places until February, when they gave birth.

“Until they lambed. They came down from Piliș, went to Buzău and from there to Bărăgan. Where there was cabbage, where there was a lot of corn. Often, when the icy wind was beating, if they didn’t run with the sheep to the village or to the shelter, he would put them in a canal (...) One winter, about 40 of them died, because the wind took them with the shepherd and put them in a canal there. No, and they stayed until they lambed. And then they put them in the *carcasses*. Or in cars. When the snow was heavy or the weather so bad, they’d bring the sheep in by *sleigh*. I don’t know how they did it, who they talked to, but that’s what they did. With the C.A.P.’s sheep, and ours”²²⁰.

COVĂSNENII, SOUGHT BY C.A.P.S FROM OTHER LOCALITIES

The hundreds of years that shepherding has been a way of life (not just a profession) in Voinești Covasnei, the fact that shepherding has been passed down in the family, from father to son, the results obtained, all this has made the reputation

²¹⁸ „Am fost vreo 8 ani. Le duceam pe Bărăgan, pe la I.A.S. la Dragalina, la Ciulnița, așa-i zicea. Acolo coboram în Ciulnița. Acolo nu știu cum vinea, dracu’, că era... deci gara Ciulnița, da’ satu’ Ciulnița era ca de-aicea la Zăbala. Și acolo era comuna Dragalina, era o comună mare. Cu trenu’ le duceam. Nu, nu, noi n-am făcut transumanță cu chicioru’, nu. Așa când le duceam pe la Hălchiu, de la Vlădeni, că era la 20 de kilometri, sau pe la Râșnov sau la Bod pe-acolo, acolo cu ele pe jos, știți? Da’ nu era atâta circulație, nu era așa. Te duceai lesene cu ele, n-aveai treabă”, Informant: Nicolae Guiu, Covasna, b. 1948.

²¹⁹ „Cum era fermă (...) discuta, de exemplu, cum eram la I.A.S. Homorod acolo, la I.A.S. Călărași (...) era în timpu’ lu’ Ceaușescu. Și le ducea cu trenu’”, Informant: Valer Muntean, Covasna, b. 1972.

²²⁰ „Pân’ la fătat. Coborau de la Piliș, mergeau spre Buzău și de-acolo spre Bărăgan. Unde era varză, unde era porumb mult. De multe ori, când bătea Crivățul, dacă nu fugeau cu oile în sat sau la adăpost, le băga în câte-un canal (...) Și nouă, într-o iarnă, ne-au murit vreo 40, că le-a luat vântul cu tot cu cioban și le-a băgat într-un canal, acolo. No, și stăteau până la fătat. Și apoi le puneau la trinuri. Sau la mașini. Când era zăpada mare sau vreme așa rea, le aduceau cu trinul oile. Nu știu cum aranjau, cu cine vorbeau, da’ așa făceau. Și oile C.A.P.-ului, și ale noastre”, Informant: Gheorghe Cojan, Covasna, b. 1945

of the shepherds of Voinești grow, being sought after by many C.A.P.s from other localities of the county and from other counties of the country. The shepherds from Voinești were the guarantee that the Agricultural Cooperative would have beautiful, healthy sheep that would give a lot of milk. They were the guarantee of profit.

“These shepherds from Covasna were more famous. They used to call us, the people from our area, who used to go, for example, baci in Bicfalău, baci in Lisnău, i.e., to a sheepfold with the sheep of the village, and the people from Covasna used to call us, around here, ‘baci de coteț’. People from Dobârlău and those, the băcelenii, they called us. My father was also a great musician. He sang at weddings in Covasna, he knew all the people from Covasna. ‘Hey, Lae, you’re all henhouse boys!’ Everyone (...) Ghiță Bâscean, Ghiță Papuc, Ghiță somewhat, Furtună’s family, everyone knew my father. (...) I know these Cojan’s. There were three brothers, one was Mircea. I don’t know them that well, they were at the Colectiv in Ilieni. The Cojans were at the Collective, but they were there for a long time. Ande Furtună, they were over there, at Câmpu Frumos. I knew them by sight. Furtună’s guys were in Câmpu Frumos. They had a *saivan*. They didn’t have a *saivan* before, they kept them at Sântion, at a landlord’s. Gazoșu was a good friend of my father’s, they used to meet in Sfântu Gheorghe, at Pomu’ Verde (Green Tree), that way, because my father liked to go to the pub sometimes. My father used to say that there were only people from Covasna, all the way to Rupea, where they were. He was also a musician. And he played at weddings in Covasna. So, ‘Come on, Lae, let me show you my *saivan*!’ He had a *saivan*, but he didn’t keep anything in it. ‘Well, why should I keep them, Lae, because we don’t have any land, we don’t have any hay, we keep them at the Collective, we just made it, so that if something happens, we can run home with them (...)’. That’s how they knew. Those were the days of the Collective”²²¹.

Employed at the C.A.P., they had rights, but also obligations and responsibilities:

“At one time, there were more than 70 shepherds there, from Bran, from Vrancea, but there were more of them, Covasna dominated, there were many from Covasna. The first time there was 125 sheep milking sheep, at the I.A.S.-uri and 200 shepherds, that is to say the youth of the current year and the youth of the previous year, which were

²²¹ „Covășnenii ăștia erau mai renumiți. Nouă ne ziceau, la ăștia de la noi, care se duceau, de exemplu, baci în Bicfalău, baci în Lisnău, adică la o stână cu oile satului, și covășnenii ne ziceau nouă, p-aici, «baci de coteț». Dobârlăienilor și la ăștia, băcelenii, așa ne ziceau. Că tata a fost și mare muzicant. A cântat pe la nunți, prin Covasna, cunoștea toți covășnenii. «Bă, Lae, voi sunteți baci de coteț!» Toți (...) Ghiță Bâscean, Ghiță Papuc, Ghiță cutare, ai lu’ Furtună, toți îl cunoșteau pe tata. (...) Îi știi pe ăștia ai lu’ Cojan. Erău trei frați, unu’ era Mircea. Nu-i cunosc așa d-aproape, au fost la Colectiv la Ilieni. Cojanii erau la Colectiv, da’ au stat mult acolo. Ande Furtună, ăștia au fost dincolo, la Câmpu Frumos. I-am cunoscut așa, din vedere. ăștia ai lu’ Furtună erau la Câmpu Frumos. Aveau saivan. Că înainte nu aveau saivan, le țineau la Sântion, la un boier. Gazoșu era pretin bun cu tata, se mai întâlneau prin Sfântu Gheorghe, pe la Pomu’ Verde, p-acolo, că îi mai plăcea și lu’ tata să mai intre pe la cârciumă, câteodată. Zicea tata că pe la toate Colectivele ăle bune, numa’ covășneni erau, până la Rupea, deval. El era și muzicant. Și cânta pe la nunți prin Covasna. Ș-apăi, «hai, mă Lae, hai să-ți arăt ce saivan am eu!» Când colo, avea un saivan vărui, da’ n-a ținut nimic în el. «Păi cu ce să le țiiu, mă Lae, că noi n-avem teren, n-avem fân, le ținem la Colectiv, numa’ l-am făcut, că în caz de ceva, s-avem un’ să fugim cu ele acas’ (...)». Așa saivane aveau. Erău vremuri de Colectiv.”, Informant: Dan Olaru, Dobârlău, b. 1956.

also rams, I don't know how many there were, 50 I think there were or 80 was the norm for rams, for a shepherd. And you had 800 sheep, you had 5 sheep. I was there permanently. There was no way to do schedule it. You had those 4 days off a month that he gave you, you had the right to holidays because you were employed with a work card, everything, you had the right to holidays and he gave the holidays, they were given in the autumn, when the harvest was over"²²².

What they were all happy about was the fact that they could keep their own animals there and sell their produce.

"I had my own flock until I retired. I.A.S.s, about eight, nine hundred, more if not. About 800, 850 there were. Well, on the book, it was written there on the paper to keep 10 sheep and 2 males [personally]. That's how it was, 12. Or 3 males. 13 pieces. But that was an I.A.S. (...) I was more lenient, with the management, we kept sheep about 25, 30 (...) you had a horse, you had enough. It wasn't bad"²²³.

PASTORAL FLOCKS

Pastoral flocks are an advanced phase of transhumance. They are of two types: *internal and external*. In the case of internal grazing,

"the shepherds, in the vast majority of cases with their families, settle for several years, usually more than ten years, in the lowland areas where they have been transhumant (the Jijia Plain, the Romanian Plain, the Dobrogea Plain). Another type of internal pastoral rotations is the settlement of shepherds (during the communist period), for decades, at the I.A.S.-s or C.A.P.-s in the lowland areas. Shepherds and their families were employed on these farms, where they managed a large number of sheep and could also have a flock of 100–200 sheep. Many of them bought the farms after 1989 and are still there today"²²⁴.

²²² „Eram într-un timp, eram peste 70 de ciobani acolo, din Bran, din Vrancea, da' mai mulți erau, cam domina Covasna, erau mulți din Covasna. 5 ciobani era norma dom'le [la un cârd]. Prima dată a fost 125 norma, oi mulgătoare, la I.A.S.-uri și 200 sterpătură, adică tineret de anu' curent și tineret anu' precedent, care erau și berbeci, nu știu câte erau, 50 parcă erau sau 80 era norma de berbeci, la un cioban. Și aveai 800 de oi, aveai 5 inși. Eram permanent acolo. N-aveai cum să faci cu rândul'. Te mai rânduiai (...) aveai ălea 4 zile libere pe lună care ți le dădea, concediu aveai drept că ereai angajat cu carte de muncă, tot, aveai dreptul la concediu și dădea concediile, se cam dădea toamna, atuncea când se termina cu monta.”, Informant: Nicolae Guiu, Covasna, b. 1948.

²²³ „Am avut și cârdul meu până am ieșit la pensie. Ale I.A.S.-ului, cam în jur de opt, nouă sute, mai multe nu. În jur de 800, 850 erau. Păi, pe carte, era scris acolo la hârtie să ții 10 oi și 2 cărlani [personal]. Așa era, 12. Sau 3 cărlani. 13 bucăți. Da' ăsta a fost un I.A.S.-eu mai îngăduitor, cu conducerea, țineam oi și câte 25, 30 (...) țineai câte-un cal, mai aveai. N-a fost rău.”, Informant: Nicolae Guiu, Covasna, b. 1948.

²²⁴ „ciobanii, în marea majoritate a cazurilor cu familiile, se stabilesc pentru mai mulți ani, de obicei peste zece ani, în zonele de câmpie unde au fost în transhumanță (Câmpia Jijiei, Câmpia Română, Podișul Dobrogei). Un alt tip de roiri pastorale interne îl constituie stabilirea ciobanilor (în perioada comunismului), pentru zeci de ani, la I.A.S.-urile sau C.A.P.-urile din zonele de câmpie. Ciobanii împreună cu familiile erau angajați la aceste ferme, unde aveau în gestiune un număr mare de oi și puteau să aibă și ei un cârd de 100–200 de oi. Mulți dintre ei au cumpărat fermele după anul 1989, fiind și astăzi acolo.”, in Lucian David, „Elemente de continuitate ale păstoritului carpatic” [“Elements of continuity of Carpathian pastoralism”], in Lucian David and Ionuț Semuc (coord.), *quoted work*, p. 32.

The fame of the shepherds from Voinești had spread all over the country. Representatives of the C.A.P.-s came and looked for them in Voinești. When they were hired, they hardly let them go, they stayed there for years.

“Since ’76 I went to (...) An engineer came from there to look for some people (...) And I went with a godfather of mine and we talked to those, and we went (...) we went there, and I stayed there at Aita Medie for 5 years and then I moved to Biborțeni. 11 years [I stayed at Biborțeni]. Yes, with my wife I went. When the C.A.P.s and the farms were built, she never left. They went to the collectives, to the farms. In 1962. They never left”²²⁵.

Their wives were also employed, with work papers, as “animal caretakers”²²⁶. Most of the time, we are talking about large farms with large herds of animals. “Well, there were the managers, there were the engineers, because it was a farm (...) a farm had 17.000 sheep, it didn’t have a thousand, two sheep like it was. Permanent [sitting], I told you. And wintering (...) in the autumn we took them to the field. He used to divide them up. He used to share, because there were fields (...) they had connections in Râșnov, in Codlea, in Hălchiu, where he was (...)”²²⁷.

If they got on well with the locals, they stayed for many years in the same place: “Yes, I went in the winter. And here I have been, in this area and there, at Rupea, I stayed for the winter, at a farm. Now, the last time I was 10 years in one place. And I stayed summer-winter there, I was employed there. No, I wasn’t with my family. No, I didn’t go with them from the farm, just grazing, that’s all. And in the summer I was still there, grazing. No, I didn’t go up the mountain. To graze, in the hills, like this”²²⁸.

Some of them, who left when they were young, found their wives in those areas, formed families there and never returned to Covasna:

“There were several who went to this part, to Rupea, there or found their other half, so to speak, and got married there. They stayed there, yes. On the side near Viscri, where the prince is, I mean when he was prince, but now he’s king”²²⁹;

²²⁵ „Din ’76 m-am dus la (...) A venit un inginer de-acolo să caute niște oameni (...) Și m-am dus cu un naș al meu și am vorbit cu ăia și ne-am dus (...) am luat acolo și-am stat acolo la Aita Medie 5 ani și pe urmă m-am mutat la Biborțeni. 11 ani [am stat la Biborțeni]. Da, cu soția m-am dus. Când s-a făcut C.A.P.-urile ăstea și fermele dă stat n-a mai plecat. S-au dus pă la colective, pă la ferme. În ’62. N-au mai plecat”, Informant: Constantin Leu, Covasna, b. 1944.

²²⁶ Source: workbook of wife Verginia Leu.

²²⁷ „Păi acolo erau directorii, erau inginerii, că doar era fermă... o fermă avea 17.000 de oi, n-avea o mie, două de oi cum era. Permanent [stăteam], v-am spus. Și iernat (...) toamna le duceam la câmp. Le împărțea. O perioadă împărțea, că erea câmpuri (...) aveau legături pe la Râșnov, pe la Codlea, pe la Hălchiu, unde era (...)”, Informant: Nicolae Guiu, Covasna, b. 1948.

²²⁸ „Da, am fost la iernat. Și aici am fost, în zona asta și acolo, la Rupea am stat la iernat, la o fermă. Acum, ultima dată am fost 10 ani într-un loc. Și am stat vară-iarnă acolo, am fost angajat acolo. Nu, n-am fost cu familia. Nu, n-am plecat cu ele de la fermă, numa-n pășunat, atât. Și vara tot acolo, în pășunat stăteam. Nu, nu m-am dus sus în munte. La pășunat, pă dealuri, așa”, Informant: Gheorghe Macovei, Covasna, b. 1959.

²²⁹ „Mai mulți au fost care au fost așa-n partea asta, pă la Rupea, p-acolo sau ș-au găsit jumătatea cum să spune și s-au căsătorit p-acolo. Au rămas acolo, da. Pă parte pă la Viscri, pă unde umblă și prințu’, adică când era prinț, da’ acuma-i rege”, Informant: Constantin Șerban, Covasna, b. 1933.

“A couple of them stayed [at our C.A.P.] when they were with the sheep. The Major’s brother and (...) this one (...) Avram. Avram’s brother, yes, because we don’t know about him. They settled there”²³⁰.

But... nothing new under the sun! Shepherds from Covasna who had gone with their sheep on transhumance had stayed and settled in various places in the country even before the CAP period. Mostly because they found good living conditions there, because they got married or for more practical reasons:

“I met a man from Covasna once. He was really from Covasna. I don’t remember his name. We were near the farm, on a piece of land. But we didn’t know that there were sheep, their sheepfold, nearby. And I was sitting like this, at night, with my brother and, I don’t know, we had another man. And he says: ‘I heard a guy crying over there’. But you could tell he was drunk after the noise. No, he came to our sheep. We didn’t take dangerous dogs there, they get lost. And we didn’t have dogs like that, to go after people. But we went before him when we heard him shouting. He was shouting at us because he was from Covasna. He came and started to tell us: ‘Look, I was like you. I came here with my father and my brother and my sheep’. And he had a place to winter, because there were such nice woods, he had a place to winter easily. ‘And they, like my dad, made me come and marry here, so they’d have somewhere to retire. They made me come here and I had to get married here. I stayed, but I’m still going to Covasna, I’ll sometimes go back’”²³¹.

However, the shepherds from Covasna were easily recognizable by their specific clothing, shepherd-like clothes, which they did not really give up:

“Moș Maioru had a brother. This one stayed in Bărăganu. When he went with the sheep to Călărași, he stayed there. And when we went, in ’79, we went to the market. And at the market, there, there was a big market, I see a man in shepherd clothes, like us. When I look, I see he looks like that. ‘You, where are you from?’/‘Where are you from?’/‘We, from Covasna, from Voinești’/‘I’m from there too. I’m Gheorghe Maioru’s brother’. No, he stayed there. So, he married there, he had a family, he had everything, he was from there, he lived about five kilometres away, towards Călărași, in a commune there”²³².

²³⁰ „A rămas [de la noi la C.A.P.] vreo’ doi, când au fost cu oile. Frate-su lu’ Maioru și (...) ăsta (...) Avram. Frate-su lu’ Avram, da, că de ăla nu se mai știe. S-au stabilit acolo.”, Informant: Florea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1956.

²³¹ „Ne-am întâlnit odată cu unu’ care era din Covasna. Chiar din Covasna era. Nu mai țin minte cum îl chema. Eram lângă fermă, pe-o tocătură. Da’ noi nu știam că-s oile, saivanul lor, acolo, aproape. Și stăteam așa, noaptea, cu frate-meu eram și, nu știu, mai aveam un om. Și zice: «am auzit că chiuie unu’ p-acolo». Da’ s-auzea după chiuitură că era băut. No, a vinit la noi la oi. P-acolo nu prea duceam câini periculoși, că se mai pierd. Și n-aveam câini așa, ca să saie la om. Da’ ne-am dus înaintea lui, când l-am auzit că strigă. El ne striga, că el era din Covasna. A vinit și-a-nceput să ne povestească: «Băi, uite, și eu tot așa am fost, ca voi. Am vinit cu ande tata și cu frate-meu și cu oile p-aicea». Și avea pe unde ierna, că erau niște păduri așa faine, avea pe unde să ierneze ușor. «Și ăștia, ande tata, m-au pus să mănsor aicea, ca să aibă unde trage. M-au pus ăștia să mănsor p-aicea și eu a trebuit să rămâi p-aicea. Am rămas, da’ mă mai duc pe la Covasna, mai viu înapoi»”, Informant: Petru Iacob, Brețcu, b. 1944.

²³² „Moș Maioru avea un frate. Ăsta a rămas în Bărăganu. Când a fost cu oile la Călărași, a rămas p-acolo. Și când ne-am dus noi, în ’79, ne-am dus la piață. Și la piață, acolo, era piața mare, văd unu’ în haine sârbe, ca noi. Când mă uit, am văst că samănă cu ăla. «Mata de unde ești?»/«Da’ voi de unde sunteți?»/«Noi, din Covasna, din Voinești.»/«Și eu is tot d-acolo. Is frate cu Gheorghe Maioru». No, și-a rămas acolo. S-a-nsurat acolo, avea familie, avea tot, era d-acolo, la vreo cînșpe kilometri stătea, spre Călărași, într-o comună, acolo.”, Informant: Florea Cojan, Covasna, b. 1956.

LIST OF INFORMANTS

Covasna, Voinești: Constantin Costea, b. 1939; Mircea Cojan, b. 1952; Maria Sandulea, b. 1933; Florea Cojan, b. 1956; Constantin Furtună, b. 1970; Gheorghe Cojan, b. 1945; Maria Cojan, b. 1949; Nicolae Cașuneanu, b. 1945; Ion Bâscean, b. 1946; Nicolae Guiu, b. 1948; Valer Muntean, b. 1972; Constantin Șerban, b. 1933; Constantin Leu, b. 1944, Gheorghe Macovei, b. 1959.

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CONSTANTIN BRÂNCUȘI (B. FEB. 19, 1876, HOBÎȚA, PEȘTIȘANI, GORJ, D. MAR. 16, 1957, PARIS). THE ARTIST OF LIGHT

*Radu Baltasiu*²³³

ABSTRACT

There is an absolute fascination of Brancuși's works. There are some fine books on maestro's oeuvre, but a sociological approach is still missing. We are proposing a brief sociological look into the Brancusian cultural revolution.

Keywords: Brâncuși, revolution, light.

THE PEASANT WHO BECAME THE MAESTRO OF FORM

Brâncuși is the peasant from Gorj County who became the universal model of form.

It is said that his father gave Peștișani's village the light in the houses, replacing the thin hole in the wall plugged with paper with windows. His father brought light into homes. His son, Constantin Brâncuși, gave us what we thought could not be given. He caught the light in form and gave it to us, revolutionizing man once again, inaugurating the series of post-modern culture. The problem is that the post-modern man is not up to Brâncuși, falling into self-love.

Brâncuși is an unique moment. He went to school, but he is not the product of school, he himself declared that art is a mystery, a faith (in an interview given to Apriliana Medianu, 6, "Curentul", October 1930). It is an unannounced appearance, integral, without residue, which gives an account of the genius of humanity through a people – because Brâncuși never stopped considering himself a Gorjean peasant, in moments of balance – in our case when God was expelled from the world by post-modernism. Brâncuși reintroduced him through the light. Being the first and only one to capture the form of light as an uncreated energy.

Before awakening man through the new form, Brâncuși gave, Constantin Noica points out "the legend of all Romanian foundations"²³⁴, "the structure of every

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²³⁴ „legenda tuturor întemeierilor românești”, in Constantin Noica, *Cuvânt împreună despre rostirea românească* [A word together about Romanian pronunciation], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1996, p. 80.

legend”²³⁵. Brâncuși took man out from under the crushing pressure of infinity, into which he was introduced by the rational, Gothic search, and restored him through art to the order of Creation by representing infinity:

“(…) the Egyptians sought to capture the infinity of death; the Gothic, with its towers, the infinity of Faustian aspiration. And they failed. Brâncuși also gave a version of infinity in stone – and he succeeded. Because it was not of infinity, but of infinity”²³⁶.

Contemporary with Einstein and with the difficult discoveries of the atomic world and the great temptations of cinematography, Brâncuși gives us “a good, sweet settlement in the absolute”²³⁷. Because Brâncuși freed man’s thought from matter, which, through his genius, he represented as light, as pure form, and introduced man into his essence, into himself. Einstein introduced man to atomic responsibility, Brâncuși freed him, seeking to see “what is within the self of infinity”²³⁸. Brâncuși, from this perspective, managed to unite the most lucid self, which is the self, with the “tamed infinity”²³⁹ – the infinity accessible to the one who seeks his self.

The Oltenians, among the smartest Romanians, gave us, together with the great minds of the thinking of the atomic age, the last human understanding of light. In this way, we once again touched God’s hand.

To the sculptor of light – Brâncuși – reinvented the form, returning it to the original in us, to the lost Paradise. Form is everything with what we operate. Without form, there is no life. The ancient Chinese told us that form allows everything. At Brâncuși, the form he rediscovered makes a new world possible. There is no need to wonder that wholeness cannot be achieved without form. Without all, we cannot have wholeness, and without wholeness, there is no being. And Brâncuși grasps this wholeness, which exists only through light, and shapes it in a primordial form: ovoid, then flight, and finally the light-flame itself.

THE STAGES

Brâncuși burns the stages: he goes from the light of antiquity, the functional light, to the light of the Catholic rationality of the stained glass to the uncreated one²⁴⁰. In this way, Brâncuși

²³⁵ „structura oricărei legende”, in *Ibidem*.

²³⁶ „(…) Egiptenii au căutat să prindă infinitatea morții; goticul, cu turnurile lui, infinitatea aspirației faustice. Și nu au reușit. Brâncuși a dat și el o versiune a infinității în piatră – și a reușit. Pentru că nu era a infinității, ci a înfinirii.”, in *Ibidem*.

²³⁷ „o bună, o dulce așezare în absolut”, in *Ibidem*, p. 89.

²³⁸ „ce este în sinea înfinirii”, in *Ibidem*, p. 22.

²³⁹ „infinitul îmblânzit”, in *Ibidem*, p. 78.


²⁴⁰ Pavel Țușară, *Brâncuși. Un sculptor de la Răsărit [Brâncuși. A sculptor from the East]*, Bucharest, Official Monitor Publishing House, 2020.

“opens the access of the sculpture, of the three-dimensional form, to the inner and uncreated light through an extensive process of transfiguration of matter, through a genuine change in the face, through a major act of transubstantiation”²⁴¹.

In this way, through faith, Brâncuși opens the doors of modern art, passing through the suspension of gravity (“Sleep”), the dematerialization of matter that becomes pure energy through the ovoid („Măiastra”). Brâncuși, therefore, discovers the true light and sculpts it!, surpassing the too human lights up to him!

A few words about the maturation stages of Brancusian creation:

First, the dynamics of wood. For Brâncuși, wood had from the beginning not only a functional dimension but also a mythical-symbolic dimension as the founder of the world. From the beginning, Brâncuși connects with wood through the fundamental dynamics of life, to which he also invites the public, leaving archetypal forms to the wood that can be found in the collective memory of each of us: from the ovoid “Child’s Head” to the infinity of the Endless Column from 1920, in wood. Here we have a real foray into what we can call the “mystique of wood”. The archetypal forms used by Brâncuși, which are also receptors in the Romanian collective mind and not only are the pillar (axis mundi), the spiral (the snake, the rope, the feminine principle), the circle (the sun, perfection -the rosette, the wheel), the rhombus (two triangles –masculine/feminine), the ring (symbolism of the circle, the universe), the zig-zag (aquatic symbolism, endless movement), and the square (stability, durability, terrestrial). All this can be found in many Brâncuși’s works, culminating in the Rooster, the Endless Column, and the Târgu Jiu ensemble²⁴².



²⁴¹ „deschide accesul sculpturii, al formei tridimensionale, către lumina interioară și increată printr-un amplu proces de transfigurare a materiei, printr-o veritabilă schimbare la față, printr-un act major de transsubstanțiere”, in *Ibidem*, p. 66.

²⁴² Olimpia Bratu (coord.), *Stâlpii. Arhetipuri în arta brâncușiană [Pillars. Archetypes in Brancuși's art]*, “Christian Tell” County Library, Gorj, 2023.



The human body – The Écorché (University of Medicine, Bucharest, 1900). The musculature and “man’s inner way of being”, in his attitude at the beginning of civilization, of Adonis, the god of male beauty, Michelangelo’s David, without whom the world would be nothing more than a possibility.

Student of Rodin. Brâncuși becomes in 1907, for a few months the student of the great French sculptor, Rodin – whose genius embodies the “bimillennial philosophy of the three-dimensional”²⁴³. To integrate it into this orbit of the great synthesis of the perfect form, “the triple recommendation of Queen Elisabeta (Carmen Sylva), Maria Bengesu, and Otilia Cosmuță was needed”²⁴⁴. Penetrated by the strong gravitational force of Rodin’s art, Brâncuși prepares his own orbit, his own escape. We see the tension between the synthesis of the

old world and its own destiny in the works of this period:




Detachment from matter. First by gravity, then by matter itself (dematerialization). His workshop in Impasse Ronsin street no. 11 becomes the center of a new universe, which revolves toward the primordial, toward the inherited peasantry from Gorj²⁴⁵. He does it by rediscovering the essence: he goes from the severe line (“Head of a man” 1902) to the flowing, feminine line of “Miss Pogany” (1912), of the ovoid type (announced by “Sleep” in 1905, “Torse” in 1909–1910).

²⁴³ „bimilenara filosofie a tridimensionalului”, in Pavel Șușară, *quoted work*, p. 41.

²⁴⁴ „tripla recomandare a Reginei Elisabeta (Carmen Sylva), a Mariei Bengesu și a Otiliei Cosmuță”, in *Ibidem*.


²⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 178.



We go from suspension of gravity through the ovoid, to dematerialization, through the Bird in Space („Pasărea măiastră”). Bird in Space (1923) represents the replacement of matter with energy, it suspends gravity, and form is indeed freed from matter. It is embodied light, not simply light reflected by a material.

The “Perfect Synthesis” – the ensemble from Târgu Jiu (1937–1938), at the invitation of Aretia Tătărescu, the wife of Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu.

If until now we have mainly focused on the representation of the primordial order with the help of the viewer, now it is about the integration into the Universe “surprised in its own dynamics”²⁴⁶ of its axial components. The occasion is the *Christian confession* of the cult of heroes, of those who sacrificed themselves in the First World War, thus integrating themselves into the primordial order through your own people. The Path, the Path of Heroes, has as its seed the Table of Silence –



Monumental ensemble “Heroes’ Path” Târgu Jiu (Gorj county) (foto available at: <https://mnlr.ro/ansamblul-monumental-calea->

“the great order of nature”, “placental virtuality itself”²⁴⁷ – formerly illustrated by

²⁴⁶ „surprins în propria dinamică”, in *Ibidem*.

²⁴⁷ „ordinea mare a firii”, „virtualitatea placentară însăși”, in *Ibidem*.

the Earth's Wisdom (1907), from which the Kissing Gate axially springs, which connects the primordial and self-awareness – the “equivalent of Bird in Space”²⁴⁸ (1910), to reach, after its filtering through the Church (St. Peter and Paul) in the Endless Column that includes everything – the world of the city, the world of here and now and the world beyond, the infinity, as Noica would say, “in its uncreated light”²⁴⁹ – Șușară, and renders it to the viewer, recovering the centrality and balance of the soul through the humility of the conscience of his heroes.

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Brâncuși captures everything in its essential moments and shows it to us. It is the world of light through sculpture (paradoxical, right?!). How can you shape something that cannot be shaped? – it is a matter to which we have access beyond logic (the coincidence of opposites), beyond the low pragmatism of our everyday life. How successfully we can enter this gate is another discussion. It is an invitation not only to reading but also to a journey that reshapes us and society.

Today, Oltenia, like the rest of the country, must be helped to overcome decades of stylistic disfigurement, to restore the beautiful connection between housing and Heaven. Not only are great works inaccurate, incomplete, or even badly valued, but also our life is increasingly deprived of the compass of the natural order, that is, of beauty. To get out of this impasse, we need a thread that not only directs us but also enlightens and organizes us at the same time, that gathers us around a flag, through what is best in us. Culturally, it means a major cultural figure, and politically, a true leader.

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²⁴⁸ „echivalentul Măiestrei”, in *Ibidem*.

²⁴⁹ „în lumina ei necreată”, in *Ibidem*.

CIVIL UNION OR THE AESTHETIC FLUIDITY OF THE FALSE FAMILY

Corina Pantelimon Bistriceanu²⁵⁰

ABSTRACT

In the construction of this article, we start from two new concepts in the socio-human sciences: that of fluidity, applied with great resonance in the interpretation of the new dynamic forms of contemporary society by Zygmunt Bauman, and that of aesthetics, in the sense of the type of judgment with which we approach the external world, as defined by Immanuel Kant. Their utility lies in verifying and explaining the manner in which new inconsistent social and familial formulas are projected and articulated, in synchrony with the liquefaction and aesthetification of all social structures of the “old order” of tradition or of the “steel carcasses” of modernity. The redefined family as a fluid aesthetic group is one in which its axes of stability, the vertical link of descent, and the supportive horizontal link of marriage are fractured and declared unusable. “Projects” of relationships in permanent construction emerge in their place, inconsistent and unstable by their very nature, whose integrative capacity is relative and manifests only as long as the satisfaction they offer lasts. These projects, which replace the “solid” social institutions in everyday social life, not only have a mimetic effect, taking on the apparent form of the relationship/structure they replace, but also have a dissolving effect. Civil partnership is such a satisfactory solution for mimicking marriage for those who do not find enough satisfaction in getting married, but nor so little that they give up on it. Its consequences, in terms of fluidizing sexual ties within the family, are of the same nature as those of incest, which fluidize the lineage ties.

Keywords: family, consensual union, liquid society, aesthetic community.

REVOLUTIONS AND THE MELTING OF COMMUNITIES

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels launched the concept of melting social solids in a social revolution where class conflicts – as well as the classes themselves and all the other categories, whether modern or pre-modern, which, due to their differentiated composition, could generate social conflict – were to be resolved by melting them into a redeemer synthesis. Like all revolutions, bourgeois, liberal, or social-communist, Marxist revolution also aimed at liberating society from the constraints that had kept it coagulated in an inconvenient order for personality and entrepreneurial rationality. The modern spirit rises against communities as old as humanity itself, pressing towards the dissolution of what was solid (indestructible, immune to history, resistant to the passage of time – such as the sacred, the tradition, the community, the family).

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The old traditional obligations (family, with its dense network of household duties and ethical obligations, neighborhood, with its claims of spatially anchored solidarity, church, whose idea of suprahuman and postmundane judgment relativized any kind of rationality, etc.) had to be dissolved in order to unleash the infinite capacity for rational calculation of the effects of human action. However, what crystallized in capitalist modernity after this initial melting of solids was rather a slag that roughed up, instead of lubricating, social action. The instances of the new social control were identified and interrogated even from the standpoint of the new rational authority. Therefore, the process was redirected at the microsocal level, and intensified, in what was called “the second modernity” or “postmodernity”. In postmodernity, revolutions are discrete. Before the Second World War, the American philosopher James Burnham announced what was already visible, namely that the administrative revolution had already ended – with the evident and complete victory of the administrators. In 1988, Henri Mendras wrote about the “second French Revolution” of the 1960s – 70s, as important in consequences as that of 1789, but whose objective was values, not institutions, and whose conquests were psychosocial rather than economic. American pragmatism and interactionism, represented in the Charles Pierce, William James, and John Dewey projects of rewriting psychosocial theories, philosophy, and pedagogy, reassess the potential for “academic revolution” through compulsory education and scientific research.

In the new postmodern, posthistorical world (Francis Fukuyama), postcultural (George Steiner), postethical (Gilles Lipovetsky), and, of course, posthuman(ist) (Katherine Hayles), the task of constructing the new social order is not assumed either politically or individually; it will be the result of convergences of particular interests. The right to individual happiness replaces the common right, shifting the anxiety generated by the inherent precariousness of life’s fluidity outside the political sphere, which guarantees only the right to choose; individuals are encouraged to use their own resources for survival, dignity, or growth. Order is guaranteed only through participation and individual achievement, internalized in the form of individual interest. Individuals are voluntary social units, urged to promote their own interests in rule-keeping; rule-breaking triggers “self-inflicted harm”. It’s in our interest to conform. Norms are replaced by fear of falling behind and by desire for satisfaction.

Family communities, the most solid forms of social affirmation, survivors of the first wave of “melting solids”, are defined in terms of zombification or bankruptcy. German sociologist Ulrich Beck (author of the phrases “second modernity” and “the society of risk”) speaks, in 1999, about communities neither alive (because their survival is not permitted) nor dead (because they resist assassination), the so-called zombie institutions:

“You might ask what a family actually is these days? What does it mean? There are, of course, the children, my children, our children. But even the quality of being a parent, the essence of family life, begins to disintegrate under the conditions of divorce (...) Grandmothers and grandfathers are included and excluded without any means of participating in the decisions of their sons and daughters. From the perspective of their

grandchildren, the significance of grandparents must be determined through individual decisions and choices”²⁵¹.

Across the ocean, sociologist Reuben Hill refers to the family as a failed, bankrupt institution:

“The bizarre composition in terms of sex and age makes it an inefficient work group, a weak planning committee, an awkward social gathering, and an uncertain group for spiritual communication. Its leadership is taken on by two amateurs, relatively lacking in experience, unprepared for the roles of husband, wife, and parents”²⁵².

THE AESTHETIC AND FLUID COMMUNITY. THE NEW FAMILY FORMULA

The liberation from the family community becomes an urgent consequence of repeated revolutions, but one that has not yet been fulfilled. People’s resistance stems from a misunderstanding of the superior quality of the “freedom to be fluid”: aversion to freedom is either due to unpreparedness for the practice of a life free from definitive affiliations, such as the family, or due to a lack of trust in the benefits of this liberation. Security and stability are still important for the human condition.

“Promoting security always requires sacrificing freedom, and freedom can only be increased at the cost of security”²⁵³

– this is one of the dilemmatic findings of modernity. Modern individualism, Enlightenment, is ambivalent,

“at the same time a vector of individual emancipation, increasing their autonomy and making them bearers of rights, and a factor of increasing insecurity, making everyone responsible for the future and obliging them to give life a meaning that is no longer pre-molded by anything from the outside”²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ „Vă întrebați ce este de fapt o familie în zilele noastre? Ce înseamnă ea? Există, desigur, copiii, copiii mei, copiii noștri. Dar chiar și calitatea de părinte, esența vieții de familie, începe să se dezintegreze în condițiile divorțului (...) Bunicile și bunicii sunt incluși și excluși fără niciun mijloc de a participa la deciziile fiilor și fiicelor. Din punctul de vedere al nepoților lor, semnificația bunicilor trebuie determinată prin decizii și opțiuni individuale”, în Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernitatea lichidă [Liquid Modernity]*, Bucharest, Antet Publishing House, 2000, p. 9.

²⁵² „Compoziția bizară în ceea ce privește sexul și vârsta o face să fie un grup de lucru neeficient, un slab comitet de planificare, un grup de distracții incomod și un grup incert de comunicare spirituală. Conducerea ei e asumată de doi amatori, relativ lipsiți de experiență, nepregătiți pentru rolurile de soț, soție, părinți”, în Corina Bistriceanu, *Sociologia familiei [Sociology of Family]*, Bucharest, Romania of Tomorrow Foundation Publishing House, 2005, p. 15.

²⁵³ „Promovarea securității cere întotdeauna sacrificarea libertății, iar libertatea nu poate fi mărită decât cu costul securității”, în Zygmunt Bauman, *Comunitatea [Community]*, Bucharest, Antet Publishing House, 2001, p. 16.

²⁵⁴ „în același timp un vector al emancipării indivizilor, care le mărește autonomia și îi face purtători de drepturi, și un factor de insecuritate crescândă, care îi face pe toți responsabili de viitor și îi obligă să dea vieții un sens care nu mai este premodelat de nimic din afară”, în *Ibidem*, p. 17.

– neither by pater familias, nor by tradition, nor by God –, say Jean-Pierre Fitoussi and Pierre Rosanvallon in a study on the new inequalities²⁵⁵. Therefore, two categories of people (autonomous and anxious) and a new hierarchy emerge. Civilization takes on two faces: the emancipation of some in the assertion of individuality and the disciplining of others for mass conformity. Reasonable restratification is succinctly formulated in a 1909 speech held by Woodrow Wilson, then president of Princeton University:

“We want to create a class of individuals with a liberal education, and we want to create another class of individuals, a much larger class, essential in any society, who will not benefit from a liberal education but will be prepared for the execution of certain heavy manual labor tasks”²⁵⁶.

In postmodernity, educating the “many more” is even more important, as work is less demanding, and access to knowledge could enable them to break away from the streams of social efficiency.

“Think of school as a laboratory for psychological conditioning, where individuals of a particular, unique type are forged through methods similar to the Chinese water torture, to manifest as a homogeneous mass, to accept continuous boredom and hateful behaviour, envy, mediocre competence, all of which must be received as a natural part of the human condition. The official economy we have built needs to be constantly supplied with ample quantities of leveled, sluggish, passive, disturbed and disturbing individuals, unfriendly and without friends, lacking family, who can be exploited until they become wastes, and then replaced, after efficiently fulfilling their assigned tasks”²⁵⁷.

Enough reason to respond to the demands of efficiency and order “in one’s own interest”, but not enough to begin to doubt this interest; enough to accept the answers with which they are bombarded, but not so much as to pose their own questions – this balance of rationality of the masses must be preserved. Critical thinking must be encouraged, but not judgment – and the model is that of domination of public opinion and mass media. To achieve this delicate balance, the occupation of choosing and deciding is doubly useful: it keeps busy those who wish to assert their freedom in the psychological act of their own choice (choosing their own

²⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁵⁶ „Dorim să creăm o clasă de persoane cu educație liberală și dorim să creăm o altă clasă de persoane, o clasă mult mai mare, de trebuință în orice societate, care să nu beneficieze de educație liberală, ci să fie pregătită în vederea executării anumitor sarcini de muncă manuală grea”, in John Taylor Gatto, *Arme de instrucție în masă [Weapons of Mass Instruction]*, Bucharest, Anacronic Publishing House, 2018, p. 25.

²⁵⁷ „Gândiți-vă la școală ca la un laborator de condiționare psihologică, în care sunt făuriți, prin metode asemănătoare «picăturii chinezești», indivizi de un tip aparte, unic, care să se manifeste ca o masă omogenă, să accepte plictiseală și urâciune continue, invidie, competență mediocră, toate acestea trebuind să fie primite ca parte naturală a condiției umane. Economia oficială pe care am construit-o trebuie aprovizionată constant cu cantități ample de indivizi niveლაți, molâi, pasivi, tulburați și tulburi, neprietenoși și fără prieteni, lipsiți de familie, care pot fi exploatați până se transformă în deșeuri, ca apoi să fie înlocuiți, după ce își vor fi îndeplinit cu maximă eficiență sarcinile trasate.”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 100–101.

identity, rejecting predetermined identities in family, religious, territorial, natural, or cultural formulas) and instills in them an endemic uncertainty given by the “inability to reflect on such an enormous multiplicity of options”²⁵⁸.

For potential nostalgia and community inertia, the ideologization of the community is seen as a solution. The aesthetic community theorized by Immanuel Kant is adopted in the explanation by Zygmunt Bauman as a model for soothing the postmodern consciousness tired of the dynamics of postmodernity. The nostalgia for community, the longing for the “warm circle” where understanding and trust were unconditional, has led to the emergence of projects for the ideological construction of substitutes. The communitarian ideology, as well as the most supported projects for the rational reconstruction of warm community frameworks, are present especially where the community is less – or not at all – encountered. In other words, the more rational-fluidly conceived society is, the more efficient its interaction is, the greater the diversity of ideas for “recovering” the community side of the new humanity. For Kant, the superior-level community of artistically mobilized consciousness can be achieved precisely because people become capable of elevating themselves individually, each according to their autonomy, predilections, and tastes on this level; a consciousness that has not emancipated itself from the constraining frameworks of family, territorial, or spiritual communities is not capable of being part of the selective circle of artwork. Taking up and interpreting this mode of coagulation of aesthetic communities, which exist only in relation to an external and prior object, Zygmunt Bauman identifies several such associative formulas: the public and fan groups, the communities created by external dangers (public enemies, crises, wars, pandemics), by events (festivals, matches), by problems (stray dogs, obesity, ecology, etc.). All these are forms of externalization and defining the fundamental insecurity of man, with which he is left to fight individually, being occasionally directed to define properly the danger, the enemy and the savior.

What characterizes all these types of palliatives of community nostalgia is the attempt to meet and communicate individual consciousnesses, but without codependency, responsibility, and unconditional attachment to others. They are “civilized communities”, respectful of the rights and choices of the individual. Social action is not guided by norms, institutions, or stable principles, but by psychological specificity and human rights. Similarly, the new project of “family community” is being constructed.

This too becomes achievable where the family disappears from people’s lives, and they begin to suffer, individually and collectively, as a result. The family project must take over what was comfortable in the real family but eliminate the burdensome pressures. It must contain but not constrain; its form must be light and fluid, efficient for reconciling the needs for belonging and stability with the temptations of

²⁵⁸ „imposibilitatea de a reflecta asupra unei asemenea multiplicități enorme de opțiuni”, in Jacques Ellul, 1998, quoted by Zygmunt Bauman, *quoted work*, 2001, p. 97.

liberation and self-promotion. The new formula must be for the psychological comfort of man what the caravan is for living – a shelter and a vehicle that does not stop moving at the same time.

THE CIVIL UNION – FLUIDITY AND AESTHETICS FOR THE FAMILY

In the terms of fluid postmodernity, the family is reimagined as an interaction, a career, a meeting, a flux; the family-institution is condemned to disappear – not for progress, for the logic of progress has been abandoned; Herbert Marcuse observes that postmodernity proposes

“an unprecedented situation in history, because today we must free ourselves from a strong, wealthy society, in relatively good working order (...)”²⁵⁹.

The disappearance of the most powerful institution to which humanity has been bound from the beginning (and perhaps until the end) is useful because it will increase individuals’ freedom of choice: what is the best family they can choose? When descent and conjugal relationships are fluid enough to be liquidated, the ties between parents and children, as well as between spouses, solidarity across ages and genders can be unraveled into as many variants as necessary to occupy the imagination and action of individuals detached from any stable reference point. Simultaneously with the breaking of the natural markers of sex and age (for we can now, following the model of the LGBTQIA2S+ mosaic composed of the overflowing imagination of decentered sexuality and adoptive ages, and even of trans-species options, identify ourselves as a “social construct” regardless of our natural “version”), we encounter the breaking of family structures.

Romanian society and family have so far resisted honorably the onslaught of postmodernity, although they are involved in the European postmodern current. The projects to legalize civil union, an alternative formula to marriage, are one of the changes with significant consequences for the family. Proposals to legalize it have been “strung” in the Romanian Parliament from 2015 until today. By the idea of regulating the bond of those who opted for non-regulation – bringing consensual cohabitation onto the same legal plane as the family – there is a rapid move towards regulating homosexual relationships in the spirit of solidarity among different sexual preferences under the umbrella of marriage and family. Despite the reasons invoked, legalizing an alternative form for marriage does not mean eliminating discrimination against those who do not wish to marry, but on the contrary, it pressures for the formalization of what they left informal. Marriage is a form of family cohabitation for those who wish to engage in matrimonial relationships that primarily involve establishing legitimate descent, and then relationships of kinship between the

²⁵⁹ „o situație inedită în istorie, căci astăzi trebuie să ne eliberăm de o societate puternică, bogată, în stare relativ bună de funcționare (...)”, in Zygmunt Bauman, *quoted work*, 2000, p. 19.

families of origin of the spouses. That is, matrimonial relationships aim to initiate family ties built through common descent. The lack of references to descent impoverishes the content of marriage itself. Although not always explicitly mentioned, the contractual part of marriage supports its fundamental mission. We emphasize that, from the point of view of social-human reality, as highlighted in the history, sociology, or anthropology of the family and as can also be observed at the level of common sense, defining for the relationship of marriage is one's commitment to the status of parent, respectively, mother or father.

Cohabitation, living together, or consensual union are not solid, stable realities. They can predominantly be considered as pre- or post-marriage arrangements, family annexes, "trial marriages", or preludes to marriage²⁶⁰. In the sense of alternatives to marriage, they are labeled with new terms, entered into the vocabulary as research shifts towards conjugal or non-conjugal relationships, predominantly centered on the sexuality presumed by heterosexual bonds. In this sense, the couple (distinct, both in reality and as a subject of study, from the family) no longer focuses on the duration or continuity of generations but rather on the (provisional, even by definition) satisfaction of the desires of the individuals involved²⁶¹. Free unions, trial marriages, cohabitation, consensual living arrangements are fluid, imprecise formulas, incapable of providing precise terms for designating "partners" until now: they are confusedly referred to as a "boy/girlfriend", "the one I'm with now", "the one with whom I live", "my partner", "my companion". Whether heterosexual or homosexual, these formulas reflect free loving practices that have opposed marriage as an institution for decades and, evidently, are in contradiction with the contractual form of civil partnership.

Moreover, they lead the "partners" to meet in the formula of the aesthetic couple, which contemplates from the outside the contours of marriage, family, descent, and which, avoiding mutual dependencies and responsibilities, "adheres" to the conjugal dyad in form and name, but non-conjugal in motives and purpose.

ILLICIT CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIPS: INCEST AND HOMOSEXUALITY

Social justice is no longer built through a good, fair, or correct society, but through the affirmation of the – formal and open to change – principle of human rights. From the perspective opened by this principle, battles begin for the

²⁶⁰ Vasile Ghețău, „Căsătoriile în România, partea a doua. Piața căsătoriei, dorința de căsătorie și formele coabitării în România” [“Marriages in Romania, part two. The marriage market, marriage desirability and forms of cohabitation in Romania”], in *Contributors*, January 5, 2024, Available at: <https://www.contributors.ro/casatoriile-in-romania-parteaadouapiatacasorieidorintadecasatoriesi-formelecoabitarii-inromania/>, Accessed on: February 14, 2024.

²⁶¹ Martine Segalen, *Sociologia familiei [Sociology of the Family]*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2011.

recognition of various forms of privileges, defined as rights of different, persecuted, or unnoticed people until now. In order to become “right”, the difference must be identified and shared by a group, or a numerical category of individuals determined enough to be visible and recognized: only if privilege becomes a collective claim does it have a chance to be approved (as a right).

“However, in practice, everything comes down to controlling the movements of individuals, demanding unconditional loyalty from a few individuals presumed to be bearers of the difference for which recognition is sought, while simultaneously blocking access for all others”²⁶².

The process is one that can be projected logistically: first, the difference that can be claimed as a human right is discovered; the carrying minority, persecuted or ignored until this moment (victim), is mobilized and fortified, and the assault for recognition begins²⁶³.

Nearly a year ago, the European Court of Human Rights admitted that the complaint of 21 homosexual couples against the Romanian state was justified: Romania violated the right to family life for 42 individuals. The acrobatics of current reason urges us not to think beyond a decision that gives others a right we thought we all had; we all live in families, so everyone, including the 42, deserves recognition of their family status. Beyond what is told to us, however, other possibilities arise: the family is truly a reality that cannot be confiscated from us; but it is one that we are given the right to renounce. Those who feel unjustly treated certainly have parents, a group of relatives, families. However, their sexual orientation seems to make them not want to adopt and perpetuate the family model. Having the freedom to exist or not in a family and choosing to live outside of it, how can they still claim to invoke the family in their choices of extramarital sexual relationships? For those accustomed to answers, less to questions (and even less to their own questions!), the family is that institution defined by the exclusivity of sexes – the condition of conjugal status and ages – the condition of descent. The cancellation of sexual exclusivity leads to the relativization of marriage, of the conjugal relationship – through the multiplication of its possible scenarios – and ultimately, to its loss as a form of family union. Similarly, the cancellation of age exclusivity leads to the mixing of generations and the deterioration or confusion of filiation relationships – which is exactly the definition of incest. Although this parallelism of fluidizing family axes is not at all invoked in the current attacks on the “rigidity” of the family, the honesty of judgment puts it into evidence.

It has been argued that incest refers to the mixing of conjugal relationships, to their affirmation in forms different from those recommended and socially

²⁶² „Totuși, în practică, totul se reduce la controlul mișcărilor indivizilor, cerând loialitate necondiționată de la câțiva indivizi despre care se presupune că sunt purtătorii diferenței pentru care li se cere recunoaștere, blocând, în același timp accesul tuturor celorlalți”, in Zygmunt Bauman, *quoted work*, 2001, p. 58.

²⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 57.

recognized. According to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, however, it has not been defined as such by primitive populations, where incest is something that does not happen and cannot happen; it is, at worst, the absurd accidental, *monstrum*. The etymologies of the term support this negative definition of incest. Incest, a common word in the most well-known European languages (English, French, Spanish, Italian), derives from the Latin *castum* (pure, chaste) and means the denial of this state of purity, of harmony. In Chinese, the term indicates disorder in social relationships, having an even clearer socio-cultural tinge, and in Indonesian, the term for “incest”, overlapping with that of adultery, has both a social-moral connotation, improper, repugnant, and an aesthetic one, of something unpleasant, ungraceful. Anthropology emphasizes that defining incest as an “illicit conjugal relationship” confronts us both with the problem of partners’ sex and with the relationship between the form of sexuality and the matrimonial relationship.

“It seems that we can and even must introduce into the category of incest, as conceptualized in numerous societies, the ‘illicit conjugal relationship’ between same-sex partners, even one consummated through a common sexual partner”²⁶⁴.

The (sexual) possibility of the existence of two parents of the same kind, mothers or fathers, is itself the essence of incestuous disorder. Incest is a generator of confusion and disorder, of disrupting the structure of related groups, of mixing familial roles²⁶⁵. Similar to incest, which leads to the overlapping of parental and filial roles, to the mixing of filial steps, to the illegitimacy of descent, homosexuality in marriage would lead to the overlapping of (pseudo)conjugal roles, to the delegitimization of this bond.

CONCLUSION

To legalize an alternative form of marriage means not only to discriminate, but also to threaten with the dissolution the marriage itself and the married people. It means that the marital bond is considered insufficient for meeting human, biological, psychological, or social needs. It means proposing to those who are mothers, fathers, husbands, or wives to revert to alternative statuses, which they have precisely

²⁶⁴ „Se pare că se poate și chiar trebuie să introducem în categoria de incest, așa cum este ea conceptualizată în numeroase societăți, «legătura conjugală» ilicită între parteneri de același sex, chiar și cea consumată prin intermediul unui partener sexual comun”, in Françoise Héritier-Augé, „Incest” [“Incest”] in *Dicționar de etnologie și antropologie [Dictionary of Ethnology and Anthropology]*, Pierre Bonte and Michel Izard (eds.), Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 1999, p. 297.

²⁶⁵ „Ah, you marriage rites – you gave birth to me, and then when I was born, you gave birth again, children from the child of that same womb, creating an incestuous blood family of fathers, brothers, children, brides, wives and mothers – the most atrocious act that human beings commit!”, in Sofocle, *Oedipus the King*, (translation by Ian Johnston), 2004, Available at: https://www.slps.org/site/handlers/filedownload.ashx?FileName=Sophocles_Oedipus.pdf&dataid=25126&moduleinstanceid=22453, Accessed on: March 27, 2024.

surpassed through marriage. It actually means encouraging the abandonment of marriage or discouraging marriage in favor of temporary, provisional relationships. In postmodernity, remaining in the family community is no longer a necessity or a duty. But to turn the “freedom” to abandon the family – loudly embraced by 42 individuals – into the possibility of destroying it for tens of millions of others in one country is far more serious than any possible disregard for individual eccentricities.

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INSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE: THE FOUNDING NARRATIVE OF “STEPHEN THE GREAT” MILITARY HIGH SCHOOL. A TRIBUTE TO THE CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY

Alexandrina Zuza²⁶⁶

ABSTRACT

This article aims to highlight the importance of “Stephen the Great” Military High School in Câmpulung Moldovenesc, the sole military high school in the Northern region of Romania, initially founded in Cernăuți in 1924, a town that belonged to the historical region of Northern Bukovina, that was occupied by the Soviets in 1940 following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This article is a tribute to this institution, as it approaches its centenary for consistently upholding Romanian traditional values, such as unfaltering faith in God and devotion to the nation and homeland.

Keywords: Romanian Army, military high school, patriotism, bravery, Stephen the Great, Bukovina Câmpulung Moldovenesc, 1924, military education.

INTRODUCTION

The military high schools in Romania play a unique role in the Romanian Army’s education system by providing advanced education and training for future military personnel. At these establishments, they cultivate their abilities to emerge as trustworthy leaders, creative individuals, innovative personalities committed to reaching greatness, creating value, to develop characters, effectively managing their military career. Within these institutions, students are introduced to the military environment and the rich traditions of the Romanian Army, strongly rooted in the past, present, and future of the Romanian nation. The Romanian military high schools should promote ancestral virtues, such as faith in God, love for the country, unconditional discipline and the integration of Christian virtues into everyday life.

The military high school generates elite individuals, who have become an integral part of the nation, contributing to its development in various fields with their hard work and dedication, upholding the country’s honor²⁶⁷.

In times of peace, in times of adversity and in times of conflict, the Romanian Army has faithfully served its nation and its people.

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²⁶⁷ Marin Gr. Năstase, *Destinul unui militar [The destiny of a soldier]*, Bucharest, Autonomous Regia Official Monitor, 2004, p. 7.

When we refer to the Romanian Army, we refer to all of those who contribute with their acts of bravery and heroism, all those who stand guard at the borders of the country and all those who understand that patriotism means love for the homeland, respect for their ancestors' actions, honoring and defending the cultural values of the Romanian nation. Heroism, inspired by the Christian ideals and patriotism are a valuable virtues, which extend to the supreme sacrifice. Through heroism, human actions are immortalized in eternity, enabling a nation to attain its most valuable assets – cultural heritage, spiritual abundance and the greatness of its past, which thrives on, gaining spiritual nourishment. Having this rich heritage, it allows individuals to enter the great family of nations and into world's history.

Today, more than ever, it is pivotal to come together in order to provide soldiers with spiritual and moral guidance, nurturing their love for their nation, homeland and faith. This will help them stay committed to true values, strengthening their will by emulating the loyalty, courage and patriotism of their ancestors. The Romanian Army is the establishment that has protected the nation's borders, frequently safeguarding it with the price of their lives²⁶⁸.

One of the greatest moral ideals that one can strive for is to have a deep love for their country and its people, while also willing to fight for national freedom²⁶⁹.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT DURING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHOOL

Significant events occurred in Romanian national history from the inauguration of the first School for the sons of soldiers in Iași in 1872 to the founding of the Military High School in Cernăuți in 1924. The inception of the School for the children of soldiers was founded following the establishment of the Union of the Principalities and the development of the initial military education and training program during the War of Independence. The Military High School in Cernăuți emerges following the Reunification War (1916–1918).

Bukovina, previously separated from Moldova and which was added to the Habsburg crown in 1775, is reverted to its homeland 143 years later, following the General Congress of Bukovina's resolution on November 15/28, 1918. King Ferdinand I joyfully welcomes the Act of Union of Bukovina with Romania, guaranteeing that the region's entire population will receive the kingdom's love, protection and paternal care, as stated in the Decree-law of December 18/31, 1918²⁷⁰.

²⁶⁸ Ștefan Popa, *Bărbăție și credință [Bravery and faith]*, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia Publishing House, 1997, p. 59 and p. 283.

²⁶⁹ Teofil Bradea, *Ce-ți doresc eu ție, dulce Românie-Dacia modernă în perspectivă eminesciană [What I wish for you, sweet modern Romania-Dacia in an Eminescian perspective]*, Oradea, Piatra Seacă Publishing House, 2018, p. 9.

²⁷⁰ „Bucovina, în cuprinsul granițelor sale istorice, este și rămâne de-a pururea unită cu regatul României.”, in Florin Pintescu and Daniel Hrenciuc, *Din istoria polonezilor în Bucovina: 1774–2002 [From the history of the Polish in Bucovina 1774–2002]*, Romania, The Union of Poles from Romania, 2002, p. 101.

The signature on the document belongs to King Ferdinand I and Ion I.C. Brătianu, who was both the President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On July 20, 1924, Lieutenant Colonel Grigorescu Traian is appointed as the commander of the high school²⁷¹.

THE HIGH ROYAL DECREE OF HIS MAJESTY FERDINAND I, 9TH OF NOVEMBER 1924

Known as “the Unifier”, King Ferdinand I, ruled as the monarch of Romania from 1914 to 1927. Even though he came from the Hohenzollern family and believed strongly in Germany’s power, Ferdinand chose to support the Entente Powers by aligning Romania with them in World War I. He demonstrated a high level of involvement in Romania’s military matters, especially when he personally led the Romanian Army during the Second Balkan War in 1913. In 1920, he organized a royal overthrow resulting in General Alexandru Averescu (1859–1938) being officially named as prime minister of Romania, starting Averescu’s first of three terms as the head of state²⁷². Ferdinand I was the founder of Stephen the Great Military High School, on the 9th of November 1924.

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“«By the grace of God and the national will, King of Romania, I wish you good health to all present now and in the future. On the report of our Minister, Secretary of State at Department of Defense, no. 4.245 of November 9th, 1924

We decreed and we decree:

Article 1. A military high school will be established at the beginning of the 1924–1925 school year in Cernăuți, Bukovina.

Article 2: This military high school in Cernăuți will be called «Stephen the Great» Military High School and will have Saint Stephen as its patron.

Article 3: Our Minister Secretary of State at Department of Defense is in charge with the execution of the present decree

Issued in Bucharest on November 25th, 1924

(ss) FERDINAND I

The Ministry of Defense, Divisional General, Mărdărescu.»²⁷³.

²⁷¹ George Istrate *et al.*, *Monografie 1994–1999 [Monography 1994–1999]*, Câmpulung Moldovenesc, Gutenberg Publishing House, 1999, p. 19.

²⁷² Kenny Peter Francis, *Monarchs*, United Kingdom, Xlibris AU, 2016, p. 64.

²⁷³ Exerpt from The High Royal Decree Of His Majesty Ferdinand I, in George Istrate *et al.*, *quoted work*, p. 5.

**“STEPHEN THE GREAT”, THE ATHELETE OF CHRIST,
CONSECRATED AS THE PATRON SAINT OF THE
MILITARY HIGH SCHOOL**

One of the most important periods in the history of Romanian military warfare was that of Stephen the Great. The great Moldavian ruler laid the foundation for the first permanent peacetime army. The long and glorious rule of Stephen the Great, nephew of the former Moldavian voievode Alexander the Good of the Mușatini dynasty was a skilled strategist. Stephen initiated direct confrontations with enemies that were generally stronger, only on rough terrains that favored the Moldavians (Vaslui, 1475). The ambushes, striking attacks and unexpected fighting techniques were not unfamiliar to Stephen, who defeated the Hungarian army of Matei Corvin in Baia (1467) and the Polish army of Ioan Albert in Codrii Cosminului (1497). The significant battles that earned Stephen the title of

“Athlete of Christ”, given by Pope Sixtus IV and also brought great fame to the Moldavian principality were those fought against the powerful Ottoman Empire, which, under the leadership of the sultan Mehmet II, was in full expansion. In 1992 the Romanian Orthodox Church canonized the Moldavian voievode”^{274 275}.

In 1954 the Military School is named after this great ruler and Stephen the Great becomes the patron saint of the school.

A better patron could not have been selected for this school. As a military leader, Stephen was brilliant. His military art relied more on talent than on training in the weapons profession. He showed two indisputable military qualities from his youth: speed in action and skill in leading a battle. He had been gifted by nature with a formidable intuition on the battlefield, a capacity that was quite rarely encountered in other commanders. This made him be where you least expected, to ensure his superiority in battle and even in front of forces much larger and better equipped than his army. In other words, he always knew how to choose the decisive moment and to strike ruthlessly and above all, he knew how to choose the place, the terrain and to take advantage of the opportunities it offered him. To the best of our ability, we notice that these three virtues – unwavering faith in God, love for humanity and profound humility – were the foundation of his remarkable and illustrious achievements. Stephen’s love for the people was a noteworthy trait that enabled him to receive good speech and grace from God, consequently allowing him to carry out numerous benevolent acts. He was aware of the negative effects of unstable leadership, which is why he made every effort to take up the role of leading the people in God’s work, following God’s guidance. He knew that God does not give a ruler power to become a tyrant. The talent and duty of leadership are bestowed to

²⁷⁴ Călin Hentea, *Brief Romanian Military History*, USA, The Scarecrow Press, 2007, pp. 63–64 and p. 78.

²⁷⁵ Jonathan Eagles, *Stephen the Great and Balkan Nationalism: Moldova and Eastern European History*, United Kingdom, I.B. Tauris, 2013, p. 75.

benefit individuals, allowing righteousness and affection to thrive in their hearts, thanks to the leader's model and compassionate actions²⁷⁶.

THE FIRST SUPERINTENDENT, LIEUTENENT CONEL TRAIAN GRIGORESCU

Traian Grigorescu was born on May 27th, 1887, in Bucharest. His parents were General Eremia Grigorescu and Elena Grigorescu. He was a respected military leader, skilled in warfare, well-educated, morally upright and deeply patriotic. His father, Eremia Grigorescu, became a hero in the Reunification War, specifically at Oituz and Mărășești. Nicolae Iorga called him the Guardian of "Our Land" and "The Trustworthy Defender of Romanian Honor"^{277, 278}. Eremia Grigorescu aroused a strong influence on the upbringing, education and orientation towards a military career of his son Traian Grigorescu through integrity, sharp judgment, steadfastness in learning, calmness, sobriety in daily life, fairness, optimism, sense of duty, traits that accompanied Traian Grigorescu throughout an exceptional military career. Continuing his father's tradition as an artilleryman, young Traian Grigorescu attended the Artillery, Engineer and Navy Military School from September 1st, 1904, to June 30, 1906. On August 15, 1916, Traian Grigorescu is mobilized together with his regiment and participates in the battles at Turtucaia. Severely wounded, he fell prisoner into the hands of the Bulgarians until May 1918 when he returned to his homeland. On July 20, 1924, by the High Decree number 3293/1924, Lieutenant Colonel Traian Grigorescu was appointed as the commander of "Stephen the Great" Military High School in Cernăuți, starting everything from scratch. Through his diligent efforts, professional competence, balance and tact, ability in interpersonal relationships and with various institutions of his time, skill in leading his subordinates, he quickly flourished a prestigious military education institution in Bukovina, brought back to the motherland. The high school superintendent demonstrated a strong commitment to overseeing the cultural and military education institution, effectively leading with diplomacy and fostering a sense of unity and cooperation in the school until 1928^{279, 280}.

²⁷⁶ Putna Monastery, *De veghe în casa Măriei Sale [On watch in His Majesty's house]*, 2nd edition, Metropolitan Iacov Putneanul Publishing House, 2019, pp. 13–16.

²⁷⁷ Traian D. Lazăr and Traian Eremia Grigorescu, *Însemnări din Războiul Întregirii [Notes from the Reunification War]*, Bucharest, Junimea Publishing House, 2019, pp. 3–6.

²⁷⁸ Nicolae Iorga et al., *O viață de om [A man's life]*, Romania, Minerva Publishing House, 1981, p. 274.

²⁷⁹ ***, *Studii: revistă de istorie [Studies: history journal]*, Romania, Publishing House of the Academy of the Romanian People's Republic, 1967, p. 768.

²⁸⁰ Mihai Bejinariu and Doru Gușu, *Monografia Liceului Militar Ștefan cel Mare [Monography of Stephen the Great Military High School]*, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1994, pp. 22–32 and pp. 22–23.

**EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1924–1940
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CHALLENGES
DURING OCCUPATION AND WAR**

Throughout its existence from its opening in 1924 to its shutdown in 1945, the high school in Cernăuți had a 16-year period of stability. During the years 1924–1940, all military and civilian personnel contributed to the construction and foundation of the school, through military instruction and education of the students, as future career military personnel. The years 1940–1945 were the most challenging for the high school, followed by an 8-year period of shutdown (1945–1953). The events which occurred during the years 1940–1945, marked the existence of the high school, determining its relocation – from Cernăuți to Roman (June 1940), to Târgoviște (July 1940), then to Câmpulung Muscel (October 1940), back to Cernăuți (October 1941), then to Timișoara (January 1944), to Pitești (January 1945) – and finally its shutdown (May 1945). The high school is reestablished under the name of Military Middle School No. 1 Câmpulung Moldovenesc, on September 1st, 1953. It has operated for 3 years at Iași, in the building of Infantry Officers Military School No. 3, until the special designed building in Câmpulung Moldovenesc was completed. On the 450th anniversary of the death of Stephen the Great, on July 2nd, 1954, the institution receives the name of the great voivode and becomes the Military Middle School “Stephen the Great” Câmpulung Moldovenesc.

The high school moves to the newly built premises in Câmpulung Moldovenesc garrison during August 1956. Although it is not mentioned in the school’s monography this event takes place due to general Emil Bodnăraș, who was the Minister of Defense at that time. He was appointed on 24th of December 1947 as Minister of Defense of the Romanian People’s Republic.

Emil Bodnăraș was born in Iaslovăț of Ukrainian and German descent and possessed Soviet citizenship. He attended “Dragoș Vodă” High School in Câmpulung Moldovenesc, graduating in 1924. One of the first actions of Bodnăraș as Minister of Defense was to increase the size of the Romanian Army. The period of military service was lengthened from 18 months to 2 years and military service was made compulsory for all citizens. Although the Romanian peace treaty had stated that the Army’s highest capacity was planned to reach maximum 120.000 soldiers, it was reported to a total of 350.000 soldiers in 1951²⁸¹. The change of the institution’s name from “Stephen the Great” Military Middle School to “Stephen the Great” Military High School, took place on January 1st, 1957.

²⁸¹ ***, *Professional Journal of the United States Army*, USA, Command and General Staff School, 1955, p. 31.

**CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, A CONTINUITY OF HERITAGE.
NOTABLE ALUMI: IN THE MEMORY OF DORU DAVIDOVICI
(1945–1989), PILOT AND WRITER – CLASS OF 1963**

In 1957, the magazine “Tinere Condeie” was released at the high school situated at the foot of Rarău mountain. The magazine included excerpts from the spiritual universe of the teenagers in military uniform: prose, poetry, monograph fragments and translations. Starting with the school year 1966–1967, the magazine appeared under the name “Orizont” (Horizon). Doru Davidovici, an exceptional military pilot, a Saint Exupéry of Romanian literature, also contributed to the magazine. The high school magazine’s publication was halted in 1989, but it reappears in 1992 under the name Alter Ego. The magazine’s name has changed into Mușatinii up to this day.

Among the remarkable alumni of the high school, 57 were advanced to the rank of general from the class of 1947 to the class of 1977 and 22 writers, including Doru Davidovici, class of 1963, stood out.

CONCLUSIONS

This article brings its contribution by marking the episode of “Stephen the Great” Military High School relocation from Cernăuți to Câmpulung Moldovenesc in 1956 by discussing important events and figures in the historical and political background that led to this decision. Equally important is acknowledging the role played by this military school and its initial superintendent Traian Grigorescu, who bravely tackled the challenges of the era during the school’s inception. No other person could have been selected as a more ideal role model and spiritual guide for the students of this school than Stephen the Great, to inspire them with important values like honor, sacrifice and above all, by upholding the Christian faith and protecting the country at all costs. Finally, it is essential that proper merit should be given to the graduates of this Military High School where they have received their education and training and have since become influential leaders, contributing to a more prosperous Romanian society and a better world.

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A POINT OF VIEW REGARDING FREEMASONRY, BASED ON A STUDY WRITTEN BY A CONTEMPORARY ORTHODOX BISHOP

*Anand-Sergiu Donca*²⁸²

ABSTRACT

This article explores the Orthodox perspective on Freemasonry, a secret organization that has been a source of controversy and debate for centuries. It examines the origins and development of Freemasonry, its quasi-religious aspects, and its historical and contemporary influence on society. The author argues that Freemasonry is a fundamentally anti-Christian organization that promotes a pantheistic-naturalistic worldview, undermines traditional morality and social order, and seeks to establish a globalist agenda. Drawing upon the writings of prominent Orthodox theologians, high members of Masonic lodges and historical figures, the article highlights the dangers of Freemasonry, as it fights against the ideas of nation and church and calls for a renewed awareness of its activities. The article concludes with a call for the Church to continue to expose the dangers of Masonic organisations and to encourage Christians to resist its influence.

Keywords: Freemasonry, Orthodoxy, globalist agenda, Illuminism, secret societies.

INTRODUCTION

We are often overwhelmed by the tumult of social and existential challenges that contemporary life brings us, challenges that are, at their core, spiritual trials. It is very difficult for a Christian to respond appropriately to the temptations of this age if they do not understand the origins and forms of manifestation of today's enemies. We therefore believe that in order to understand the temptations of the new world, it is necessary to understand, among other things, Freemasonry – as a secret organization on the one hand, and as a quasi-religious phenomenon on the other.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE GENESIS OF FREEMASONRY

The first forms of Masonic organization appeared at the beginning of the 18th century, when the first lodge was founded in England in 1717. Immediately afterwards, such organizations appeared in France and America. Over time, differences developed between Anglo-American and French Freemasonry, the latter

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being more strongly infused with the secular ideals of the revolution that erupted in 1789, carefully guided by the Jewish-Masonic elites of the time²⁸³.

Although they emerged only in the “Age of Enlightenment”, when speaking about their origins, Freemasons refer to ancient Greek and Egyptian mysteries, to various archaic forms of spirituality (polytheistic, deistic – in any case pagan)²⁸⁴, to the orders of the Knights Templar, going as far back as Adam²⁸⁵, in an attempt to justify their existence through the myth of a multi-millennial spiritual and historical continuity. All of these mythical histories have been contested with solid arguments. The Jewish origins of Freemasonry are, on the other hand, undeniable, the organization being based from the very beginning on the Talmud and Kabbalah²⁸⁶, and taking a form of organization similar to the Kahal. It has also adopted Christian, Jewish and ancient (Greek, Egyptian, Persian, etc.) expressions and symbols, as well as elements of magic. Freemasons symbolically represent the masons who, during the time of Solomon, built the Temple in Jerusalem. Here we also identify the real and supreme purpose of Freemasonry: *the rebuilding of Solomon’s Temple*, that is, *the supremacy of the people of Israel over all nations*, as the Talmudic text also instructs them²⁸⁷. These reasons have led His Eminence Irineu Mihălcescu to call this organization “The Synagogue of Satan”²⁸⁸.

On July 16, 1782, in Wilhelmsbad, a congress took place that cemented the alliance between the Illuminati, founded on May 1st, 1776, by Johann Adam Weishaupt, Freemasonry and Martinists – occult organizations whose total membership was over three million people worldwide. The Illuminati was the only organization that came up with a concrete plan of action, which is why it took over the leadership of the alliance. We can intuit that at that congress, among other things, plans were made for the revolution that was to begin just seven years later. A witness testified after this event that, although he cannot reveal anything that was discussed

²⁸³ Édouard Drumont, *La France Juive [Jewish France]*, Vol. I, Paris, Flammarion Publishing House, 1886, p. 276, quoted by Nicolae Paulescu, *Spitalul, Coranul, Talmudul, Cahalul, Francmasoneria [The Hospital, the Koran, the Talmud, the Kahalul, Freemasonry]*, Bacău, Babel Publishing House and Vicovia Publishing House, 2010, p. 132.

²⁸⁴ Albert Pike, *Morala și dogma Ritului Scoțian Antic și Acceptat al Francmasoneriei [Morals and dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry]*, Bucharest, Herald Publishing House, 2018, p. 95, quoted by Dragoș Dăscă, “Francmasoneria și mirajul luminării fără Hristos” [“Freemasonry and the mirage of enlightenment without Christ”], in Dragoș Dăscă (ed.), *Lumina din tine să nu fie întuneric. O perspectivă ortodoxă asupra francmasoneriei [Let the light within you not be darkness. An Orthodox perspective on Freemasonry]*, Iași, Doxologia Publishing House, 2024, pp. 42–43.

²⁸⁵ Albert Pike, *quoted work*, 2018, pp. 106–107.

²⁸⁶ „Masoneria înseamnă căutarea Luminii, iar această căutare ne aduce la Cabala” in Albert Pike, *Morals and Dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry*, n.p., Nuvision Publications LLC, 2014, pp. 509–522, quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 17.

²⁸⁷ Édouard Drumont, *La France Juive [Jewish France]*, Vol. II, Paris, Flammarion Publishing House, 1886, p. 320, quoted by Nicolae Paulescu, *quoted work*, p. 123.

²⁸⁸ IPS Irineu Mihălcescu, *Teologia luptătoare [Fighting theology]*, Roman, Publishing House of the Roman and Huși Diocese, 1994, pp. 164–176, quoted by IPS Irineu Mihălcescu, „Francmasoneria” [“Freemasonry”] in Dragoș Dăscă (ed.), *quoted work*, p. 109.

there, what is to come is truly horrifying and that we cannot imagine what awaits us: “it will be impossible for the Church and monarchy to escape”²⁸⁹.

STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHY WITHIN FREEMASONRY

Depending on the rite of the lodge in which they operate, members of Freemasonry are divided into degrees, and they do not know who is their superior or equal in degree. First of all, we have Johannite or Blue Freemasonry, where members are divided into three degrees: apprentice, fellowcraft and master²⁹⁰. Then, in the Scottish or Red Rite, there are thirty degrees, in addition to another three invisible degrees, where those who *de facto* lead the entire Masonic organisation, on a global level, are found, at the head of which stands the so-called “Uncrowned Patriarch of the World”²⁹¹.

René Guénon, a French thinker and Freemason, reveals in one of his works what these unknown superiors truly represent

“for [them] Freemasonry is only the instrument, or, better said, an instrument among many others”²⁹²

through which the elites of Masonic organizations carry out their objectives. He gives us as an example the changes in collective mentalities that these hidden leaders of secret societies (Freemasonry and the Illuminati, in particular) have produced for decades in the 18th century, changes that led to the notorious French Revolution, where:

“the Unknown Superiors did not need to intervene anymore, because the action of the subordinate agents was already sufficient”²⁹³.

The higher degrees are the only ones that can decide the elevation of a member to a higher degree, and each ascension in the hierarchy requires initiation and an oath. This oath obliges the initiate into the new degree to keep the new gnosis that will be offered to him secret. Otherwise, he faces terrible punishments or even death by torture²⁹⁴.

²⁸⁹ Hieromonk Serafim Rose, *Cursul de supraviețuire ortodoxă [Orthodox survival course]*, n.p., n.d., pp. 159–164.

²⁹⁰ Engelbert Huber, *Freimaurerei. Die Weltmacht hinter den Kulissen [Freemasonry. The world power behind the scenes]*, Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, *Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft Publishing House*, 1934, p. 63, quoted by IPS Nicolae al Ardealului, “Studiu asupra francmasoneriei” [“Study on Freemasonry”] in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, p. 62.

²⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

²⁹² „(...) pentru [Superiorii Necunoscuți] francmasoneria nu reprezintă decât instrumentul, sau, mai bine spus, un instrument printre multe altele” in René Guénon, *Francmasonerie și companonaj. Studii și articole [Freemasonry and Companionship. Studies and articles]*, Bucharest, Herald Publishing House, 2021, pp. 199–205, quoted by *Ibidem*.

²⁹³ „Superiorii Necunoscuți nu au mai avut nevoie să intervină, căci acțiunea agenților lor subalterni era deja suficientă.”, in *Ibidem*.

²⁹⁴ Mitropolitul Irineu Mihălcescu, „Despre simbolismul și ritualul masonic” [“On Masonic symbolism and ritual”], in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, Bucharest, Year XLI, Issue II, No. 14/1923, pp. 1021–1025 quoted by Mitropolitul Irineu Mihălcescu, *quoted work*, in *Ibidem*.

FREEMASONRY AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH: A CONFLICT OF BELIEFS

Given that both the past and the present teach us that Freemasons are found in Church structures from the lowest hierarchical level to the highest, we consider it necessary to present the arguments that prove the anti-Christian, quasi-religious and anti-social character of Freemasonry, in all its forms of manifestation throughout history.

In Russia, Freemasonry was first banned in 1794 by Empress Catherine II, and then definitively condemned in 1822 by Tsar Alexander II. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus anathematized it in 1815, while the Orthodox Church of Greece condemned it firmly on three occasions: 1933, 1996 and 2014. The Orthodox Church of America also did the same in 1955²⁹⁵. Even the papacy had excommunicated Freemasonry as early as 1738 (such a prompt reaction, shortly after the establishment of the first lodges, precisely because these secret organizations were then attacking primarily Catholicism, the papacy and the Western monarchies). Having a precedent in the Christian world and understanding the dangers of Freemasonry, the Romanian Orthodox Church decided, in 1937, following a study drawn up by His Eminence Dr. Nicolae, Metropolitan of Transylvania, to condemn Freemasonry. However, we did not see a renewal of this anathema (as the Greek Church did, for example) after 1989, when the fall of the communist regime also meant the re-establishment of Masonic lodges in Romania.

In the Metropolitan's study, after a brief introduction explaining the history, organization and initiation ritual, the connection between Freemasonry and Jews is exposed. Rabbi Dr. Isaac M. Wise, nicknamed "the most important rabbi in America", said:

"Freemasonry is a Jewish organization, whose history, mission, signs and interpretations are Jewish from beginning to end"²⁹⁶.

Dr. G. Karpeles, a German historian of Jewish origin, declared:

"The idea of Freemasonry arose out of internal necessity from Judaism. Solomon is considered its founder, who saw the highest flourishing of Israel"²⁹⁷.

Then, in the Masonic magazine *Symbolisme*, it was written:

"The most important mission of Freemasonry is to glorify the Jewish race, which has preserved the divine content of knowledge unaltered. Then, it must support the Jewish race, to erase national boundaries"²⁹⁸.

²⁹⁵ Dragoș Dâscă, *quoted work*, in *Ibidem*, pp. 9–10.

²⁹⁶ „Francmasoneria este o organizație iudaică, a cărei istorie, misiune, semne și interpretări sunt de la un capăt la altul iudaice”, in Huber, *quoted work*, p. 184 quoted by IPS Nicolae al Ardealului, *quoted work*, in *Ibidem*, p. 66.

²⁹⁷ „Ideea francmasoneriei a izvorât cu necesitate internă din iudaism. Ca întemeietor al ei e considera Solomon, care a văzut cea mai înaltă înflorire a lui Israel”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 66–67.

²⁹⁸ „Misiunea cea mai importantă a francmasoneriei este să glorifice rasa iudaică, care a păstrat nealterat conținutul dumnezeiesc al cunoașterii. Apoi, ea trebuie să sprijinească rasa iudaică, pentru a șterge granițele naționale”, in *Ibidem*.

Jean-Baptiste Bidegain, a former Freemason, wrote:

“Freemasonry, which is undeniably of Jewish origin, is for the Israelites an instrument of action and struggle, of which they secretly avail themselves, – so remarkable for their instinct of domination and their science of governing, – they created Freemasonry in order to enroll in it people who, not belonging to their race, nevertheless undertake to help them in their deeds, to collaborate with them in establishing the rule of Israel among men”²⁹⁹.

THE SATANIC CHARACTER OF MASONIC ORGANIZATIONS

The next argument concerns Masonic rituals (ceremonies), which take on a quasi-religious character, profoundly incompatible with Christianity. Forms of deism (specific to the Enlightenment), elements of Kabbalistic spirituality, Old Testament and Talmudic texts mixed together, ancient (Jewish, Egyptian and Greek) and Christian symbols intertwine and give rise to an anti-Christian religious organization.

Voltaire and J. J. Rousseau were two Enlightenmentists who had a strong influence on the secret organizations of the 18th century and, consequently, on the revolutions that followed (1789, 1848, 1917, etc., considering that, according to some historians, “none of the revolutions that have taken place since the 18th century has been without the criminal interference of Masonic lodges”³⁰⁰). The deist God is very vague, impersonal and often confused with nature. Whereas at Voltaire we see an exacerbation of reason, Rousseau believes in the supremacy of feeling. While the former devoted his whole life to trying to destroy Christianity (the motto ‘Écrasez l’infâme’ means “crush the infamous”, i.e., the religion of Christ), the latter imagined his utopia completely devoid of Christianity, which, for not being a religion of tolerance (as he believed), had no place in the ideal world³⁰¹.

The writings of Albert Pike (1809–1891; Sovereign Grand Commander of the Supreme Council of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite, 33rd degree), one of the most important Freemasons in history, clarify this for us:

“Our religion, as high-grade Masons, consists in the unadulterated belief in Lucifer. If Lucifer is not God, then neither is Christ. (...) Lucifer is the God of the world”³⁰².

²⁹⁹ „Francmasoneria, care este incontestabil de origine evreiască, este pentru israeliți un instrument de acțiune și de luptă, de care se servesc în mod secret [aceștia], – atât de remarcabili prin instinctul lor de dominație și prin știința lor de a guverna, – au creat Francmasoneria ca să înroleze într-însa oameni care, neapartținând neamului lor, se angajează totuși să-i ajute în faptele lor, să colaboreze cu ei la stabilirea domniei lui Israel printre oameni”, in Jean-Baptiste Bidegain, *Le Grand Orient de France [The Grand Orient of France]*, Paris, Librairie antisémite Publishing House, 1905, p. 186, quoted by Nicolae Paulescu, *quoted work*, p. 123.

³⁰⁰ „niciuna din revoluțiile care s-au produs din veacul al XVIII-lea încoace nu s-a făcut fără amestecul criminal al lojilor masonice”, in IPS Irineu Mihălcescu, *quoted work*, in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, p. 110.

³⁰¹ Hieromonk Serafim Rose, *quoted work*, pp. 150–155.

³⁰² „Religia noastră, a masonilor de grad înalt, constă în credința neprihănită în Lucifer. Dacă Lucifer nu este Dumnezeu, atunci nici Hristos nu este. (...) Lucifer este Dumnezeul lumii”, in Albert Pike, *quoted work*, 2018, p. 14, quoted by Dragoș Dâscă, *quoted work*, in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, pp. 14–15.

“Lucifer, the Light-bearer! (...) Lucifer, Son of the Morning! Is he not the one who bears the Light, and with his dazzling brilliance blinds the weak, sensual or selfish souls?”³⁰³.

“If Lucifer were not God, would Adonai (the God of the Christians), whose deeds demonstrate His cruelty, perfidy and hatred of man, barbarism and repulsion towards science, would Adonai and His priests still slander [Lucifer]?”³⁰⁴.

Similarly, excerpts from the work of Oswald Wirth (1860–1943; Grand Master in the Scottish Rite Lodge Travail et les Vrais Amis Fidèles) show that at the high level, inaccessible to the vast majority of Freemasons, Satan is believed in as a positive demiurge, recalling the “good intentions” of the serpent in Eden:

“We should be wary of yielding to this indolence of the spirit that conflates the Great Architect of the Universe, according to the conception of the Initiates, with the God of the faithful. (...) The tempting serpent, who incites the audacity to taste the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, symbolizes a particular instinct that is not that of conservation. This urge is noble and subtle in equal measure; it provokes the individual’s imperative need to rise up on the ladder of beings³⁰⁵”.

“God is the ideal that man carries within himself. (...) Let us have the courage to say that we are religious and to assert ourselves as apostles of a religion more holy than all the others. Let us propagate the religion of the Republic³⁰⁶”.

According to Jean Marquès-Rivière, the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite has adopted the “legend” about the life of Jesus from the Jewish Talmud, from which it appears that Christ was the illegitimate child of a Roman soldier (Joseph Pandera) and a young Jewish widow tramp. These lies, along with other Talmudic passages

³⁰³ „Lucifer, purtătorul-de-lumină! (...) Lucifer, Fiu al Dimineții! Oare nu el este cel care poartă Lumina și cu strălucirile sale de nerăbdat orbește sufletele firave, senzuale sau egoiste?”, in Albert Pike, *quoted work*, 2014, p. 254, quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 15.

³⁰⁴ „Dacă Lucifer nu ar fi Dumnezeu, oare Adonai (Dumnezeul creștinilor), ale Cărui fapte demonstrează cruzimea Sa, perfidia și ura față de om, barbarism și repulsie față de știință, oare l-ar mai calomnia [pe Lucifer] Adonai și preoții Săi?”, in David L. Carrico, *Lucifer – Eliphas Levi – Albert Pike and the Masonic Lodge. A study of Freemasonry and its Relationship to the Occult and Satanism*, Tell City, FOJC Ministries, 1981, p. 17, quoted by *Ibidem*.

³⁰⁵ „Ar trebui să ne ferim să cedăm în fața acestei indolențe a spiritului care îl confundă pe Marele Arhitect al Universului, din concepția Inițiaților, cu Dumnezeul credincioșilor. (...) Șarpele ispititor, care incită la îndrăzneala de a gusta din fructul Arborelui cunoașterii Binelui și Răului, simbolizează un instinct particular care nu este cel al conservării. Acest imbold este, în egală măsură, nobil și subtil; el provoacă nevoia imperioasă a individului de a se ridica pe scara ființelor”, in Oswald Wirth, *Francmasoneria pe înțelesul adepților săi. Filosofia, obiectul, metodele și mijloacele sale [Freemasonry as understood by its followers. Its philosophy, object, methods and means]*, Bucharest, Herald Publishing House, 2021, p. 326 and 382, quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 21.

³⁰⁶ „Dumnezeu este idealul pe care omul îl poartă înlăuntrul său. (...) Să avem curajul de a ne spune că suntem religioși și de a ne afirma ca apostolii unei religii mai sfinte ca toate celelalte. Să propagăm religia Republicii”, in Radu Comănescu and Emil Dobrescu, *Franc-masoneria. O nouă viziune asupra istoriei lumii civilizate [Franco-Masonry. A new vision on the history of the civilized world]*, Vol. I, Bucharest, Europa Unita Publishing House, 2001, p. 223, quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 22.

about the life of the Savior that are extraordinarily blasphemous, are part of Masonic rituals. Also taken from the Talmud is the legend of Hiram – the architect of Solomon’s Temple – who takes on the role of god in Masonic lodges.

INSIDE THE LODGE: THE HIDDEN GOALS OF FREEMASONRY

Another argument from the study of Metropolitan Nicolae of Transylvania is represented by the purpose of Freemasonry. Often, freemasons present their organisation as a mainly charitable one. His Eminence Nicolae begins with a rhetorical question: why would there be a need for a clandestine association and secrets to carry out a charitable action? He then demonstrates, offering quotes from renowned Freemasons and confronting these with historical realities – that philanthropy is not the purpose of Freemasonry:

“The pursuit of truth that Freemasonry speaks of must be understood as a launch of all ideas of dismantling the state and society. All the ideas of the extreme left of communism were prepared in lodges and applied by Freemasons”³⁰⁷.

Freemasons provided substantial financial assistance to Lenin for his revolutionary activity. Lenin himself was a 31-degree freemason (Grand Inspecteur Inquisiteur Commandeur) and a member of the Art et Travail Lodge from Switzerland and France. Alongside Trotsky, the first Soviet leader took part in the International Masonic Conference in Copenhagen, in 1910³⁰⁸.

Hieromonk Serafim Rose masterfully summarizes the true goals of Freemasonry (in unison with the Illuminati): the abolition of monarchy and all legitimate governments, the abolition of private property, the abolition of the right to inheritance, the abolition of patriotism, the abolition of family as a sacred institution, the overthrow of marriage and all Christian morality, the establishment of common and compulsory education for children (*ergo*, not the parents educate their own children, but the state) and, finally, the abolition of religion³⁰⁹. A novice, newly initiated into a Masonic lodge, does not immediately learn the true purpose of the organization for which he has just taken an oath. He has no idea even about the secrets that are promised to him and which he swears he will not reveal. If he does not keep his oath (again, to join a society whose purpose he does not know precisely), he risks paying with his life.

³⁰⁷ „Cercetarea adevărului de care vorbește francmasoneria trebuie înțeleasă ca o lansare a tuturor ideilor de destrămarea a Statului și a Societății. Toate ideile de extremă stângă ale comunismului au fost pregătite în loji și aplicate de francmasoni”, in IPS Nicolae al Ardealului, *quoted work* in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, p. 74.

³⁰⁸ Oleg Platonov, Терновый венец России: История масонства [*The Crown of Thorns of Russia: A History of Freemasonry*], Moscow, Родная страна [Home country] Publishing House, p. 417, quoted by *Ibidem*, p. 74.

³⁰⁹ Hieromonk Serafim Rose, *quoted work*, p. 166.

FREEMASONRY AND THE LEGAL ISSUE

The study continues with a critical analysis of the evolution of Masonic lodges in Romania, followed by the secular, societal argument that should lead to the banning of Masonic organisations by the state. Through an oath, a Mason is bound for life to certain obligations: keeping secrets, unconditionally defending other Masonic brothers, etc. To see to what extent this organization can endanger a state, we will look more closely at the latter obligation mentioned. A politician, a magistrate, a judge, a director who is secretly also a Mason, cannot be fully trusted, and therefore should not be able to hold such positions. In the book *The Obligations of a Freemason*, members are required to do the following: you must prefer a Freemason over any other man, when he requests, under equal conditions, in the same situation. Moreover, even the internal ethical manual of the Romanian National Institute of Magistracy (INM) recommends that Romanian magistrates not be members of occult organizations, such as Masonic lodges, Rotary Club, Lions etc. When the oath of Masonic obedience takes precedence over the principle of equality before the law, it is clear that these memberships cannot be compatible with the status of a magistrate³¹⁰.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH'S POINT OF VIEW

Finally, the study that underpinned the anathema of Freemasonry ends with the conclusions, which summarize the reasons that justify the measures that the Church intended to take at the time. Here we will outline, paraphrasing, the main ideas:

Freemasonry teaches its adherents to gradually give up their faith, through insidious and prolonged suggestion, not through orders or obligations, promoting the supremacy of reason. It fights openly and fiercely against Christianity, even if it declares otherwise at times to create confusion (the end justifies the means in their view, so that lying does not bring with it any pangs of conscience):

“In Freemasonry, orders are never given or received. They work only by suggestion. What is transmitted is the state of mind which is indispensable for the realization of the plans of the occult Power. (...) In a lodge you find yourself in an environment where the same song is always sung to you, which sooner or later ends up by suggesting you”³¹¹.

Freemasonry propagates a pantheistic-naturalistic conception of the world, a world of an impersonal and Luciferian god. It advocates a purely secular morality, rejecting the idea of any kind of education stemming from religious faith, from which materialistic and opportunistic attitudes arise. Freemasons believe that there is no

³¹⁰ Dragoș Dâscă, *quoted work*, in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, pp. 54–55.

³¹¹ „În Francmasonerie nu se dau și nu se primesc, niciodată, ordine. Se lucrează numai prin sugestie. Ceea ce se transmite, este starea de spirit indispensabilă pentru realizarea planurilor Puterii oculte. (...) Într-o lojă te găsești într-un mediu unde îți se cântă mereu același cântec, care, mai curând sau mai târziu, sfârșește prin a te sugestia”, in Nicolae Paulescu, *quoted work*, pp. 130–131.

difference between the “conventional” religions in their proximity to truth (only the “meta-religion” of Freemasonry possesses the full truth), therefore Christians have no superiority in knowledge of the world and eternity over Jews or atheists. Freemasonry has a quasi-religious character, practicing a cult similar to that of pre-Christian mysteries, fully permeated by Kabbalistic and Talmudic ethos. It constantly undermines the social order, there is never any sincerity, they subversively attack social and state structures. Freemasonry fights against the idea of nation, aiming to form a global mega-state, with a unique leadership³¹².

The measures that the Church considered appropriate and effective at the time to combat this enemy of God, of the social-moral order and of the nation³¹³ were: a) a publicistic and oral action to expose the goals and activities of Freemasonry; b) an appeal to Romanian intellectuals who are members of lodges to leave them or, if they refuse, to isolate them and refuse them the service of burial and presence in Church structures; c) a pastoral mission of priests to inform the people about the nefarious purposes of this organization and to advise them to be wary and not to vote for people who belong to lodges; d) lobbying with Parliament and the Government to enact a law to abolish occult organizations³¹⁴.

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. CONCLUSION

Today, we can identify the influence of Freemasonry at least at the ideational level in contemporary ideologies, but we could speculate (and even research in detail, why not?) about a direct, sustained and concrete involvement of Freemasonry in today's social and political movements. We find striking similarities between today's ideologies and the freemason's god of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*. The Romanian people have shown a wise skepticism about Freemasonry. It struggled to penetrate our society in the 19th century, just as one of its criminal offspring, communism, did. In the past, Romanians called Freemasons “farmazoni” (from the Russian *фармазон*), a word that means sorcerer or, in abstract terms, cunning or sly man.

In conclusion, the words of Father Serafim Rose are a source of strength for us in faith today:

“We, Orthodox Christians, know that he who casts aside revelation, tradition, the Church, and who accepts whatever his mind tells him or whatever his feelings dictate to him opens the door to whom? To Satan, of course, because Satan enters with the help of thoughts and feelings. We will see that these revolutionary upheavals can only be explained by the fact that Satan orchestrates them. He inspires these people with all kinds of plots and ideas”³¹⁵.

³¹² IPS Nicolae al Ardealului, *quoted work*, in Dragoș Dâscă (ed.), *quoted work*, pp. 95–98.

³¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 99.

³¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

³¹⁵ „Noi, creștinii ortodocși, știm că acela care dă la o parte revelația, tradiția, Biserica, și care acceptă orice îi spune mintea sau orice îi dictează sentimentele sale îi deschide poarta cui? Lui Satana, desigur, deoarece Satana intră cu ajutorul gândurilor și al sentimentelor. Vom vedea că aceste tulburări revoluționare nu pot fi explicate decât prin faptul că Satana le coordonează. El îi animă pe acești oameni cu tot felul de comploturi și idei”, in Hieromonk Serafim Rose, *quoted work*, p. 155.

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ESSAYS

A DIALOGUE OF THE YOUTH

Samira Cîrlig³¹⁶
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Anand-Sergiu Donca³¹⁹

ABSTRACT

A group of young people who want to understand the world and the issues facing it through dialog, share ideas from their weekly readings. In this way, theory meets practice and opens up new perspectives of knowledge. This material is the result of some of these youth dialogues.

Keywords: dialog, youth, knowledge.

DECEMBER 22, 2023: ELITE, ECONOMY AND FREEDOM

SAMIRA

A few days ago, the Professor [Radu Baltasiu] sent us a comprehensive and enlightening piece on economic sociology and theory of elites, from which I will share a few ideas:

1. Why we are talking about this topic: 47% of Romanians live at risk of poverty and deprivation. The answer to this issue is: *the organisation of labour*; and we can deal with this issue from economic sociology and theory of elites. What is economic sociology and what does it do? It is an applied science, more precisely an interdisciplinary approach between sociology – the science of social logic – and economics – the science of resource distribution.
2. What we mean by elites:
“The elite means that minority of the national community which takes the uttermost responsibility and amasses the highest qualities of the community”³²⁰.

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³²⁰ „Elita înseamnă acea minoritate a comunității naționale care își asumă răspunderea socială supremă și cumulează calitățile cele mai înalte ale comunității”, in Mihail Manoilescu, *Forțele naționale productive și comerțul exterior – Teoria protecționismului și a schimbului internațional* [National productive forces and foreign trade – Theory of protectionism and International Trade], Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1986, pp. 275–276.

3. What is their role, precisely?

“The aim [of the elite] is [or is not] the nation, the affirmation of its consciousness, the enhancement of its power and independence, its integration into a single whole and the development of all the potentialities contained in the huge collective personality it [the nation] forms”³²¹.

“The obligations of the elite are not only to preserve, but also to elevate the other social classes”³²².

Going back to the organisation of labour and why is it important: “We work a lot and without keenness of perception”³²³; and this can be observed in matters like emigration, demographic decline, or even mortality etc. The disorganisation of labour therefore affects society on all levels.

A way out of this stalemate is within reach, but only when a generation emerges that collectively embraces the imperative of developing the society as a whole.

ALIN

Samira opened the dialogue by referring to the economic organisation of the country. A solid starting point that can be enriched with the idea of freedom. Freedom is fulfilment, purposeful movement – the essence of life, which for human being is an awareness of our talents, towards the light – the gifts that are in us for others.

Professor Radu Baltasiu says that freedom is essentially social, meaning that it is not a state in itself, but a continuous movement (between God and the nation, as Țuțea would say) towards one another.

Isolation, emigration, unprecedented abortions represent a state of the overwhelmed man, unable to move (or act) geopolitically and chronospiritually.

It is almost Christmas Eve and no carolers are making their presence felt, with a few exceptions. Spiritually and relationally lonely, we have reached a point where sadness is seen through counter-actions. The more decorated the streets are, the lonelier our grandparents are for the holidays. The more crowded the malls, the more separated we are from each other, the more asocial. We seem to be in a prison in which the people around us are just “the gateway” to something else, a time in which our senses are numbed by “green”, “gender” and “trans-human” dreams. All we need is the iris scan to be in total prison. We are awoken from this nightmare by a gypsy on a tram that reminds us about „Deschide ușa, creștine” (*Open the door, Christian!*).

³²¹ „Scopul [elitelor] e [sau nu] națiunea, afirmarea conștiinței ei, sporirea puterii și independenței ei, întregirea ei într-un singur tot și dezvoltarea tuturor virtualităților cuprinse în uriașa personalitate colectivă pe care ea o formează.”, in *Ibidem*, p. 118.

³²² „Obligațiunile elitei nu sunt numai de a conserva, ci și de a ridica celelalte clase sociale.”, in *Ibidem*, p. 117.

³²³ „(...) în România se muncește mult, dar se muncește rău și fără socoteală”, in Mihail Manoilescu, *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești [The Romanian bourgeoisie's purpose and destiny]*, Bucharest, Cugetarea – G. Delafras, p. 123.

Therefore, let's open the door of joy to the whole world.

NARCIS

Thank you to Samira for bringing in the Professor's presentation³²⁴ for today's sharing. I will follow her example because I discovered many ideas there that I think are of great use to us.

In the professor's presentation, the sociological thinking of polarity, the great discovery of the classics of sociology (Durkheim, Weber, Pareto), shines through. The whole society moves on several polar axes, between two "mutually dependent" "extremes" (as Pareto would say), "extremes" as society of status – market society, mechanical and organic solidarity.

"The great achievement of the nineteenth century for sociology is polarities, bivalent social logics, the sociology of polarity. Everything in society is composed according to a logic of bipolarity. The entire sociology of the nineteenth century is deeply impregnated with the spirit of nuclear, fundamental polarities. Societies are conceived in a dualistic manner. The idea of polarity is the primordial core of any image on society"³²⁵.

I will highlight some of the polarities found in the presentation:

Individual and social life with the choice (freedom) that links them:

"Individual life is social regardless, even if we choose to concern only ourselves. Choice is what makes individual life to be social as well (we choose between things that belong to others)³²⁶".

The idealist and the egoist:

"The egoist draws others into his own reality by using them"³²⁷.

"The idealist strives to elevate others to a reality that is beyond ego, perceiving himself as the messenger of an idea through which access to reality becomes possible"³²⁸.

³²⁴ Radu Baltasiu: lecturer on "Family – the last redoubt in the face of the destructive offensive of neo-Marxism", at the Conservative Conferences organized by the Institute of Conservative Studies "Mihai Eminescu", in Suceava, on November 4th, 2023.

³²⁵ „Marea cucerire a veacului al XIX-lea pentru sociologie sunt polaritățile, logicile sociale bivalente, sociologica polarității. Tot ceea ce există în societate se compune după o logică a bipolarității. Întreaga sociologie a secolului al XIX-lea este impregnată în profunzimi de spiritul polarităților nucleare, întemeietoare. Societățile sunt gândite în viziune dualistă. Ideea polarității este matca izvodală a oricărei imagini despre societate.”, in Ilie Bădescu, *Istoria Sociologiei. Perioada marilor sisteme [History of Sociology. The great systems period]*, Galați, Porto-Franco Publishing House, 1994, p. 10.

³²⁶ „Viața individuală este oricum și socială, chiar dacă noi alegem să ne privească doar pe noi. alegerea este ceea ce face ca viața individuală să fie și socială (alegem dintre lucruri care sunt ale altora)”, in Radu Baltasiu: lecturer on "Family – the last redoubt in the face of the destructive offensive of neo-Marxism", at the Conservative Conferences organized by the Institute of Conservative Studies "Mihai Eminescu", in Suceava, on November 4th, 2023.

³²⁷ „Egoistul îi atrage pe ceilalți în propria realitate, folosindu-se de ceilalți.”, in *Ibidem*.

³²⁸ „Idealistul se străduiește să îi ridice pe ceilalți la o realitate care e dincolo de ego, el considerându-se purtător de cuvânt al unei idei prin care accesul la realitate devine posibil.”, in *Ibidem*.

Profession and politics:

“Profession is the work pursued in accordance with the knowledge acquired by mankind in a field, through which we earn our bread by being useful to others, to the society that supports our education (the process by which we acquire knowledge). (...) *Politicianism* is the ability to use others in order to achieve our goals, often by usurping professional or official positions, including through plagiarism”³²⁹.

Between complacency and competent character:

“The difference between complacency (*massified individual*) and genius is the ability to handle *will*. Whoever masters his will, emerges from mediocrity and, eventually, will have a word in the society. And the best environment [for the exercise of will] is the profession. Polar thinking presents us with a choice between two options ‘that exist regardless of what we may say about them’”³³⁰.

It’s up to us whether we choose light or darkness.

ANAND

I’m thinking about what Alin brought up based on Samira’s words. We have the idea of *freedom as fulfilment*, followed by the idea that *isolation is the state of the overwhelmed man*, of the defeated man, who gives himself up to history, I would add. Therefore, we understand that isolation, which often includes *abdication from ideals* and *unwillingness to engage in communion* (*cuminecare*, Noica³³¹), is in fact a rejection of freedom and consequently a violation of the Divine Naturalness.

Freedom – a continuous movement (meaningful, between God and the nation), generates an inner tension that is fecund in terms of creativity and gives concentration and commitment when it comes to intellectual work. This tension also has an ordering, guiding role. Once it goes into hibernation, chaos, disharmony and lack of direction arise, all of them overwhelming and counterproductive.

I then thought, seeing Narcis’ emphasized antinomy between *the egoist* and *the idealist*, that egoism is a consequence of pride and isolation, which I mentioned earlier, is a manifestation of it. Today, egoism is born unconsciously, from one’s earliest years, and it is a real challenge for the contemporary young man to free himself from the bad habits acquired in the family or society. The idealist moves meaningfully, lives that *tension*, and is, therefore, summoned to devote himself and to work in unison with others, as the *idea* comes above the individual, the *general* above the particular. The man who remains trapped in his own self and chases excuses, is wasting his time and energy, as he has no means of fulfilment.

³²⁹ „Profesia este munca desfășurată în acord cu cunoștințele dobândite la un moment de omenire într-un domeniu, prin care ne câștigăm existența fiind folositori celorlalți, societății care ne susține educația (procesul prin care dobândim cunoștințe).”, in *Ibidem*.

³³⁰ „Diferența dintre delăsare (persoana masificată) și geniu este capacitatea de gestiune a voinței. Cine își stăpânește voința iese din mediocritate, va avea un cuvânt de spus în cetate. Iar cea mai bună tribună este ... profesia”, in *Ibidem*.

³³¹ Constantin Noica, *Cuvânt împreună despre rostirea românească [A word together about Romanian pronunciation]*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2020, pp. 277–282.

JANUARY 26–28, 2024: DEMOCRACY BETWEEN THOUGHT AND ACTION

ALIN

In your book [professor Radu Baltasiu], you give the following definition: “Democracy is the instrument through which individual interests are harmonized with the collective interest of the instrumental rationality of the market. Democracy limits political irrationality by limiting the power of the state official and his functions, on the one hand, and by widening access to state positions to all citizens, on the other; it facilitates the most accurate expression of individual interests and restricts the possibility of aberrant mutations in the sphere of political power”³³².

In addition to the many perspectives that the definition above opens up, I will focus on one aspect: the 2021 elections in America.

Recently, an article appeared in the international press describing a seemingly forgotten aspect in the public opinion, brought back into discussion by the Attorney General of Texas. I reproduce an excerpt below:

“Tucker Carlson: They stopped counting votes on election night. Ken Paxton: ‘Because what they needed to figure out was how many real votes there were so they could figure out how many mail in ballots to apply to the election. That’s what they would have done in Texas, I’m convinced’”³³³.

Therefore, the conflict in Ukraine has secured funding for itself and so did the Biden clan and others close to him. At what cost? Putin says that every extra vote was bought for \$10. But the *price* of democracy, freedom, private property and a free economy is to be paid by all of us.

ANAND

I was reading today Dimitrie Cantemir’s *Divan* („Divanul”), his first printed book, a valuable philosophical work, written when he was 25–26 years old, at the end of the seventeenth century. Throughout the reading, we are engaged in a (sometimes passionate) argument between *the Wise* and *the World*, symbols of *Reason* (the Soul, which includes divine revelation) and the *Body* (profoundly

³³² „Democrația este instrumentul prin care interesele individuale sunt armonizate cu interesul colectiv al raționalității instrumentale a pieței. Democrația limitează irraționalitatea politică prin restrângerea puterii oficialului și a funcției sale, pe de-o parte, iar pe de altă parte, prin lărgirea accesului la funcțiile în stat pentru toți cetățenii, permite exprimarea cât mai fidelă a intereselor individuale și restrângerea posibilității apariției unor mutații aberante în sfera puterii politice.”, in Radu Baltasiu, *Sociologie economică și teoria elitelor [Economic sociology and elite theory]*, 2003, p. 15.

³³³ Jim Hoft, “I knew exactly what they were doing”: Texas AG explains how Dems stole 2020 election”, in *WND*, January 24, 2024, Available at: <https://www.wnd.com/2024/01/knew-exactly-texas-agexplainsdemsstole-2020-election/>, Accessed on: March 5, 2024.

mundane). As a matter of fact, the full title of the work is: *The Divan or the Quarrel of the Wise Man with the World or the Judgment Between the Soul and the Body*³³⁴.

The debate (in the form of a quarrel) consists of an exchange of ethical arguments, designed to engage the reader, to challenge him to think (to discern) and ultimately to make a choice.

At one time, *the World* was trying to convince *the Wise* that youth is worth living in pleasures and entertainment and that only after 50 years of living, man should concern himself with spiritual and moral values and respect the words of the Holy Scripture (Bible). *The Wise*, with *memento mori* in his mind, speaks about the imperative of a *permanent awareness*, of a vibrant conscience, full of tonicity, which takes care of the soul (with a constant thought toward the afterlife) in every place and at all times³³⁵; Worldly desires, i.e., sins, are life shortening³³⁶. An exhortation to repentance and work with the self, followed by an analogy about bees, which do not waste time with flowers that do not offer them good pollen:

“[the bee] searches through all flowers and all places, and where it finds sweetness it collects, but where it finds bitterness it leaves, so do I (...)”³³⁷.

I wanted to transcribe a few quotes in order to let us all enjoy the sweetness of the old Romanian language from the 17th and 18th centuries.

NARCIS

I bring Nae Ionescu, one of the great wisemen of the interwar Romanian world, into the discussion initiated by Alin.

The US rigged elections and the use of judicial power in order to block another Trump candidacy for the White House are typical actions of a dictatorship. Any democratic country is basically on an axis: democracy at one end, dictatorship at the other. The US is swinging between these poles: *democracy – dictatorship* because it's natural for it to do so. Nae Ionescu demonstrates that the purpose of a political party is to eliminate its opponents in order to take power, but when it has accomplished that, it loses its very *raison d'être*. It is no longer *a part*, but *a whole*, the country itself. Therefore, we are no longer talking about democracy, but about *the dictatorship of a part that establishes itself as a whole*.

“Political parties are not – in the normal historical process – realities with perpetual existence, and that it is in the very nature of the political party that at some point it will disappear”³³⁸.

³³⁴ Dimitrie Cantemir, *Opere. Volumul I: Divanul. Istoria ieroglifică. Hronicul vechimei a romano-moldo-vlahilor [Operas. Volume I: The Divan. Hieroglyphic history. The chronicle of the ancient Roman-Moldo-Vlachs]*, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing House, Encyclopedic Universe Publishing House, 2003.

³³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³³⁷ „[albina] prin toate florile și prin toate locurile puindu-să, cearcă, și unde ari dulceață afla miiare strânge, iară unde amărăciune găsește iară acolo o lasă, așe dară și eu (...)”, in *Ibidem*, p. 162.

³³⁸ „(...) partidele nu sunt – în procesul normal istoric – realități cu existență perpetuă, și că stă în însăș natura partidului politic ca la un moment dat el să dispară.”, in Nae Ionescu, *Roza Vânturilor [The Wind Rose]*, Bucharest, The Wind Rose Publishing House, 1990, p. 181.

“(…) Let us observe, nevertheless, that at the moment it is fulfilled, i.e., in the moment it has defeated its opposition, the political party has signed its own death sentence. For as soon as a political party is, in fact, a ‘dialectical reality’, it can only exist in opposition to another party; – therefore it ceases to be itself, the moment when, by victory, it has destroyed its opponent”³³⁹.

We should not think that the great Romanian is anti-democratic. In the same article from “The Wind Rose”, he mentions that the ruling party must allow internal differentiation, so that other parties can emerge from it. It must return to its status as a part. But this rarely happens. In the interwar period, writes Nae Ionescu, Stalin (by terror) and Mussolini (by force) demonstrated this.

Unfortunately, the US is following the footsteps of dictators. Perhaps the Texas border issue is a sign that Republicans do not want to give up: they either lose in a unitary US or win in a divided one.

SAMIRA

I would like to share with you tonight some ideas about what Nichifor Crainic named *demophilia*. To remind ourselves, what we mean by demophilia:

“*Demophilia* demands that the rulers of a nation must be connected to those being ruled, to show love and identify with the problems of the people”³⁴⁰.

How does this idea relate to what my colleagues discussed earlier: it was about democracy as an instrument of harmonising individual interests under one ideal (which is eminently collective). Nevertheless, democracy has been perverted, which is why Crainic suggests replacing it with *ethnocracy*.

What is ethnocracy:

“We define ethnocracy as the political will of the indigenous race to establish the state as the expression of its properties and the organ of its mission in the world. If democracy displaced the centre of gravity of the state towards the periphery of the minority, ethnocracy is entitled to realign it with the national personality of the majority that created it”³⁴¹.

The appropriate state form of ethnocracy is *ethnocratic corporatism*:

“i.e., a corporatism adjusted by the principle of numerical proportionality based on ethnical criteria. (...) Only the rationalisation of professions according to the numerical proportion of the country’s populations can restore our nation to the status of the royal race of this land”³⁴².

³³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 179.

³⁴⁰ „Demofilia cere conducătorilor unei națiuni să fie legați de cei conduși, să manifeste iubire și să se identifice cu necazurile poporului”, in Nichifor Crainic, *Ortodoxie și naționalism [Orthodoxy and nationalism]*, Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 1997, p. XXIV.

³⁴¹ „Numim etnocrație voința politică a rasei autohtone de a face din stat expresia proprietăților ei și organul misiunii ei în lume. Dacă democrația a deplasat centrul de gravitate al statului spre periferia minoritară, etnocrația e îndreptățită să-l reazeze în personalitatea națională a majorității care l-a creat”, in *Ibidem*, p. XXVI.

³⁴² „adică un corporatism rectificat după principiul proporționalității numerice după criteriul etnic. (...) Singură raționalizarea profesiunilor după proporția numerică a populațiilor din țară poate să readucă națiunea noastră în situația de rasă regală a acestui pământ”, in *Ibidem*.

What precisely means the rationalisation of professions: “This rationalisation means, on the one hand, the Romanianisation of professions, and, on the other hand, admitting the numerical proportion, it becomes the true expression of equity towards heterogeneous populations”³⁴³.

ANAND

I have two questions regarding what Samira said:

1. What does the “Romanianisation of professions” mean in practical terms?
2. Can demophilia and ethnocracy function simultaneously? How to avoid neglecting foreign, minoritarian nations?

SAMIRA

We shall listen, once again, to Nichifor Crainic’s words:

Crainic writes about a totalitarian state, let’s remember that. The totalitarian state is

“the dynamic coordination of all the organic functions of the nation. Since its criterion is ethnicity, it requires the elimination of non-Romanians from the organic functions of the state and their distribution according to their numerical proportion in the organic functions of society. Today, in Romania, most of these functions are held by foreigners: finance, industry, commerce, trades, free professions, the press (...)”³⁴⁴.

We have learned in the previous times that demophilia

“means identifying yourself with the sorrows of the people in order to heal them”³⁴⁵.

It is totally opposed to democracy because it has

“falsified the consciousness of the ruler of our fatherland”³⁴⁶:

“We define ethnocracy as the political will of the indigenous race to establish the state as the expression of its properties and the organ of its mission in the world. If democracy displaced the centre of gravity of the state towards the periphery of the minority, ethnocracy is entitled to realign it with the national personality of the majority that created it”³⁴⁷.

Since we are talking about a totalitarian state, no one will be neglected, but the priority will be “our people”.

³⁴³ „Această raționalizare înseamnă, pe de o parte, românizarea profesiunilor, iar, pe de altă parte, admitând proporția numerică, ea devine adevărata expresie a echității față de populațiile eterogene”, in *Ibidem*, pp. XXVI–XXVII.

³⁴⁴ „coordonarea dinamică a tuturor funcțiilor organice ale națiunii. Întrucât criteriul lui este etnicul, acesta pretinde eliminarea neromânilor din funcțiile organice ale statului și repartizarea lor după proporția numerică în funcțiile organice ale societății. Cum astăzi în România cele mai multe din aceste funcțiuni sunt stăpânite de străini: finanțe, industrie, comerț, meserii, profesii libere, presa (...)”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 109–110.

³⁴⁵ „înseamnă identificarea ta cu suferințele poporului pentru a le vindeca”, in *Ibidem*, p. XXIV.

³⁴⁶ „falsificat conștiința de stăpână a patriei noastre”, in *Ibidem*.

³⁴⁷ „Numim etnocrație voința politică a rasei autohtone de a face din stat expresia proprietăților ei și organul misiunii ei în lume. Dacă democrația a deplasat centrul de gravitate al statului spre periferia minoritară, etnocrația e îndreptățită să-l reazeze în personalitatea națională a majorității care l-a creat”, in *Ibidem*, p. XXVI.

**FEBRUARY 2ND-3RD, 2024:
MAX WEBER AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTING**

NARCIS

Considering that we have to interact with countless enterprises on a daily basis, it would help us to understand the logic on which they are organised. In *Economy and Society*, Max Weber demonstrates that the entire activity of an enterprise, whether we call it a business, a company or a barbershop, is organised by the accounting of the capital.

“An economic ‘enterprise’ is autonomous action capable of orientation to capital accounting”³⁴⁸.

Any enterprise operates in order to gain profit from the opportunities provided by the market. It always has in mind that future assets (goods and money held) will be more valuable than they are today.

“Capital accounting is the valuation and verification of opportunities for profit and of the success of profit-making activity by means of a valuation of the total assets (goods and money) of the enterprise at the beginning of a profit-making venture, and the comparison of this with a similar valuation of the assets still present and newly acquired, at the end of the process; in the case of a profit-making organization operating continuously, the same is done for an accounting period. In either case a balance is drawn between the initial and final states of the assets”³⁴⁹.

ALIN

I could not understand why the “sense of us” you keep trying to create among some of us still does not stick with some. Yesterday I found out why, from Noica:

“However, egocentric all that is human and all that is alive is, the self is not felt as such until later in a more elevated time of Life. It is not ‘natural’, although it is deeply connected with nature (The plant is, after all, also egocentric since it draws everything to itself; but it is not an ‘I’). That is why man also becomes an ‘I’ quite late. Like the adverb, the first-person singular pronoun occurs only in a time of maturity and refinement of culture. One might say, then, that in the grammar of historical life the first-person plural pronoun arises at first, i.e., a kind of ‘we’, and only afterwards would the first-person singular arise. But without the experience of singularity of the individual, the first-person plural has no profundity, no spiritual significance, no meaning (without conscious individuals, the collective remains a mob). Only when the self-detaches as self can it truly engage in debate and composition with the ‘we’”³⁵⁰.

³⁴⁸ Max Weber, *Economy and society. An outline of interpretative sociology*, California, University of California Press, 1978, p. 91.

³⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁰ „Oricât ar fi de egocentric tot ce e om și tot ce e viu, eul nu este resimțit ca atare decât într-un ceas mai ridicat al Vieții. El nu e «firesc», deși ține din plin de natură. (Egocentrică este, în definitiv, și planta, de vreme ce trage totul spre ea; dar nu e și un «eu».) De aceea și omul se desprinde târziu ca eu. Ca și adverbul, pronumele persoanei întâi singular apare abia într-un ceas de maturitate și de rafinament

In other words, we are witnessing the creation of a paradox: the creation of a false sense of “us”, when in reality it is only in the interest of the “I”. The apparent “umbrella” of the collective interest is only a derivation, the residue not rising above the personal level. Hence the lack of ideals, power of sacrifice and so many other minuses.

SAMIRA

Based on Alin’s sharing, which refers to the generation destroyed by ego(ism) and having in mind the professor’s words about the generation to which Pan M. Vizirescu (a disciple of N. Crainic) belonged, I will concentrate this evening on an excerpt from Nichifor Crainic, which I believe can be a good example for understanding the profundity of self-sacrifice. Crainic refers, in his text, to the generation of the Great Union, whose soul “could no longer think selfishly”. Here’s why:

“What petty, self-serving calculations could fit into this year’s soul of sacred madness? In each young man lived, groaned, shrieked, and rose the entire nation. And those young men threw themselves into death, fascinated by the sublime vision of the enlarged fatherland. Who was to benefit from the sacrificial offering was of no interest to anyone, for, raised to heroic heights, the soul can no longer judge selfishly. The life of this generation was a tragedy; but through that tragedy was forged the most glorious destiny that our nation has experienced to this day”³⁵¹.

ANAND

Reading your sharings, I was thinking about the idea of overcoming, linked to the imperative of perseverance (about which the professor has often spoken) and I tried to understand what keeps us from overcoming, from transforming will into action and recklessness into wisdom (discernment, which introduces criteria and, as a consequence, establishes priorities); and this could be analysed both from a subjective, empirical (suffering from this “disease” myself) and theoretical perspective.

In searching for where this state of quasi-powerlessness originates from, I have come, amongst other things, to the *precarious self-knowledge*. Without self-consciousness there can be no collective consciousness, and without collective

al culturii. S-ar putea spune, atunci, că în gramatica vieții istorice se ivește la început pronumele persoanei întâi plural, adică un fel de «noi», iar abia după aceea s-ar naște și persoana întâi la singular. Numai că, fără experiența singularității insului, persoana întâi plural nu are adâncime, valoare spirituală, sens (fără indivizi conștienți, colectivul rămâne gloată). Doar atunci când eul se desprinde ca eu poate el cu-adevărat intra în dezbateri și compunere cu «noi»”, in Constantin Noica, *Despre demnitatea Europei [About Europe’s dignity]*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2012, p. 134.

³⁵¹ „Ce calcule mărunte, de interes personal, mai puteau să încapă în sufletul de sacră nebunie al acestui an? În fiecare tânăr trăia, gemea, scrâșnea și se ridica neamul întreg. Și tinerii aceia s-au aruncat în moarte, fascinați de sublima vedenie a patriei mărite. Cine avea să beneficieze de ofranda sacrificiului nu interesa pe nimeni, fiindcă, ridicat la temperatură eroică, sufletul nu mai poate judeca egoist. Viața acestei generații a fost o tragedie; dar prin această tragedie s-a făurit cea mai glorioasă soartă pe care a trăit-o neamul nostru până azi”, in Nichifor Crainic, *quoted work*, p. 28.

consciousness there is no sense of responsibility in the way we want to cultivate it. As Alin showed us, with the help of Constantin Noica: without the “I”, there can be no “we”, but if the *detachment* does not take place, the “I” remains stuck in itself, unable to devote itself.

Dimitrie Cantemir also tells us about the importance of self-knowledge on the path of repentance:

“For this reason, knowing which sin you are closest to, you must be strong against that sin; and about this inner enemy, who is often at war with you, you must always think about how and in what ways you are to be beaten”³⁵².

And that’s how I understood, in time, that the fact that I don’t do sports, for example, is a spiritual deficiency. Also, in the light of the Cantemirian texts, we should remember the following:

“man will be strong when with wisdom he will fulfill his weaknesses, and with these he will always think man, I am, and not God; and again: man, I am, but not animal. Because the worst part of man, which is flesh, to earthly things and to sins draws him, so that we must fight the war within [ourselves]”³⁵³.

Indeed, the work is not stress, because stress is related to laziness and the lack of an idea (ideal); I also talked about tension a few weeks ago and I think it is necessary in order to fulfil that idea. The young people a hundred years ago had to endure much greater sufferings than we do today, with our artificial melancholies (if they were genuine, they would germinate). Perhaps it is precisely the total lack of a formative and strengthening Calvary that we miss. Though I should be ashamed of myself for saying so, because again I am left with the impression that we are seeking help from outside for this... Eliade was not working because the outside was pushing him, but because his heart told him to do so. Why does our hearts let us toil?

APRIL 19, 2024: THE “PRIVILEGED” STATUS OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

NARCIS

The popular opinion nowadays “encouraged” by people like those at the *Humanitas* publishing house is that the Orthodox Church enjoyed a privileged status during the interwar period. Nae Ionescu strongly argues against this view. The

³⁵² „Pentru aceasta, cunoscându-te la ce păcat să fii mai aproape, acelaia puternicește împotriva să-i stai, și cu acest dinlontru nepriiatin, carile cu tine ades războiu a bate obicinuit iaste, ades că-ți iaste cu dînsul a te bate să gîndești și cum și în ce feliu îți iaste a te lovi, în minte să-ți fie.”, in Dimitrie Cantemir, *quoted work*, p. 254.

³⁵³ „omul preaputernic va fi cînd cu înțelepciunea neagiunsele lui va plini, și acestea pururea socotind să gîndiască: om sint, și nu Dumnădzău; și iarăși: om sint, iară nu dobitoc. Pentru căce pre om, partea lui cea mai rea, adecă carnea, cătră cele pemintești și cătră păcate îl trage, așa încît trebuie să ne războim cu războiul cel dinlontru”, in *Ibidem*.

reasons? The country's modern state wrongly regarded the Church, and the Christians did not react appropriately to the situation.

The relationship between the country's modern state and the Orthodox Church:

- The administration marginalized the Church, reducing it to the policeman-like status of the keeper of social order³⁵⁴;
- The budget allocated to the Church was minimal³⁵⁵.
- What was the attitude that the Orthodox Church lacked?
- To come up with initiatives³⁵⁶;
- To have a clear point of view on an issue³⁵⁷;
- To "assert itself as a disciplined body with a firm central authority"³⁵⁸;
- To resort to heroic and radical solutions, such as creating its own higher education system³⁵⁹.

The abovementioned led to a state of affairs where a significant Faculty of Orthodox Theology in the country was proud of "doing science", not of being the keeper of the dogma.

Today, when the Church is again under attack (the recent case of Father Tănase from Valea Plopului), Nae Ionescu's words are more than necessary.

ALIN

The problem raised by Narcis, that of the infiltration of the state into the affairs of the church in matters of education, is a sensitive one. I say this because today we have probably all read about the lynching of Father Tănase. Here we have two problems:

1. Indeed, the state is involved in the affairs of the church. One can observe Bănescu's vile reaction to this case.
2. I strongly disagree with the second point, that of an unequivocal point of view on an issue from the Church. Why? Precisely the aforementioned mentioned case shows that if the Church is unequivocal, it is still the people who say that it is exaggerating. Father Tănase made it very clear that he was referring to the Western law, where rape cases are judged not only based on actions, but also on the context. What people (mis)understood could be seen in all the newspapers.

We have reached this point because Romania has been and still is under an almost permanent siege against its culture. For example, in the book *The Holocaust of Romanian Culture*, we find a small testimony about the aggression with which the Romanian pseudo-elites have literally set fire to all the written sources and other

³⁵⁴ Nae Ionescu „Tot despre Facultatea Chișinăului” [“All about the Chișinău Faculty”], in Nae Ionescu, *quoted work*, pp. 29–34.

³⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁶ Nae Ionescu, „Învățământul teologic” [“Theological education”], in *Ibidem*, pp. 19–21.

³⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

documents that have a fundamental role in preserving and solidifying the Romanian culture. For example:

“In his novel *The Intruder*, Marin Preda dwells on a representative illustration of the holocaust of Romanian culture after the war: ‘This friend’s father’, she continues, ‘was a historian, but he had also been a politician in his life, long ago, and had been part of a government, which had never even formed, because it had fallen. But its list had been published in the Official Gazette, and from the Gazette they took almost everyone from the governments after the First World War to the end of the Second World War. This historian when they arrested him, said he had a very important statement to make. ‘As a man who has studied history for so many years’, he said, ‘without comparing myself to Iorga, who had a tragic fate, I understand why the current regime is taking these decisions, but I have one request. In my archive, which has been taken from me, there are valuable documents, the results of a lifetime of research, not all of equal value, but some are so precious that their destruction cannot be matched by anything. I appeal to your patriotism not to destroy these documents’. And then, in response, an order was given right in front of him to burn this archive, with all its so-called precious documents. ‘You don’t make history, Minister’, they said, ‘we do’. Marin Preda picked up this incident from the oral history of Bucharest, told in whisper. Its victim – C. C. Giurescu. The extraordinary meticulousness of this historian was well known, as was his collection of records and documents, extremely precious for the history of Romanians. It is very likely that among the files that were burned by the occupation political regime were also the working files of Giurescu the Elder, the founder of the ‘dynasty’ of historians, files as precious as the others. The real victim of this ‘spontaneous’ holocaust was the history of the Romanians. It is known from the same oral traditions of Bucharest culture, recorded fleetingly somewhere, that Mihail Roller, the partisan historian of the Romanian Communist Party, in his historical research unscrupulously destroyed documents that contradicted his political theses about the Romanian history”³⁶⁰.

³⁶⁰ „În romanul «Intrusul», Marin Preda se oprește asupra unui caz ilustrativ pentru holocaustul culturii române după război: «Tatăl prietenului ăsta, continuă ea, era istoric, dar făcuse și politică la viața lui, demult, și făcuse parte și dintr-un guvern, dar care nici măcar nu ajunsese să se convoace, că și căzuse. Lista lui însă fusese publicată în Monitorul Oficial și de pe Monitor i-a luat cam pe toți, din guvernele de după primul război mondial și până la sfârșitul celui de-al doilea. Istoricul ăsta, când l-au arestat, a spus că are de făcut o comunicare foarte importantă. Persoana mea nu contează, a zis el, ca om care a studiat atâția ani istoria, fără să mă compar cu Iorga, care a avut o soartă tragică, înțeleg de ce regimul actual ia aceste măsuri, dar am o singură rugămintă. În arhiva mea, care mi-a fost ridicată, sunt documente de preț, rodul unor cercetări de-o viață, nu toate de aceeași valoare, dar unele sunt atât de prețioase că distrugerea lor nu poate fi echivalată cu nimic. Fac apel la patriotismul dumneavoastră să nu distrugeți aceste documente. Și atunci, drept răspuns, s-a dat ordin chiar în fața lui să fie arsă această arhivă, cu toate documentele ei așa-zis prețioase. Istoria n-o mai faci dumneata, domnule ministru, cică i s-ar fi spus, o facem noi». Întâmplarea a fost, se pare, aievea, Marin Preda o culesese din istoria orală a Bucureștilor, spusă cu fereală, iar victima imediată – istoricul C. C. Giurescu. Era cunoscută meticulozitatea extraordinară a acestui istoric, ca și colecția lui de fișe și de documente extrem de prețioasă pentru istoria românilor. Este foarte probabil ca în fișele date pradă focului de energumenii regimului politic de ocupație să se fi aflat și fișele de lucru ale lui Giurescu-bătrânul, întemeietorul «dinastiei» de istorici, fișe la fel de inestimabile ca și celelalte. Victima adevărată a acestui holocaust ad-hoc a fost istoria românilor. (Se știe din aceleași tradiții orale ale culturii bucureștene, consemnate fugitiv undeva, că Mihail Roller, pontiful discreționar al Partidului Comunist din România în cercetarea istorică, distrugea fără scrupule documentele care-i contraziceau tezele politice despre întunericul istoriei românilor).”, in Mihail Ungheanu, *Holocaustul culturii române [The Holocaust of Romanian culture]*, Bucharest, D.B.H. Publishing House, 1999, p. 26.

SAMIRA

What makes this aggressiveness possible is the loss of the concept of “nation”. This is what the state looks like from the perspective of a man who has not lost the meaning of this word, but on the contrary, has deepened it by living it:

“From his time working at the Ministry of Education, A.G. [Anton Golopenția] has taken away – as he says himself – ‘a positive experience’ and a ‘certainty’. The positive experience was that of ‘using monographic and statistical research in administration’. It led to the certainty that ‘the exploration of the realities of a nation at a given time is the necessary premise of the national state’. (Leipzig, 14 October 1935 – letter to D[imitrie].G[usti]). This certainty remained to be deepened in Germany. In any case, it would be the starting point of his work there³⁶¹”.

ANAND

I am particularly concerned by the points that Narcis mentioned about what the Church lacks. First of all, I am thinking about the idea of creating its own educational system, independent from the state (this would imply a curriculum free from the pressures of the Ministry of Education). How would such a system look like?

I think that ideally (and what could one do without a clear idea, without an ideal?), it would seek to forge a different kind of man, both humble and idealistic (in Noica’s meaning of the word). Humble in that he is always open *to receive*, curious enough to overcome the barriers of the self and devote himself to knowledge. Idealistic in such a way that he would utterly believe in an *Idea* and follow it restlessly. The two characteristics impose a hierarchy, introducing criteria into the consciousness, without which there would be no priorities and, of course, no work focused on precise goals. Just arbitrary. All at random...

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³⁶¹ „Din timpul muncii la Ministerul Instrucției, A.G. s-a ales – așa cum spune el însuși – cu «o experiență pozitivă» și cu o «certitudine». Experiența pozitivă a fost cea a «utilizării cercetărilor monografice și statistice în administrație». Ea a condus la certitudinea că «explorarea realității de la un moment dat a unui neam e premisa necesară a Statului aceluia neam» (Leipzig, 14 octombrie 1935 – către D[imitrie].G[usti]). Această certitudine rămânea să și-o adâncească în Germania. În orice caz ea va constitui punctul de plecare al activității sale de acolo.”, in Radu Baltasiu, *Anton Golopenția. Crestomație*, Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing House, 2023, p. 45.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE SZEKLETS AND THE SECUIZATION OF ROMANIANS

Samira Cîrlig³⁶²

ABSTRACT

*The content of this paper is a review of G. Popa Lisseanu's work *The Szeklers and the Secuization of Romanians* by G. Popa Lisseanu. The importance of this subject matter can hardly be overstated, since it deals with an issue that is less researched, although it affects the lives and existence of many present-day citizens of Romania and the very existence of some Romanian communities, namely the Secuization of Romanians. This is a sensitive issue closely linked to two other problems: the persistence of the Dacian-Romanian element in Dacia (especially in what is known as Transylvania and its eastern part, which constitutes a hindrance for the Hungarian politicians, men of culture, and so on, who dream about the utter assimilation and denationalization of the Romanian population) and the question of the origin of the Szeklers. The topic discussed is vital for Romania because of the Secuization of the Romanians, or more precisely, their Hungarianization since this process is still ongoing today employing church and school as tools. G. Popa gives a warning signal regarding this predicament of some parts of the Romanian population that, although it constitutes the majority in Romania, faces some serious troubles regarding its existence in some regions of the country. The author tries to raise the necessary awareness about this situation, hoping that the authorities in charge will take the required measures as soon as possible. The present review is useful because it presents, in a synthetic manner, a series of important information that clarifies a problem that is still having an impact and raises the issue of the denationalization of Romanians, as well as of the destabilization of the Romanian state.*

Keywords: Romanians, Szeklers, identity, denationalization, Transylvania.

CONTEXT OF THE BOOK

The present work is a short fragment of a larger work on the Romanians of the Szeklerland and was presented at a conference that the author gave on December 1st, 1932, in Cristur, within the framework of the conferences organized by the "Astra" Society of Transylvania³⁶³. This work aims to complement the praiseworthy work done in the same direction by two other professors, Sabin Opreanu from Cluj and Teodor Chindea from Gheorgheni³⁶⁴. The work constitutes a response to a pressing

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³⁶³ G. Popa Lisseanu, *Secuii și secuizarea românilor [The Szeklers and the Secuization of Romanians]*, Bucharest, "Universul" Newspaper Publishing House, 1932, p. 3.

³⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

problem, namely the denationalization of Romanians from Szeklerland, which has become a constant problem over time and against which the Romanian state does not take any action.

ISSUE DISCUSSED: ROMANIANS IN SZEKLERLAND

The problem discussed by the author is that of the Romanians of the Szeklerland, who, over time, were subjected to a permanent process of denationalization by the Hungarians once they arrived in these territories. The historical context was favourable to the Hungarians since they had to change their behavioural patterns after the defeats at Merseburg, Lech (955), and Adrianople (970). Their actions of devastation and plundering stopped due to the influence of the Germans, especially thanks to the marriage of Geiza's son Stephen the Holy to Gizela of Bavaria³⁶⁵. Thus, instead of continuing the destruction of the civilizing work of Charles the Great, the Hungarians were turned into propagandists of the Western civilization, which was represented in the Middle Ages by the worldly power of the Popes. From that moment on, contact with Romanians had become inevitable. The Hungarian-Romanian symbiosis may have been fatal to the Hungarian element, but it was certainly fatal to the Romanians in eastern Transylvania. Here, although our compatriots, the Szeklers, could be Romanianized, they became, due to special circumstances, an efficient force that succeeded in the process of denationalization of the native Romanians³⁶⁶. The Romanian problem in the area known today as "Szeklerland" is delicate. The researcher faces a tricky situation for two main reasons, which until now have also remained insufficiently researched: the persistence of the Dacian-Romanian element in Dacia and the question of the origin of the Szeklers³⁶⁷.

The persistence of the Dacian-Romanian element in Dacia

Regarding the first problem, namely, the persistence of the Dacian-Romanian element in Dacia, Hungarian historians have denied the idea that Romanians were autochthonous in the regions north of the Danube. They claimed that the Romanians were foreigners in this area and that they had arrived from the Balkan regions after the arrival of the Hungarians³⁶⁸. However, by researching the old documents and chronicles in more detail and with a more critical eye, Romanian historians have found that when the Hungarians arrived in Pannonia, they found a vast and widespread mass of Romanians, not only in the present-day regions of Transylvania but also in northern Hungary, in the counties of Ung, Bereg, and others, and even

³⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

³⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 6–7.

³⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

³⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

beyond the Tisza and Danube. These Romanians remained only on the other side of the Tisza. Those who lived in Pannonia, at the time of Hungarians's arrival, dispersed, some taking the way of wandering, and others becoming Hungarianized in the mass of the newcomers³⁶⁹.

The origins of the Szeklers

Hungarian historians have developed several theories regarding the origins of the Szeklers, which will be outlined below. They faced a conundrum. They would have wanted to consider the Szeklers as being the most ancient people in Transylvania, without being forced to acknowledge them as a separated and different nation that had become Hungarian over time. If the Szeklers were Huns, as the chroniclers claim, or the remnants of the Gepids, as the priest Karacsonyi claims, or the remnants of the Avars, according to Sebestyen, we cannot then speak of the Hungarian unity of soul. From this perspective, the Hungarian problem is that in the absence of a unity of soul, people can no longer claim the homogeneity of their race³⁷⁰.

Hunnic theory

Next to the anonymous Notary of King Bela, another important Hungarian chronicler is Simon of Keza. He was a priest at the court of King Ladislaus IV (1278–1290) and is the author of an excerpt from the Acts of the Hungarians (*Gesta Ungarorum*). Both in Anonymus' time and in the time of Simon of Keza, the idea that the Hungarians were descended from the Huns had been popularized, even though modern science has established that they are different people altogether. Simon of Keza, who also accepted the medieval tradition of the descent of peoples from the sons of Noah, asserted that the Hungarians originated from Menrot, a descendant of Japheth who had two sons, Himor and Magor, from whom the Huns and Hungarians were supposed to stem. Like Dragoș-Vodă, Hunor, and Magor, taking after a deer, they reached the shores of the Meotide Sea and, finding beautiful and fruitful land, settled there³⁷¹.

Three passages from Simon de Keza's book are particularly relevant to Romanians:

“After his return from his expedition in the west, Attila remained in Sicambria – today's Buda – for five years and, before rebuilding his army, granted the request of the cities of Pannonia, Pamphylia, Dalmatia, Phrygia and Macedonia, exhausted by so many plunderings and sieges, to go to Apulia, leaving only the Vlachs who had been their (the Huns') shepherds and colonies, (i.e., farmers), to remain in the place”³⁷².

³⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

³⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

³⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

³⁷² „După întoarcerea sa din expedițiunea din apus, Attila rămânând la Sicambria – Buda de astăzi – timp de cinci ani și, mai înainte de a-și reface armata, a încuviințat cererea cetăților din Pannonia, Pamphilia, Dalmația, Phrigia și Macedonia, istovite de atâtea prădăciuni și asedii, să se ducă în Apulia, rămânând pe loc numai Vlachii care fuseseră păstorii și colonii, (adică agricultorii) lor, (ai Hunilor)”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 13–14 .

To an impartial and unprejudiced researcher, it is clear from this fragment that of all Attila's peoples, only the Vlachs remained, being the local people who were shepherds and farmers that didn't want to leave precisely, since they were on their ancestral land³⁷³.

"The Szeklers remained on the plain of Chigla, a place that has yet to be identified, until the second coming of the Huns, that is Arpad's Hungarians. They helped the Huns to conquer the country, and afterwards they were rewarded with a part of the country, which was not located in Pannonia, but in the mountains. There they went to live among the Blacks, whose alphabet they also used"³⁷⁴.

It follows from what is quoted above that, at the time the chronicle was written, the Romanians lived in the mountains of Transylvania and were literate having their own Cyrillic alphabet. Moreover, Iorga believed that the Cyrillic alphabet of the Romanians was also used by Szeklers who lived mixed with them³⁷⁵.

"At the end of the war, of Attila's descendants, only foreigners remained in Pannonia. The slaves, the Greeks, the Germans, the Messianics, and the Vlachs, who in Attila's time did the work of the serfs"³⁷⁶.

Simon of Keza tells us that, among other populations, the Messinians and Vlachs remained in Pannonia. However, we do know that both the Messinians and the Vlachs were Romanians during the Middle Ages. This information was also confirmed by other chronicles and by an anonymous geographer who, in 1308, spoke of the two parts of Hungary, calling them Messia and Pannonia, both of which were the homes of Romanian shepherds³⁷⁷.

Theory of Szeklers colonization

If, in addition to the chroniclers, we take into account the oldest documents pertaining to the Szeklers, the conclusion is that at the beginning of their presence on these lands, they were not located in the South-East of Transylvania. They were present all over the country, fulfilling a military duty, wherever there were objectives to be defended³⁷⁸. We find them in Bihar, as free city guards, and in Baranya, as kings' servants. In any case, wherever one encounters the Szeklers, one finds that "they are not a tribe apart, as most Hungarian writers maintain, but a profession"³⁷⁹. The fortresses built on the hills to the right of the Olt in the Făgăraș region, which

³⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

³⁷⁴ „După ce secuii, care au rămas în câmpia de la Chigla, localitate încă neidentificată până acum, până la venirea de-a doua oară a hunilor, adică a ungarilor lui Arpad, și după ce i-au ajutat pe aceștia la cucerirea țării, au primit ca recompensă o parte din țară, dar nu în Pannonia, ci în munți, unde au trăit amestecați cu Blackii, al căror alfabet l-au întrebuințat și ei”, in *Ibidem*.

³⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

³⁷⁶ „După ce s-a sfârșit războiul, dintre urmașii lui Attila, au rămas în Pannonia numai străinii. Sclavii, Grecii, Germanii, Messianii și Vlachii, cari, în timpul lui Attila, făceau serviciul poporului de jos, al robilor”, in *Ibidem*.

³⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁷⁹ „ei nu sunt un trib aparte, cum susțin cei mai mulți scriitori unguri, ci o profesiune”, in *Ibidem*, p. 16.

were guarded for the most part by the Szeklers, also date from around this period: Halmeag, Galați, Feldioara, Găinari, and Săcădate. However, the settlements of Szeklers that were brought here were only maintained in Halmeag and Noul Roman, near Găinari³⁸⁰.

The hypothesis of the colonization of the Szeklers, only for the purpose of defending certain objectives, is not sustained by facts, since from Crizbar to the mountains of Harghita there was a whole line of fortifications. The existence of these fortifications would be pointless, had the Szeklers lived, since the time of the Huns, on the eastern edge of Transylvania. Would these fortifications have ever been built, leaving outside them the same-speaking population of the Szeklers, as they were found to have been in the 12th century? Clearly not. Therefore, it cannot be admitted that beyond the line of fortifications, there was a Szekler population, and that behind the line of fortifications there were also Szeklers³⁸¹.

Colonization of the counties of Trei Scaune and Ciuc with the Szeklers occurred around 1150³⁸² because the Hungarian forces could not defend their own borders. The kings, who had also taken upon themselves the task of being the agents of the Holy See and spreading Catholicism in the East, also decided to colonize the country with the Germanic population. The stated aim of colonization was to defend the borders on the one hand and to raise the country economically. We do not know exactly when the latter colonization took place³⁸³. The oldest documents relating to the presence of Germanic settlers in Transylvania date back to 1191, and those about the Szeklers from 1210³⁸⁴. A crucial point to consider is that even if those documents speak about the Szeklers, it does not follow from that that Transylvania was colonized by them, but only that they existed in this area at that time³⁸⁵.

The true colonization with the Szeklers in the county of Trei Scaune occurred later, after 1222. They originated from colonies first established on the left bank of the Mureș, between Orăștie and Sebeș³⁸⁶. In the beginning, the life of the Szeklers settlers was hard³⁸⁷. A few years later, in the region of Orăștie-Sebeș, around 1280, there was a strong presence of Romanians, while the Szeklers disappeared almost completely³⁸⁸. From the Andrian diploma dated 1224, we learn that the Sepsi region was settled only after this year, while the Kizdi and Orbai regions only after 1224³⁸⁹. The Szeklers had colonized the Ciuc plain much later and in lesser numbers. On this account, it can be explained why there are entire exclusive Romanian villages to be

³⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

³⁸¹ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

³⁸² *Ibidem*, p. 22.

³⁸³ *Ibidem*.

³⁸⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

³⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

³⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 25–26.

³⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 26.

found in that area of the region³⁹⁰. We do not know when colonization took place, but we do know that it was done by kings for military purposes³⁹¹.

The name of the Szeklers settlements indicates the Romanian identity of the place and its inhabitants:

“In the dictionary of Mr. Martinovici and Mr. Istrati, we find no less than 48 localities bearing the name Szekler and 81 with the name Hungarian. Undoubtedly, when an attribute is given to a locality it is done to qualify it. Could we imagine a village in Dolj County, for example, being labelled as ‘Romanian’? And if Olahfalu was the name of the present-day village of Vlahița, it was either because the village was formed as a colony or because, unlike the other villages around, which were Szeklers, it was inhabited at a certain point in time by many Romanians. The villages on the outskirts of Odorheiu County Szekelyfalva, Szekely Szallas, and Ujszekely, were formed later by the colonization of Romanians. Moreover, since these villages were populated by Serfs and the Szeklers were not serfs, their colonization can no longer be doubted”³⁹².

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT AND ITS PUBLIC UTILITY

The problem addressed by this book, namely the Secuization of Romanians, is another name for their Hungarianization. This is an ongoing process carried out mainly through church and school, as already mentioned³⁹³. The Romanian state is, according to the in-force Constitution, a national, sovereign, independent, unitary, and indivisible state³⁹⁴. Therefore, the indirect message of the book is that when the “being of the state” is under attack, its representatives must take action as quickly as possible to defend it. Otherwise, we can speak of a besieged state.

Moreover, the author confesses that the work he wrote is a wake-up call pertaining to a dangerous situation. He acknowledges that he is not the first one to make it known. The predicament of the Romanian population from South-Eastern Transylvania presents the reader with a problem whose resolution is vital:

“an alarm call. Others have sounded it before us, but they have not been heeded. We hope, however, that step by step, as the real situation becomes known – for today, we

³⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

³⁹¹ *Ibidem*.

³⁹² „În dicționarul d-lor Martinovici și Istrati întâlnim nu mai puțin de 48 localități cari poartă numele de secuiesc și 81 care poartă numele de unguresc. Fără îndoială, un atribut se dă pentru a specifica, pentru a caracteriza o localitate. Ne-am putea oare închipui că un sat din județul Dolj, bunăoară, să se numească «românesc». Iar dacă Olahfalu s-a numit satul de astăzi Vlahița, aceasta s-a făcut desigur, fiindcă acest sat s-a format ca o colonie sau că, spre deosebire de celelalte sate dimprejur, care erau secuiești, în acest sat se găseau, la un moment dat mulți români. Și, fără îndoială, satele din marginea județului Odorheiu: Szekelyfalva, Szekely Szallas și Ujszekely s-au format mai târziu prin colonizare între români. Și, ținând seamă că aceste sate erau populate cu iobagi, și că secuii n-au fost iobagi, colonizarea lor nu mai poate fi pusă la îndoială”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 28–29.

³⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 46.

³⁹⁴ ***, *Constituția României [Romanian Constitution]*, Available at: https://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site2015.page?den=act2_1&par1=1#t1c0s0sba2, Accessed on: January 20, 2024.

must confess, it is not known at all, or almost not at all – the necessary measures will be taken to correct and stop the ongoing evil, measures that we do not feel the time is right to mention here”³⁹⁵.

NECESSARY CLARIFICATIONS

Primacy of Romanians in the area known today as “Szeklerland”

It should be established at the outset that the primacy of the Romanian element is undeniable in Transylvania, particularly in the so-called “land of the Szeklers”, at the time of the arrival of the Hungarians. The presence of the native Romanian population is attested to in written chronicles³⁹⁶. Furthermore, it is worth noting that when we meet the Szeklers for the first time, we find them side by side with the Romanians³⁹⁷. Last but not least, the persistence of the Romanian element in Dacia was attested to by a consistent and indisputable series of evidence³⁹⁸.

The evidence of primacy, duchies, and voivodships – rudimentary forms of Romanian organization – is also undeniable: the Romanians, formed by the fusion of Roman and Dacian elements, could not be deprived of certain institutions, even if their form was rudimentary at the time³⁹⁹. Due to the expansion of ‘Catholicism’ in Transylvania, a huge pressure was exerted on the wealthy Romanian class to convert to Rome. By doing so, the Romanian upper classes could preserve their privileges. This is why many Romanians are recorded in documents of the time as Hungarians, even though they were not. Returning to the forms of organization, there was a plethora of Romanian voivodes and counts in Transylvania to be found. In 1326, the Negul voivode of Hodoș, in 1335 Bogdan voivode in 1335, who was about to change to Catholicism. In 1345, five voivodes converted to Catholicism, and in 1363, the Ivan, Bog, and Bale families were founded in Beiuș. Due to pressure from Hungarians, all these voivodes and their families switched to Catholicism and increased the number of Hungarians⁴⁰⁰.

Secuization of the Romanian Nobility

By Romanian nobility, we refer to the voivodes and counts, but it must be said that in addition to them, there was another privileged class, namely the boyars⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁵ „strigătul de alarmă. L-au dat și alții înaintea noastră, dar n-au fost ascultați. Avem însă, de astădată, speranța că încetul cu încetul, cunoscându-se situația reală, căci ea astăzi, trebuie să o mărturisim, nu se cunoaște deloc sau aproape deloc, se vor lua măsuri de îndreptare și de stăvilire a răului, măsuri pe care nu găsim momentul potrivit de a le semnala aici”, in G. Popa Lisseanu, *quoted work*, p. 60.

³⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 29.

³⁹⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁹⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 31–32.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

How and why the nobles were Hungarianized:

“the Hungarian state was never a national state, but an ecclesiastical state, the king being the representative of the Pope of Rome, from whose hands he was obliged to receive the apostolic crown, and any nobleman, by the very fact of his ennoblement, became a follower of Catholicism. All the voivodes, all the cnes, and all the nemeses – the name of boyar was preserved only in Făgăraș – were Hungarianized, taking the Catholic religion until the Reformation, and then even another confession”⁴⁰².

Persecution of Romanians during the Transylvanian Principate as brutal repression of opposition

It must be said that many nobles opposed Hungarianisation and, thus, they became the target of the persecutions of the Hungarian power. This persecution had 3 phases:

1. Phase 1: Romanians who maintained their religion were considered schismatic, heretic, and persecuted by Catholics. For example, the Synod of Buda in 1299 decided that they had no right to build Churches or even to join one, and if they did not respect this, they would be physically assaulted⁴⁰³. In 1428, King Sigismund ordered the confiscation of the property of all nobles and counts who held Orthodox priests on their estates. Romanian priests, on the other hand, had their wealth confiscated and were expelled from the country. Furthermore, Orthodox people who wanted to marry Latins were not allowed to do so unless they converted to Catholicism, and baptism was also forbidden⁴⁰⁴.
2. Phase two: persecutions against “heretical Romanians” increased in the age of the Calvinist princes. As proof of this, the Transylvanian Diet of Sibiu in 1566 decided that the priests of the Romanians who were leading them to “perdition” would be expelled from the country if they did not convert to Catholicism, regardless of their hierarchical position⁴⁰⁵.
3. The third phase of religious persecution occurred after the Roman Catholic union. The Romanians, left without their natural leaders, helplessly endured the viciousness of the times. These times were especially disastrous for the Romanians of the Szeklerland⁴⁰⁶.

The consequences of these persecutions were: conversion to Catholicism for some or the exile of the firmest Orthodox believers, who had to flee Transylvania for the other two Romanian Principalities. Most damaging for the native Romanian population was the eradication of their nobility in the South-East region of Transylvania⁴⁰⁷.

⁴⁰² „statul unguresc n-a fost niciodată, un stat național, ci un stat bisericesc, regele fiind reprezentantul Papei de la Roma, din mâinile căruia era obligat să primească coroana apostolică, orice nobil, prin însuși faptul înobilării sale, devenea un adept al catolicismului. Toți voivozii, toți cnejii și toți nemeșii – numele de boier s-a păstrat numai la Făgăraș – s-au maghiarizat, primind religia catolică până la reformă, și în urmă chiar și altă confesiune”, in *Ibidem*, pp. 33–34.

⁴⁰³ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 36.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

Szekler status during persecution

The Szeklers had a privileged status because:

“They had an old family and tribal organization. They were not serfs, but free citizens, exempted even from taxes”⁴⁰⁸.

“By the fact that the Szeklers had been colonized in the most exposed parts of Hungary, it was deemed natural that they should obtain privileges which the other citizens of Hungary did not have”⁴⁰⁹.

The Secuization of the Romanians during the Habsburgs and during dualism, or how did the privileges of the Szeklers influence the lives of the Romanians?

The privileges of the Szeklers have caused Romanians long-term suffering. The losses that the Romanians have endured in the last two centuries in that part of Transylvania have been seriously documented. The existence of these documents that cannot be denied allows the historians to follow closely the process of Secuization that the Romanians people have been subjected to⁴¹⁰.

Estimated number of Secuized Romanians

From the statistics of the time, we learn that in the last two centuries alone, the number of Romanians, who amounted to 30% of the entire population of Szeklerland, has fallen to 5%. The remaining 25% has been lost in the mass of the Szeklers. This difference represents a loss of 130.000 – 140.000 Romanians out of a total population of about half a million⁴¹¹.

The instruments of the denationalization of Romanians were the church, schools, army, administration, justice, war, and poverty

The Secuization of Romanians has been achieved in several ways. The Secuization proceeded first by attacking the institutional pillars of the Romanian community. The two institutions that guaranteed the preservation of Romanian identity – the Church and the School – were the most affected⁴¹². Later on

“the Secuization intensified when Hungarianization became the ruling dogma in Budapest. It had to be achieved by making use of all existing means, – through the army, the administration, the judiciary and, above all, through economic means”⁴¹³.

⁴⁰⁸ „aveau vechia organizațiune familiară și de trib. Ei nu erau iobagi, ci cetățeni liberi, scutiți până și de dări către fisc”, in *Ibidem*, p. 36.

⁴⁰⁹ „Prin faptul că Secuții au fost colonizați în locurile cele mai expuse ale Ungariei, era firesc ca ei să obțină privilegiile pe care nu le aveau ceilalți cetățeni ai Ungariei”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

⁴¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

⁴¹² *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁴¹³ „secuizarea s-a intensificat, când maghiarizarea s-a prefăcut la Budapesta în dogmă de guvernământ, – prin toate mijloacele, prin armată, prin administrație, prin justiție și mai ales prin mijloace economice”, in *Ibidem*.

The Church

Through the pressure exerted on Orthodox Christians, all but absolutely all branches of their spiritual life were affected. Christians generally feel a need to commune with God in general and especially at certain moments in life, such as during baptism, marriage, illness, or death. The link between us and God is naturally mediated by the priest. Therefore, it is vital for the spiritual survival of a community. In the absence of a Romanian priest, the Christian was forced to turn to another priest, regardless of his denomination. Thus, religious needs have led many Romanians to switch to foreign denominations⁴¹⁴.

Apart from spiritual needs, the Church placed great emphasis on financial stimulation in its process of denationalization. Because Hungarian churches were supported by the state, they benefited from a large amount of income that they used to “reward” those who renounced their faith. Therefore, Romanians who switched to a Hungarian denomination were exempted from any church payment. In addition, when a person made the switch, they received money from the priest as a reward⁴¹⁵.

The school

Another instrument through which mass denationalization was achieved was schools. One of the reasons that made this possible was that the school, being the servant of the church, ancilla ecclesiae, was directly and immediately influenced by what the priests decided, as they had a free hand to order in their schools, which were all denominational⁴¹⁶. In Szeklerland, the Romanian population had fewer denominational schools at its disposal because the church (or other denominations) was poor and helpless, not being supported by the authorities; thus, the Romanian communities did not have the means to support the schools. Under these conditions, Romanian pupils were forced to learn in Hungarian denominational schools, where they did not hear a single Romanian word⁴¹⁷.

Moreover, Romanian pupils who wanted to gain access to superior levels of study were forced to convert to the Hungarian confession⁴¹⁸. Romanian teachers also had to show “pronounced Hungarian feelings” to be able to teach and to be “trained” in this respect, they were sent to exclusively Hungarian areas. Once the teacher was “trained” in accordance with the “new values”, he was sent “as an agent of Hungarianism” to Romanian localities⁴¹⁹. The denationalization of Romanians through schools was organized, continuous, and growing action. The main target thereof was the construction of an unitary Hungarian state⁴²⁰.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 42–43.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 45–46.

The army

The army was another aggressive instrument of Hungarianization. Pressures and abuses were frequent and multi-directional: for example, Romanians from Romanian counties were transferred to regiments where the language of instruction was German, and young recruits from the so-called “Szeklerland” to Hungarian regiments. Moreover, even after finishing their military service, former soldiers who wanted to re-join either the army or the gendarmerie were forced to change their religion; otherwise, they were not accepted⁴²¹.

The denationalization of Romanians through the army was a constant practice throughout the years:

“During the war, young Romanians were sent to the most exposed places, precisely because they were Romanian. The Secuization of Romanians through the army was done in old times so that Romanians could benefit from the privileges of the Szeklers; it was done later, during the functioning of the regiments of the stables, – Romanians from Făgăraș County/being recruited in the cavalry regiment of the Szeklerland (...). Some of the Romanians who were Secuized reached high ranks and even became the most prominent representatives of the Hungarians”⁴²².

Another eloquent example is the case of the First World War, when only Transylvanian Romanians were enlisted, not the minorities. Since at that time, an important indicator of Romanian nationality was religious membership, many Romanians declared themselves as belonging to the reformed tradition(s) to avoid the risks posed by being dragged into a military campaign and, after the war, at the insistence of the priests, did not return to the law of their ancestors⁴²³.

The Administration

The administration, along with schools and especially the Church, was also an instrument of mass denationalization because it affected the lives of Romanians, no matter how hard they tried to avoid it. An important moment in this process was when the idea of a Hungarian unitary state became a dogma for the Budapest government. As a result, the denationalization of the Romanians no longer encountered any obstacles and was carried out “openly, without any scruples, without any embarrassment”⁴²⁴.

⁴²¹*Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁴²² „În timpul războiului, în locurile cele mai expuse erau trimiși tinerii români, tocmai fiindcă erau români. Secuizarea românilor prin armată s-a făcut în timpurile vechi pentru ca românii să beneficieze de privilegiile secuilor, s-a făcut mai târziu, în timpul funcționării regimentelor grănicerești, – românii din județul Făgăraș/ fiind recrutați în regimentul de cavalerie din Secuime (...). Unii dintre românii secuizați au ajuns la grade înalte și au ajuns chiar să fie reprezentanții cei mai de seamă ai ungarilor”, in *Ibidem*, p. 49.

⁴²³ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

⁴²⁴ „pe față, fără niciun scrupul, fără nicio jenă”, in *Ibidem*, p. 50.

The reasoning behind this approach was as follows: after the union of the Principality of Transylvania with Hungary in 1848, the country's rulers feared that the union would not last. Therefore, during this era of forced Hungarianization, they sought to strengthen the Szekler element in Transylvania. To achieve this, the Szekler element was favored at the expense of other nationalities. Thus, the Hungarians did not retreat from their actions. In short, a privileged situation was created for the Szeklers to "eliminate the Romanians"⁴²⁵.

The instruments of denationalization through administration are as follows:

The Composesorates

A special type of property, the composesorial property, was established in Szeklerland. There had been indeed composesorates before, but they were only forest composesorates and were established following the introduction of the frontier regiments of Empress Maria Theresa. At the end of the dualism in 1867, the forest composesorates were joined by field composesorates⁴²⁶. First, with the introduction of the cadastre, *i.e.*, land registers, between 1870 and 1880, the forest composesorates were declared private property, even if the former land surveyors had only the right to use them⁴²⁷. In other words, Hungarian magistrates, who were supposed to protect the state's wealth and not to alienate it, entered these Szekler composesorates in the land registers as owners of forests instead of the state, which was the rightful owner. Thus, the aim was to create a privileged situation for Szeklers. With the creation of the field composesorates, other injustices arose because Romanians could only enter these composesorates if they renounced their nationality⁴²⁸.

The logic of things was as follows: the Hungarian state started a real state policy in order to give the Szeklers more and more privileges and not to give up their nationality, which was in reality Hungarian. In 1901, the Ministry of Agriculture in Budapest found that many Szeklers had been leaving their homes and that their property had remained in foreign hands, and it set up a commission in Târgu Mureş to study the problem and propose solutions. Based on the commission report, the Ministry gave 300.000 crowns to establish a common and 30.000 crowns to breed cattle. All this money was for Szekler counties only. The Ministry was also informed that the Romanians in the region were mostly engaged in sheep and cattle breeding, which meant that those advantages were used by Romanians and not Hungarians, which is why, in 1902, the Ministry approved other funds for the establishment of communal composesorates, which could only be made up of the Szekler people⁴²⁹.

⁴²⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴²⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴²⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

⁴²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 51–52.

Industrial enterprises

After the founding of the composesorates, measures were taken to ensure that Szekler manual workers could be employed in industrial enterprises, whereas Romanians were forbidden from doing so. The only way to get employed by these enterprises was to become a member of a Hungarian confession/community⁴³⁰.

The Cooperatives

Another extremely important moment during the denationalization process of the Romanians was the creation of cooperatives, which were given money on loan at a very low interest rate to take over the property of the Romanians. To accomplish this, instruments were created, such as the “Szekely Kirendelcseg” Institute, which took the Romanians’ property using the Szeklers⁴³¹. For example, in the exclusive Romanian commune of Laureni, in 1911, owner Gego Carol intended to sell his land. Although the authorities of Laureni’s commune wanted to buy the land, the management of the Institute “Szekely Kirendelcseg” telegraphically bought the entire estate. As a result, a quarter of the Romanian inhabitants of Laureni’s village had to leave it to find another way to make a living⁴³².

Land redistribution

Along with the composesorates, another mechanism that had a disastrous influence on Romanians’ national identity was land redistribution, as the best lots were given to the Szeklers/ Hungarians, while the more isolated ones, on ravines or hillsides, were given to Romanians, even in cases where, prior to the land redistribution, Romanian lands would have been located near the villages in which they lived. Moreover, in some areas, Romanians were forbidden from buying land before renouncing Orthodox Christianity. Ioan Negrea from Aita Mare, for example, bought a house and did not put it in his name until he renounced his faith and changed his name to Fekete Ianoş⁴³³.

Economic constraints

Economic constraints were another effective instrument of annihilation of the national identity of the Romanian population in times of multiple financial problems. For example, the family of Count Mikes, from the county of Trei Scaune, favored the passage of Romanians into the heart of Szeklerland through various economic acts, such as building materials and firewood. This is how many families were denationalized, including the Dogariu-Kadar family. Also, the counts Zethäl and Bernath, from Micloşoara’s commune, forbade the Romanians from working on their land unless they changed their religion. Under these conditions, more than 48 families were Secuized⁴³⁴.

⁴³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 52.

⁴³¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴³² *Ibidem*.

⁴³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 52–53.

⁴³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

OTHER UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF ROMANIANS' SECUIZATION

Szekler traditions, customs and fairy tales

One proof of the Romanianness of the Szeklers, who came out of our nation, are the Romanian customs, traditions, and fairy tales accurately preserved by our compatriots. Here are a few examples:

“The Szeklers keep the fasts, especially the Lent and the Feast of the Holy Cross; they know the days of fasting and the days on which fish is eaten; they go to confession and confession regularly; they observe the feasts of the Orthodox church, Sânpetru, St. Elijah, St. Foca, Epiphany, Ascension, and others”⁴³⁵.

“(…) believe in the Mother of God, even the reformists (…) come at Epiphany to the river and take the Holy Water; they come to the Romanian priest to celebrate their day of liturgy and call upon him to read to the sick person’s head or to make a blessing in case of misfortune or sickness in the cattle, believing that only the Romanian priest has divine grace; they call upon him to bless a new house; they ask that the bells of the Romanian church be rung when the clouds gather in summer, so that hail does not hail; at the funeral, they cover the mirror in the house of the dead, take the decorated apple to the grave and give the priest a candle and a cloth”⁴³⁶.

“Besides, the fairy tales and folktales from the Szekler region are nothing but our Romanian fairy tales. We need only quote ‘The Gypsy in the Shepherd’s Hut’ to realize that is borrowed from the Romanian folklore”⁴³⁷.

The Romanian language of the Szeklers

The denationalization of Romanians can also be demonstrated by the many loan words present in the language of the Szeklers. Many names of localities, valleys, hills, lowlands, coasts, plains, and fields still bear the stamp of the native Romanian presence, although they are used by the Szeklers. Sometimes, because of the denationalization process, these names are translated, changed, or even renamed⁴³⁸. Because of their multitude, we cannot list all the place names that we find in the so-called “Szeklerland”, but here are some examples: Desiș, Dosuri, Coastă, Frumoasa,

⁴³⁵ „Secuii țin posturile, în special postul Păresimilor și de ziua S-tei Cruci; cunosc zilele de harți și zilele în care se mănâncă pește în post; se spovedesc și se cuminecă regulat; păzesc sărbătorile bisericii ortodoxe, Sânpetru, Sf. Ilie, Sf. Foca, Bobotează, Înălțarea și altele”, in *Ibidem*, p. 54.

⁴³⁶ „(…) cred în Maica Domnului, chiar și reformații (…) vin la bobotează la rău și iau agheasmă; vin la preotul român să le țină zi de liturghie și-l cheamă să citească la capul bolnavului sau să le facă sfeștanie în caz de nenorocire sau boală în vite, socotind că har dumnezeesc are numai preotul român; îl cheamă pe acesta să le binecuvânteze o casă nouă; cer să se tragă clopotele bisericii românești când se adună norii vara, spre a nu bate grindina; la înmormântare acoperă oglinda în casa mortului, duc la mormânt mărul împodobit și dau preotului o lumânare și un ștergar”, in *Ibidem*, p. 55.

⁴³⁷ „De așijderea basmele și snoavele din regiunea secuiască nu sunt decât basmele noastre românești. N-am avea decât să cităm «Țiganul la stână» ca să ne dăm seama de împrumutul făcut”, in *Ibidem*, p. 57.

⁴³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

Fântoasa, Fântâna, Zăpada, Flămânda, Laz, Mal, Moșie, Pleș, Gulușa, Izvor, Setea, Mocirla, Lunca, Vadu, Secătura, Cocovia, Murgu, Tabla, and many others. These findings also demonstrate that the Romanian language was spoken in those areas⁴³⁹.

Brief clarification: why can't we say that these are simple cultural borrowings?

Although some researchers might argue that the Szeklers borrowed these cultural elements from the Romanians because they lived together, we must also establish that the borrowing is always mutual. However, this is not the case because only the Szeklers borrowed words from Romanians, not Romanians. This linguistic dynamic in fact shows that Szeklers today are Romanians who have been denationalized throughout history⁴⁴⁰.

RECOMMENDATIONS

At the country's leadership level

Knowledgeable people, who have properly documented this problem, have a duty to bring the country's leadership to the issue, to warn of the dangers involved, and the leaders, in their turn, have a duty to listen and act according to the historical truth⁴⁴¹. Furthermore, the Romanian people are duty-bound not to forget the truth that history attests, a truth that was, is, and always will be on the side of the Romanian point of view:

“Our endeavour to reawaken the national sentiment, should not be plagued by the fear of defeat, for we have the justice on our side, and the justice of those who walk in the ways of the Lord always succeeds”⁴⁴².

Intra-Community level

In what concerns the solidarity between the members of the Romanian community, one should bear in mind that Romanians have been under the onslaught of immense and long-lasting pressures and attacks over the years, which is their decisions should be treated with empathy. Gratefulness should be shown to the priests and teachers who, within the limits of their possibilities and in the face of harsh circumstances, fulfilled their duty by saving at least part of the Romanian elements in these regions from complete disaster⁴⁴³.

⁴³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 57–58.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 60.

⁴⁴² „În lucrarea noastră de redeșteptare a sentimentului național, să nu avem nicio teamă de neizbândă, fiindcă noi suntem cu dreptatea în brațe și dreptatea acelor cari merg pe căile domnului totdeauna învinge”, in *Ibidem*, p. 61.

⁴⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 60.

At the intercommunity level

At the same time, patience and compassion must be shown toward the fellow Szeklers, despite the hardships they have experienced. Discussions with them regarding their past and origins should be initiated in a peaceful manner thereby showing them there is almost no difference between them and the Romanian population according to ethnological and anthropological data⁴⁴⁴.

CONCLUSION

The first stage of the denationalization process of the Romanian population is set in the era of the Arpadian kings, the Angevin kings, and the Calvinists, by catholicizing the ruling class, that is, the nobles, because

“the state, at that time, was not a Hungarian national state, but an ecclesiastical state, a clerical state, the kings being the representatives of the papacy”⁴⁴⁵.

The second stage of the denationalizing process took place during the age of the Transylvanian princes when the Romanian element was ostracized and removed from the ranks of the nations of Transylvania by the *Unio Trium Nationum* and later by the laws of Verboczy. The third stage, forced Hungarianization, encompasses the last two centuries and even the present day⁴⁴⁶.

In this way, Hungarian state power has worked in all forms, legal and illegal, to the detriment of the Romanians, who have gradually abandoned their ancestral language and law, increasing the number of Szeklers and eventually Hungarians, without any wish to know their origin⁴⁴⁷.

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Popa Lisseanu G., *Secuții și secuizarea românilor [The Szeklers and the Secuization of Romanians]*, Bucharest, “Universul” Newspaper Publishing House, 1932.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 61.

⁴⁴⁵ „statul, pe vremea aceea, nu era un stat național unguresc, ci un stat bisericesc, un stat clerical, regii fiind reprezentanții papalității”, in *Ibidem*, p. 60.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

HUNGARIAN ESPIONAGE IN ROMANIA 1918–1940

Alin Bulumac⁴⁴⁸

ABSTRACT

The book represents the fruit of a concern, which derives from the sense of duty and conscience towards the homeland, of a Romanian who will remain anonymous in the ranks of written history. Also in the unknown logic of destiny is the fact that a relative of this officer kept this manuscript hidden until December 21, 1990, a moment he considered to be an opportune moment for publication and through the kindness of Mr. Ioan Dumitru, the pages of the manuscript knew the ink of the Concordia publishing house in Timișoara. The wish of the counter-intelligence officer from the Romanian espionage service, to leave a manuscript to the next generations, which consists in clearly mentioning the dangers and the gaps of the organization of the Romanian administration, with the specific purpose of eliminating them as well as the risk of creating new territorial seizures, the fear rising to the level of the disappearance of Romania as an independent and sovereign state. The fate of the author will remain unknown but taking into account the fact that he wrote the lines of this book in 1942, in the middle of the Second World War, when Romania was directly under the military pressure of Nazi Germany, after significant territorial losses, directly underlines the importance of the moment of the beginning and organization of the Hungarian espionage service, whose infrastructure was created with the support of Germany, from before the First World War. The author himself confesses at the very beginning of the book that he bled from the young age of 18 for the integration of the country he loves "more than anything in this world", a fact that indirectly indicates to us that the author of the manuscript is one of the heroes who have fought in the war of national reunification and put the national ideal of Greater Romania before everything else. The novelty that this book presents lies in the fact that regardless of the size of Budapest's effort, both internally and externally, to consider itself wronged in the face of history and the Trianon treaty, the Hungarianization process continues with even more intense force compared to the dualistic period. The territorial rapture dictated from Vienna represents nothing more than the consequence of a whole series of activities in the field of cultural diplomacy of Budapest, regarding the historical revenge directed against the Trianon treaty. It is true that the level of hardness is not as high, but the increasing subtlety of the Hungarianization phenomenon demonstrates Budapest's active and continuous concern to regain lost territory.

Keywords: Trianon, Hungarianization, espionage, Transylvania.

SHORT INTRODUCTION

The book published by Ioan Dumitru at the Concordia publishing house represents a unique chance that the author decided to offer to a synthesis manuscript written by a Romanian officer from Romania's counterintelligence service. At the same time, the book represents a unique chance offered to the general public to go behind the scenes of the unseen history of Romania from that period, as well as a chance to offer the reader a tool to decode the strategy that has reverberations to this day.

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The author's exhortation as well as the purpose of the manuscript that saw the light of print can be reduced to the following essence:

"I wrote these study notes out of an exhortation to do my duty of conscience towards my homeland, Romania, for which I bled at an early age 18 years old and whom I love more than anything in this world. And I also wrote to them with the hope that they will resonate and enlighten people, with love for their country, will find the best solution (...) in order to protect Romania from occult interests"⁴⁴⁹.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN SPY SERVICE IN ROMANIA

Before the war of national integration

The infrastructure of the espionage system

In order to be able to understand the entire spider web type ramification, created inside Romania by the Hungarian secret service, the author provides a brief history of this fact. Things begin to take shape from the time of King Charles I, who concluded a secret alliance with the central powers, corroborated with

"Hungarian arrogance that disregarded the humble Wallachian population from the East and South of the Carpathians"⁴⁵⁰.

gave Austria-Hungary the leeway to find out information only through legations and military attachés. Contrary to the dualist approach, Germany was not exactly sure of the alliance with King Charles because they "considered the treaties then as now as scraps of paper"⁴⁵¹ and since they foresaw the European war a long time ago, they organized an extensive espionage service in our country, especially an economic one, which they managed right from the office of their plenipotentiary minister⁴⁵². The goodwill of the king and politicians allowed the German agents, without much effort, to

"take control of us and make intensive and thorough studies on Romania's production, on the possibilities of gathering resources, going with these studies to the point that they decided in advance even the loading places as well as the necessary means of transport"⁴⁵³.

Thus, knowing our territory in detail, the result of this constant and painstaking activity was that at the time of the occupation of Oltenia and Muntenia in the First World War, the Germans extracted the maximum resources that our country could

⁴⁴⁹ „Am scris aceste note de studiu din îndemnul de a mi face datoria de conștiință față de patria mea, România, pentru care am sângerat la vârsta fragedă de 18 ani și pe care o iubesc mai mult ca orice pe lumea aceasta. Și l-am mai scris de asemenea cu speranța că ele vor avea răsunet și oameni luminați cu dragoste de țară vor găsi soluționarea (...) punerii la adăpost a României de uneltirile oculte.”, in Ioan Dumitru, *Spionajul Maghiar în România 1918–1940 [Hungarian espionage in Romania 1918–1940]*, Timișoara, Concordia Publishing House, 1990, p. 5.

⁴⁵⁰ „trufia maghiară care desconsidera umila populație valahă de la Est și Sud de Carpați”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵¹ „socoteau și atunci ca și astăzi tratatele drept petice de hârtie”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵³ „să pună stăpânire pe noi și să facă studii intense și minuțioase asupra producției României, asupra posibilităților de adunare a resurselor, mergând cu aceste studii până acolo încât au hotărât dinainte până și locurile de încărcare precum și mijloacele de transport necesare”, in *Ibidem*, p. 6.

offer until “the last egg and the last grain of wheat”⁴⁵⁴. It is important to know that the result of these studies was known only in Berlin and Austria-Hungary received general information or almost nothing. This continued until 1915 when the political attitude in Romania began to take shape, at which time the dual monarchy began to think about organizing an espionage service directed against Romania and a first step consisted in the agreement with the German secret service towards to provide them with information “of all categories and in all domains”⁴⁵⁵. Based on this information, the Austro-Hungarian General Headquarters established a special espionage section for Romania organized in two offices: the office for the centralization of information and the office for studies and exploitation of information. The information was obtained by resident informants recruited from businessmen in Romania, as well as based on the activity of special informants who roamed the country unhindered far and wide⁴⁵⁶.

How the information was obtained

The way in which the information was collected from the field comes from the revelations of a former Hungarian spy, originally from Sibiu, who was active in the Hungarian espionage service against Romania, throughout the first world war. From his confession, two ideas emerge that show how it was possible to easily gather important information by the spies in Romania: first of all, “the all-pervading corruption of that time”⁴⁵⁷ but also “the extraordinary carelessness that still reigns today”⁴⁵⁸.

Regarding corruption, a former spy testifies to the fact that he roamed the country unhindered by anyone thanks to the use of money, firmly stating that in Romania anyone could be easily corrupted “starting from border guards and up to the highest official of the country”⁴⁵⁹. Moreover, it shows that he was also aided to a great extent by the “extremely corrupt and cowardly Jewish element”⁴⁶⁰ who was very well placed especially in the commercial circles of the country. For example, with the help of money and some Jews, he was able to create in Bucharest a circle of trust that offered him the most reliable information among politicians, gentlemen and ladies from high society, but also among highly skilled business agents recruited from the turn of the Jewish element.

Regarding negligence, the spy’s revelations seem to be in the realm of fantasy, not even Romania’s enemies could believe that such things would have been possible. A convincing example is the fact that this spy was able to find out the date of Romania’s entry into the first world war (August 15, 1916), a fact that shows the level of corruption and the power of the money in front of which nothing, not even

⁴⁵⁴ „la ultimul ou și ultima boabă de grâu”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵⁵ „de toate categoriile și din toate domeniile”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁴⁵⁷ „corupția atotstăpânitoare din acea vreme”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵⁸ „neglijența ieșită din comun care mai domnește și astăzi”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵⁹ „începând de la grăniceri de santinelă și până la cel mai înalt funcționar al țării”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶⁰ „elementul evreiesc extrem de corupt și de laș”, in *Ibidem*.

the defense of the country, can resist. But will the money be enough to give the opponents a complete picture of the internal situation? Not by a long shot, because the ease and carelessness of some important actors in the Romanian state allowed any spy to find out secret things even from public spaces. This was possible because discussions of secret matters occurred “in trams, public places, on the street, in the train, in the family and in front of everyone”⁴⁶¹. To understand these things, the former spy confesses a case of incredible negligence:

“I was traveling about two weeks before Romania’s entry into the war, towards Iași, in a first-class compartment of a train in which there were a general and several officers. Thinking that I was English and that I did not know Romanian, the general and the officers began to discuss military training and the intentions of the General Staff in case of war. In order to be more explicit, the general drew on a map, located on the wall of the compartment, the area of concentration and the direction of advance of some armies up to the region where the First Army and the Fourth Army will meet and then together they will advance towards Budapest. Obviously, I continued my journey until the officers got off the train, and then I tore the map from the wall, delighted to have acquired such a valuable piece of information”⁴⁶².

Considering the seriousness of the strategic mistakes, it is possible to understand the necessity of the French general Berthelot coming to the country in order to reorganize the Romanian army, starting on October 15, 1916. King Ferdinand himself appoints Berthelot his advisor, at the same time signing an order duty through which he could inspect the entire Romanian army, and the findings and proposals of the French general became mandatory⁴⁶³.

After the First World War

The separation from Austria and the loss of the provinces which she had hitherto held, placing Hungary within her natural borders, produced a very strong reaction, or rather a terrible rematch.

The reaction consisted of an aggressive propaganda among the member states of the League of Nations to whom they formulated their claims in successive stages and secretly laid the foundations of a solid espionage organization.

⁴⁶¹ „în tramvaie, localuri publice, pe stradă, în tren, în familie și în fața oricui”, in *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁴⁶² „Călătoream cu vreo două săptămâni înainte de intrarea în război a României, spre Iași, într-un compartiment de clasa I a unui tren în care se găseau un general și mai mulți ofițeri. Crezându-mă că sunt englez și că nu știu românește, generalul și ofițerii au început să discute despre pregătirea militară și intențiile pe care le avea Statul Major în caz de război. Generalul pentru a putea fi mai explicit a desenat pe o hartă, aflată pe peretele compartimentului, zona de concentrare și direcția de înaintare a unor armate până în regiunea unde Armata I și Armata a IV se vor întâlni și apoi împreună vor înainta către Budapesta. Evident, am continuat călătoria până ce ofițerii au coborât din tren și apoi am smuls harta din perete, încântat că am căpătat o informație așa de prețioasă”, in *Ibidem*, p. 9.

⁴⁶³ Dan Falcan, „I-a propus regele Ferdinand lui Henri Berthelot șefia Marelui Stat-Major al Armatei Române?” [“Did King Ferdinand propose to Henri Berthelot to be the head of the Romanian Army General Staff?”], in *Historia*, Available at: <https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/i-a-propus-regele-ferdinand-lui-henri-berthelot-567150.html>, Accessed on: July 8, 2024.

Regarding the border review claims, Hungary had a plan in 3 successive stages:

1. The first stage, also called the “minimum stage” which claimed the immediate annexation of the territories with a 50% Hungarian population and which, according to their claims, would have included the counties of Timișoara, Arad, Oradea, Cluj, Satu Mare, Zalău, Someș, Bistrița, Mureș Aiud, Odorhei and Three Chairs.
2. The 2nd stage, called the “maximum stage” called for the launching of a plebiscite in the rest of the lands which also decides on the remaining lands of Romania where the population would have pronounced in favor of Hungary.
3. The 3rd stage, which proposed to be carried out by means of arms, had as its objective the restoration of the old Hungary with the borders of 1914.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HUNGARIAN ESPIONAGE SERVICE

The Hungarian spy service came into being right from 1920, being organized by Regent Horthy, who collaborated closely with Lieutenant-Colonel Zoldt, who for 20 years was the head of the intelligence service. From the personnel point of view, great importance was given to perfecting specialization and stability considering that in this way not only a good yield is obtained but “the personnel used is used to the territory and the enemy”⁴⁶⁴.

From the analysis of the documents of the file 121 C.W. it appears that the espionage against Romania was organized as follows: a main information center located in Szolnok, which has two more subordinate centers, a larger one in Miskolcisz and the other, somewhat smaller, in Szeged. In turn, the Szolnok center is organized into sub-centers as follows:

- a. the Debrețin sub-centre had the mission of surveillance of the portion between Careii Mari and Ordea, with unlimited reach in depth;
- b. the sub-centre at Szehalaholm had the portion between Oradea and Arad, also with unlimited depth;
- c. the sub-centre at Szentes, had the region in the southern area of Arad, with unlimited depth.

PETTY OR BORDER ESPIONAGE

This presupposes that each border unit must perfectly know the border terrain both on their own territory and on the foreign one, to a depth of 20 km, in order to be able on the one hand to facilitate unobserved crossings and on the other hand to it can be made easier in case of war to cover actions. In addition to this, the level of detail goes up to the names of the commanders of the Romanian border guard units,

⁴⁶⁴ „se obișnuiește personalul întrebuițat cu teritoriul și dușmanul”, in *Ibidem*, p. 12.

the post level and the names of the commanders of the large units in the border area as well as the heads of offices⁴⁶⁵. Moreover, the knowledge of the terrain is not only necessary among military officers, but the picture in the territory of the enemy must be completed by a press officer, who also, at a depth of 20 km, must know data from all categories such as

“the situation frontier regiments, troop deployments, supervised or unsupervised field works, the population and the movement of the population including officials”⁴⁶⁶.

THE ORGANIZATION OF HUNGARIAN ESPIONAGE AND PROPAGANDA IN ROMANIA

It should be mentioned from the beginning that Hungarian espionage in Romania is organized directly from Horthy's cabinet and the propaganda section is organized by division general Zolt. The latter had the mission of undermining Romania's state organization both among the army and in the administration, through the Hungarian party in Romania. In order to increase the information staff, they appeal to the feeling of nationality and to the current insecurity, the agent's conviction being made gradually, promising him the rewards that will await both him and his accomplices when Hungary triumphs.

With the moment of 1920, Budapest understood that a paradigm shift was required, in order to eliminate the “injustice”: if until the revolution of 1848 Hungarianization was done by force and by enticements, every Romanian who embraced the Hungarian cause was ennobled and received the estates in Transylvania or in the Hungarian hinterland, after 1848

“when the hard means of Hungarianization no longer worked, they resorted to two systems, the church and the culture”⁴⁶⁷.

Things went so well in favor of the Hungarians that in 1914 the Hungarians predicted that

“in a few decades they will succeed in Hungarianizing all or almost all of the Romanian population”⁴⁶⁸.

The appearance of the Hungarian party in Romania must be understood as a reaction of Budapest to the disintegration of the empire after Trianon⁴⁶⁹, with the

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁴⁶⁶ „situația grănicerilor, dislocări de trupe, lucrări de teren supravegheate sau nesupravegheate, populația și mișcarea populației inclusiv a funcționarilor”, in *Ibidem*, p. 20.

⁴⁶⁷ „când mijloacele dure de maghiarizare nu a mai mers au recurs la două sisteme, cel bisericesc și cel cultural”, in *Ibidem*, p. 68.

⁴⁶⁸ „în câteva decenii vor reuși să maghiarizeze toată sau aproape toată populația românească”, in *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 67.

addition that the means of action have also been adapted to the new reality. Thus, two large categories of action can be seen, in addition to espionage actions:

In the religious field

As for the religious system, where Hungarianization through the religious path was impossible due to dogmatic differences and beyond the subterfuge of the united church, when rivalries arose, priority was given to religion and not to nationality, a fact that suited the Hungarians who are “raised and watered at the well Hungarian Catholicism”⁴⁷⁰. It must not be forgotten that the Catholic priest, in his work as a clergyman, seeks to drag Hungarian women to obtain all kinds of information that they know or hear at home or in the groups where their husbands are active.

In the cultural field

The school also has an important role because through the school the child is inoculated from an early age that

“he is Hungarian, and the propaganda always tells him that he has a persecuted homeland that sooner or later will wake up and come to claim its rights”⁴⁷¹.

While the school tells the children to avoid any mixing with Wallachians, the propaganda instructs the young men to avoid Romanian women but urges the girls to marry Romanians⁴⁷².

Of real interest are the connections of Romanian officers married to minorities of Hungarian nationality, Hungarian agents putting indirect pressure, being alone by the husbands’ feelings towards their wives, speculating on the one hand sentimentally but on the other hand from the point of view of the Hungarian nation’s gratitude to by those who help her. It is also worth noting the fact that from a marriage with a Hungarian woman, all the boys and girls are completely Hungarian at heart:

“these children grow up Hungarian, learn only Hungarian, eat Hungarian and most of the time embrace the Catholic religion”⁴⁷³.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, our present duty is to make use of all this experience, and to seek, by a systematic education, at least in the army, to remove the dangerous defects which may at any time lead to our destruction⁴⁷⁴. Moreover, it is clear that for

⁴⁷⁰ „crescuți și adăpați la fântâna catolicismului maghiar”, in *Ibidem*, p. 69.

⁴⁷¹ „este maghiar iar propaganda îi spune mereu că are o patrie urgisită care mai curând sau mai târziu se va deștepta și va veni să-și revendice drepturile”, in *Ibidem*, p. 78.

⁴⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷³ „acești copii cresc ungurește învață numai ungurește mănâncă ungurește și de cele mai multe ori îmbrățișează religia catolică”, in *Ibidem*, p. 76.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

Romania it is vital for the agents in the field to receive the principles of patriotism and on the basis of these qualities to realize their specialization and improvement in order to defend the national existence⁴⁷⁵.

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⁴⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 12.