

No 1(37), 2021
new series

ETNOSFERA

JOURNAL



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Romanian Academy Publishing House
Bucharest, June 2021

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ARTICLES

THE INVOLUTION OF EDUCATION FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES IN UKRAINE AS REFLECTED IN THE MONITORING BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

Council of Europe monitoring mechanism for the protection of national minorities rights reveals the involution of the education in national minorities languages in Ukraine. Between 1999 and 2020 Ukraine underwent four cycles of monitoring, composed of a state report, an opinion of a panel of experts and a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The present article proposes a review of these monitoring cycles with a focus on the situation of education in national minorities languages. The Ukrainian Government's policy of compelling all schools to exclusive use of Ukrainian language was noted by the mentioned monitoring mechanism, but there was no noticeable improvement of the situation during 1999–2020.

Keywords: Ukraine, national minorities, education, rights

Ukraine signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 15th September 1995 and ratified it on 26th January 1998, the monitoring mechanism started in May 1999². The present article will present the situation of education in mother tongue for the national minorities in Ukraine as it may be seen in the monitoring reports carried under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCMN) of the Council of Europe (CoE). Two decades of monitoring reveal that the mechanisms established at the beginnings of the Ukrainian statehood after the Soviet collapse are still in place, hindering the development of the national minorities.

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²Council of Europe, „Ukraine”, s.a., Available at: www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/ukraine, Accessed on 10th March 2021.

LEGISLATION FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES' SCHOOLS IN UKRAINE DURING THE 90'S

The Language Law of Ukraine from 1989 introduced a whole series of provisions intending to curb russification and make Ukrainian the dominant language in all spheres of public life³. In regard to education in minorities' languages this law had the following main provisions:

1. The free choice of the language of instruction is an inalienable right of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR;
2. The Ukrainian SSR guarantees each child the right to be brought up and to receive education in its national language;
3. In the schools of the Ukrainian SSR, teaching will be done in Ukrainian. In places of compact settlements of civilians of other nationalities, schools can be established in which the language of teaching will be their national language or another language;
4. In schools, separate classes can be created in which the language of teaching is Ukrainian or the language of people of a different nationality;
5. In all schools, the study of the Ukrainian language and the Russian language is compulsory;
6. In institutions of special secondary, professional technical, and higher education of the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainian is the language of teaching. In places of settlement of a majority of citizens of other nationalities, the language of teaching is in their national language, alongside Ukrainian;
7. In the above-mentioned institutions, groups can also be created with the Russian language of instruction in cases determined by the appropriate organs of state administration.

The Language Law of 1989 had some progressive provisions for national minorities, but some imprecise expressions (for instance the law did not specify what was meant by "compact settlement") and lack of administrative guarantees rendered it useless.

In 1991 Ukrainian Parliament adopted Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, which guaranteed all nations and national groups the right to use their mother tongue in all spheres of public life, including education, administration⁴.

In mid-1992 the Ukrainian parliament adopted a very liberal law on national minorities which granted equal political, social, economic and cultural rights to all citizens, "regardless of their ethnic origin, and supported the development of their national self-consciousness and self-expression". This was immediately followed by a separate article which defined these guarantees as resting upon the national

³ Jan Germen Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-speaking Population*, Amsterdam/Utrecht, KNAG, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

minorities observing the constitution and laws of the land, as well as respecting its state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article three defined national minorities as “Groups of Ukrainian citizens who are not Ukrainian by nationality and who manifest national consciousness and community of interest within the group”⁵.

However, the benevolent legislation influence was reduced by administrative measures, especially after the appointments of Minister Talanchuk and his radical deputy Anatolii Pohribnyi⁶. Unsatisfied with the slow growth rate of Ukrainian-language instruction – the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed pupils only increased from 47.9% in 1990–1991 to 49.3% in 1991–1992 – and accusing the heads of local administration and schools of ignoring the stipulations of the State Program, these officials tried to find new ways to reach the goals of Ukrainization. Teachers who switched to Ukrainian language instruction received material “encouragement”, new schools could be opened only if they used Ukrainian language, before receiving the status of lyceum or college any school should switch to Ukrainian language. Another administrative incentive for minorities’ schools to open only Ukrainian classes was Talanchuk's order to give schools transferring to Ukrainian priority in receiving textbooks.

With these measures the Ukrainian Government clearly wanted to indicate that Ukrainian schools and schools with other languages of instruction were not to be treated as equals: the former were to be the norm, the latter the exception. For admittance to the former, there would be no obstacles whatsoever, *i.e.* if parents have not applied for a specific language of instruction, their child should automatically be assigned to a Ukrainian school, for admittance to the latter a special application would be required. Obviously, the Ministry hoped that parental passivity would result in many children being enrolled in Ukrainian schools.

New changes in the language politics had a legal foundation in the Constitution of Ukraine, which was adopted in June 1996. The constitution further guaranteed “the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine”⁷, but the administrative measures described above for limiting the use of minorities languages in schools remained in place.

The new Ukrainian state developed an efficient mechanism for ethnic assimilation: on one side the legislation was drafted as to be praised on international level⁸, on the other side the ambiguous wording and administrative measures drastically limited the use of minorities languages in schools (also in local administration and mass-media).

⁵ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and nation building*, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 94.

⁶ Jan Germen Janmaat, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁷ Article 10, Constitution of Ukraine, Available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%F0#Text>, Accessed on August 22, 2022.

⁸ Myroslava Antonovych, *The Rights of National Minorities in Ukraine: An Introduction*, P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds.), *Minority Rights in the New Europe*, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 251–257.

FCMN'S PROVISIONS FOR EDUCATION IN MINORITIES LANGUAGES

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities seeks to ensure the use of national minorities' languages in education through the articles 12 and 14, the main provisions being the following:

Article 12

1. The Parties, if necessary, shall take measures in the areas of education and scientific research in order to promote studying the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and major part of the population.
2. In this connection, the Parties, besides, shall guarantee proper conditions for training the teachers and access to training appliances, as well as promote contacts between pupils and teachers belonging to different communities.
3. The Parties undertake to give persons belonging to national minorities' equal opportunities for access to education on all the levels.

Article 14

1. The Parties shall be obliged to recognize that every person who belongs to national minority has the right to study the language of own minority.
2. If the localities where the persons who belong to the national minorities traditionally reside or where they constitute a considerable part of population, in case of sufficient necessity the Parties try to provide, if possible and within the framework of their educational systems, for the persons who belong to these minorities, the proper conditions for teaching the language of the relevant minority or education in this language.
3. Paragraph 2 of this Article is used without prejudice to study official language or this language.

Basically the use of mother tongue for national minorities members should be granted at all levels, the government should ensure the training for teachers in minorities languages – all without hindering the use of the official language. The monitoring mechanism put into place by the Council of Europe revealed beginning with 1999 the way the Ukrainian Government understood to protect national minorities' right for education in mother tongue.

FIRST CYCLE OF MONITORING 1999–2003

Ukraine presented the general situation of its national minorities on 2 November 1999⁹. According to this report Ukraine had a comprehensive legislation

⁹ Report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999.

covering the right of national minorities to learn in their native language (Declaration of the rights of nationalities in Ukraine, and secured in the laws of Ukraine On national minorities in Ukraine, On languages in Ukraine and On education. Without specific details, the report stated that courses of local lore, history of native land, history of Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, and Moldavian peoples are taught in schools providing general education. According to the Ukrainian report of 1999 persons who belong to national minorities have the same opportunities for access to education on all the levels as the ethnic majority has. In order to satisfy cultural/educational needs of pupils being of national minorities' origin on the base of the annual State Program of issuing literature in national minorities' languages, about 170 official editions, text-books and manuals, as well as phrase-books, were issued in 19 languages of ethnic communities. Particularly, text-books or manuals of 26 titles were issued for pupils of the 1st and 2nd forms in Polish, Romanian, German, and Hungarian. In common with the Hungarian and Romanian sides, manuals on history of Hungarian and Romanian people have been published.

The report states that the Ukrainian Government organizes and finances training of the pedagogical staff for schools where teaching is done in national minorities' languages. Such specialists are trained in 15 higher schools of the country: in the Ternopil State Pedagogical Institute at the faculty of philology – specialists on Polish language and literature; in Zakarpattia Pedagogical Institute (town of Beregove) – pedagogical staff for educational institutions where teaching is done in Hungarian, in Lviv State University named after I. Franko – teachers of Polish language; in Izmail Pedagogical Institute – teachers of Bulgarian and Moldavian languages; in Uzhhorod State University – teachers of Slovak, Hungarian and Roumanian; in Volyn State University named after Lesia Ukrainka – teachers of Polish; in Zhytomyr Pedagogical Institute – teachers of Polish; in Mariupol Humanitarian Institute – teachers of new Greek language and literature; in Cherkassy State University – teachers of Russian language and literature; in Chemivtsi State University – teachers from schools with teaching in Romanian; in Chernivtsy High Pedagogical School – specialists in Romanian; in Prykarpattia State University – specialists on Slav philology; Mukacheve Pedagogical School – teachers from elementary school and educators from pre-school institutions where teaching is done in Romanian and Hungarian.

According to the same source in 1999 in Ukraine there were 21.246 educational establishments of general education, including with Ukrainian language of teaching 16.032 (4.421.265 pupils), Russian – 2.561 (2.313.901 pupils), Romanian – 108 (27.776 pupils), Moldavian – 18 (4.509 pupils), Hungarian – 65 (21.214 pupils), Crimean-Tatar – 6 (4.071 pupils), Polish – 3 (1.109. pupils). Besides, there were 2.469 mixed educational establishments of general education, in particular 2.394 – Ukrainian – Russian, 28 – Ukrainian – Hungarian, 7 – Ukrainian – Romanian, 9 – Russian – Romanian.

The opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities published in 2002 found many issues regarding the use of national minorities' languages in education¹⁰. The main problem was that the pupils belonging to national minorities were confronted with difficulties in ensuring adequate access to textbooks for persons belonging to national minorities. Persons belonging to the Romanian minority have called for a creation of a multicultural university in the Chernivtsi (something that never happened).

The legal guarantees for persons belonging to national minorities the right to receive instruction in their language were formulated in a general fashion and the legislation at issue contained no precise numerical or other threshold that would trigger the introduction of instruction in, or of, a minority language in a school. As regards the practical implementation of Article 14 of the Framework Convention, the Advisory Committee noted that the share of the instruction in the Ukrainian language has considerably increased in recent years at all levels of education while in particular the share of the national minorities languages teaching has decreased. The Advisory Committee underlined that the reform should not result in undue limitation of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities under Article 14 of the Framework Convention, and that the above-mentioned threshold should be applied in an equitable manner in relation to all languages of persons belonging to national minorities.

On 5th February 2003 was adopted the Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, stating that:

“The implementation of the Framework Convention in the educational sphere merits particular attention from the authorities with a view to ensuring that the on-going reforms in this sphere do not result in undue limitations on the existing right of persons belonging to national minorities to receive instruction in and/or of their languages”¹¹.

SECOND CYCLE OF MONITORING 2004–2011

Ukraine submitted a second report concerning the national minorities in 2006¹². After describing the structure of the education system, the report stated that the decision on the use of national minorities' languages in schools belongs to the local authorities, the decision being made based on the request from

¹⁰ Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Opinion on Ukraine adopted on 1st March 2002, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2002.

¹¹ Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, 5 February 2003, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

¹² Second report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to article 25, paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 8 June 2006, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

parents. According to this report in 2006 the number of schools using minority languages decreased sharply from 1999: Russian – 1345 schools (525 260 pupils), Moldavian – 8 schools (3 127 pupils), Romanian – 94 schools (22 365 pupils), Hungarian – 70 schools (14 823 pupils), Polish – 4 schools (943 pupils), Crimean-Tatar – 14 schools (3 472 pupils). Also the report insisted that the Ukrainian Government took all necessary steps to ensure access to text-books in minorities languages.

In 2008 the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was concerned that the final examinations in secondary education and entrance examination to higher education institutions will have to be conducted in Ukrainian only. This reform would also apply to students who have studied in schools with minority language instruction¹³. Taking note of the efforts made by the Government of Ukraine the Advisory Committee highlighted the objections from Ukrainian authorities to the introduction of teaching in minority languages on the grounds of an alleged lack of qualified teachers. The lack of quality textbooks continued to be an issue of deep concern for several national minorities, such as the Romanians, the Moldovans and the Crimean Tatars. Textbooks for national minorities were outdated, insufficient in numbers and poorly translated from Ukrainian, a state of affairs which may contribute to decisions by parents to send their children to Ukrainian schools.

Another major problem was that no follow-up has been given by the authorities to the proposal to set up a multicultural university in the Chernivtsi; consequently Romanian students were obliged to study topics other than Romanian philology in Ukrainian exclusively. The Advisory Committee noted that, as a result of a general reform process, the share of the instruction in the Ukrainian language had considerably increased at all levels of education while the share of national minorities' languages teaching was decreasing. Another issue was that since 2003, the Ministry of Education of Ukraine has encouraged educational institutions with instruction in a minority language to introduce more subjects taught in Ukrainian.

The Advisory Committee heard disconcerting reports by representatives of national minorities suggesting that local authorities have shown a lack of support for minority language education. For example, representatives of the Romanian minority deplored the fact that an increasing number of Ukrainian classes in certain Romanian schools are being opened at the expense of the Romanian language. The Advisory Committee was concerned that such developments, coupled with the aforementioned shortage of textbooks and qualified teachers, combined with the obligation to take entrance examination to higher education in Ukrainian, can discourage parents from sending their children to educational institutions with minority languages. The obligation for the authorities to provide for the creation of a class or a school with education in a minority language, if certain objective

¹³ Advisory Committee on The Framework Convention for The Protection of National Minorities. Second Opinion on Ukraine, 30 May 2008, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

conditions are met, was not provided for in clear terms and no effective legal remedy seems to be available against arbitrary refusals by the local authorities.

The resolution adopted in 2011 stated that the share of instruction in the Ukrainian language has continued to increase at all levels of education while, according to the assessment made by persons belonging to some national minorities, instruction in minority languages has been decreasing, at the same time the shortage of quality textbooks and qualified teachers for teaching in minority language persisted¹⁴.

THIRD CYCLE OF MONITORING 2009–2013

Ukraine answered in 2009 asserting that there were in place the necessary institutions for training teachers in national minorities' languages and that the study in native language is guaranteed by law¹⁵. The numbers for the educational institutions in minorities languages provided in 2009 by the Ukrainian Government showed a new decrease: Romanian 89 (from 94 in 2006), Moldavian 6 (from 8 in 2006), and Hungarian 66 (from 70 in 2006). The report insisted anew that the local authorities are responsible for opening classes in national minorities' languages.

In 2012 the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities noted that in what regards the quality and quantity of minority language textbooks received reports that, despite efforts taken by the authorities, provision of textbooks continues to be inadequate at all grades and particularly in secondary schools¹⁶. Also, representatives of the Romanian minority were concerned that opportunities to study in the Romanian language at the University of Chernivtsi are limited to a small Romanian philology department, where teachers of Romanian language and literature are trained. The Advisory Committee asked the Ukrainian authorities to continue their efforts to ensure that a sufficient number of adequately trained teachers is available to meet the needs of minority language institutions, including for minority language education in subjects other than language or literature.

The Advisory Committee further noted that representatives from all minority communities claim that the number of minority language schools, as well as the quality of education offered is in continuous decline, even in areas where the minority forms a significant part of the population. Another neglected concern was about the continued lack of legal certainty as regards access to education in

¹⁴ Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, 30 March 2011, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

¹⁵ Third report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of The Framework Convention for The Protection of National Minorities, 7 May 2009, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

¹⁶ Advisory Committee on The Framework Convention for The Protection of National Minorities. Third Opinion on Ukraine, 22 March 2012, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

minority languages, as there was still no precise legal framework with regard to educational rights. While the Constitution and the 1989 Law on Languages contain general guarantees relating to minority language education, the decision of whether to open a minority language class or school lies with the local authorities. In addition, the Advisory Committee was informed that there is no Romanian language instruction at all in 21 villages of Chernivtsi Oblast, inhabited mainly by Romanians, and that tendencies continue towards opening Ukrainian rather than Romanian language classes. Local authorities also continue to object the opening of Polish language classes, and Bulgarian language education continues to be limited to a few hours per week, even in areas of compact settlement of this minority. The Advisory Committee urged the authorities to provide clear legal guarantees for the right of persons belonging to national minorities to receive education in and of their language.

The resolution for the third monitoring cycle noted the same concerns as before¹⁷. The requests for Ukraine were to provide clear legal guarantees for the right to receive education in and of minority languages and regularly monitor their effective implementation; increase and diversify opportunities to study in minority languages at university level; increase efforts to provide minority language institutions with adequate supplies of quality textbooks and strengthen opportunities for the training of minority language teachers; adopt clear law provisions in order to ensure the use of minority languages for access to higher education.

FOURTH CYCLE OF MONITORING 2014–2020

Ukraine submitted a new report on the situation of national minorities in 2016¹⁸. This time, the Government in Kyiv resumed to general statements, that teachers in Ukraine are regularly trained for general educational establishments and classes with teaching in the Crimean Tatar, Hungarian, Russian, Polish, Romanian, Slovakian and Bulgarian languages. The specific numbers for institutions providing education in national minorities languages showed the same decreasing trend: for Romanian 78 (down from 89), for Moldavian 5 (down from 6) etc. The Ukrainian Government maintained its stance regarding the opening of national minorities languages schools by the local authorities and that the national legislations covered all necessities for the education in national minorities languages.

The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities from 2018¹⁹ took notice of a further decrease of the numbers of

¹⁷ Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, 18 December 2013, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

¹⁸ Fourth Report submitted by Ukraine pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 30 May 2016, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

¹⁹ Advisory Committee on The Framework Convention For The Protection of National Minorities. Fourth Opinion on Ukraine, 5 March 2018, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

schools providing education in national minorities languages (75 schools using Romanian language, 3 schools using Moldavian language). Concerns have been raised however about the limited number of places available at smaller philology departments, such the Romanian philology department at the University of Chernivtsi, which do not train enough qualified teachers in general and teachers capable of teaching subjects other than Romanian philology in particular.

The Advisory Committee recommended that the authorities introduce flexibility in the implementation of the territorial administrative reform and ensure that the availability and quality of education at minority language schools do not suffer as a result of the establishment of large hub schools and a disproportionate focus on financial efficiency. Also, the Advisory Committee calls on the authorities to increase their efforts to ensure that an adequate supply of textbooks and/or other teaching and learning materials in minority languages is available at all levels of education.

The resolution adopted in 2020²⁰ asked the Ukrainian Government to continue efforts to develop, in consultation with all relevant groups, a clear and coherent legislative and policy framework regarding the use of languages in order to provide solid legal guarantees for the protection and use of all minority languages; to introduce flexibility in the implementation of the administrative territorial reform and ensure that the availability and quality of education in minority language schools does not suffer as a result of the regionalization.

CONCLUSIONS

Beginning with the 90s the Ukrainian Government developed a mechanism aimed at imposing the Ukrainian language as the sole education language. There are some persistent characteristics of this mechanism that are worthy of a short analysis. The decision on the opening of classes/ schools in national minorities' languages is relegated to the local authorities, which in turn are encouraged to reject all calls for such classes or schools, this allows the central government to deny responsibility regarding the decrease of numbers of schools using national minorities languages. Other means to discourage the parents to enroll their children in national minorities' schools: lack of text-books in national minorities languages, final exams only in Ukrainian even that the candidate did not studied in Ukrainian, lack of teachers in national minorities languages. The legislation is maintained ambiguous and therefore the opening of classes in national minorities' languages is almost impossible.

²⁰ Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, 8 December 2020, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

The monitoring mechanism put into motion by the Council of Europe revealed all these means of the Ukrainian Government and asked in each resolution to stop the process of hindering the education in national minorities' languages – with no result. The Ukrainian Education Law of 2017 went even further, banning virtually all education in native languages for national minorities, something that deserves a future article.

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SOME ASPECTS CONCERNING THE CATHOLIC PROPAGANDA IN THE BALKANS. THE AROMANIAN CASE

Emanuil Ineoan²¹

ABSTRACT

At the end of the 19th century, there have been some attempts at confessional proselytism in the Balkan targeting the Aromanian communities, partly encouraged by the inspector Apostol Mărgărit, who was in close relations with the abbot Faveyrial, the leader of the Order of Lazarusians from Monastir (Bitola). Minister D. A. Sturdza himself supported such an idea by relying "on the entry of Romanians into the Catholic orbit".²² However, the transition to Catholicism did not increase, but provided the basis for an accusation often used by the patriarchal party which considered that the use of a liturgical language of Latin origin was the favourite channel for the transition to the Roman confession.

Keywords: Aromanians, Catholic Church, Macedonia, Balkans, nationalism.

THE CONTEXT

The first school inspector to report on the situation of all Romanian schools in the Balkan Peninsula was appointed in 1870 in the person of Apostol Mărgărit²³, an Aromanian teacher from Avdela, a graduate of the Greek high school in Ianina as young as 38 years old²⁴.

In 1878, the position of *Inspector General of the Romanian Schools in the Balkans*, based in Bitolia²⁵, was officially established. From the very beginning, it was foreseen that the holder of this position would take over part of the attributes of the Romanian diplomatic representative from Constantinople²⁶, being an intercessor between the Aromanian communities and the government from Bucharest.

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²² Gheorghe Carageani, *Studii Aromâne*, Bucureşti, Fundația Culturală Română, 1999, p. 266.

²³ Mihail Cordescu, *Istoricul școalelor române din Turcia, Sofia și Turtucaia din Bulgaria*, Bucureşti, 1906, p. 28.

²⁴ Victor Papacostea, Mihail Regleanu, *Documentele Redeșteptării Macedoromâne*, Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca, Ștefan Vâlcu (ed.), Bucureşti, Editura Predania, 2012, p. 428.

²⁵ Simion Țovaru, *Problema școalei românești din Balcani*, Bucureşti, 1934, p. 28.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Despite the complaints received during his life, but also posthumously, the activity of the first inspector, Apostol Mărgărit, produced a strong school animation in the Balkans, the large number of primary schools established, the creation of secondary education in the area being his main achievements.

At the time, the discretionary powers of the inspector and the legitimacy he sometimes abused were criticized:

“However, it was not reasonable to create such an inspector position, to abandon the leadership of the Romanian cultural movement on the shoulders of the holder, pouring money annually from the country's budget for school maintenance, without having the possibility of control to know what is done and how it works”²⁷.

At the same time, the entire system of implementation of Romanian education in the Balkans was blamed for not involving the community that was a decisive factor in school affairs. The system of communities operating in Turkey provided that they could manage their own school and church affairs through the ephorates and guardianships led by their own representatives. This was the mechanism used by the Bulgarians to promote their cultural and ecclesiastical cause in the area. Leaving on the field as a total deciding factor only the person of the inspector, the impression was created of private and not community schools, which would have ensured a different consistency of educational efforts in the area²⁸.

If when Apostol Mărgărit started his activity, the representation of the Romanian state in the field was rather weakly consolidated, the end of the 19th century occasioned also the creation of consular networks in the Balkans. Simion Țovaru, considers that at this moment there are a series of frictions between the two authorities that were answering to Bucharest: the inspector and the consul. The same author appreciated that the animosities were also dictated by some political considerations, the inspector's function being the work of the liberals, in this case Ion Brătianu, and the merit of setting up consulates in the Balkans being assumed by the conservative government²⁹.

The establishment of the second consulate in Macedonia in Bitola on June 1st, 1892 by the Conservatives (accomplishment of the former plenipotentiary envoy to Constantinople and Foreign Minister Alexandru Lahovary) led to numerous tensions with Inspector Mărgărit, who resided in the same city. The consul together with several local notables dissatisfied with the excessive authority of the inspector called for the establishment of a new governing body of the schools: the school ephorates³⁰. The idea of ephorates was used by both Greeks and Bulgarians

²⁷ „Nu era însă rezonabil a se crea un atare post de inspector, spre a abandona pe seama titularului conducerea mișcării culturale române, svârbind anual bani din bugetul țării pentru întreținerea școalelor, fără să aibi posibilitatea de control spre a ști ce se face și cum se lucrează!” Eugen Ionescu, *Cauza românească în Turcia Europeană*, București, Tipografia Gutenberg, 1906, p. 27.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁹ Simion Țovaru, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

(after 1870) and consisted of providing an autonomous status to schools and churches that were fully or partially financially supported by the local community. In a memorandum prepared by a number of Aromanian teachers in 1900, it was expected that with the success of the awakening of the national consciousness, the communal and church revenues in the hands of the Grecofiles would be used for cultural institutions, a context in which the Romanian state would not be so financially burdened³¹. The institution of school ephorates was also used by other nationalities having as their main task the administration of school and church property; thus, schools no longer had a particular character, as it was until the advent of iradela. The schools belonged to the teacher or tutor in whose name the opening authorization was issued. If the ephorates were to function, the schools would become public, belonging to the Romanian nation, as the authors of the memoir stated³².

THE ACCUSATIONS

Under these conditions, both the inspectorate and the consulate became hotbeds of intrigue of the parties harmful to the school³³. The emergence of the conflict had several causes that were not foreign to a number of external factors interested in channelling the Aromanian community to other desiderata. One of the professors from Bitolia, Nicolae Maimuca, who later became one of Mărgărit's successors, was acid to him, accusing that the money was spent for the political interests of a foreign state through Mărgărit, which, despite what he claimed, was aimed at weakening the national feeling of the Romanians in the city of Bitolia. The same appellant stated that Inspector Mărgărit had entered into close relations with the Austrian consul in Bitolia, Knapitch, in the years 1880–1881, when the priest Faveyrial practically became his intimate adviser. Faveyrial worked with his superior, Monsignor Bonnetti, the head of the Catholic mission in Thessaloniki. The plan devised by Mărgărit, in Maimuca's opinion, was to convert all Romanians to Catholicism and then to form a strong current that would oppose the policy of the states that had aspirations over Macedonia, practically facilitating the political projects of Austria. The arrival in those years in Bitolia of Vasile Glodariu as director and Corvin as a teacher at the Romanian High School, both Austrian subjects (Transylvanian Romanians) made Knapitch even more confident in his plan of success. Once Monsignor Bonetti became the apostolic nuncio to Constantinople, Catholic proselytism took off, as nuncio, he made several visits to Macedonia and even to the Romanian high school in Bitolia. Abbot Faveyrial even set up a Catholic seminary inside the Romanian boarding school in Bitolia, and the

³¹ ***, *Scurtă privire asupra chestiunii macedo-române*, București, 1900, p. 21.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³³ Simion Țovaru, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

seminarians and a large number of scholarship holders regularly went to the Catholic Church whose choir was made up of Romanian scholarship holders who “worship according to the Catholic rite”³⁴. An 1884 letter from the Apostol Mărgărit showed that he was working in agreement with the French ambassador to Constantinople and the papal mission³⁵. In 1887, the papal nuncio of Constantinople, Monsignor Boneti was triumphantly received in the schools from Monastir at the order of Mărgărit. The result of these secret negotiations undertaken by Apostol Mărgărit was, in the view of his mentioned critic, the disinterest of the Aromanians towards the schools endorsed by him, but also towards the support that the Romanian state continued to give to this inspector³⁶.

The Greek professor Antoine Spiliotopoulos confessed at the beginning of the 20th century evaluating from the Greek perspective the Romanian propaganda that it had hired the abbot Faveyrial who, although supported by Austria-Hungary and other Catholic states, was substantially paid by the Romanian state with about 400,000 gold francs annually in order to create a network of Romanian schools, boarding houses and colleges in the villages of Monastir, Janina and Thessaloniki. The amount advanced by Spiliotopoulos is really fabulous considering that to these funds further funds were added, from the perspective of the Greek academic, from the Macedonian-Romanian Society and others³⁷.

The same Maimuca declared that after 1890 all the students of the boarding school were obliged to go to the Catholic Church and sing the *Te Deum* for the Emperor of Austria. The Austrian government ensured, alongside the king of Romania, that Mărgărit had all the leadership of the Aromanian cause without the direct interference of the Ministry of Public Instruction. Mărgărit himself declared that “he has a peremptory order sanctioned by the king of Romania”³⁸. About the authoritarian way in which the inspector led the school activity, Maimuca confessed that “he has absolute power over the Macedonian-Romanian issue, his relations are Russian decrees”³⁹... Mărgărit being supported by D.A. Sturdza, and once his star sets, Mărgărit will remain isolated and unmasked⁴⁰.

In 1890, Mărgărit’s hostile party began to be more and more coagulated, even addressing a memorandum signed by 55 people to the Bitolia inspector and asking

³⁴ Nicolae Maimuca to George Murnu, 27 January 1891, Bitolia. From the private collection of Professor Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca.

³⁵ Ștefan Mihăileanu, *Les Roumains Macedoniens et les intrigues Etrangères*, București, 1892, p. 18.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁷ Antoine Th. Spiliotopoulos, *La Macedoine et l'hellenisme sa force et ses droits*, Atena, Imprimerie Apostolopoulos, 1904, p. 69.

³⁸ Nicolae Maimuca to George Murnu, 27 January 1891, Bitolia. From the private collection of Professor Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca.

³⁹ “are o putere absolută asupra chestiunii macedo-române raporturile sale sunt ucazuri rusești”, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Nicolae Maimuca to George Murnu, 24 April 1898, Monastir. From the private collection of Professor Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca.

him on behalf of the community in that city to recognize the ephorate of the Romanian schools showing that Mărgărit was a foreign agent and requesting his non-interference. The memorandum was signed by 55 people⁴¹.

In the same year, another protest was sent to the Ministry of Instruction in Bucharest, requesting:

“[the cessation of the] papist propaganda within the high school in Bitolia, which is done by the “papist” priest [nn. Faveyrial] who uses all means to make students papists in order to insult our religion and our priests; he gives the students dogmatic sermons leading them in groups to the papist chapel with Mărgărit in the lead, even the high school premises being the property of the papist mission, which has a secret communication with the mission house ... ”⁴².

On June 17th, 1891, Abbot Lobry, the superior of the Lazarusians of Constantinople, wrote a letter to Father Faveyrial recalling the help promised to them by Mărgărit. According to Ștefan Mihăileanu, this Catholic agitation was not done with Austrian support, but with French support. He suggested that Mărgărit acted without the actors in Bucharest knowing the real stake of his deeds. The closeness of the Aromanian inspector to the abbot Faveyrial was a really problematic one given that he had repeatedly declared that the Romanians and the Albanians should organize themselves under the protection of the sultan and the pope⁴³.

Even if this scenario of religious union with a church authority other than that of the Patriarch of Constantinople was based on a political calculation that would have favored an exit from under the influence of the Greek clergy and the power of assimilation of the liturgical language, still Eastern spirituality assumed for centuries under the most difficult conditions it was not considered a circumstantial accessory for the Aromanian communities⁴⁴. Here is the opinion of one of the most well-known Aromanian leaders on the Catholic offer:

“Maybe there are among the Macedonian Romanians individuals who believe that being put under the pope’s protection would be beneficial, but none of those who sincerely believe in the good of the Romanians would accept this: the Aromanians would rather give up their national individuality than faith. Apostol Mărgărit knows

⁴¹ Nicolae Maimuca to George Murnu, 13 December 1890, Bitolia. From the private collection of Professor Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca.

⁴² “propagandei papistașe din cadrul liceului din Bitolia ce se face prin preotul „papistaș” [nn. Faveyrial] ce întrebuințează toate mijloacele spre a face papistași pe elevi ca să insulte religiunea și preoții noștri; ține elevilor predici dogmatice ducându-i în corpore la capela papistașă cu Mărgărit în frunte, până și localul liceului fiind proprietatea misiunii papistașe aceasta având comunicație secretă cu locuința misiunii...”. Dimitrie Cosmulei, *Memoriu despre starea școlilor românesci din Macedonia*, București, 1891, p. 47.

⁴³ Ștefan Mihăileanu, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ It should be noted that in history there are no mass transitions of Aromanian Orthodox to Islam (except for the town of Nânta in Meglenia), a situation that we do not meet again in other Orthodox nations in the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire.

that the Aromanians were angry with the Romanian culture because it was presented to them under a Catholic light⁴⁵.

Of course, such an accusation, which may not be fully verified, has been cleverly speculated by the Grecophile party, which accused Bucharest of intending to bring Catholicism to Greek territories through schools and churches. On the other hand, the hostility shown by a series of Aromanian notables towards Mărgărit's actions also comes against the background of the progress of the school-educational action, of the increasing number of graduates of the Romanian cultural institutes from Macedonia and Epirus. The best of this new elite come with a new vision of cultural action that invariably conflicts with the views of the old Apostol Mărgărit. The growing expectations and the desire to instil an alert advance on the national question make that in 1894 a Romanian Ephorate was set up in Bitolia to lead the schools and to represent them before the Ottoman authorities. It will be officially recognized by both the Ottoman government and the government in Bucharest⁴⁶. Basically, this recognition was made in the absence of general legislation providing this right, the act itself being an exception that recognized a state of affairs, namely that of the desire of some Aromanian communities to break away from the Greek ephorates and to pursue their own cultural but also ecclesiastical path, the latter much more difficult to obtain.

Regarding the school organization, until 1898 all the schools in the Balkans were subordinated to an inspector-administrator in the person of the principal of the primary school in Vlaho-Clisura, Apostol Mărgărit. At the end of the century, the inspector was accompanied by two school inspectors, one for Macedonia and one for Epirus-Thessaly. In addition to these structures, in Constantinople there was also a person in charge of the church and school affairs of the Romanians in Turkey⁴⁷.

Since 1898, two inspection districts were created, one for Macedonia and one for Epirus and Albania. In 1900, a new inspectorate was established only for Albania, a position taken over by Elie Papahagi. The fiscal year 1905-1906 divided the constituency Albania, holder Andrei Balamaci, into two regions Korița and Berat-Elbasan, holder Anton Becea⁴⁸.

⁴⁵ "Poate că sunt printre românii macedoneni inși care cred că punerea sub protecția papei ar fi benefică, însă nimeni dintre cei care cred cu sinceritate în binele românilor nu ar accepta aceasta: mai degrabă aromânii renunță la individualitatea lor națională decât la credință. Apostol Margărit știe că aromânii s-au supărat pe cultura română pentru că ea le-a fost prezentată sub o lumină catolică.", *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁶ Gheorghe Zbucă, Stelian Brezianu (coord.), *Românii de la sud de Dunăre. Documente*, București, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1997, p. 173.

⁴⁷ Adina Berciu Drăghicescu, *Școli și biserici românești din Peninsula Balcanică*, București, Ed. Universității din București, 2004, p. 145.

⁴⁸ Simion Măndrescu, „Școli și biserici românești în Albania”, în *Graiul Românesc*, an I, nr. 2, februarie 1927, pp. 49–50.

In order to undermine the authority of the inspector, the consuls were the ones who supported from the shadows the creation of school ephorates, thus launching as early as 1895 the cycle of endless debates in the Aromanian communities⁴⁹. In time, two types of Romanian schools were created in the Balkans: some dependent on the inspectorate and others “ephoral” led by ephorates and supported by the consulate⁵⁰. At the end of 1900, as a result of numerous complaints received by the Ministry of Cults and Instruction, C. C. Arion, having decided to reduce the financial aid sent south of the Danube, decided to let the draft budget for schools be made by the Romanian consul at Bitolia in agreement with the inspectors and principals of the schools. The inspector’s person is not even mentioned at the consultations, Mărgărit being thus removed from a prerogative that he had used intensely until then⁵¹. On September 1st, 1902, Apostol Mărgărit was retired from the position of General Inspector of Romanian Schools and Churches. He died a year later, in 1903⁵².

At a time when everything had to be done, the appreciation of the activity of the Apostol Mărgărit must be done *cum grano salis*.

Even Ionel Brătianu mentioned in the plenary of the parliament about the Aromanian community from Perivole who asked for papal protection, no longer enduring the harassment of the Greek clergy. At the end of the 19th century, we find some attempts at confessional proselytism, partly encouraged by the inspector Apostol Mărgărit, who was in close relations with the abbot Faveyrial, the leader of the Order of Lazarusians from Monastir (Bitola). Minister D. A. Sturdza himself supported such an idea by relying “on the entry of Romanians into the Catholic orbit”⁵³. However, the transition to Catholicism did not increase, but provided the basis for an accusation often used by the patriarchal party which considered that the use of a liturgical language of Latin origin was the favourite channel for the transition to the Roman confession.

FINAL REMARKS

Although the documents we consulted did not show any active involvement of the Apostol Mărgărit in the Catholic propaganda actions targeting the Aromanian communities in the Balkans, this was one of the accusations insistently conveyed by Greek leaders frightened by the loss of influence in the area.

⁴⁹ Simion Țovaru, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁵⁰ Eugen Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁵¹ Adina Berciu Drăghicescu, *op. cit.*, p. 170, C.C. Arion către ministrul Afacerilor Străine, Alexandru Marghiloman, 1900.

⁵² Victor Papacostea, Mihail Regleanu, *Documentele Redepșteptării Macedoromâne*, Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca, Ștefan Vâlcu (ed.), Editura Predania, București, 2012, p. 428.

⁵³ “pe intrarea românilor în orbita catolică” – Gheorghe Carageani, *Studii Aromâne*, București, Fundația Culturală Română, 1999, p. 266.

In a context in which the quality of Orthodoxy was often translated as Greek identity, the strategy of Apostol Mărgărit, condemned by some Aromanians of the time, can be interpreted as an attempt to save Aromanian communities from denationalization by the action of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate. His close relations with some members of the Catholic clergy in Macedonia can be seen in the wake of this idea.

For the movement of emancipation of the Aromanians from the end of the 19th century, Apostol Mărgărit remains one of the founding fathers, despite his opponents, both from the time in which he lived and later.

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TRANSYLVANIA AS A DEPENDENT PROVINCE OF THE EMPIRE. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE MITTELEUROPEAN PARADIGM

Alin Bulumac⁵⁴

ABSTRACT

Mittleuropa is one of those ideas that, from a historical point of view, produced more harm than good in Transylvania. Even if in the dualistic period the region represented a very important stake for Hungary in particular, but also for Austria, this did not offer any compensation to the majority of inhabitants. Although representing the statistical majority, the Romanians became a tolerated population that found itself in situations in which the very idea of human dignity was being mocked. Here, a paradox lies: even though this was the historical reality, an unnatural tendency to promote false advantages of Transylvania as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire can be easily identified. The article's objective is to explain and demonstrate that the Mittleuropa paradigm influence and temptation expanded and managed to conquer the Transylvanian elites, with economic, political and demographic consequences. This situation can be understood with the help of the modern world system theory (I. Wallerstein), as an exploitation of the periphery by the semi-periphery (Austro-Hungarian Empire). However, the Hungarians had a constant initiative to take advantage of this relationship of subordination and tried to change the ethnic rapport in the region due to the fact that the Hungarians were a minority in Transylvania, all "in the name of the Emperor". This context allowed Hungary to manifest itself geopolitically in the Carpathian area through exploitation.

Keywords: Mitteleurope, Trianon, Transylvania, Geopolitics of the Carpathian Basin, Modern world system, propaganda

INTRODUCTION

The present paper aims to briefly analyze the context in which Transylvania was a dependent/underdeveloped territory during the Austro-Hungarian dualism, and to question whether this socio-economic status was improved after the Great Union of 1918. This historical period was chosen to outline an overview of the geopolitical projects that Hungary propagated in Transylvania. We will use sociological concepts such as the *modern world system* (I. Wallerstein) and the *Carpathian basin geopolitics* (R. Şorban) to highlight the fact that, in the dualist

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period, Transylvania represented nothing else than another peripheral area of exploitation (economic, political and demographic), into the framework of the Mitteleuropa pan-idea. In this sense, the present-day geopolitical phenomenon of the Carpathian basin seems to be a development of the old Mitteleuropa pan-idea. We shall see that the logic of economics is ideologically shaped by the pan-idea.

The relevance of the current article is one of national importance because it brings to light aspects that confront the tendency to report to the dualist period in Transylvania as to a flourishing one, which underlines two possible directions: either those who promote this idea are people of good faith, which by simple and superficial analogies, can accept this as valid, or they represent elements strategically placed to spread the Hungarian ideological propaganda that militates for the recapture of the “unjustly” lost territory through the Treaty of Trianon.

THE NATIONAL STATE AND PLANNING

Historically, the Romanian nation was divided in terms of territoriality, due to unfavorable geopolitical reasons. But, in the same time, this represented a main and important pillar for consolidating the national consciousness and will for emancipation. From an economic standpoint, the national state was considered to be the only one that could ensure a harmonious and balanced growth in order to eliminate attempts at speculation or those aimed at an “irrational” development of the state, more precisely to the detriment of those who make it up⁵⁵.

Thus, the national thinking and ideal bring alongside the idea of economic protectionism of the state in relation to what Wallerstein developed as the thesis of the modern world system. In short, in relation to this world system, focused on extracting surplus value, the nation-state is the only geopolitical actor without which the harmonious development of the national economy cannot be ensured.

PAN-IDEAS AND SUBSTITUTION EMPIRES

Before describing the modern world system, we consider it necessary to highlight the theoretical context that made possible the emergence of the modern world system, and of the pan-ideas. It can be said that a pan-idea represents the attitude towards a certain space, dressed in the form of a “great spatial idea”⁵⁶. Any pan-idea conquers, first of all, the space of thought of the intellectual segment found on a given territory. Later on, it becomes the main pivot of that particular pan-idea and also its motor force, that consists in the conversion or even spiritual perversion of the other.

⁵⁵ Radu Baltasiu, *Introducere în Sociologie*, Craiova, Editura Beladi, 2007, p. 315.

⁵⁶ K. Haushofer, *De la Geopolitique*, Paris, Fayard, 1986, p. 534.

A main general objective of a pan-idea is to symbolically withdraw the territorial border, thus preparing further geopolitical and geocultural changes. This starts by overlapping a “feeling of space” that is identified in a particular area, an “area of glorious old memories”, the pan-idea manifesting itself as a spatial representation of a “nostalgic area”⁵⁷. Moreover, it is a framework for aggregating symbolic relations between an ethnic group or a population (or more) and a space or territory of apparently “legitimate” expansion⁵⁸.

Nicolae Iorga was one of the intellectuals who identified the origin and ideal-type of manifestation of such pan-ideas in the Romanian space. He defined this phenomenon with the name of “empires of substitution” or imitation, because the pan-ideas that intersect in the Romanian space want nothing more than to achieve a level of power the Roman Empire once had (under its two expressions: ancient Rome and Byzantium). On the Romanian territory, several pan-ideas could be identified, such as: pan-Slavicism, pan-Germanism, pan-Catholicism, pan-Hellenism, pan-Hungarianism, etc⁵⁹.

MITTELEUROPE

In our case, the pan-idea of interest is the Mitteleuropean one, an idea that, like any other geocultural entity, is “an assumed reality”⁶⁰. However, adopting such an idea is not a popular action, but rather “a cultural, a very organized” assumption⁶¹, practically projected on a territory and adopted by the local or national elites.

According to Shils' theory, peoples have “a map or a picture of the world” that is always in dispute. These maps “intervene in people's cognitive acts”, which is why Shils called them “cognitive maps”⁶². Such maps are instruments used by the elites, be they “politicians, statesmen, aristocracies, virtual elites, chancelleries, strategies, logistics services, diplomacy, etc.”⁶³.

From this perspective, Mitteleuropa, as a geopolitical representation, can be considered “a panideological map”⁶⁴ but beyond the “library” filled with “atlases, diplomatic encyclopedias, and stocks of emotionally charged representations”⁶⁵, it

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Ilie Bădescu, Ioan Mihăilescu, *Geopolitica, Integrare, Globalizare*, București, Editura Mica Valahie, 2004, p. 251.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Edward Shils, *Tradition*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 326. Cf. Gould, P. White, *Mental Maps*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974, p. 326.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Ilie Bădescu, Ioan Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

is hidden a “projective geography”⁶⁶ and not necessarily a physical one⁶⁷. It is the emotional component that helps the nostalgic unfolding of the imperial feeling⁶⁸. As such, the Mitteleuropean pan-idea is actually a mix of collective representations and emotions ranging from the cultural superiority of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the overwhelming Trianon nostalgia (the breaking of the Empire in nation-states, mostly the downfall of the “Great Hungary”).

SUBVERSIVE MITHS

The great Hungary

The paradigm according to which “Greater Hungary” has existed for 1000 years is one of the subversive myths that still circulate in the Transylvanian space and take hold of those social strata, despite the fact that they defy historic facts. This idea is a gross falsification of history, because after the battle of Mohacs in 1526, when Hungary was defeated by the Ottoman Empire, the direct consequence of the events was the transformation of Hungary into a Turkish pashalik⁶⁹ until 1699 the Treaty of Karlowitz, when Hungary became part of the Habsburg Empire⁷⁰. Here, one must note that all these changes during this timeframe did not concern the autonomy status of Transylvania, recognized by the Ottoman Empire, as Wallachia and Moldova were. The moment when Transylvania lost its status of Grand Principality (obtained in 1765 by order of Empress Maria Theresa) was 1868, when it was integrated into the Hungarian part of the Empire right until 1918/1920 (when it returned to Greater Romania by the decision stipulated in the Trianon Treaty⁷¹).

MITTELEUROPE ONCE AGAIN

The emotional component associated with the background development of the Mitteleuropean pan-idea has two simultaneous characteristics: it is both

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Viorela Gherasim, „Trezii-vă! Transilvania nu a făcut niciodată parte din Ungaria Mare. A fost o vreme sub ocupația Imperiului Austro-Ungar”, 2018, in *Ziar Harghita*, Available at: <https://ziarharghita.ro/trezii-va-transilvania-nu-a-facut-niciodata-parte-din-ungaria-mare-a-fost-o-vreme-sub-ocupatia-imperiului-austro-ungar>, Accessed on 10 March 2021.

⁷⁰ Miron Manega, „Precursorii lui Mihai Viteazu, în "proiectul" Unirii: Petru Rares, Giovanni Batista Castaldo si Sigismund Bathory”, in *Revista „CERTITUDINEA”*, nr. 4/2008, Available at: www.certitudinea.ro/articole/presa/view/precursorii-lui-mihai-viteazu-in-proiectul-unirii-petru-ares-giovanni-batista-castaldo-si-sigismund-bathory, Accessed on 10 March 2021.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

aggressive and seductive, so that “its intrinsic aggression is not perceived at first sight”⁷². The combination of the two generates subversion. Post and sub-imperialist myths of evocation are therefore subversive myths⁷³. As its effect is widespread, it can be said that the Mitteleurope paradigm is a “geopolitical subversion”⁷⁴ because it has all the characteristics of these myths: “it is a post historical, sub-imperialist myth, of nostalgic evocation, aggressive and seductive, that is, subversive”⁷⁵.

This can explain why Romanian intellectuals of national orientation became a prey in the face of this temptation, as it happened with the ones from Transylvania or Banat, who were in the proximity of the Mitteleuropean geopolitics manifestation space. Not only were they caught in this vicious circle, but through the actions and manifestations of these cosmopolite intellectuals, they contributed to the shift of the “gravitational center” from Bucharest to Vienna or Budapest⁷⁶.

THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM

The theory was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and refers to another type of “world system”, very different from the way the classical empire used to work. The two types had the same economic purpose: the extraction of surplus from the ruled territories. However, the main difference between them lies in the surplus appropriation mechanism: the empire used the tribute mechanism, while the modern world system based upon the market⁷⁷. Another difference is that the new “system” formed firstly an economic entity and not a political one⁷⁸. Moreover, the system is “global” not because it encompasses the whole world, but this new unity is greater than any other legally defined political unit and the connection of its parts is of an economic nature⁷⁹. The novelty with which this new structure is imposed consists in the functional specialization⁸⁰ of its component areas⁸¹, more exactly:

1. The core – located in North-West Europe, comprised of urban-industrial economies with a strong bourgeoisie
2. The semi-periphery – located in Central Europe, based on an economy constructed around self-employed landowners, tithe and exploited labor in a lease system

⁷² Ilie Bădescu, Ioan Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Ilie Bădescu, *Sincronism european și cultură critică românească*, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 2002, p. 238.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

3. The periphery – located in Eastern Europe and Latin America, characterized by an agrarian economic system, based on cereal crops (monocultures) and with labor in the various forms of slavery (on plantations or in the mining industries)

A first specific feature is the size of the economic flow, unequally divided between the three areas⁸². The persistence of this type of system is possible by maintaining the differences (between the three areas)⁸³, which also generates a systemic process of underdevelopment. Specifically, the periphery is the most affected area due to its function of suburbanization⁸⁴ within the international division of labor, in the sense that it is meant to supply the central area with raw materials, extractive materials and all that is necessary for the industry and the cities in the center. In addition to the delivery of raw materials, this process is one that forces the periphery to remain in the same “state” of development, because it is highly dependent on the system’s core. Moreover, it is hooked on the suburban style of life created⁸⁵, based on passive imitation, obedience, individuals with volatile characters, etc.

Here, we can conclude that the essence of the “periphery” is the process of suburbanization, a state which, in addition to its specialization in secondary production, assures subordination to the core’s needs, which further leads to a state of generalized dependence⁸⁶. In short, the periphery suffers a process of “development of underdevelopment”⁸⁷.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE CARPATIC BASIN

The geopolitics of the Carpathian Basin refers not only to [1] the place where the Hungarian geopolitics manifests itself [Romania], but also to [2] the process that assures the Hungarian ethnic reproduction⁸⁸. This phenomenon is based on the preconception and erroneous belief of the Hungarian elites that “Hungarianness carries in itself a hereditary message”, namely “to have a decisive and leading role in the Carpatho-Danube basin”⁸⁹. This motivational voice is transformed into the ambition to update the Hungarian border until it reaches the maximum known expansion during the period of Austro-Hungarian dualism. The vision underlying

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Ilie Bădescu, *Tratat de geopolitică*, București, Editura Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 171.

⁸⁸ Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru, Ovidiana Bulumac, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna*, București, Editura Etnologică, 2013, p. 14.

⁸⁹ Raoul Șorban, *Fantasma Imperiului Ungar și Casa Europei*, București, Editura Globus, 1990, p. 19.

this energetic manifestation consists in imagining a “multinational, polyglot state, in which the conqueror, in a numerical minority, arrogates his right to lead and exploit in his own interest peoples of another nationality, of another language”⁹⁰, this being the central point of the Hungarian ideology.

The situation can be considered dramatic from several perspectives, but the most important is the one that provides the overview of the instrument and means that the Hungarians used to achieve their goal: the assimilation or annihilation of other “nationalities” that “stand in the way” of achieving the ideal⁹¹.

“[In this way, an ideology of] denationalization, assimilation, or forced and rapid annihilation was created [and] together with the idea of the political nation, it became not only a fighting argument for domination, but it’s very expression”⁹².

Things started to show an aggressive trend when the Hungarian Diet stated that the:

“Peoples living ... are considered equal nationalities before the law, ... on the basis of individual freedom and freedom of association ... only if those claims are reconciled with the country's policy”⁹³.

However, the policy was in fact advocating for the creation of a “living space” necessary for the fulfillment of the “humanitarian” mission of the Hungarian people⁹⁴. In other words, in Transylvania the Hungarian ideology reserved the social privileges *only to the individuals of Hungarian ethnicity*, in order to fulfill the “mission” of the Hungarian nation⁹⁵ on account of the exploitation, assimilation or even annihilation of other nations. The paradox is that it has managed to create a fetish towards the Hungarian nation that has reached the point of supporting its members whether or not they are right, while being against the development of modern nation-states⁹⁶. On the scale of history, this meant the transformation of Hungary into a political nation⁹⁷, whose instrument of manifestation was to generate a certain sense of identity to all those who adhered to it and to create a system based on the principle of equality “of all, whatever their ethnic origin, with the precondition to adhere, by assimilation, to Hungarian nationality”⁹⁸.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁹² “Ideologia deznaționalizării, a asimilării, ori a anihilării forțate și rapide alături de idea “națiunii politice” a devenit nu numai un argument de luptă al dominației, ci însăși expresia sa”, *Ibid.*

⁹³ “toate popoarele locuitoare [în Ungaria] ... sunt a se considera de naționalități egale înaintea dreptului ... pe temeiul libertății individuale și a libertății de asociere... numai dacă acele pretențiuni se împacă cu politica țării”, *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ “s-a urmărit crearea unui echilibru înăuntrul unui sistem acceptabil pentru toți, cât și proclamării egalității tuturor, oricare ar fi originea lor etnică, cu condiția preliminară de a adera, prin asimilare la naționalitatea ungară”, *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.

One of the lesser-known things is the fact that in Transylvania, as a consequence of the Romanian demographic majority, despite the assimilation policies, the Romanian language was the language used in the dialogues between individuals of different ethnicities, being available to everyone⁹⁹. Despite this, the forced Magyarization process gained momentum during the time of Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza, also known as the “nationalities crusher”¹⁰⁰, and culminating in Count Albert Apponyi's 1907 education laws¹⁰¹.

The education laws implemented by Apponyi established the obligation to study in Hungarian in schools, and this measure was extended to denominational and communal schools, which had the right to provide training in a minority language. The law also permitted the (Hungarian) state to suppress any Romanian school for the simple reason that this was claimed by higher state interests. The application of Apponyi's laws represented a severe blow to the spiritual development of the Romanians in Transylvania, so that five years after its entry into force, 320 Romanian schools out of the 2,795 existing at that time were closed. The number of closed schools grew to 600 by 1915¹⁰².

In addition to these measures, the direct consequence of the discrepant Hungarian privileges was the negative discrimination of other nationalities through the functioning of the industrial economy, culture, trade with the help of human resources recruited from the Hungarian or Magyarized population, succeeding in imposing a privileged situation¹⁰³.

Another heavy blow to the Romanian people on the territory of Transylvania consisted of the religious restrictions that were imposed, by raising the level of “national religion”¹⁰⁴ of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, which generated subsequent effects in areas such as culture, education, recreational activities and last but not least, in terms of the mystery of the wedding¹⁰⁵. The ironic paradox of Hungarian ideology is that while aggressive assimilation efforts and tactics were made against other nationalities, Hungarian elites constantly challenged the nationalities' ability to reach the level of „Hungarian perfection”¹⁰⁶.

⁹⁹ “Oricând se întâlnește doi inși (transilvăneni — n.a) de neam diferit, neputându-se înțelege în propria lor limbă, graiul românesc le este la îndemână spre a servi de talmaci. Faci o călătorie, mergi la un târg — toată lumea știe românește («Man mache eine Reise, man gebe sich auf einen Jahrmakt, Walachisch kann Jedermann...») Limba română (spre deosebire de germana ori maghiara n.a.) o înveți aproape fără să vrei, din contactul zilnic de pe stradă.”, *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁰² Alin Ion, „Legea educației Apponyi, care a dus la închiderea a sute de școli românești din Transilvania. Toate școlile să fie prevăzute cu emblema ungară”, 2018, in *Adevărul*, Available at: (https://adevarul.ro/locale/targu-jiu/legea-educatiei-apponyi-dus-inchiderea-sute-scoli-romanesti-transilvania-toate-scoalele-prevazute-emblema-ungara-1_5af406ffdf52022f75cd9794/index.html), Accessed on 10 March 2021.

¹⁰³ Raoul Șorban, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

THE TRIANON MOMENT AND SUBSEQUENT MANIFESTATIONS

From Hungarian space

The reality of losing the war was a hard-to-accept truth for the Hungarian elites who were forced to relinquish long lasting positions and privileges obtained through state policies. The ferocity and stubbornness of the Hungarian elites, despite the international treaty regulating the new reality, of not accepting the new reality emerge even from the reaction and actions of the regent of Hungary between March 1, 1920 – October 15, 1944¹⁰⁷ is well known. For instance, Miklós Horthy, during this period, did nothing but fight for the revision and amendment of the Trianon Peace Treaty using:

“all means of public education, agitation and propaganda, internal and external, both throughout the apparatus. as well as through various patriotic associations militating against the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Trianon, seeking to justify the need to revise them”¹⁰⁸.

Another figure who had major implications in shaping this direction of the Hungarian geopolitical was Count Pal Teleky. After becoming prime minister (July 20, 1920), it was obvious which were his intentions:

“during the first term as prime minister, the image of his policy was characterized by firm intention to revise the Peace Treaty and to reject categorically theoretically and practically the «liberalism» as well as the intention [to refuse] the adoption of Christian ideology”¹⁰⁹.

ASPECTS INSIDE THE TRANSYLVANIAN AREA

There is a significant difference between the way the Hungarian elites see themselves (“noble” and “aristocratic”) and the manner in which they relate to “the rest”, meaning the peasantry, both of Hungarian and Romanian ethnic origin, with an inner advantage on the first category. Thus, the Hungarian elites created a hierarchical system with administrative, socio-cultural, economic and political repercussions: the upper class (the Hungarian elites) was the most privileged one, followed by the Hungarian peasantry, and, on the lowest position in the hierarchy, the Romanian peasantry. The realization of this system generated the development

¹⁰⁷ Britannica editors, “Miklós Horthy”, 1998, Available at: www.britannica.com/biography/Miklos-NagybanyaiHorthy, Accessed on 10 March 2021.

¹⁰⁸ “Folosind toate mijloacele educației publice, a agitației și a propagandei, interne și externe, atât întregul aparat de stat, ca și diversele asociații patriotice, au declanșat o ofensivă împotriva stipulațiilor cuprinse în Tratatul de la Trianon, căutând să motiveze și necesitatea revizuirii lor”, Raoul Șorban, *op. cit.*, p. 47–48.

¹⁰⁹ “În timpul întâiului mandat de prim-ministru, imaginea politicii sale era caracterizată de intenția fermă de a revizui Tratatul de pace, de a refuza categoric teoretic și practic, «liberalismul», ca și de intenția adoptării ideologiei creștine.”, *Ibid.*, p. 49.

of the upper layer at the expense of the other categories, the exploitation being exercised on both categories, but especially on the Romanian peasantry.

One of the most important tensions that were propagated by the Hungarian elite, succeeding through perseverance and regular rhythm (publicly known as “the policy of small steps”), was the unquestionable axiom that declared the supremacy of the Hungarian people over all others, especially the Romanians, that give them the supreme argument for controlling the power. In other words, the nobility of the Hungarians should be considered not only a law of nature, but also the expression of God’s will¹¹⁰.

This collective psychosis at the level of the Hungarian elites created the emotional context of the collective inadaptation to the post-Trianon European order. In political terms, this collective inadaptation took the form of *revisionism*: the systematic approach to deny and recover the ‘territorial losses’ after the Paris Treaty. The sudden change in the political reality could not be managed by the Hungarian elites because the “direction” of manifestation and action was coordinated not locally, but directly from Budapest. In 1937, top 18 Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania wrote:

“[This] unexpected loss of the war struck as if in the back of my head. This blanket, which were sacredly believed that its situation was unshakable. The only support, the power of the state, has disappeared from under his feet”¹¹¹.

Thus, losing their political and economic leverage, they were left with only the ideological instrument known as *passive resistance*¹¹², which remains valid to this day. For instance, just a couple of months ago, the Hungarian prime minister stated:

“Hungary, which has just regained its self-esteem, has just freed itself from the shackles of the hundred years after Trianon, has just regained the taste and path of its former greatness, and has just got rid of the miserable clothes of pessimism and humiliation”¹¹³.

The refusal to accept the newly instated Trianon realities also translated into a boycott of the former administration that did not want to work under the Romanian state, and chose to be part of the mass emigration of Hungarian officials. According to the data from the National Institute of Statistics, as a direct consequence of the establishment of the Romanian administration, out of

¹¹⁰ Metamorphosis Transylvaniae. Orszagreszunk atalkulasa, 1918–1936 apud. Anton Golopenția, *Opere complete*, Vol. I, Sociologie, Editura Enciclopedică, 2002, p. 331.

¹¹¹ “Pierderea neașteptată a războiului a lovit parcă în moalele capului. Pătura aceasta, care era încredințată cu sfințenie că situația ei e de nestrămutat. I-a pierit de sub picioare singurul reazăm, puterea de stat.”, *Ibid.*, p. 332.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Iuliu Vlădescu, „MTI: Orbán: maghiarii sunt campionii supraviețuirii pe scena istoriei europene”, 2020, in *Evz*, Available at: <https://evz.ro/mti-orban-maghiarii-sunt-campionii-supravietuirii-pe-scena-istoriei-europene.html>, Accessed on 10 March 2021.

approximately 100,000 families that formed the administrative apparatus of Transylvania, in the period 1918–1924 approximately 197,000 people were “repatriated” to Hungary¹¹⁴.

The concept of passive resistance was created by the Hungarian elites in the cities, and they tried to impose it among the villages that revolved around those urban areas. However, the carried-out exploitation of the peasantry led to the rebellion of the latter, both Hungarians and Romanians, against the new tactics of passive resistance imposed by the city. It could be said that the “adhesion of the Hungarian village” took place rather than of the cities because the village found the practical way faster than the bourgeoisie¹¹⁵.

After the Great Assembly in Alba Iulia, the information spread very quickly according to which the estates would be divided, so that each family would have enough land for a decent living. In this direction, the reaction of the Hungarian peasant was natural: to react together with the Romanian peasants against the Hungarian landowners. This moment represented the deviation of the Szekler and Hungarian villages from the path of passive resistance designated by the city leaders¹¹⁶. Thus, the moment of December 5, 1920, when the Hungarian landowners organized in Cluj a protest rally against the agrarian reform¹¹⁷, was the one that gave birth to open solidarity between peasants, regardless of ethnicity. This solidarity derived from the understanding the humanity of the spirit specific to Transylvania, a fact that came to the surface every time the Hungarian administration was being exaggerated or insulted the dignity of the peasants. These excesses have always been sanctioned by both Romanians and Hungarians, regardless of the ethnicity of the person concerned¹¹⁸.

After the Great Union, the remaining Hungarian political stratum in Romania manifested a passive attitude in political terms for one reason only:

“... it was completely caught up in the struggle not for the nation, but for the integrity of wealth. As soon as they reorganized their wealth, they began to take an active part in guiding Transylvania's minority policy”¹¹⁹.

In other words, the Hungarian political activity on the Romanian territory after Trianon did not aim at anything other than the restoration of the Hungarian “nobility”¹²⁰, following even the guiding ideas of the pre-war Hungarian propaganda:

¹¹⁴ Anton Golopenția, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 332–333.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

¹¹⁹ “... era prinsă cu totul în lupta dusă, nu pentru neam, ci pentru integritatea averii. De îndată ce și-au reorganizat averea, au început să ia parte active în îndrumarea politicii minoritare a Ardealului.”, *Ibid.*, pp. 333–334.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

“by offering deputy seats to directors and then buying independent newspapers, the Hungarian magnates' party managed to deal decisive blows to its opponents. The guiding ideas of the publicist counter-elite, made up mainly of freelancers and publicists, all come from the pre-war Hungarian opposition program”¹²¹.

From an economic point of view, after the Great Union, Transylvania experienced an upward trend. To know the state of affairs in Transylvania, before the Great Union, we quote below a representative quote:

“... life course, quiet, timid, lacking in initiatives. Colony, both spiritually and economically. Provincial newspapers and provincial people. The culture, centralized in Budapest, was in very modest manifestations. With the change of mastery, all of a sudden, they changed. Not only because of the change of mastery. The pace of urban development had intensified even before the Union. The premises of autonomous spiritual creations have appeared. But in the whole of old Hungary, on the periphery, their use would have been very slow”¹²².

Thus, the myth according to Transylvania was prosperous during the Austro-Hungarian dualism can be easily dismantled only if we look at Simion Mehedinți's analysis on the rapid development of Transylvania under *the supervision of the Romanian state*¹²³:

1. The number and capital of autonomous companies in Transylvania are growing impressively¹²⁴

Year	Number of societies	Social capital
1919	231	190.446.000
1923	468	1.571.077.000
1936	554	4.383.985.000
1937	568	4.449.062.000

2. Cereal production also increased significantly (corn alone, for example, increased from 8.1 quintals per hectare in 1921 to 16.0 quintals per hectare in 1938) and total production increased from 17.922.000 quintal to 34.377.000 quintals¹²⁵.

¹²¹ “Oferind locuri de deputat directorilor și mai apoi cumpărând ziarele independente, partidul maghiar al magnaților a izbutit să dea lovituri decisive adversarilor săi.”, *Ibid.*, p. 335.

¹²² “Cursul vieții molcom, timorat, lipsit de initiative. Colonie, atât din punct de vedere spiritual cât și din punct de vedere economic. Gazetișoare provinciale și oameni provinciali. Cultura, centralizată la Budapesta, mijea în manifestări foarte modeste. Cu schimbarea stăpânirii toate s-au prefăcut, dintr-o dată. Nu numai din pricina schimbării de stăpânire. Ritmul evoluției urbane se accentuase încă înainte de Unire. Au apărut premisele unor creații spiritual autonome. Însă, în întregul vechii Ungarii, la periferie, s-ar fi ajuns foarte încet la folosirea lor.”, *Ibid.*, p. 337.

¹²³ Simion Mehedinți, *L'orientation économique de la Transylvanie*, in *Revue de Transylvanie*, 1940, p. 221.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

3. The import-export economic relations have experienced a development through the orientation towards the East¹²⁶.

1938	Romanian principalities and provinces of Turkey	Hungary and the provinces of Austria
Export	2.995.091	89.144
Import	4.157.055	172.408

This flourishing was based on the fact that Transylvania had a large market in the Principalities beyond the Carpathians: Moldova and Muntenia. Simion Mehedinți is also the one who demonstrated the fact that *before* and after the Great Union, Transylvania's economic circuits headed south and east, that is, towards the Romanian countries and not towards Hungary¹²⁷.

In this sense, we are not mistaken if we conclude that the economic renaissance of Transylvania, after acquiring its historical place within the Romanian nation, is the clearest proof that the province found geographically in the middle of the country forms an organic unit with the rest of the Romanian State¹²⁸.

With this change of the dominant objective, the Romanian nation found itself alongside allogeneic populations, which occupied for a long time many privileged positions. A negative tension accumulated over time, but the Romanian people in Transylvania had the ability to turn it into a constructive tension, specifically in a tension that would stimulate and guide Romanians to enter and remain in trade, industry and the free professions, and chose to ignore the revenge type of attitude towards the others¹²⁹.

CONCLUSIONS

To demystify the idea that in the dualistic period Transylvania was more economically advantageous than embedded in a Romanian state was the main aim of this paper, and the utilized instruments that proved the affirmation were the geopolitical analysis of the Mitteleuropa pan-idea and the world-system referential.

Another important aspect referred to was the geopolitical ability of the Romanian culture to transform negative pressures into positive tensions that brought growth to all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, and the framework of such an enterprise was the Great Romania. The Romanian national unitary state was nothing else but the very reason of being for the entire Romanian people, regardless of the temporal geographical divisions, and this aspect should not be diminished, regardless of the recorded harshness of times.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 223

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Anton Golopenția, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

Another direction that the material aimed was to suggest the reader some directions for action suited for the Transylvanian space. Because this issue has been analyzed and debated for a long time, we consider it to be a gesture of recognition of the work submitted for the national uprising of the Romanians, the rendering of the ideas elaborated by Anton Golopenția¹³⁰:

1. A long-term public campaign should be carried out to clarify the great masses of Hungarians in Romania on the situation created by the flourishing of the Romania state.
2. To proceed today, as if the Hungarians were a compact and hostile group, in its entirety, to the whole of Romania, means to put water on the mill of magnates and freelancers, who lead the Hungarian party and have every interest in persisting a tension between the Romanian state and the Hungarian community in Romania. Our policy today on Hungarians must be *differentiated*:
“Of understanding and closeness with the leaders and the blankets that have been inserted in the whole of Romania”¹³¹.
“Of tenacious repression of those who are unjustly claiming to be the representatives of the entire Hungarian nation in Romania, and seek to perpetuate, among the Hungarians in Romania, the latent uprising of the first years after the war”¹³².
3. Unlike allogeneic groups, the Romanians who are also responsible for preserving the Romanian state must know how to act not only in the perspective of the Romanian nation, but also in the perspective of the Romanian state. However, it will remain, as we seen before, a state with foreign populations. Less than we have now, but still with “minorities”. To act only in the perspective of the nation, to give the inevitable competition the aspect of struggle means not to take care of the coherence necessary for the Romanian state in the attempts that may arise. Not even the most formidable strengthening of the Romanian nation can ever completely remove the need for a good understanding with the foreign people living among us.
4. Competition for economic positions is driven by individuals and groups. The limitation of these competitions to the intensity compatible with the interests of the Romanian state is today's duty of the state leadership.

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¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 339–341.

¹³¹ “De înțelegere și apropiere cu conducătorii și cu păturile ce s-au inserat în România întregită.”, *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹³² “De tenace reprimare a celor care, pretinzându-se pe nedrept reprezentanții întregii ungurimi din România, caută să permanentizeze, la ungurii din România răscularea latentă din anii dintâi de după război.”, *Ibid.*

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A SHORT ANALYSIS REGARDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY OF ROMANIANS FROM THE HARGHITA-COVASNA AREA

Samira Cîrlig¹³³

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to address the subject of social security of the Romanians that live in the Harghita-Covasna area. The purpose is to identify if the security of Romanian people is threatened, to what extent and by whom. First, the paper addresses the concept of social security, with references to other related topics, followed by a discussion on the statistics' dynamics for both Romanian and Hungarian communities. The article also tries to detect the causes of the identified oscillations; consequently, we will reveal the causes that led to the decline of the local Romanian community and its connection with the active involvement of "Hungarians and Hungary". For this inquiry we will use mass-media articles, statistical data, and/or researches undertaken by institutions or specialized personnel in the field.

Keywords: security, societal security, identity, abandon, assimilation.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

Societal security

According to sociologist Adela Șerban, the concept of societal security refers to: "a relational reality, and the word security does not designate only a social fact, that of being put at shelter from any danger, but also a sense of confidence and peace that emerges from the absence of danger. Security, like health, is not only a feature of a state of affairs, but also a state internalized by a human subject, whether individually or collectively"¹³⁴.

The societal security is an umbrella type of concept that includes the state's efforts to make a deal with the new threats towards the social security. Societal

¹³³ PhDc in Sociology, University of Bucharest, Romania; E-mail contact: oana.samira.cirlig@gmail.com.

¹³⁴ "o realitate relațională, iar cuvântul securitate nu desemnează numai un fapt social, acela de a fi pus la adăpost de orice pericol, cât și un sentiment de încredere și de liniște pe care îl dă cuiva absența pericolului. Securitatea, ca și sănătatea, nu este numai o caracteristică a unei stări de fapt, ci și o stare interiorizată de către un subiect uman, fie el individual sau colectiv" in Adela Șerban, *Securitatea societală: fundamente teoretice*, București, Editura Valahia, Colecția Euxin, 2008, p. 54.

security is the ability of a society to maintain the identity of its individuals intact, despite the possible threats or social change¹³⁵. In other words, societal insecurity sets in when the society feels threatened in terms of its identity¹³⁶. The term of *societal security* was first introduced by Barry Buzan in his work “People, States and Fear” in 1991 and it had the purpose of connecting the state security with the human security¹³⁷. Social security responds to “the security needs of organic type of communities”¹³⁸, where by “organic community we mean a naturally cohesive community, based on data and natural availabilities”¹³⁹.

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver defined social security as:

“a particular form of collective security, the object of which is to maintain elements of societal and ethno-symbolic cohesion, specific to human communities. A safe societal space means a space in which the constitutive values, purposes and collective meanings are protected, but also the internal solidarity and the social power that support them”¹⁴⁰.

Although social security is closely related to other sectors of the security studies, as it aims and seeks to ensure the protection of all communities, it is distinguished by the simple fact that it

“identifies individuals as members of a social group. Society means identity, the way of self-understanding of communities and individuals who identify themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct, however at the same time they intertwine with explicitly political organizations concerned with act of governance”¹⁴¹.

Through the idea of social security an emphasis on the identity phenomena, gender relations and social cohesion was put. As Adela Șerban argues, the concept of social security appeared because there has always been:

“an organic need of human communities to defend their right to exist and their tendency to be in a way is structurally their own. That's why we think we can state,

¹³⁵ Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993, p. 23.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Adela Șerban, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹³⁸ “nevoilor de securitate ale comunităților omenești de tip organic”, *Ibid.*, p. 12

¹³⁹ Prin “comunitate organică înțelegem o comunitate încheșată în mod natural, pe baza unor date și disponibilități firești”, *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ “drept o formă particulară a securității colective, al cărei obiect îl constituie menținerea elementelor de coeziune societală și etno-simbolică, specifică comunităților omenești. Un spațiu societal sigur înseamnă un spațiu în care sunt protejate valorile constitutive, scopurile și sensurile colective, dar și solidaritatea internă și puterea socială care le susține”, *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁴¹ “identifică indivizii ca membri ai unui grup social. Societatea înseamnă identitate, modalitatea de auto-înțelegere a comunităților și a indivizilor care se identifică drept membri ai unei comunități. Aceste identități sunt distincte, dar în același timp se întrepătrund cu organizațiile explicit politice preocupate de guvernare”, in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 171–172.

without a risk of error, that the need for social security and, implicitly, the concern for its assurance are historical constants of humanity”¹⁴².

The organising concept in the societal sector is *identity*. When we open the subject of societal insecurity, we are talking about how different communities define the perceived threats on their survival as a community that owns a national identity. Thus, the societal security refers to:

“large identity groups which are self supporting themselves; the empirical content varies both in time and space. In contemporary Europe, these groups are mainly national, but in other religious regions or racial groups have more relevance. The subject could be understood as the «security of the identity»”¹⁴³.

According to Bill McSweeney, the collective identities are the result of a political negotiation between a few actors. Rogers Brubaker argues that there are three such actors between which a particular interaction is created, a subject that should be taken into account from a societal security perspective: between the nation-state, the national minority, and the national minority's external homeland¹⁴⁴.

THE IDENTITY

A final aspect that needs to be reviewed is identity. Montserrat Guibernau believes that:

“Identity is a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes who a person is and how he or she socially and psychologically identifies. (...) The defining elements of identity are continuity in time and differentiation from others, two foundations of national identity”¹⁴⁵.

In other words, collective identities are "related" to the idea of power. Montserrat Guibernau argues that, for millions of people, the nation is in fact an

¹⁴² “o necesitate organică a comunităților omenești de a-și apăra dreptul la existent și tendința lor de a ființa într-un mod care le este structural propriu. De aceea credem că putem afirma, fără riscul de a greși, că nevoia de securitate societală și, implicit, preocuparea pentru asigurarea sa sunt constante istorice ale umanității”, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴³ “(..) grupuri identitare mari care se auto-susțin; conținutul empiric al acestora, variază atât în timp cât și în spațiu. În Europa contemporană, aceste grupuri sunt în principal naționale, însă în alte regiuni grupurile religioase sau rasiale au mai multă relevanță. Conceptul ar putea fi înțeles și «ca securitate a identității»”, in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *Securitatea – un nou cadru de analiză*. (trad.) George Jigla. s.l., CA Publishing, 2010, p. 172.

¹⁴⁴ Lucian Ștefan Dumitrescu, *Managementul securității naționale/internaționale contemporane. Raport de cercetare postdoctorală: Identificare și securitate identitară în Târgu-Mureș. Spre un model cantitativ de analiză a securității identitare la nivel regional*, București, 2015, p. 10.

¹⁴⁵ “Identitatea este o definiție, o interpretare, a sinelui, care stabilește cine este și unde se află o persoană din punct de vedere social și psihologic. (...) Elementele definerii ale identității sunt continuitatea în timp și diferența față de ceilalți, ambele elemente fundamentale ale identității naționale” in Guibernau, 2013, p. 10, apud. Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

extension to the familial group, and the only political community in which they really matter. Therefore, the idea of belonging generated by collective identities is an important antidote to loneliness, alienation, and social insignificance¹⁴⁶.

In the professor's vision, the national identity has five dimensions, first of which she names the cultural part of the national identity, which explains why identity cannot exist outside an institutional environment. For Guibernau, the cultural dimension refers to national symbols, beliefs, and traditions which, once internalized, become a constituent part of the nation. The second dimension is the psychological one, which refers to the emotions generated by certain historical events. The third dimension is the territorial one. It concerns the territory that was imagined and simultaneously internalised as home. The historical dimension gives a community a sense of resilience over time, pride, and uniqueness. The final dimension of the national identity is the political one, which relates to citizenship and, at least in theory, guaranteed loyalty towards the state¹⁴⁷.

THE NATION

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde argued that in Europe, societal security is mainly about nations, or more precisely nations as ethnic groups or minorities¹⁴⁸. Further, the link between the nation and the "imagined community" will be addressed in short. The "imagined community" is based on Benedict Anderson's idea of "invented community" and Smith's idea of "lateral ethnicity":

"For Anderson, the imagined community is the basis of the nation state. In other words, the state is based on a false community in which, Anderson highlights, tradition is nothing more than an ideological imaginary. As ideological, lateral constructs, such communities are easily constructed through the vectors of secular or ecclesiastical authority that define the political nation. True, for Anderson, all nations are invented, the distinction between political and organic nations does not exist. Anderson omits what Anthony Smith calls vertical ethnicities. Unlike lateral ethnicities, created from the top down by political command, vertical ethnicities are organic, with an ancient basis of common traditions"¹⁴⁹.

¹⁴⁶ Lucian Ștefan Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁹ "Pentru Anderson, comunitatea imaginată reprezintă baza statului național. Cu alte cuvinte, statul se întemeiază pe o falsă comunitate în care, arată Anderson, tradiția nu ar fi altceva decât un imaginar ideologic. Fiind construite ideologice, laterale, astfel de comunități sunt ușor de înregimentat prin vectorii autorității laice sau bisericești, cele care definesc națiunea politică. Este adevărat, pentru Anderson, toate națiunile sunt inventate, el neavând acces la distincția dintre națiuni politice și națiuni organice. Anderson omite ceea ce Anthony Smith numește etniile verticale. Spre deosebire de etniile laterale, create de sus în jos, prin comandă politică, etniile verticale sunt demotice, organice, cu o bază străveche de tradiții comune" in Radu Baltasiu (coord.), Gabriel Săpunaru, Bulumac Ovidiana, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna – raport de cercetare*, București, Editura Etnologică, Colecția de Studii Sociologice, 2013, p. 15.

THE NATION AND THE STATESMAN

Simion Mehedinți, one of the most respected intellectuals of the 20th century in Romania, stated that:

“The first duty of the statesman is to ensure the permanence of his nation, linking it as closely as possible to the national territory”¹⁵⁰.

Also, he synthesized the statesman’s duty in only three words: restorer, keeper and renovator of the land¹⁵¹.

THREATS TO COMMUNITY MYTHS, RITUALS AND SYMBOLS

The reference object of the societal sector is the collective identity. Aiming to be a particular field, it is actually more difficult to establish some clear boundaries between the existential threats and those less serious, which may be a serious challenge. The collective identities have an inner dynamic and a conservative nature, which transforms the menaces toward this sector to be perceived as a danger of not being oneself anymore, as threats to the concrete identity¹⁵².

The threats to societal security are mainly related to migration, horizontal and vertical competition. The latter appears especially where projects about political integrity or secessionists projects are undertaken, whereas the horizontally competition may occur at any level. Many of the local conflicts are linked to the vertical competition between nation-states and minority-nations and have as trigger an element that refers to the idea of minority¹⁵³.

To understand the idea of “we” one must go back to the definition of society, a community united by its collective identity. Applying the concept of security to this definition, one can observe that societal security ensures the affirmation of group identity and social cohesion. Thus, the main risks and threats to the societal security are those related to language, religion, traditions, symbols, collective memory, etc. These are in fact the components that determine that they belong to a specific community. For Buzan, these kinds of threats come from within the state rather than outside of it. However, the exterior threats that are not totally excluded¹⁵⁴.

¹⁵⁰ “datoria cea dintâi a omului de Stat este să asigure trăinicia națiunii sale, legând-o cât mai strâns de teritoriul național” in Simion Mehedinți, *Opere Complete*, Vol. I, *Geographica*, Partea a doua, Biblioteca Enciclopedică, Fundația Regală pentru Literatură și Artă, București, 1943, p. 318.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹⁵² Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 17.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁵⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (2nd ed.), London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 123.

STATISTICAL DYNAMICS

According to data provided by the National Institute of Statistics, in 2011, in Harghita there were 39,196 Romanians out of a total of 310,867¹⁵⁵, which means that the percentage of Romanians was 12.6%¹⁵⁶. In Covasna, out of 210,177 people, only 45,021 were Romanians¹⁵⁷, i.e., 21.42%¹⁵⁸ of the total population. Therefore, in the two counties, the Romanian community became a “local minority”¹⁵⁹. When we say local minority, or dominated, we mean “the population that is a majority nationally but is a minority locally”¹⁶⁰.

A comparative analysis of the data concerning the nationality structure of Covasna's population shows that in 2011, compared to 2002, the Hungarian ethnic population decreased by 7%, while the Romanian ethnic population decreased almost twice as much, by 12%¹⁶¹. For Harghita, the data is clearer: the Romanian population decreased while the Hungarian population increased. Bishop Andrei of Harghita and Covasna warned in 2019 about the regional depopulation of Romanians, stating that the number decreased in only four years by 30,000 (from 81,000 to 50,000). The disappearance from the registers of the Orthodox diocese of 37% of the faithful could mean the biggest demographic collapse in the country recently recorded¹⁶².

According to the 2011 census, when Romania's population was 20,121,641, the Hungarian community in Romania was 1,259,914 and represented 6.2% of the country's population. Most Hungarians were in Harghita¹⁶³, where 84.09%¹⁶⁴ of the population was Hungarian, and in Covasna, where Hungarians made up 73.14%¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁵ INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.2. Populația după etnie – macroregiuni, regiuni de dezvoltare, județe și categorii de localități”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 20, 2021.

¹⁵⁶ $39.196 \times 100 / 310.867 = 12,6\%$.

¹⁵⁷ INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.2. Populația după etnie – macroregiuni, regiuni de dezvoltare, județe și categorii de localități”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 20, 2021.

¹⁵⁸ $45.021 \times 100 / 210.177 = 21,42\%$.

¹⁵⁹ Radu Baltasiu (coord.), Gabriel Săpunaru, Ovidiana Bulumac, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁶⁰ “populația care este majoritară în plan național, dar minoritară în plan local”, *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Lazăr Lădăriu, “Concluziile unui recensământ sau cine pe cine deznaționalizează”, 2012, in *Condeiful Ardelean*, Available at: <http://www.condeifulardelean.ro/articol/concluziile-unui-recensamant-sau-cine-pe-cine-deznationalizeaza>, Accessed on March 13, 2020.

¹⁶² Iulia Drăghici Taraș, “Exodul românilor din Covasna și Harghita provoacă îngrijorare”, 2019, in *Covasna Media*, Available at: <https://covasnamedia.ro/stirea-zilei/exodul-romanilor-din-covasna-si-harghita-provoaca-ingrijorare>, Accessed on November 4, 2020.

¹⁶³ INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.10. Populația după etnie și limba maternă – județe”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 11, 2020.

¹⁶⁴ $261.417 \times 100 / 310.867 = 84,09\%$ (din populația Harghitei este de etnie femeie de etnie maghiară).

¹⁶⁵ $153.728 \times 100 / 210.177 = 73,14\%$ (din populația Covasnei este de etnie femeie de etnie maghiară).

of the county's population. In ten years, from 2002 to the 2011 census, the Hungarian community in Romania managed to record a decrease of only 0.4%, remaining the largest ethnic minority in Romania¹⁶⁶.

Therefore, while the Romanian population has decreased with approximately 37% in the last four years, Hungarians have decreased by only 0.4% in a decade. We should ask ourselves if there is any connection between the Romanian demographic decline and the idea of societal insecurity.

THREATS TO THE IDENTITY OF ROMANIANS IN HARGHITA- COVASNA: A NEW TYPE OF HUNGARIAN REVISIONISM?

Mircea Stratulat defined revisionism as the set of “revengeful actions that continue the interwar revisionist policy”. He defined neo-revisionism as the Hungarian state’s attempt to remove the areas where ethnic Hungarians are in the majority from the influence of the Romanian state. For instance, the neo-revisionist attitude is characterized by:

“the imposing autonomy, the self-government and the segregation in every fields of activity (administration, economy, education) to exit from the Romanian jurisdiction (or Yugoslav and Slovak) the areas where the Hungarian minority has a majority. (...) A specific form of Hungarian neo-revisionism (less common in the practice of interwar revisionism) is Hungary’s intention to “defend” the Hungarians in its neighbouring countries”¹⁶⁷.

This type of “defense” of the Hungarian minority is done as we have already seen on several levels. The economic manner of “intervention and defense” firstly intended to focus on the demographic level and on the second place, indirectly expressed, but also much needed, the religious, educational, administrative ones of the Hungarian community from the Harghita and Covasna area. What may be supportive for some can become isolating for others.

To get an overall idea of the degree of societal insecurity that Romanians in the two counties may feel, we will try to underline the effects of the measures presented above towards the identity of their community, as it is a key aspect in the

¹⁶⁶ Ziarul Financiar, 2012, “Maghiarii și romii, cele mai numeroase minorități etnice din România”, Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/eveniment/maghiarii-si-romii-cele-mai-numeroase-minoritati-etnice-din-romania-9200543>, Accessed on November 4, 2020.

¹⁶⁷ “acțiuni revanșarde care continuă politica revizionistă interbelică”, iar prin neorevizionism înțelege încercarea maghiară de a scoate zonele unde etnicii maghiari sunt majoritari de sub influența statului vizat. De pildă, neorevizionismul caută ca prin “impunerea autonomiei, autoguvernării și a separatismului în toate domeniile de activitate (administrație, economie, învățământ, etc.) să scoată de sub jurisdicția României (ori a Iugoslaviei și Slovaciei) zonele unde minoritatea maghiară deține pondere în rândul populației. (...) O formă specifică de exprimare a neorevizionismului maghiar (mai puțin întâlnită în practica revizionismului interbelic) o constituie pretenția Ungariei de a-și asuma “apărarea” minorităților maghiare din țările vecine” in Mircea Stratulat, *Revizionism și neorevizionism ungar*, București, Editura Globus, 1994, p. 7.

societal paradigm. Our main interest is to identify to what extent we may analyze a vertical competition in the case of the nationalities which are undertaken in this analysis. Thus, we will try to seek the effects of the Hungarian applied ethnopolitics, and to discuss the extension of the Hungarian sphere of influence.

CONCRETE ACTIONS IN THE FIELD

The Hungarian community in Romania benefits from a permanent support from the Hungarian state, but it also receives constant attention, funds and advantages on ethnic criteria from the Romanian state, all due to the intense activity of the non-governmental organizations that represent its interests (among which the most influential is called the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania). However, it should be noted that this NGO has received constant and consistent funding from the Romanian state both as a non-governmental organization and as a political party. The documents show that this party started in 2000 with public funding of 389,000 lei and reached almost 21 million lei in 2010, over 18 million lei in 2014, reaching 32 million in 2020¹⁶⁸. Its public funding has increased 53 times in the last 14 years. To these amounts, we can add the 7.3 million RON spent exclusively on the rehabilitation of the monuments of the Hungarian community in Covasna and Harghita. The money was allocated by party president Kelemen Hunor when he was head of the Ministry of Culture, from 2009–2011¹⁶⁹.

More serious than the overfunding is the lack of similar actions for the Romanian community in this area. Let us see a relevant comparison: between 2011 and 2014, the Ministry of Culture allocated 25.2 million lei for the rehabilitation of Hungarian monuments in Harghita and Covasna, while for the Romanian monuments, however, it was allocated only 112,600 lei¹⁷⁰. In other words, in less than 3 years, the Hungarian community has received 22 times more funding from the Romanian state alone than the Romanian community. The issue of the. This

¹⁶⁸ Mădălina Mihalache, “UDMR, ventuză bugetară cu statut dublu”, January 27, 2021, in *Jurnalul*, Available at: <https://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/udmr-ventuza-bugetara-cu-statut-dublu-865252.html>, Accessed on: June 27, 2021.

¹⁶⁹ Moara lui Gelu, “U.D.M.R. – afacere de milioane de euro din fonduri publice”, 2014, Available at: <https://moaralugelu.blogspot.com/2014/04/udmrafaceredemilioanedeeurodin.html?m=1>, Accessed on February 27, 2021.

¹⁷⁰ Dan Tanasă, “EXCLUSIV. În patru ani, peste 14,3 milioane de lei de la Cultură pentru renovarea conacelor secuiești din Covasna și Harghita. VEZI ce sumă RIDICOLĂ au primit monumentele românești”, 2015, in *DanTanasa.ro*, Available at: <https://www.dantanasa.ro/exclusiv-in-patru-ani-pest-143-milioane-de-lei-de-la-cultura-pentru-renovarea-conacelor-secuiesti-din-covasna-si-harghita-vezi-ce-suma-ridicola-au-primit-monumentele-romanesti-documente/>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.

Dan Tanasă, “EXCLUSIV. UDMR, o afacere de milioane de euro anual din fonduri publice DOCUMENTE”, 2016, in *DanTanasa.ro*, Available at: <https://www.dantanasa.ro/exclusiv-udmr-o-afacere-de-milioane-de-euro-anual-din-fonduri-publice-documente/>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.

Ziare.com, “Câți bani au primit partidele de la stat luna trecută: PSD e campion detașat, cu peste 16 milioane de lei”, 2019, Available at: <http://www.ziare.com/politica/partid/cati-bani-au-primit-partidele-de-la-stat-luna-trecuta-psd-e-campion-detasat-cu-pest-16-milioane-de-lei-1567726>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.

aspect brings to the table the concept of the “abandoned society”¹⁷¹ by its own elite, which has a serious consequence: the drastic decrease of the Romanian population in the area.

In the same time, the Hungarian state does not neglect the Magyar community in Romania. It invests heavily in the area through various cultural and economic associations, etc., among which the Pro Economica Foundation and Communitas are the most famous. In 2019, Hungary, through the Pro Economica Foundation, invested more than 70 million euros¹⁷² in the study area to support the development of agriculture. Although in theory this money can be accessed by anyone, regardless of nationality, one of the mandatory conditions is to speak Hungarian. For this reason, only 8% -10%¹⁷³ of the beneficiaries were Romanians, the rest being Magyar, obviously. And this was just one of many examples of the sources of funding received by the Hungarian community in this area. But there are many more domains funded, such as education, sport, culture, religion, and so on.

Another level of the field actions initiated by the Budapest government is the symbolic one. For instance, the year of 2018 was declared “The year of Hungarian families abroad”¹⁷⁴ and the 2019 was declared “The year of Hungarian children abroad”¹⁷⁵. All these actions had the purpose of enforcing the national identity in the Hungarian communities, regardless the state they live in.

THE EFFECTS

The societal security of the Romanians in the studied area is affected on the one hand by the over-developed support that the Hungarian community receives either from the Hungarian or the Romanian state, through the intervention of political parties. However, societal security is also affected by the absence of

¹⁷¹ Radu Baltasiu, Ovidiana Bulumac, *Istorie socială. Actualitate și problematică*, București, Editura Universității din București, 2017.

¹⁷² Info Mureș, “Ungaria investește zeci de milioane de euro în Mureș, Harghita și Covasna”, 2019, in *Info Mureș*, Available at: <https://stiri.infomures.ro/economie/ungaria-investeste-zeci-de-milioane-de-euro-in-mures-harghita-si-covasna/>, Accessed on February 20, 2021.

¹⁷³ G4media, “60 de milioane de euro de la Budapesta pentru aproape 5000 de fermieri din Ținutul Secuiesc/În ciuda avertismentelor MAE, Fundația Pro Economica anunță că marți va fi desemnat primul proiect câștigător în categoria mari investiții”, 2019, Available at: <https://www.g4media.ro/60-de-milioane-de-euro-de-la-budapesta-pentru-aproape-5000-de-fermieri-din-tinutul-secuiesc-in-ciuda-avertismentelor-mae-fundatia-pro-economica-anunta-ca-marti-va-fi-desemnat-primul-proiect-castiga.html>, Accessed on February 20, 2021.

¹⁷⁴ Punctul.ro, “Un miliard de forinți pentru programul Anul familiilor maghiare de peste hotare”, 2018, Available at: <https://www.punctul.ro/un-miliard-de-forinti-pentru-programul-anul-familiilor-maghiare-de- peste-hotare/>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

¹⁷⁵ Hiradu.ro, “Potápi: începe anul tematic dedicat copiilor maghiari de peste hotare”, 2019, Available at: <https://hirado.hu/2019/02/12/potapi-incepeanultematicdedicacopiiormaghiaridepeste-hotare/?source=hirkereso>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

support and concrete action from the Romanian state. In the short term, the most important consequences of the above are emigration and assimilation of Romanians. In the long run, the pressure on the identarian element will lead to a decrease in the number of Romanians and eventually to their disappearance from the two counties.

EMIGRATION

Threats to societal security can be understood through the evolution of migration. Overall, the population of Harghita and Covasna seems relatively more fixed in the territory, but if we could extrapolate the results of the research conducted by CESPE in Toplița in 2012–2013, we could show that more than half of the Romanian population is affected by emigration¹⁷⁶. Older Hungarian quantitative studies show that the Romanian population has twice the migration coefficient of the Hungarian population¹⁷⁷. We understand from this that in terms of actual emigration and the desire to emigrate, the Magyars are less affected than the Romanians¹⁷⁸.

ETHNIC SUBSUMPTION: ASSIMILATION OF ROMANIANS THROUGH MIXED MARRIAGES

The *ethnic subsumption* is another factor one should take into consideration, due to the fact that it leads to weakening the structural identity of Romanians, which inhabit the area in question. Through ethnic subsumption we understand:

“the willingness of Romanian speakers to ‘give away’ their identity, especially through marriage. The phenomenon takes the form of ethnic dissolution where the Romanian community is already weakened, being incapable of demographic and social resistance, etc”¹⁷⁹.

Earlier studies on the subject show that Romanians:

“(...) have a double coefficient of ethnic subsumption, *i.e.*, willingness to cross the border of their own identity through marriage”¹⁸⁰.

¹⁷⁶ Centrul European pentru Studii în Probleme Etnice al Academiei Române, *Toplița – starea comunității. Raport parțial preliminar*, 2013, Ms., p. 11.

¹⁷⁷ Csata István, Kiss Tamás, *Perspective demografice în județul Harghita. Prognosticul divizării regionale a populației de etnie maghiară, romă și română*, s.a., Ms. p. 43.

¹⁷⁸ Radu Baltasiu, *Direcții de presiune cu relevanță demografică. Situația demografică în Harghita și Covasna. Resuscitarea biopoliticii maghiare în centrul României*, 2019, Ms, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ “(...) disponibilitatea vorbitorilor de limbă română de a-și “dărui” identitatea, în special prin căsătorie. Fenomenul ia forma dizolvării etnice acolo unde comunitatea românească este deja slăbită, fiind incapabilă de concentrare demografică, socială etc.” in Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru, Ovidiana Bulumac, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁸⁰ “(...) au un coeficient dublu de subsumare etnică, adică de disponibilitate de a trece frontiera propriei identități prin căsătorie”, *Ibid.*, p. 66.

According to the 2002 census, Romanian women are more likely to “give away their identity”¹⁸¹ through marriage, in comparison to Hungarian and Roma women. Most mixed marriages are those in which the husband is Hungarian, and the wife is Romanian. Thus, the number of marriages between a Hungarian man and a Romanian woman is about 14 times higher¹⁸² than the number of marriages between a Romanian man and a Hungarian woman. Also, the number of marriages between a Hungarian man and a Romanian woman is 50 times¹⁸³ higher than that between a Hungarian man and a Roma woman. These statistics demonstrate that the Hungarian men are preeminently looking for connections with Romanian women, essentially because Romanian women are more willing to create multicultural marital commitments, while Roma ethnical women are less interested in mixed marriages.

A WORRYING PROGNOSIS

According to the 2011 census, in only two of the nine municipalities and towns in Harghita the Romanians are the majority of the population, particularly Toplița (68%) and Bălan (58%). However, considerable decreases from 2002 to the 2011 have been recorded, of 3 and 6% (Toplița: 71.10% and Bălan: 64.81%). In the rural areas of Harghita the majority of the population is also Hungarian: in 49 out of the 58 localities Hungarians represent more than 80% of the population. We note that Romanians represent 31 of the 58 communes, less than 1% of the local population. Simultaneously, there are fewer Romanians than Roma, from which we can deduce that Romanians living in the countryside are the ethnic group most likely to disappear, either because of emigration or assimilation. If the numbers continue to fall in the 31 communes with less than 1% Romanians, by the next census the Romanians will disappear completely.

According to the same 2011 census, in the urban area of Covasna, Hungarians hold most of the population in four of the five municipalities and towns. Compared to the 2002 census, the Hungarian population has decreased slightly but does not exceed 2% on average. The only town where Romanians are in the majority is Întorsura Buzăului, where the decrease recorded is twice as large from one census to another, i.e., about 4% (95.90% in 2011 compared to 99.18% in 2002). In Covasna, out of the 40 communes analyzed, in only five Romanians are in the majority. Hungarians, on the other hand, are in the majority in 33 of the 40 communes (percentage score 12.5% to 82.5%).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁸² Own calculations based on data provided by: INSE, 2002, “Vol. IV. Tab. 29. Nuclee familiale pe tipuri, după etnia persoanelor care le alcătuiesc, pe medii de rezidență”, Available at: <https://insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t29.pdf>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

In other words, there are about 7 times more Hungarian majority municipalities than Romanian ones. Moreover, in 27 of the 33 communes inhabited predominantly by Hungarians, they represent more than 80% of the population. Another aspect that highlights the fact that Romanians are the ethnic group more prone to disappear from the study area is the number of communes where Romanians have percentages below 10%: 27 in number, while Hungarians have only 4 (the number of communes where Romanians are below 10% is four times higher than the Hungarian ones). The number of communes where Romanians are less than 1% is twice as high as those where Hungarians are less than 1%. That being said, it is plausible that until the next census, those 6 communes in which Romanians represent just 1% of the population, to be 100% settled by Hungarians.

CONCLUSIONS

Societal insecurity refers to threats that affect the cultural reproduction of a social group. This type of insecurity 'dilutes' the sense of belonging to a larger collectivity. In other words, societal insecurity takes the form of distrust in public institutions. It also creates a sense of social injustice and a feeling of abandonment. Myths, symbols, and rituals make up the collective identity. They must be protected and guaranteed by certain state institutions. To talk about social justice, people must first trust these institutions. Finally, for this mechanism to work, institutions must gain people's trust. The case of the Romanian community in the Harghita – Covasna area is illustrative of this perspective.

This study concluded that the societal security of the Romanians in the Harghita – Covasna area is threatened by the active involvement of the Hungarian state. However, the societal security of Romanians is even more affected by the non-involvement of the Romanian state in solving the problems faced by Romanians.

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THE IGNORED ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPTS OF PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION

Mihail Ungheanu¹⁸⁴

ABSTRACT

The related concepts of progress, development, or evolution seem to be the expression of pure modern rationality, of science. The present paper intends to show that these concepts have another root that can be found in the realm of myth, of occult theology, or mythology. The transformist point of view can be found in Heraclitus from Efesus or in Hinduism, but also in hermetic philosophy or the Kabbalah or even alchemy. All these points of view have been synthesized and expressed in Hegel's work and through Hegel they got to be present in Marxism. The role of the state is now conflated with the role of the divine Redeemer. Politics gets a new meaning. The fact that progress and evolution have become indisputable dogmas and carry such an import is to find in the religious roots thereof and the view on man as the self-deifying agent.

Keywords: evolution, Hegel, philosophy of history, progress.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the First World War, some people were able to unite themselves in a national state and were free to build their own culture, their society after being subjugated by other people and states. The Romanians got their national state, united for the first time, now able to speak and create in their mother-tongue without fear of being disenfranchised of their rights because of their culture, ethnicity, for belonging to the Orthodox Church, and so on.

One of the greatest minds, the sociologist Dimitrie Gusti thought that the age of the state as an instrument of nations had arisen and that the state will ensure the development of nations¹⁸⁵. The state had ceased to be the instrument used by different groups to attain different ends. The experience of the Second World War, and also the experiences of communism – one of the real expressions of the despotic and demonic ideology which these days is known under the name of social justice – had proven him to be wrong. According to his method, science – sociology in his case – is a practice that should be used to know the social reality of

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¹⁸⁵ Dimitrie Gusti, *Cunoaștere și acțiune în serviciul națiunii*, Vol.1–2, București, Fundația Culturală Regală Principele Carol, s.a.

the Romanian people (in his case), his method being called sociological monography. The idea was that a man of science fulfills or has to fulfill a function of serving the people and not some abstract ideals. Science, social or not has the function to improve and to better the lives of the people that live in a country. Any reform has to accept the presuppositions that the spiritual and cultural reality of a particular people offer. Political and social reform has to come from reality and not from top to bottom. Science is not confined only to understanding, explaining, and describing the facts, but should, based upon the knowledge of the social reality, try to elaborate some normative ideas that should be realized in reality with the help of politics. Sociology, Ethics, and Politics are the three main sciences.

In a certain sense, Gusti's conception about science, ethics and politics – seen as aspects of the same system of understanding the world – could be seen as a kind of social engineering, but not as radical as communism, or what it is called these days progressivism. It is more or less what Pierre-Andre Taguieff calls *melioroisme*¹⁸⁶. But in this case, the improvement of the life of a people is not based on the Manichean distinction between guilty and innocent, on identifying the enemy and his eradication. Progress or the ideology of progress has at its core the extrapolation of successes in the realm of science and technology, which are observable to the whole realm of social and political existence.

According to this view, these successes will lead necessarily to a betterment of human existence, to the realization of human values such as justice, truth, rationality, freedom either by some peoples or by the whole of humanity. This view of history and society is about bringing about the goals of human existence, which may lead to proclaim the coming of the end of history or of proclaiming the age of perfect society; these views presuppose that different orders of value can be accomplished at the same time, that there are no contradictions between them, etc. It is postulated that these values are interconnected and that their progress is a harmonious one and will produce the general advancement and betterment of the civilization¹⁸⁷. The movement of progress takes place automatically. To state the existence of progress means to state that there is a global meaning of history, a unique direction thereof, imagined as an infinite or very long process of betterment of human existence¹⁸⁸.

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The System of Ethics and Politics envisaged by Gusti is not based on the idea that the improvement of a country implies the demonization of entire categories of people (aristocracy, jews, men or white people, as the present-day fake anti-racism

¹⁸⁶ Pierre-André Taguieff, *Le sens du progrès*, Paris, Flammarion, 2004.

¹⁸⁷ Pierre-André Taguieff, *L'effacement de l'avenir*, Paris, Galilée, Paris 2000, p. 361.

¹⁸⁸ Pierre-André Taguieff, *Le sens du progrès*, p. 95.

states) and ascribing an ontological evil to their existence as such (gender violence, whiteness, etc. being such a conception that assigns collective guilt and makes guilt independent of anything done by a member of the demonize category). Radical ideas about the means and ways to achieve the improvement or social progress that demonize entire categories of people or that are akin to eugenics, for example achieving equality between genders by taking out certain characteristics of human beings like independent thinking (a feature of the so-called toxic masculinity) or by jettisoning the whole cultural heritage because it is the expression of toxic people (whites), abolishing private property are not included in Gusti's understanding of ethics and the science of politics.

Like many modern or contemporary thinkers, he made use of the idea of progress. This idea, as other thinkers have argued, is an *idée-force* of modernity (Taguieff), which may possess features akin to a mythical idea or conviction. This idea is so pervasive that even people that find themselves in opposite positions, or what do not fall in the category of progressivism entertain it. Electoral or political discourses from people like Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, or Donald Trump do have something in common. They speak about a better or bright future. People that do not or not considered as progressive are being labeled as being on the wrong side of history. In the Democratic Party, when candidates fight to be appointed to become candidates for the presidency, each other accuses the other of being a fake progressive, of being not a true progressive. This point of view presupposes that change in history is unidirectional, that it can go from worse to better¹⁸⁹. Even someone that is not considered to belong to the progressivist party, a deplorable such as the former President Trump stated that the USA is at the beginning of a new millennium and that it looks to the future. His listeners should think and dream big, and that the time is the time to unlock the mysteries of space, to free Earth of disease, etc.¹⁹⁰. This is clearly a speech full of progressivist ideas, an expression of this typical modern view.

For the French philosopher Pierre-Andre Taguieff, the idea of progress is a modern one, built up to counter nostalgia or the myth of decadence. One of its roots lies in Francis Bacon's work, in his conception of science as a cumulative process and of knowledge as power. Though this statement may partially be correct, this paper argues that the idea of progress and the correlative idea of evolution is not so modern at all, and can be found in some religious contexts and writings. One can see the sources thereof when one tries to understand the theological and mythical import of Hegel's Work, import that is the synthesis of some strains of occult theologies, and elements of Neoplatonism, Christianity, Gnosticism, etc.¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁹ Matthew B. Slaboch, *A road to nowhere. The Idea of Progress and its critics* (epub), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018, p. 8.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁹¹ Glenn Alexander Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2001.

The main and common denominator in some of those, in the hermetic tradition and the *Kabbalah*, is the idea that existence as such, even God – partially or in his entirety, is becoming: God's life is becoming and so is the world which is seen as a necessary part of this becoming. More than that all creation and existences are in their ultimate substrate divine. Man is the last product of this process of self-actualization and self-knowledge of the Godhead therein God attains self-knowledge and complete self-conscience: this is process through which man knows Nature and himself, since he is integral part thereof; it is also the process in which God knows himself as he expresses himself in Nature through man's doing. In this way, God becomes Spirit or *Geist* in Hegel. The spirits divide itself and objectifies itself as Nature and in acquiring the knowledge on Nature as the expression of itself, the God comes to itself and acquires self-knowledge. This self-knowledge is the cancelation of alterity (this is what Hegel calls *Idealität des Geistes*); Nature as Spirit is the representation of the Absolute Idea. In Nature, God appears in the form of different, disjoint, particular beings – *in Elemente des Aufeinander*¹⁹².

For example, hermeticism conception of God sees him as deficient, as something or someone that needs completion, and man and man's knowledge are necessary for God to attain this state of perfection¹⁹³. Progress or evolution is this process through which God attains completion or becomes God in the fullest sense. As such, this is a necessary movement, therefore progress/evolution is necessary. God is still transcendent but needs the world and man to complete himself. God needs man to recognize him and to acknowledge him and vice-versa. This is not unlike the dialectics between master and servant in Hegel's work. God wishes to be known by his greatest creation, man. The end of man, the completion and perfection of his existence is the knowledge of God whereby man realizes God's need to be recognized. The whole creation has as its purpose the need for self-knowledge of both God and man. This is not so innocent as it seems. The practitioner of hermeticism has a practical purpose in his mind which implies the substitution of the love for wisdom with the lust for power. Achieving total knowledge and getting to wield Godlike powers¹⁹⁴. Hegel's work represents a synthesis of different such currents. Gnosticism does not imply that God needs man to know and acknowledge him. The world is a fallen state or the product of an incompetent deity, therefore there is no such thing as progress and evolution.

Nevertheless, salvation in hermeticism is attainable through knowledge and understanding, through gnosis. It is also a knowledge that is reserved for an elite, the teacher had to keep his knowledge secret from the multitude. It is not a salvation that is offered by a divine Savior for everyone. It is hard work and implies or produces a change in the one who got enlightened. Philosophy is for

¹⁹² G.W.F.Hegel, *Enzyklopedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften.Grundrisse*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, vol. 3, 1979, p. 18.

¹⁹³ Glenn Alexander Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

living as Hegel states. Words carry a kind of existential empowerment, thus expressing a kind of complete speech or encyclopedic discourse.

When acquired, this discourse would change and transform the whole of reality and empower the life of the one who achieved it. It is a performative discourse. In its modern form, this kind of thinking is expressed by the work of Hegel. The hermetic tradition, as Hegel's philosophy, believe that God is knowable. Hegel rejects the negative theology of traditional Christianity. God can be known and acquires self-knowledge and consciousness in the concept. For hermeticism too, god can be known in a piecemeal fashion and express his existence in different modi or moments. The cosmos is a unity not just a collection of unrelated objects and knowing one-self implies knowing the whole and vice-versa. Everything in the world is internally related. For Hegel Nature is an expression of God, God set himself apart from himself, the nature becoming a kind of mirror in which God sees himself. Man, which belongs to nature, therefore to a manifestation of God through knowledge of nature, comes to know God. This process is a circle, the end thereof being the reconciliation, the coming back of God to himself. True philosophy is the actualization of the Absolute Spirit. The main goal of philosophy is to capture the whole of reality in a complete, circular speech that transforms the human person. The goal thereof is the unification with God. Philosophical speech is therefore performative and accomplishes this goal.

This way to see things is ancient. It is not peculiar to Hegel, but to older traditions like the hermetic, kabbalistic, or alchemical one. All of those have added something to Hegel's work. There are also Gnostic and Neoplatonic sources for his endeavor. According to the Neoplatonic frame of thought, nature and every living being represents in a sense the self-development and differentiation of the One, though this can't be construed as progress but more as a loss of being, as degradation. It is the opposite paradigm to the Hermetic one. Another input to Hegel's work comes from Meister Eckhart and his mystical theology. The insight present in the German mystic depicts God as not being complete without creation, an insight that does not fit the biblical narrative but fits Hegel's. God must create to actualize his nature. This implies or can imply an eternal creation whereby the freedom of God to choose or not to choose to create is denied, etc. Such a view can be attributed to the philosophical and pagan notion of absolute divine simplicity, which states that there are no real distinctions in God, that God equals his essence, etc. Since God's essence is necessary and no internal real distinction can be found, then even the act of creation is eternal. To this view comes the idea of a dialectical relationship to the world, God is good, the world is necessarily bad, etc. This divine simplicity in such a form is not present in Hegel, but somehow the idea of creation as a necessity of God's existence got into his work. Nevertheless, since there are occult sources for his work it might be speculate that it got it by assimilating them into his thought.

A good example of such a philosophy is the one of Sebastian Franck that holds that in each man an ember of God is present, that God is what he reveals himself to be, God is self-manifestation and self-revelation, etc. Another source which influenced Hegel is the *Theologica Germanica* – that influenced Martin Luther – work that states that God is dependent upon man to redeem nature, that man is the redeemer of nature, but first, he must come to know God. God is All and must be all, God is a whole, and evil comes to be when man breaks with the whole (this is a break with Christianity, wherein evil is not an existence per se but a movement of the will. It is a view related to the conception that evil equals falling in multiplicity and distinction). Man contains in itself the characteristics of all creation, and man entails and enfolds the essence of all things.

Another important source for Hegel's philosophical conception of God is Jakob Böhme's work. For the German mystic from Görlitz, reality is not characterized by a movement towards God. God in itself is a process of God becoming God. This is a necessary process, which is set forth by contradictions inside the Godhead, between what he calls the seventh spirits or seven source spirits. God is *der Ungrund*, a dark nature, an abyss that through the process of becoming, fueled by inner and dialectical conflicts comes to his fulfillment, a concrete form, which Böhme calls a body. It is the expression of the process of self-expression. All things come to be fully specified, including God – *Geistesleiblichkeit* in the terms of the pietist Oetinger. God ceases to be a self-contained, self-absorbed center (which as one of the origin-spirits is evil, Lucifer). The sour-spirit, the spirit of isolation, the selfishness that everything displays. In a sense, if God is to get out of himself and accomplish self-actualization, he must go through conflict. Evil is a part thereof. God gets out of himself, objectivates himself as Nature, and afterward comes back to himself.

The myth of the fall is also reinterpreted. In paradise, man enjoys God in an unthinking unity that he has to break to become himself. Alienating himself from God, man can attain a higher state, and return to God in full consciousness of his nature and the nature of God. Evil is, therefore, necessary and a component of the good and of progress/evolution. At the end of this process, man gains his perfection and so does God. This is called self-awareness and closure. History has therefore a direction and, this may vary according to the variants of this view, man can speed up or set forth the necessary process that will achieve this sought perfection. Doing evil and evil as such are justified. It is unavoidable. And since only a few people are privy to this kind of knowledge and have access to the mind of God and the rules that govern His becoming, the conception that they know how to lead this process is not far-fetched. And since evil is necessary and contributes to the good of mankind, every kind of wrong-doing can be justified and seen as an act through which man and God achieve the self-awareness and self-knowledge that lead to their actualization. The basis for the myth of progress is therefore laid down and of justification of totalitarian and terror policies that accompany them. Eliminating the

enemies of progress is a quasi-automatic process, there is no real responsibility for this action because both of the parts implied in the struggle are forms or manifestations of God. This self-becoming of God is a temporal process and the latest apparitions in the realm of life in temporal order, these are therefore better embodiment or actualizations of the divine. They are stations which are nearer to the goal of the self-manifestation of the Godhead. These expressions can fight each other, struggle belongs to God itself, and maybe reconciled in a superior form that is being born in this process.

HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. ABOLISHING OTHERNESS

Philosophy, in Hegel's understanding, is not creative. It just gives a formulation of something that I already present from the beginning of the world or eternity. It is an expression of this primordial wisdom, a recollection and the reenactment of the whole process of self-manifestation of the Godhead. It is the Hegelian version of the hermetic *philosophia perennis*¹⁹⁵. Speculative philosophy is the fully adequate, fully conscious expression thereof. What Böhme teaches about the fall of man, is accepted by Hegel. Creation and fall are seen as necessary to the whole process. Man must be brought back to unity with the divine ground of being but in a fully self-conscious mode. In a sense, man is God since there is no real ontological difference between them. Man can know God. There is a goal of history, a positive one, and everything has sense through the lenses of this conception. Mankind has a privileged access to this process, he can become aware of it and become God, getting God-like power and even can take the lead of the whole thing. In Hegel's work, speculative philosophy is the main activity through which the recollection of God's becoming and is the place wherein the Absolute comes into being. Through speculation the Idea (God) becomes for itself, God achieving thereby self-awareness and completion¹⁹⁶. This the Absolute, the self-actualized divine. Every individual belongs to a chain of being, of necessity and, according to Hegel, each individual that becomes aware of his goal of this whole process learns how to articulate this knowledge in the circular magic speech. Mentioned earlier. This knowledge and this discourse set the respective individual above this process of suffering and conflict, of struggle. This is accessible only through philosophy, Hegel's speculative philosophy. Access to this power is gained through the use of imagination. This knowledge gives form to the Absolute itself. The complete discourse on Absolute is the Absolute itself¹⁹⁷. Such a philosophy can be rightly seen as demonic.

The spirit is the final term of this process. Mankind or spirit represents the awareness of the identity between the whole process in Nature and the self-

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 85–86.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

knowledge the divine I attained in humans. The whole process wouldn't be possible without opposition. This was acknowledged by Boehme, that selfhood develops only when it meets opposition. This opposition is to be found for God in god, without opposition the self – human or divine won't come back. Returning to itself requires opposition from something. But, in the case exposed here, one of the ways the self relates to the other is its wish or urge to annihilate otherness. The activity of the Spirit is made from *Idealität*, from different ways to bring back into his interiority of the external objectivation of his. This makes the Spirit to be Spirit, a complete simple and universal I¹⁹⁸.

The urge of complete mastery or annihilation of the other is the root of the process described in detail by Hegel in his *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, but it is present in all of his work. This is also true of man, since man is a will and an I, also a particular expression of the Spirit. The drive is to abolish the divide b and distinction between subject and object and to exalt oneself above everything else. Even the simple perception of the multitude deprives it of its alterity, whilst being impressed with the universality and simplicity of the Spirit. The Spirit as religious consciousness penetrates through the apparent independent existences of things to the level of the inner power that holds the things together until it reaches the way the Idea shows itself into them. That is the act of philosophical thinking¹⁹⁹. This is the accomplishment of the Spirit qua Absolute Spirit, the achievement of idealization. The Spirit acquires in his way his concrete form. It is the withdrawal of substance or being from the world into the subject, thereby the subject becomes the center around which all the world flows²⁰⁰. The Spirit makes the world conform to its Idea. The Spirit is the infinite affirmation of himself and the absolute negation of alterity, which was the exterior objectivation of an inner plurality. This transformation or cancelation of the otherness can be brought about only the grasp of the whole through a System of Science. Through this process, the true self, the true individual, true substance, and true God are actualized. Cognition and knowledge do just that. And freedom is also possible only through the annihilation of otherness.

True knowledge, Absolute Knowledge means to grasp the only individual that is, the Absolute. In the Absolute Spirit, both the subjective and objective moments of the Spirit are achieved, thus expressing the absolute truth. The Spirit is both Manifestation, Self-Revelation and the content thereof. Form and content. The activity of the Absolute Spirit is orientated and exercised upon himself, not on

¹⁹⁸ “Alle Tätigkeiten des Geistes sind nichts als verschiedene Weisen der Zurückführung des Äußerlichen zu der Innerlichkeit welche der Geist selbst ist, und nur durch diese Zurückführung, durch diese Idealisierung oder Assimilation des Äußerlichen wird und ist er Geist.” (“Toate activitățile spiritului nu sunt decât moduri diferite de aducere înapoi la sursă a exteriorului la interioritatea care este însăși spiritul. Numai prin această aducere înapoi, prin această idealizare sau asimilare a ceea ce este exterior, Spiritul este și devine Spirit”), in G.W.F. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁰⁰ Glenn Alexander Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

something exterior because it is not exterior. The essence of the Spirit is freedom, the absolute negative identity with himself, absolute independence, absolute self-relation, *das Sichaufsichselbstbeziehen*. This freedom is not just from Another, but freedom realized in Another independence from the Other²⁰¹. This freedom is an activity that entails the overcoming and assimilation of the otherness. The existence of otherness or the Other is the essence of alienation. This happens when Nature is not understood as being the product of the Spirit. Alienation exists wherever there are otherness or external determinations that may act upon the Spirit, that impose limits to it, and are not recognized as the result of the activity of the Spirit.

Along these lines of thinking differences between peoples, objective determination, differentiation between man and woman appear as products of the Spirit that is present in man, therefore of man. It is easy to see how upon this insight the idea that certain distinctions and determination that have and still govern the life of mankind can be interpreted as being man-made or social construction, as fictions intended to oppress and alienate. For the Absolute Spirit to be actualize completely, the limit – *die Schranke* – which Nature represents must be abolished (must be recognized as being posited by the Spirit himself to make possible the dialectical process of his becoming). All the particular limits have to be abolished. The Absolute Spirit means abolishing everything that is not itself. God comes to itself, becomes itself only in the State. In the state, the Spirit comes to be free in the world he posits, in a moral world – *sittliche Welt*²⁰², and afterward in religion, art and philosophy.

All desire strives after self-consciousness and strives after the conflict with the self. It seeks conflict. This is what Jakob Böhme called Evil. The desire to annihilate the other and to absolutize one's self²⁰³. The whole becoming is thus caused and furthers by this process and dark urge. The highest and only substance and only individual, the object of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* is this urge. It is the truth, it is the Logos. It is the Unconditioned, an organic totality, an individual, self-sustaining, determined by nothing. His inner moments make up the whole being, it is a system of the world²⁰⁴. There are other systems of thought related to the Hegelian paradigm, *Kabbalah* is one of them. It is described as a system of oral revelation passed down from God to Moses, but in reality, is more of a mish-mash of early Jewish mysticism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, or even Hermetism. This strain of thought was present in Hegel²⁰⁵.

According to Gershom Scholem²⁰⁶, the idea of God embraced by the *Kabbalah* is akin to process philosophy, God is in itself a dynamic process, that is becoming. The root of the name Yahweh is supposed to mean becoming. Not all

²⁰¹ G.W.F. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁰³ Glenn Alexander Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

²⁰⁶ Mentioned in Glenn Alexander Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

the strains of the Kabbalah accept the idea that God is made manifest in his entirety, most of them holding to the idea that it has a transcendent aspect. For the peculiar understanding of Kabbalah that Isaac Luria espouses *En-Sof* – plays the same role as the *Ungrund* of Böhme. Creation is the external aspect of something that talks places in God. The Infinite. *En-Sof* is supposed to develop into a true subject, even though at the beginning it is neither subject nor object. God wills to see God, God wills to see Himself, to objectivize Himself to himself, to achieve perfect self-knowledge of Himself²⁰⁷.

As in Hegel, where the I denotes the self-relation of God through man, whereby man is the only being that reduplicates itself in the way that allows him to be the universal that is for the universal, the last Sephirot (which means number, source; Melkuth, Shekinah, the Presence of God) from the Tree of Life is construed as being the I of God. And sometimes the sephiroths that make up the Tree of Life are considered as belonging to God's essence. They are moments of the process of becoming that is God. Just like in Böhme and Hegel one of these moments Gevurah/Din or the Wrath of God can be seen as the source of Evil, when it ceases to be tempered, balanced by other sephiroths. And just as Hegel conceives of the state, especially the Prussian state as the embodiment and manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, then Shekinah is thought of God as embodied in the "community of Israel." This process of manifestation and self-revelation is seen, as in Hegel, in a dialectic and triadic way.

Even the hermeneutics applied to the revelation proceeds in a dialectical manner, Hegel's system is also pervaded by triadic structures, after two opposed verses the third reconciling them. Another belief that is in harmony with Hegel's conception is the idea that the manipulating of Adam's language will lead to the recollection/recovery of the wisdom lost with the Fall²⁰⁸.

Speculative philosophy, philosophy as such can achieve something that might be regarded as magic straight from an occult book. Through philosophy one can achieve in a conscious way a state wherein the subject arises over space and time; the external relationships are abolished, that is the otherness is negated. Thus, the world becomes something that is understood and willed. This is another aspect of the very modern wish to remake and reengineer the world, nature, and humanity. Philosophy is therefore understood as a higher type of magic, absolute magic²⁰⁹; magic being a kind of technology that intends to confer control over the world. Philosophy is a technocracy, that tries to rebuild Adam Kadom, the prelapsarian man.

Hegel's philosophy reassembles in some aspect the kabbalistic conception of Isaac Luria. God is also encompassed in His process of Self-Becoming of giving birth to Himself. All the realms of being, even the lowest are connected to the highest and in this process of self-becoming, wherein evil and the fall play a role,

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

and so does man. The self-becoming process of God doesn't stop at God but parts of it are about man. The role of the man is to perfect themselves, to restore the nature of Adam Kadom, to redeem the fallen world²¹⁰. As the Kabbalah sees the community of Israel as embodying the Presence of God, so Hegel, and before him in Western Christianity, Joachim da Fiore see the community of worshippers as embodying God, the presence of God; this view is the one of the pietists with whom Hegel was acquainted well, since he dwelled among the Swabian pietist of his time. No intermediary then between man and God, whereby the community of worshippers is being assigned the power to achieve knowledge of God and salvation without any help. The Kingdom of the Spirit is identified with the community of worshippers. Community is existing Spirit and the Spirit is God existing as community. This is the stage of self-actualization, of achieving human freedom. The absolute state is too something along these lines: the state is also Objective Spirit, participating in the life of the state means to participate in the life of God, though basically everything and everyone is God, a form of his self-expression that can be put on an evolutionary scale.

CONCLUSIONS

In this context, the function of the state might see in another way as normally assumed. The state, or/and big corporations could be considered as the instrument through which evolution can be achieved or helped to attain the supposed desired result, a fully immanentized eschaton, the perfection of humankind – when God falls out of the picture or when mankind it is seen as a vessel for a divine essence. The state is not an instrument meant to promote the wealth of a national community but an instrument that favors and promotes the will to power, used by certain groups to further their agendas. And each of the states, even under the guise of a democratic state, has extended even further now than under communism. The state must produce in human beings a change of heart that allows for the necessary progress to take place. According to the Hegelian framework in the individual the same process that takes place in history must take place too so that the envisaged eschaton arrive. Absolute Spirit and the human spirit are driven by the urge to abolish heterogeneity, by abolishing Otherness, which is basically alienation.

The state now wants to punish feelings that people may have or have not. Otherness is conceived in this Hegelian framework as oppressive since it is alienation, that is the Spirit that posits itself as Another and forgets that it is Another. Objective determinations are not determinations at all, they are the projection of the Spirit, the human spirit in philosophical and social frameworks inspired by Hegel. The fact that they impose themselves on the human spirit and appear as objective, as independent from him is interpreted as oppression. The

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

sentiment is stronger when this idea is strengthened by another Hegelian idea, namely that the human spirit is in itself God or, as in Gnosticism, or kabbalism, the human spirit is seen as a part of the divine, not merely an image and semblance thereof. In political and social terms, this view translates into a totalitarian view of existence, wherein some categories of humans will be seen as evil, as causes for the unhappiness that exists in a certain society. Distrust and hate of Otherness become the rule. Emancipation is the return to unity, even though is not primordial unity. It entails the abolition of everything that is a hindrance to the much-sought reunification, of distinctions or self-sustaining differences. But otherness disappears. And also, there is a sentiment of omnipotence associated with this, omnipotence that can be seen to be achieved after the emancipation process.

Progress, evolution, and alienation have therefore theological and occult roots. The idea of alienation s Hegel expresses it implies that all objective determinations of our being are really subjective, product of the Spirit that inhabits and makes out man. Moreover, in his conception evil is justified, being a part of the process of self-becoming of God and therefore sin. Though in this understanding of God the meaning of sin is not the traditional one. It becomes a necessary condition for evolution and progress. So does evil. And since overcoming and abolishing difference and Otherness is the way to attain the final reconciliation, then evil acts can be justified.

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THE NOTION OF DIASPORA: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND MISSIONARY PARADIGM

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ABSTRACT

As the diaspora concept has overgrown, so has its meaning spread to host different intellectual, cultural and political agendas. This concept has led to a so-called diaspora's spillage – a spillage of term's meanings in the semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space. An attempt was made to summarize the extensively used theoretical approaches with regard to the term's content. On the basis of these theoretical landmarks, we want to further illustrate an enhanced type of community which is being build based on typical diaspora elements. The scope of the paper is not to approach in a comprehensive way a Romanian orthodox community of diaspora as it is virtually impossible in a single paper, but to illustrate a diaspora structure. The research method is theoretical (fundamental), "the pure research" for theoretical, conceptual development and shall be based on making abstract ideas. We have concluded that: from a categorial point of view, the Italy's orthodox community embodies defining characteristics for an economical oriented diaspora. This community is going through pressure felt by every diaspora community: adapting to the new conditions, temptation of assimilation and at times the problematic relations with the host society. On the other hand, from an ecclesial perspective, Romanian Orthodox Bishopric from Italia co-exists in the same area along with other parallel Orthodox jurisdictions conducted on ethnic records used to find common ways of societal expression.

Keywords: concept, community, communion, diaspora, Christianity, mission.

DIASPORA. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The debate on diaspora and its meanings, significance, defining elements and implications has witnessed a real boom in the last decades. As the concept has overgrown, so did its meaning spread to host different intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the services it was enlisted for. The concept has led to a so-called *diaspora's spillage* – a spillage of term's meanings in the semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space²¹².

The *Diaspora* concept derives from Greek and is founded on the translation of the Aramaic word (*Galut*). It is based on the verb *speiro* (to cut) and the prefix

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²¹² See widely Rober Brubaker's point of view in *The "diaspora" diaspora*, in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2005, p. 1.

dia (on) in Ancient Greek (this term referred to migration and colonization). In Aramaic the term initially referred to Jewish colonization outside Palestine after Babylonian slavery, but it has also acquired a new general connotation which designates people who set away from the settlements of ancestors²¹³.

According to Gabriel Sheffer, the first theory about diaspora originated with Amstrong's paper entitled "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas" published in *American Political Sciences Review* in 1976²¹⁴. In his book entitled *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, Sheffer argued that using the diaspora concept just for the Jewish nation is wrong because there may have been other people before, such as the Nabataeans, Phoenicians, or Assyrians. Furthermore, during the second half of the 19th century, several groups very similar to the Jewish diaspora appeared in Europe, such as the Greek or Chinese. From this point of view, Sheffer proposes three criteria according to which he defines the diaspora concept:

1. maintaining and developing own collective identities in the people's diaspora;
2. the existence of an internal organization distinct from those existing in the country of origin or the host country;
3. significant contacts with the motherland: real (trips) or symbolic contacts as in the saying: "next year in Jerusalem" at the end of the Easter prayer²¹⁵.

More recently, in his book entitled *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*²¹⁶, Robin Cohen went on to emphasize the lack of sufficient theorizing in publications about the diaspora and suggested that the "Jewish archetype" may be a basis for reflection. In his vision, the following common features belong to the diaspora:

1. Spillage / leaving the mother earth, often traumatic, in two or more foreign regions;
2. Alternatively, expansion in search of a job, in search of trade or of other colonial ambitions;
3. A collective memory and a myth about the originating land that includes the location, history and achievements;
4. The idealization of a supposed ancestral home and a collective commitment to maintain it, restore it, provide security and prosperity even through creation;
5. Development of shares of return to gain collective approval;
6. A strong ethnic group, with a long-held conscience based on a distinctive sense, a common history and a common faith;

²¹³ Lisa Anteby-Yemini & William Berthomière, Diaspora: A Look Back on a Concept, in *Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem*, 16/ 2005, pp. 262–270.

²¹⁴ Mohamed Dorai, *La circulation migratoire*, in *Migrations etudes*, no. 84, dec., 1998.

²¹⁵ Gabriel Sheffer, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, Saint Martin Press, New York, 1986.

²¹⁶ Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An introduction*, UCL Press, London, 1997.

7. A problematic relationship with the host society, suggesting at least a lack of acceptance, or the possibility that another calamity will fall on the group;
8. A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members from other countries where they have settled;
9. The possibility of a distinctive but creative and enriched life of the host countries with a tolerance towards pluralism.

The list is conscientiously called “common traits” to indicate that no diaspora has all these traits. Rather, it unwinds the methodological devices and (no less than) includes important cases that are intuitively part of, or supposed to be part of the diaspora phenomenon²¹⁷.

Robin Cohen also proposed a typology based on several empirical observations consisted of four types:

1. Working diaspora
2. Imperial diaspora
3. Diaspora exchange
4. Cultural diaspora

This latter type of diaspora – the cultural diaspora, has become the most stimulating and productive one. It comes from the fact that most of the leaders were (and still tend to be) intellectuals, writers and very active in the public sphere. The discourse of the diaspora, in its cultural dimension, has reserved a large space for the term *hybridity*, used by post-modern authors to show the evolution of new social dynamics as mixed cultures.

In this field, conceptual research is developed with reference to the “traveling cultures” theorized by James Clifford²¹⁸. Cohen summed up this movement by quoting that from this perspective:

“Diasporas are positioned somewhere between *non-states* and traveling cultures due to the fact that they involve living in a nation in a physical sense but traveling in an astral or spiritual one which extends beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of the area”²¹⁹.

William Safran, one of the first authors to publish in the *Diaspora* journal and edited by Kachig Tololyan, suggests that from this point of view the term in question can be considered a “metaphorical name” and can be applied to various populations, expatriates, political refugees etc. In his papers, Safran defines the diaspora as *expatriate minority communities*:

1. which are scattered from the original *center* to at least two *peripheral* locations;
2. who maintain a *memory*, a vision or a myth of the original homeland;

²¹⁷ Robin Cohen, *Diasporas and the state: from victims to challengers*, in *International Affairs* 72 (3), July 1996, pp. 515–516.

²¹⁸ James Clifford, *Diasporas*, in *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1994.

²¹⁹ Robin Cohen, *op cit.*, p. 516.

3. who “believe that they are not – or may not be – fully accepted by the host country”;
4. who see the ancestral home as a possible place for return when the time is right;
5. who are involved in maintaining or restoring this birthplace and;
6. whose conscience and solidarity of the group are “importantly defined” by the continuous relationship with the homeland²²⁰.

During the 1990s, many typologies were proposed to understand and describe the diaspora. For example, Alain Medam proposed a typology based on a degree of cohesion and dynamism of the diaspora organization. From this perspective, Medam differentiates between “crystallized diaspora” and “fluid diaspora”²²¹.

For another specialist on this issue, Michel Bruneau, the typology must be based on a diasporic organization. He defined three major types of diasporas:

1. anteprenorial
2. religious
3. political²²².

Recently, to clarify the matter, Nicholas van Hear proposed that the diaspora should be defined based on at least three criteria:

1. cross-border presence is long-lasting, although exile is not necessarily permanent but may include movement between the motherland and the new host countries;
2. the persistence of cross-border presence, although exile is not permanently necessary, as long as the travels between the country of origin and the new home countries can develop;
3. there is a kind of exchange – social, economic, political or cultural – between or along spatially separated populations in the diaspora²²³.

Rogers Brubaker²²⁴, in an integrative effort, comes to synthesize the multitude of theoretical approaches and to conclude that there are three basic elements that remain widely understood as constituting the diaspora. Some subsets or combinations of them, weighted differently, emphasize most definitions and debates of the phenomenon. The first is the dispersal in space, the second is the orientation towards a homeland, and the third is the retention of identity. Taking into account the important change given to these elements and the various ways in which they have been interpreted provide a leverage for an analytical assessment of the diaspora’s spillage.

²²⁰ William Safran, *Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and return*, in *Diaspora*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1991; Idem, *Comparing Diasporas: A review essay*, in *Diaspora*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1999.

²²¹ Alain Medam, *Diaspora / Diasporas. Archétype et typologie*, *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, vol. 9, no 1, 1993.

²²² Michel Bruneau, *Diasporas*, Montpellier, GIP Reclus, 1995.

²²³ Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities*, UCL Press, London, 1998.

²²⁴ Roger Brubaker, *The „diaspora” diaspora*, in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2005, pp. 5–7.

DISPERSAL

This is the criterion that is most widely accepted today and also the simplest. It can be interpreted strictly as forced or traumatic dispersal and, more generally, as any dispersion in space provided that it passes through the state borders; or broadly so that it is sufficient within state borders.

Although dispersion is widely accepted as a diaspora criterion, it is not universally accepted. A substitute division defines the diaspora as “ethnic communities divided by state borders”, or “that segment of people living outside the homeland”. This allows established compact populations to be counted as diaspora even when a part of the population lives as a minority outside the ethno-national “homeland”.

ORIENTATION TOWARDS A HOMELAND

The second constituent criterion is the orientation towards a real or imaginary homeland, as a source of valuable authority, identity and loyalty. A significant change can be identified in the recent discussions. Previous discussions strongly highlighted this criterion. For example, four of the six criteria mentioned by Safran concern the orientation towards a homeland. Firstly, these include maintaining a collective memory or a myth about the homeland. Secondly, “as regards the ancient homeland as real, as the ideal home and the place to which it may eventually return”. Thirdly, “the collective commitment to maintain or restore the homeland and its security and prosperity”. Fourthly, “goes on to refer personally or indirectly to the homeland in such a way that significantly shapes its identity and solidarity”²²⁵.

RETENTION OF IDENTITY

The third criterion is what is called identity retention involving a separate maintained identity vis-à-vis the host society. Armstrong invokes Barth's seminal contribution to underline the importance of boundaries for authorities that do not have their own territorial policy:

“Obviously a diaspora is something more than a group of people who distinguish themselves through some secondary characteristics such as all people with Scottish names in Wisconsin. The diaspora deployed ... they have often constituted a separate society or a quasi-society for centuries”²²⁶.

²²⁵ William Safran, *Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and return*, in *Diaspora*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1991, pp. 83–84.

²²⁶ Mohamed Dorai, *La circulation migratoire*, in *Migrations etudes*, no. 84, dec., 1998, p. 2.

The deliberate resistance can maintain limits to the assimilation through self-applied inbreeding or other forms of self-segregation or as an unintended consequence of social exclusion.

The preservation of identity is an indispensable criterion of diaspora. This allows everyone to talk about it as a separate “community”, which is united by a distinct, active solidarity as well as dense social relations, which crosses state borders and connects diaspora’s members from different states in a single “trans-national community”.

Intense discussions also emerged in the literature on the appropriateness of using the “orthodox diaspora” concept. Maria Hammerli²²⁷ is the author who is questioning this concept. According to her, the catchphrases that fall under the issue of the orthodox diaspora is designated in the pre-synodal discussions: “the issue of the orthodox diaspora”, “the so-called orthodox diaspora”, or the mere use of the term in “...” suggests that the juxtaposition of the words *orthodoxy* and *diaspora* is considered to be rather inappropriate.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE “ORTHODOX DIASPORA”?

- a. The territory of the spillage, i.e., areas which are traditionally not Orthodox (Western Europe, America, Australia, certain parts of Asia);
- b. the orthodox in diaspora are people who are dispersed in these territories, emigrants and their descendants.
- c. an ecclesiastical state or situation which is characterized by the extension and overlapping of national church jurisdictions²²⁸.

The term “Orthodox diaspora” consists of two levels of analysis. The first is a historical and sociological reality marked by:

- migration of the orthodox population to countries that are not traditionally Orthodox;
- the creation of national diaspora in host countries;
- the potential of developing a religious diaspora clustered around the orthodox faith, a common characteristic of ethnically different emigrants.

The second level of analysis concerns the theological substance of the concept. The term diaspora, initially a religious concept related to Judaism, is used to describe the structure and sacramental life of Orthodox religious institutions outside traditional territories, aiming at the orthodox ecclesiology and canonical organization²²⁹.

²²⁷ Maria Hammerli, *Orthodox diaspora? A sociological and theological problematisation of a stock phrase*, in *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 10: 2–3, pp. 97–115.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Romanians, Greeks, Russians, and Serbs have spread all over Western Europe, especially in France, Britain, Germany and more recently in Spain and Italy. Their presence in these territories can be traced back until the 15th century (Greeks) or 17th century (Russians), but these ethnic groups only began to count demographically in the 20th century, when political and economic factors have caused more waves of emigration from people seeking a better life.

The Orthodox Church played a leading role in clotting the concerned ethnic communities and, in many cases, took over the role the state should have played in bringing together its dispersed citizens. A careful analysis of these communities reveals that among their features we can find the elements that diaspora theorists display in their studies²³⁰:

1. these populations have in most cases been deployed against the background of unpleasant circumstances;
2. the structural unit of these communities derives from the establishment of religious institutions, cultural centers, language schools and ethnically-oriented charities. The number, size and purpose of these institutions vary according to both ethnicity and the host country. These institutions are both an expression of the existence of a collective memory about the motherland and the environment for reaffirming and reclaiming this conscience which allows a perpetual reinvention of national identity.
3. The motherland remains the reference center both by its desire to return to the homeland supported by the country's interests in international lobbying, but also by directing economic resources towards the it.

From a theological and canonical perspective, the existence of ethnic groups in the diaspora and their organization of churches on ethnic grounds poses several problems. Two canonical principles²³¹ have been bumping heads when the problem of organizing the ecclesial life of emigrants has been raised. This is about the ethnic principle and the jurisdictional or territorial principle.

The ethnic principle requires that the bishops of each nation should gather into a single Church under the leadership of a primate, according to the 34 apostolic canon²³². This principle is met by the Romanian orthodox church, all Slavic churches and the oriental orthodox churches. That is why their orthodox diaspora throughout the world belong to the mother Church²³³.

On the other hand, the jurisdictional-territorial principle, according to Canon 8 of the first Ecumenical Synod²³⁴ states that it is totally unacceptable that there

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

²³¹ For a presentation of the Orthodox Church's canonical organizational principals, see Arhid. prof. dr. Ioan N. Floca, *Drept canonic ortodox*, vol. I, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1990, pp. 191–205.

²³² Arhid. prof. dr. Ioan N. Floca, *Canoanele Bisericii Ortodoxe, note și comentarii*, 1992, p. 26.

²³³ Pr. lect. univ. dr. Irimie Marga, *Principiul jurisdicțional în Biserica Ortodoxă*, în *Revista Teologică*, serie nouă, XIV (86), nr. 3, iulie–septembrie 2004, p. 61.

²³⁴ Arhid. prof. dr. Ioan N. Floca, *op. cit.* pp. 56–57.

should be two or more Orthodox jurisdictions in the same territory. This has been achieved on the spillage's territory by respecting the principle of ethnicity²³⁵.

The emergence of ethnic jurisdictions opened up the era of ecclesiological contradictions in the life of Orthodox churches that share the same territory and divide believers on grounds of nationality, culture and language. The *jurisdictions's* energies have been channeled to preserve the various national-cultural heritage – Romanian, Russian, Greek, Syrian-Lebanese, Serbian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian and so on.

To these canonical and organizational contradictions, other theological contradictions are added, especially in the ecclesiology area. For example, these refer to Orthodox Christian eschatology which links salvation not to a nation nor to a terrestrial *topos*, but to the kingdom of God, and from this point of view it is about a situation of diasporas in this world, of removal from the heavenly homeland. On the other hand, from an ecclesiological point of view, ethnicity is not a fundamental criterion of the Church, but unity is achieved by the Church around the Eucharist and the Archbishop, therefore in the local community-church. Ethnicity also calls into question the universal character of the Church²³⁶. Nor should the powerful conflicts that the issue of the canonic status of the Orthodox diaspora generates be overlooked.

Based on these theoretical landmarks, we want to show two types of Orthodox diaspora. One arising from dramatic changes of historical order, which by successive changes of borders led to the emergence of diaspora structures, mentalities and organizational forms (this is the metropolitan of Basarabia) and another that is built on specific diaspora elements (the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate in Italy).

THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITY OF THE ITALIAN BISHOPRIC. THE MISSIONARY PARADIGM

Two co-ordinates are fundamental for our development: the experience of a community that is praying and the experience of an imposed loneliness.

Neuroscience has found that we have structures called mirror neurons. How do these neurons work? When I see someone who has cut his hand, I have a pit in my stomach, I am ready for empathy because neurons are painting my mental landscape. The community is extraordinary. Inside a community, the neuronal structure helps me live what the other lives without speaking. What neuroscience

²³⁵ See Pr. prof. dr. Liviu Stan, *Ortodoxia și diaspora*, în *Ortodoxia*, XV, nr. 1, 1963, pp. 3–38; Arhid. prof. dr. Ioan N. Floca, *Diaspora ortodoxă și organizarea ei canonică, problemă pe agenda Sfântului și Marelui Sinod*, în *Revista Teologică*, serie nouă, VI (78), nr. 3–6, iulie-decembrie 1996, pp. 218–236.

²³⁶ Maria Hammerli, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112.

discovered: in 1992 it was found that when I look at a man doing things and someone photographed my brain activity, my brain looks the same as the brain of the one I look at, me doing nothing but looking, the only difference is that the last piece, the command center, is missing. (I have the cerebral aggression painted, I have the premotor cortical areas that plan the movement, but I lack the motor cortex). In the paper entitled *The Mystical Mind*²³⁷, Andrew Newberg made the research and found that no person who prayed alone had reached the intensity of mental and spiritual condition compared to when the person was in a community. Therefore, taking part in the church life improves the physical and spiritual state, and when it comes to the Romanian community in diaspora, it goes without saying that the church gives a better shape to the community.

Speaking about the Romanians who left the ancestry country to live on distant lands, we can say that they keep a living connection with those of a nation and a tribe with them precisely through their presence at the church and sometimes, by discovering or rediscovering the Church on the land where they are given to live²³⁸. Most of them came to Italy for a better life, and seeing that it is not enough to make them happy, they returned to God as the only real source of happiness. Thus, many of them discovered the Church as they were in the West, and added to the already existing communities. Other Romanians discovered the Church they had little known in Romania, and another number of Romanians continued to be present in the Church, as they had been in Romania, or perhaps even more present and aware of the treasure they found.

At first there were few Romanian Orthodox communities in Italy. They were mainly in the big conurbations: Milan (1975), Torino (1979), Firenze (1984) and Bari (1983). After the revolution in 1989, the number of Romanians who emigrated to Italy has increased, so that new parishes were formed in other cities as well. The Italian parishes belonged to the Archdiocese, and since 2001 to the Romanian Orthodox Metropolia of Western and Meridional Europe, having as archipasters his Eminence Adrian (Hritcu), until 1992, his Eminence Serafim (Joantă) of Germany, Central and Northern Europe until 1998, and his Eminence Josseph (Iosif Pop) until 2008. In June 2004, His Grace Bishop Siluan (then the vicar bishop of Metropolia mentioned above entitled Marsilianiul) was named vicar bishop for Italy where there were 34 parishes at the time²³⁹.

²³⁷ See in this regard Andrew B. Newberg's paper *The Mystical Mind*, Minneapolis, USA, 1517 Media Publishing House, 1999.

²³⁸ The main source for this part of the paper forms the documentary material published by Pr. Dionisie Rusnac, *Episcopia Ortodoxă Română a Italiei, în Autocefalie și responsabilitate*, pp. 903–912. The information was cross-checked with exact data on the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate's website. www.episcopia-italiei.it.

²³⁹ The Romanian Orthodox presence in Italy has recently become a topic of sociological research, with a PhD thesis being drawn up in this respect: Suna Gülfer Ihlamur, *The Romanian Orthodox Churches in Italy: The Construction of Romanian-Italian Transnational Orthodox Space*, Trento, 2009, p. 438, Available at: eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/74/1/PhDThesisSGI.pdf, The thesis was drawn up at the Faculty of Sociology of the University in Trento. The bibliographical elements that have been the basis of this research are found in the final bibliography of this paper.

Currently, the number of parishes on Italy's territory has reached 122 and continues to rise monthly with another five ahead²⁴⁰.

From the point of view of the categorial diaspora, the Orthodox Community in Italy embodies the defining characteristics for an economically oriented diaspora. We know that the economic side has often put a strong emphasis on some peoples' migration. In this way the Church assumes to preserve identity and cohesion at a group level, to develop and maintain the consciousness of ethnic belonging to a well-defined group, to maintain contact with the motherland and to adapt continuously to the new social and religious context. The Church is in a position to respond to new challenges that society and the economic context has. If in an economically underdeveloped society the Church faces a certain type of needs, the Church is called upon to respond to the new challenges that impose a society or better yet a society in which money come first. So that the ancient Church is called upon to restore to the normal connections of faith and norms of moral and Christian conduct which believers have to obey. The Community is going through the pressures that any community in diaspora knows: adaptation to new conditions, the temptation of assimilation and sometimes problematic relations with the host society. On the other hand, from an ecclesiastical point of view, the Romanian Orthodox Bishopric in Italy coexists in the same territory with other parallel Orthodox jurisdictions, organized on ethnic grounds which are used in an attempt to find common ways of expressing in society.

We must also note that the Orthodox faith is not a factor that clots the ethnic communities, but rather acts as an element that strengthens every ethnic community. This fact still raises ecclesiological problems since, as we well know, the Orthodox understanding of the Church is based on the principle that every Christian local community gathered around a bishop who has jurisdiction over a defined territory and presides over the Eucharist is a local manifestation of the whole body of Christ. From this perspective, the relations between the ethnic Orthodox jurisdictions that share the same territory and at the same time their relations with the mother churches, we will find enough inconsistencies that are still awaiting resolution. But even if there are certain discrepancies, certainly they will be resolved in time, or the Church will know how to manage these situations, even the most delicate when asked.

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ESSAYS

YOUTH BETWEEN DISCIPLINE AND RITUAL

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ABSTRACT

This essay highlights the importance of discipline for young people today. Discipline plays a crucial role in the formation of young people as it reduces their inflated egos. When we talk about an egocentric generation, we are automatically talking about a generation whose discipline is lacking or has been seriously damaged. Lack of discipline has serious effects, from the mental (slowing down of cognitive skills) to the physical (childhood obesity is the ideal example). The undisciplined generation has been significantly affected by the presence of the 'online' in their lives, which occupies almost all their time. Mircea Eliade argues that the solution to this problem is for young people to rediscover the sacred. It is therefore the sacred that both clarifies and disciplines young people and protects them from the dangers of an overdeveloped ego.

Keywords: piety, ego, discipline, ritual.

PIETY: TAMING OF THE YOUTH'S EGO

Piety, sociologically speaking, is a continuous manifestation of the will. On the other hand, the Holy Fathers place piety above fasting and prayer, because without obedience man can fall prey to the sin of pride, which, as we know, is the greatest of all and which “goes before the fall”²⁴³.

“Self-delight”, vain glory, or pride represents “a thinner, more diabolical form of selfishness, of detachment from the connection with God, and with fellow men as sources of love and therefore of life”²⁴⁴.

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²⁴³ Cuviosul Siluan Athonitul, *Între iadul deznădejzii și iadul smereniei*, Editura Deisis, 1996, p. 126.

²⁴⁴ “(..) încântarea omului de sine însuși, slava deșartă, mândria, hula, sunt o altă formă mai subțire, mai diavolească a egoismului, a desprinderii din legătura cu Dumnezeu și cu semenii ca izvoare ale iubirii și deci ale vieții”, in ***, *Filocalia*, Vol. 9, p. 9.

WHAT IS PIETY?

But what exactly is piety? It is a “voluntary release of selfishness”²⁴⁵. If selfishness is the one that generates fear in the case of young people, then obedience is the best “weapon” against it, because the one who obeys, believes. The one who has faith has no reason to be afraid because fear comes from the devil, and he who obeys “is like a white paper. It has nothing written on it to be taken by the devil”²⁴⁶.

THE WAR OF MAN WITH HIMSELF

The lack of piety generates a war with the Other, but one even greater, with the self. This is why St. John Climacus argues that:

“the proud need not be tempted by the devil, for he has become to himself both devil and enemy”²⁴⁷.

This double “rupture” with the mentor as well as with oneself generates an overwhelming feeling of loneliness, especially for young people. Best known as the “typical identity crisis during adolescence”, such an alienation feeling leads to isolation, and isolation eventually leads to depression²⁴⁸.

A study conducted in the late 1990`s²⁴⁹ in US showed that there are also other causes that generate such a feeling (of abandonment, loneliness) and which should be taken into account:

- the experience of parental divorce (almost half of young people with such an experience),
- the absence of parents due to overworked programs (63% of young people lived in families where no parents worked from home),
- the weakening of the relationship with the mother (only 25% of young people said that their mothers are at home when they return from school),
- “the TV mirage” (98% of young people say they spend more than 11 hours a week watching TV).

²⁴⁵ Maria Burlă, “Ascultarea este eliberare de egoism de bunăvoie”, s.a., Available at: <https://sfintititreierarhi.mmb.ro/ascultarea-este-eliberare-de-egoism-de-bunavoie>, Accessed on March 10, 2021.

²⁴⁶ “Cel ce face ascultare e ca o hârtie albă. Nu are nimic scris pe ea care să fie luat de diavol.”, Mărturie Athonită, “Despre ascultarea de părintele duhovnicesc”, 2018, Available at: <https://marturie.athonita.ro/despre-ascultarea-de-parintele-duhovnicesc/amp/>, Accessed on March 10, 2021.

²⁴⁷ “cel mândru nu are nevoie să fie ispitit de diavol, pentru că a devenit pentru el însuși și diavol și dușman”, in Noemi Noah, “Păcatul Mândriei în Viziunea Sfinților Părinți”, p. 2, Available at: <https://ro.scribd.com/document/409545057/Pacatul-Mandriei-in-Viziunea-Sfintilor-Parinti>, Accessed on March 21, 2022.

²⁴⁸ Josh McDowell, *Generația înstrăinată: Un pod peste prăpastia dintre generații*, Oradea, Editura Scriptum, 2005, p. 26.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

THE TELEVISION – A NEW WAY OF GENERATING LONELINESS

Virgil Gheorghe talks about the mirage of television in his book “The revival of the world or why we don't want to break away from television”²⁵⁰. According to his theory:

“the effect of audio-video media is a magical one, given that after only two minutes of installation in front of the TV, the emission of alpha waves, passivity, semi-hypnotic state, etc. increase fantastically. The beta activities of the cortex decrease to zero, the selective faculty ceases to manifest, axiological functions are suddenly suspended, the island is deprived of any psycho-moral initiative (...) Exposure to television induces mental states that we can classify in the family of states of alteration of consciousness (hypnosis, hallucinations, etc.). A man who spends about 3-6 hours in front of the TV (...) is enchanted, mentally confiscated”²⁵¹.

From this point of view, television was the first step in the process of modern human alienation, followed by the mirage of the Internet, which only deepened the distance and implicitly weakened the human interactions. In the absence of these interactions, which make possible the existence of man as a social being, the individual loses control, because the idea of authority is diluted. Piety becomes from this point of view an increasingly distant desideratum, while the ego grows almost directly proportional to the time spent in front of the TV or online.

Another study released by Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh showed that the more time people spend on the Internet, the more stressed, lonely, and depressed they become²⁵². A study conducted by Starcom, in 2019, showed that young people in Romania spend an average of 6 hours on the internet daily²⁵³. Looking at these figures, one can only glimpse the high level of loneliness that young people face.

SEDENTARISM – THE HIDDEN PART OF THE ONLINE

Therefore, piety also means discipline, which is increasingly lacking in young people as their main concern becomes “online”. From this point of view, “hiding behind a screen” (which offers the illusion of anonymity) does nothing but

²⁵⁰ Virgiliu Gheorghe, *Revrăjirea lumii sau de ce nu mai vrem să ne desprindem de televizor*, București, Editura Prodromos, 2006.

²⁵¹ “Efectul mediei audio-video este unul de tip magic dat fiind faptul că după numai două minute de la instalarea în fața televizorului crește fantastic emisia undelor alfa, ale pasivității, stării semi-hipnotice, reveriei și teledependenței, etc. Activitățile de tip beta ale cortexului se diminuează spre pragul zero, facultatea selectivă încetează să se mai manifeste, funcțiile axiologice sunt brusc suspendate, insul este deposedat de orice inițiativă psihomorală, (...) Expunerea la televizor induce stări psihice pe care le putem încadra în familia stărilor alterate de conștiință (stările de natură hipnotică, visele, halucinațiile etc.). Un ins care petrece circa 3–6 ore în fața televizorului (...) este vrăjit, confiscat mental (...)”, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁵² Josh McDowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

²⁵³ Revista Biz, “Cât timp petrec tinerii români pe internet?”, 2019, Available at: <https://www.revistabiz.ro/cat-timp-petrec-tinerii-romani-pe-internet/>. Accessed on June 12, 2021.

fuel the idea of disobedience on the one hand, and on the other hand “feed” the biggest enemy of young people, the ego.

A 2020 UNICEF study found that 1.5 billion children and young people worldwide have been affected by school closures around the world. “*The coronavirus pandemic has caused an unprecedented increase in screen time*” said Howard Taylor, chief executive of the Global Partnership to Stop Violence Against Children²⁵⁴. In other words, the pandemic has accentuated the loneliness of young people. On the other hand, the former Romanian Minister of Justice, Raluca Prună, stated that the level of online crime increased during the pandemic²⁵⁵. This means that not only the degree of loneliness increased during the pandemic but also the degree of disobedience (its expression in the online environment can be bullying, for instance).

At the same time, discipline is the way in which the ego can be shaken. An example of introducing the idea of discipline among young people is sports. Starting from the idea that a healthy mind is possible only in a healthy body (which is not possible in its absence), sports can be a sure way to reconnect the young person with oneself but also with the other. The absence of this type of discipline is reflected in the number of young people who have weight problems. The latest statistics in this regard ranked Romania second in Europe in terms of childhood obesity²⁵⁶. The World Obesity Federation estimates that, in the absence of drastic prevention and treatment measures, by 2030, in our country, almost 500,000 children aged 5 to 19 will suffer from obesity, according to a statement from the Smart Nutrition clinic. In the last four decades, the global rate of childhood obesity has increased tenfold, with the number of children diagnosed with obesity reaching about 124 million worldwide, according to a WHO study²⁵⁷.

For Romania, the absence of official statistics makes childhood obesity a silent killer. The only official study contains data from 2015 and shows that in all age groups studied – 7, 8 and 9 years, the share of children with weight problems (overweight or obese) is over 25%, according to INS data. Specifically, 1 in 4 children in the study groups had weight problems²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁴ UNICEF, “UNICEF: Copiii sunt expuși unui risc crescut în mediul online în timpul pandemiei de COVID-19”, 2020, Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/romania/ro/comunicate-de-pres%C4%83/unicef-copiii-sunt-expu%C8%99i-unui-risc-crescut-%C3%AEn-mediul-online-%C3%AEn-timpul>, Accessed on June 12, 2021.

²⁵⁵ Raluca Prună, “Nivelul de infracționalitate online a crescut în timpul pandemiei”, 2020, in *G4Media*, Available at: <https://www.g4media.ro/raluca-pruna-nivelul-de-infracionalitate-online-a-crescut-in-timpul-pandemiei-cum-raspunde-comisia-europeana-noilor-provocari-aparute-in-lupta-impotriva-spalarii-banilor.html>, Accessed on June 12, 2021.

²⁵⁶ Ziarul Bursa, “Ocupăm locul doi în Europa la obezitate infantile”, 2019, Available at: <https://www.bursa.ro/semnal-de-alarma-ocupam-locul-doi-in-europa-la-obezitate-infantila-07067730>, Accessed on April 2, 2021.

²⁵⁷ Green Report, “Numărul copiilor afectați de obezitate, în România, va crește la aproape 500.000 până în 2030 studiu”, Available at: <https://green-report.ro/numarul-copiilor-afectati-de-obezitate-in-romania-va-creste-la-aproape-500-000-pana-in-2030studiu/>, Accessed on February 13, 2021.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

THE STATE'S CONTRIBUTION TO YOUNG PEOPLE'S LONELINESS

The Covid-19 pandemic provided the pretext for measures that have eliminated and still eliminate freedom of any kind (of choice by imposing the vaccines, of movement, by introducing social distance, of restrictions on movement, of expression, by reducing to silence by coercion, threats and finally sanctions of people who do not agree with the imposed measures, socialization and direct interaction by eliminating physical contact: hugs, handshakes, etc., religious manifestation, by closing places of worship, introducing boundaries etc.). All these measures have increased the degree of loneliness.

THE DISCIPLINE BETWEEN EGO AND THE OTHER

On the other hand, discipline is the way in which the self can be strung, but it gives the individual a direction: to himself (ego) or to the other (sacrifice, sharing, etc.).

The distinction between the two types of orientation (in time and space) is made by Mircea Eliade in the book "The Sacred and the Profane". Starting from the idea that "the sacred means both reality, permanence and efficiency"²⁵⁹, Eliade states that both space and sacred time differ from ordinary time and space.

SPACE AND TIME AS A BENCHMARK

Regarding the sacred space, what distinguishes it from the other places, it is the set of qualities and its different structure:

"So there is a sacred space, so 'strong', significant, and other spaces, unconsecrated, therefore lacking in structure and consistency, in other words amorphous"²⁶⁰.

As for the sacred time, it differs from the profane time in the sense that it is loaded with meanings and is reversible, repeatable.

"There are intervals of Sacred Time, such as the time of the holidays and on the other hand, the profane Time, the usual temporal duration, in which the documents without religious significance are inscribed. There is, of course, a „rupture” between these two kinds of time, but, through the mediation of rites, the religious man can easily pass from the usual temporal duration to the Sacred Time"²⁶¹.

²⁵⁹ "Puterea sacră înseamnă deopotrivă: realitate, perenitate și eficiență.", Mircea Eliade, *Sacru și Profanul*, București, Editura Humanitas, 2013, p. 14.

²⁶⁰ "Există așadar un spațiu sacru, deci "puternic", semnificativ, și alte spații, neconsacrate, lipsite prin urmare de structură și de consistență, cu alte cuvinte amorfe.", *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁶¹ "Există intervale de Timp sacru, ca de pildă timpul sărbătorilor (în cea mai mare parte periodice) și, pe de altă parte, Timpul profan, durata temporală obișnuită, în care se înscriu actele lipsite de semnificație religioasă. Între aceste două feluri de timp există, bineînțeles, o ruptură; dar, prin mijlocirea riturilor, omul religios poate "trece" cu ușurință de la durata temporală obișnuită la Timpul sacru.", *Ibid.*, p. 54.

THE RITUAL – AS A DETACHMENT

The term *rupture* introduced by Eliade refers to the idea that man can pass from one time to another, through what is known as ritual, and through this passage, specifically, the individual ‘breaks’ from profane time for to integrate in the sacred one:

“By its nature, sacred time is reversible, in the sense that it is in fact a primordial mythical Time brought back to the present. Any religious holiday, any liturgical time means the re-actualization of a sacred event that took place in a mythical past ‘at the beginning of the beginnings’. Religious participation in a holiday involves stepping out of the “ordinary” time frame and reintegrating into the mythical Time updated by that holiday”²⁶².

In other words, for the religious man, the profane temporal duration can be ‘stopped’ and ‘resumed’ by introducing, with the help of rites, a sacred, non-historical Time (in the sense that it does not belong to the historical present).

Another idea is to relate to the ‘finality’ of time, which is perceived differently. For a religious man, time:

“knows ‘sacred’ intervals, which do not integrate into the temporal duration that precedes and follows them, which have a different structure and a different „origin”, because it represents a primordial Time, sanctified by the gods and now can be brought back through the holiday”²⁶³.

All while for the non-religious man:

“time can be neither a rupture nor a mystery: it constitutes the deepest existential dimension of man and is linked to his own existence, thus having a beginning and an end, namely death, the disappearance of existence”²⁶⁴.

SHORT CONCLUSION

It can be said that discipline restrains and shapes the ego and it can be found even in the idea of ritual, at its very core, which helps to organize the individual around its own axis, without consuming himself. At the same time, in addition to discipline, the element that makes the difference between the sense of orientation

²⁶² “prin natura sa, Timpul sacru este reversibil, în sensul că este de fapt un Timp mitic primordial readus în prezent. Orice sărbătoare religioasă, orice Timp liturgic înseamnă reactualizarea unui eveniment sacru care a avut loc într-un trecut mitic, "la începutul începuturilor". Participarea religioasă la o sărbătoare implică ieșirea din durata temporală "obișnuită" și reintegrarea în Timpul mitic actualizat de acea sărbătoare.”, *Ibid.*

²⁶³ “cunoaște intervale “sacre”, care nu se intergrează în durata temporală ce le precedă și le urmează, care au o altă structură și o altă "origine" pentru că reprezintă un Timp primordial, sanctificat de zei și putând fi adus în prezent prin sărbătoare.”, *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁶⁴ “Timpul nu poate reprezenta nici ruptură, nici “mister”: el alcătuiește dimensiunea existențială cea mai profundă a omului și este legat de propria sa existență, având așadar un început și un sfârșit, și anume moartea, dispariția existenței.”, *Ibid.*

of the individual axis, is faith, because it places in the center of the particular cosmos, *the other* and not *the self*. Thus, the more the idea of traditions or ritual (passing, renewal, initiation, etc.) is diluted, the more the individual orients himself towards his own ego, and vice versa, the more present the ritual and tradition are in the life of the individual, discipline directs man to *the other*. On the other hand, the orientation of an individual is given not only by the presence but also by the frequency of the ritual in his life. A man who considers the fact that space and time is not uniform and homogeneous, disciplined we could say, will report accordingly, depending on the space or time in which he is.

The difference between a religious man and a non-religious one is given by the way of reporting and the direction of the self: the religious man directs his own self towards the Sacred, implicitly towards the other through care, sacrifice, almsgiving, etc. while the non-religious man has oriented his self to himself, case in which the emphasis is being put on his own person, thus becoming lonely.

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YOUNG GENERATIONS AND THEIR PURPOSE

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ABSTRACT

This paperwork aims to briefly analyze the actual situation of the young generations through a pluri-paradigmatic perspective. Why is this topic chosen? Because the generation represents the means by which a nation can rise or, on the contrary, in the undesirable case, dissipate in the face of the challenges of the times. In this sense, the role of the elites is an essential one, not only for the good organization of the nation, but especially for the preparation and strengthening of generations to foresee and reduce the effects of future crises.

Keywords: generation, elite, value.

THEORETICAL CLARIFICATION: WHO ARE THE YOUNG PEOPLE?

[1] Fred Mahler in his book, *Generation of the Year 2000*, defines young people as “the future of the present”²⁶⁸.

[2] Aristotle states in this sense that young people are the social category that stores hope²⁶⁹.

[3] At the same time, youth is a “potential factor for change”²⁷⁰.

HOW SHOULD WE RELATE TO YOUNG GENERATION?

According to Mahler, youth is that part of life in which man becomes conscious. But what does it mean to be aware? It means to have an ideal and to act

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²⁶⁸ Fred Mahler, *Generația anului 2000*, București, Editura Politică, 1988, p. 8.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.

in the direction of its realization, but only in accordance with the highest values, which leads us to think of Dimitrie Gusti's concept of *cultural personality*, an idea similar to what Constantin Rădulescu Motru defined as *energetic personality*.

Some examples of iconic generations of young people, listed in the works of Mircea Vulcănescu:

[1] the generation of forerunners, according to N. Iorga, who appears after the revolution of Tudor Vladimirescu;

[2] the Pașoptist generation;

[3] the social generation, since 1907;

[4] the fire generation, which includes N. Ionescu, N. Crainic, L. Blaga, P. Șeicaru;

[5] The young generation. Here Mircea Vulcănescu distinguishes two founding moments of the young generation: a "spiritual" one (1925–1929), characterized by self-rediscovery, and a "non-spiritual" moment (1929–1932) dominated by lack of perspectives²⁷¹.

What we want to point out is that these generations have taken on a mission in relation to the urgency of the times. This leads us to ask: have today's young people (in this case "snowflake generation") undertaken any collective mission? If so, what is it? If not, how can its non-existence be explained?

A possible explanation for the non-assumption may be the permanence of the "non-spiritual" stage, in the sense that the emphasis has been shifted in the consumerist society from the soul to the body, from being to having. The lack of prospects thus becomes a *modus vivendi* for today's young people. We thus encounter an exaggeration of the exhortation "Carpe Diem!". In other words, the moment becomes the most important but also the only reference point for young people. In theology, this phenomenon is called secularization.

The process of secularization has caused a shift in the center of gravity of life and culture from God to man. At the center of existence God is no longer placed, but man. Thus, the world passed from theocentrism to anthropocentrism²⁷².

Regarding the role that young people have, that of taking on a mission, it must be said that such an action would involve education on the one hand, but also would require self-education. In this sense, we cannot help but wonder how one can discover its own purpose, an idea that takes us to the example of talents. In order to be able to multiply your talent, don't you first have to know what that is? But before that, comes the question, how do I know what my talent is?

²⁷¹ Istorii regăsite, "Tânăra generație", 2010, Available at: <https://istoriiregasite.wordpress.com/2010/10/22/criterion-i/>. Accessed on June 18, 2021.

²⁷² Pr. prof. univ. dr. Nicolae Răzvan Stan, *Suport de curs: Spiritualitate și cultură filocalică*, Craiova, 2020–2021, p. 3.

YOUNG PEOPLE AND ELITES

The societal function (for the whole society) of the young generation has two major directions:

1. they are the expression of innovation and perpetuation.
2. they innovate (they rise to the ideal, so they surpass themselves) only insofar as they are aware of reality (or they deceive themselves that they are²⁷³).

Innovation is in a continuous tension with the perpetuation (preservation) of a social order. Anticipatory socialization is the process that unites them. Adapting to the group that empowers you (reference group) means: innovation (you can't adapt perfectly, you are deviant²⁷⁴) and perpetuating the order of that group through integration.

From another perspective, Mihail Manoilescu analyzes the Romanian bourgeoisie from a totalitarian perspective. He asks himself this question: What is the role of the bourgeoisie in the society of which it is a part? At the time of writing (1942) Manoilescu is aware that Romania has not entered the phase of the totalitarian state (Germany / Italy). That is why it analyzes the pre-totalitarian state of Romania in the bourgeois class, a class that deals with the organization and national production being the main force that raises the state of a society.

The need to analyze the bourgeoisie also arises from the state of the village: its double exploitation in relation to the city (unequal exchange between village and city and foreign exploitation of cities). Manoilescu's brief conclusion was that the Romanian bourgeoisie ignored the village, the social unit whose importance was highest and whose share at the administrative level represented about 80% of the country's population at the time.

ELITES FACING OTHER ELITES

We start from two main ideas:

[1] If we stop at the definition of what it means to be aware (written at the very beginning of the essay), we remember that being conscious presupposes the existence of an ideal in the direction of which one manifests, which gives the 'direction', driven by some ideas with high value rank.

[2] Young people fulfill two major functions in society: they are the expression of innovation and perpetuation. They only innovate insofar as they are aware of reality.

It turns out that the measure of anchoring the individual in reality is given the ability to innovate and perpetuate an idea.

²⁷³ One proof that young people are only apparently aware is that they trust in 'political correctness', a certain interpretation of reality that gives them the illusion that they really understand the reality around them.

²⁷⁴ Ion Ungureanu, *Paradigme ale cunoașterii societății*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 247.

Thus, starting from these pillar ideas, we try to answer questions that we consider relevant in relation to the topic of the discussion:

- a. who sets the height of a value?
- b. or what makes the [value] “high”?
- c. how does it combine or relate to other high ideas / values?

In this sense, the sociologist Nicolae Petrescu says through the surface and substrate paradigm that:

“the relationship between human nature and social differentiations corresponds to the relationship between the substrate and the surface of social life. This is the double aspect under which social life appears. The first is the permanent and unifying aspect, the other represents the provisional and differentiating aspect of the social reality. While human nature always remains the same, social differentiations vary according to time, place and ethnic group”²⁷⁵.

So according to this paradigm, the differences are only social, in form. But still, on what criterion is one form or another, higher or lower?

We try to explain through another paradigm, that of the pyramid of needs and the principle of social derivation, which says:

“In order to respond to the most basic biological needs, society creates means to satisfy them, and these means become, in turn, derived needs, which will generate new means and therefore needs, which means that the social derivation of needs is a process continuously and that biological (elementary) needs represent only a link in the chain of (derived) social needs. In turn, derived needs are „elementary” or „natural” in the same sense as biological ones, in the sense that without their satisfaction human survival is not possible”²⁷⁶.

In other words, social differentiation comes from the way society accepts basic needs. However, this “way” is given by the elites of that society, which, among other things, deal with “national organization and production, being the main forces that raise the status of a society”²⁷⁷.

In this way, young people appear from this perspective as the essential and necessary element through which elites promote and pass on a “way”, a “style” or a

²⁷⁵ “Relația dintre natura umană și diferențierile sociale corespunde relației dintre substratul și suprafața vieții sociale. Acesta este dublul aspect sub care apare viața socială. Primul este aspectul permanent și unificator, celălalt reprezintă aspectul provizoriu și diferențiator al realității sociale. În timp ce natura umană rămâne mereu aceeași, diferențierile sociale variază în funcție de timp, loc și grup etnic.” in Nicolae Petrescu, *The interpretation of national differentiations*, London, Watts and Co., 1929, pp. 106–107 apud Ion Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

²⁷⁶ “Pentru a răspunde celor mai elementare nevoi biologice, societatea creează mijloace de satisfacere a lor, iar aceste mijloace devin, la rândul lor, nevoi derivate, care vor genera mijloace și deci nevoi noi, ceea ce înseamnă că derivarea socială a nevoilor este un proces continuu și că nevoile biologice (elementare) reprezintă doar o verigă a lanțului de nevoi sociale (derivate). La rândul lor, nevoile derivate sunt „elementare” sau „naturale” în același sens ca și cele biologice, adică în sensul că fără satisfacerea lor nu este posibilă supraviețuirea omului.”, Ion Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

²⁷⁷ “... organizarea și producția națională, principalele forțe care ridică o stare a unei societăți” in Mihail Manoilescu, *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești*, București, Editura Cugetarea-Georgescu Delafras, 1942, p. 61.

simple formula of “how to”. Beyond the practical mode, this *modus operandi* is “taught” [we could say, mainly] through books.

The moment or the “place” in which two societies “meet” becomes problematic, because that place is neither uniform nor easy to establish or identify. Is it legitimate and natural when the elites defend those represented, but is it still when these “actions” overlap in the space (physical, cultural, ideological, political, etc.) of the other elites? Many “hide” from the idea that the best defense is the attack, but even so, an aggression remains. If we have basically, as human nature, the same needs, why do some have greater needs? We tend to believe that it is also due to the ideas circulating in that space.

The most spectacular are the pan-ideas, in the sense that they “throw” over vast and very diverse spaces. Even if they are based on various „myths”, which in their essence have the same „message”, the victory of good over evil, who and what is good or bad? All the elites and the tension that manages these ideas directed against someone, is called geopolitics.

In conclusion, young people are the future geopolitical actors of society and if they are oriented towards an ideal, or a way to achieve that ideal, it will be perpetuated further: through family, children, relatives, relatives, acquaintances, etc.

SHORT CONCLUSION

In conclusion, young people are the future geopolitical actors of society and if they are oriented towards an ideal, or a way to achieve that ideal, it will be perpetuated further: through family, children, relatives, relatives, acquaintances, etc.

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BOOK REVIEW

“I’m not afraid of death, I’m sorry it won’t let me write everything I’ve accrued.” (Ion Ungureanu)

ION UNGUREANU. “THE PARADIGMS OF SOCIETY KNOWLEDGE”

*Narcis Rupe*²⁷⁸

ABSTRACT

The present paper aims to review a fundamental book for any sociology student. Social scientist Ion Ungureanu, author of the book “The paradigms of Society knowledge”, has organized in an original way the “theoretic core of sociology”: its main paradigms. He argues that sociology is a multi-paradigmatic science. Sociology does not have a universal paradigm, but several paradigms are competing for hegemony. The Romanian sociologist establishes the main fields of study: the constitution, organization, change and evolution of society. Although synthetic, the book is a vast one, and the review will be limited to the presentation of the links between sociological paradigms. Each paradigm has a scientific potential, and from this point of view, Ion Ungureanu’s work can reopen old fields of research in Romanian sociology.

Keywords: core of sociology, paradigms, sociological studies fields, Romanian sociology, sociologist model.

Ion Ungureanu was one of the most prolific Romanian sociologists before 1990. Managing to distinguish himself from ideological influences, he devoted himself to sociology and won the appreciation of his colleagues²⁷⁹. He was a professor of the history of sociology at the University of Bucharest. Unfortunately, his life was short, and he failed to elaborate all the ideas he has acquired over time

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²⁷⁹ Florin Tănăsescu, “Confluente emoționale și spirituale”, in *Sociologie Românească Jurnal*, vol.3, no. 2/1992, pp. 133–134, Available at: <https://revistasociologieromaneasca.ro/sr/issue/view/62>, Accessed on January 15, 2021.

through his sociological activity. However, he managed to make remarkable progresses in universal and Romanian sociology. Ungureanu contributed to the shaping of a:

“... new interpretative vision on the genesis of Romanian sociology as science and on the role of exemplary cultural personalities in the affirmation of the sociological perspective in Romanian culture ...”²⁸⁰.

In universal sociology, he discovered that this science is multi-paradigmatic. The result of this vision is “The paradigms of society knowledge”. The book is a foundation for re-establishing the Faculty of Sociology in Bucharest after 1990²⁸¹. The Romanian sociologist also helped plan the reform of the Faculty of Sociology in Bucharest after the fall of communism in Romania.

BOOK INTRODUCTION

“The paradigms of society knowledge” aims to establish the place of sociology among other sciences. Compared to natural sciences (which have a dominant paradigm, physics for example), sociology is multi-paradigmatic:

“If the development of sociological science were to follow the same path as physics, for example, we could say that sociology is today only a pre-paradigmatic science, because it does not have only a paradigm used as an ‘example’ for defining and resolving all of the problems that rise in the study of society”²⁸².

Thus, the book establishes the core of sociology. Ungureanu defines the paradigm in multiple ways. The paradigms are:

“fundamental statements in the socio-human sciences because, starting from them, many theories, theses, sentences and ideas concerning the lives of people in society have been and are derived”²⁸³.

A paradigm is also a denomination for:

“... the complicated road that a sociological sentence goes through, from the first writing, through various forms of redrafting from the perspective of sociological

²⁸⁰ “o nouă viziune interpretativă asupra genezei sociologiei românești ca știință și a rolului unor personalități culturale exemplare la prefigurarea și afirmarea punctului de vedere sociologic în cultura românească ...”, *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁸¹ Radu Baltasiu, “Lucrări ‘Șantier’. ‘Întâlnire’ cu cartea lui I.Ungureanu. Paradigme ale cunoașterii societății (1990). Prima întâlnire”, in *Etnosfera Journal*, no.1/2018, p. 127, Available at: <https://www.etnosfera.ro/revista-etnosfera-nr-1-2018/>, Accessed on April 18, 2021.

²⁸² “Dacă evoluția științei sociologice ar urma aceeași traiectorie ca fizica, de exemplu, am putea spune că sociologia este astăzi doar o știință preparadigmatică, căci ea nu are o singură paradigmă folosită ca ‘exemplu’ pentru definirea și rezolvarea tuturor problemelor studierii societății.”, Ion Ungureanu, *Paradigme ale cunoașterii societății*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 13.

²⁸³ “Ele [paradigmele] reprezintă enunțuri fundamentale în științele socioumane fiindcă, pornindu-se de la ele, au fost și sunt derivate numeroase teorii, teze, propoziții și idei privind viața oamenilor în societate.”, *Ibid.*, p. 21.

theories other than the one in which it was originally born, and will be accepted or unaccepted in the end, as a sociological law ...”²⁸⁴.

Sociology comprises some dominant paradigms because all are in a race for hegemony:

“But sociology is a multi-paradigmatic science because there are at most dominant sociological paradigms, not an universal paradigm in sociology (more paradigms compete to win hegemony)”²⁸⁵.

The paradigms are organized into four main categories: the constitution, organization, change, and evolution of society. Each chapter of the book is part of a category. “Man in society: Sociality and sociability” is part of the society constitution study issue. “Anatomy of society: Structure” and “Social structures: Classes, stratification and social mobility” are part of the organization category. The category of social change and evolution is included in the chapter of “Evolution of societies”.

MAN IN SOCIETY: SOCIALITY AND SOCIABILITY

Society's constitution is explained through the concepts of sociality and sociability. Sociality is “the quality of man to be a social being, and the property of society to be established as a form of people's inter-existence”²⁸⁶ and sociability is “the ability of a man or a group of people to integrate into society”²⁸⁷. Each paradigm covers one aspect of sociality or sociability as demonstrated in the next sentences.

Through socio-biology, Ungureanu begins to explain why the human is a social being. Sociality is in human genes by natural selection and altruism is a condition for society's existence:

“The human population is "genetically" forced to be altruistic and cooperative, because natural selection will facilitate those who help each other and cooperate, and will not facilitate those who refuse cooperation”²⁸⁸.

²⁸⁴ “Pentru a indica printr-un singur termen drumul complicat pe care îl parcurge un enunț sociologic, de la prima formulare, trecând prin diferite forme de reelaborare din perspectiva altor teorii sociologice decât cea în care a apărut inițial, urmând să fie acceptat sau neacceptat, în final, ca o lege sociologică, am folosit termenul de paradigmă.”, *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁸⁵ “Deoarece sociologia este însă o știință *multiparadigmatică* (mai multe paradigme competiționează pentru a câștiga hegemonia), există cel mult paradigme sociologice *dominante*, nu și o paradigmă universală în sociologie”, *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁸⁶ “calitatea omului de a fi ființă socială și proprietatea societății de a se constitui ca formă a inter-existenței”, *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁸⁷ “capacitatea (abilitatea) unui om sau a unui grup de oameni de a se integra într-o societate”, *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁸⁸ “Populația umană este obligată „genetic” să acționeze altruist și cooperativ, fiindcă selecția naturală va favoriza pe cei care se ajută între ei și cooperează, și nu pe cei care refuză cooperarea.”, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

In the second paradigm, “The residues of sociability” of Vilfredo Pareto, Ungureanu explains sociability as an effect of social discipline:

“Pareto analyses sociability as a residual form of discipline, considering, as well as modern sociobiologists, that the latter is a ‘natural’ trait of the human being, on account of its ‘herd spirit’. Discipline is the manner in which the social actors stimulate, control and elaborate association or by which they repress actions that can undermine the association of individuals”²⁸⁹.

Society has other residues that consolidate the discipline of their members, residues like the ‘us sentiment’, the “need for uniformity”, “mercy and cruelty”, “altruism” and “asceticism”. The “The principles of social exchange” paradigm argues that sociality exists because of the social interaction in which people give and receive different kinds of services.

The fourth paradigm of Emile Durkheim demonstrates that sociality is based on the dynamic/moral density of society. The growth of division of labor, Durkheim argues, may modify sociality. In primitive societies, the people were organized on the basis of their common traits, but in modern societies the difference between humans became the criteria of organization:

“Based on this, Durkheim sets out the law of the social division of labor as the law of human sociality by the following formula: the more the collective human being type is in a society, and the more rudimentary division of labor, the more repressive rules governing interhuman relations; conversely, as the collective human being type is differentiated and individual types are developing, and the division of labor expands, the regulation of interhuman relationships loses its repressive character and takes the form of restitution (‘compensation’ by compensating the victim)”²⁹⁰.

Muzafer Sherif in the paradigm of “The effect of the social norm” highlights Pareto’s idea: discipline is essential for sociability. In this sense, sociability varies by compliance with the social norm. Ungureanu explains starting from the paradigm “The pyramid of needs and their social derivation principal” (B. Malinowski) that both sociality and sociability are essential pillars for society’s survival. The institutions and culture are “derivate needs” that satisfy human needs (A. Maslow). However, is it contemporary sociality a servant of human needs? Based on T. Veblen and J. Baudrilard, Ungureanu’s answer was negative.

²⁸⁹ “Pareto analizează sociabilitatea ca o formă reziduală a disciplinei, considerând, ca și sociobiologii moderni, că aceasta din urmă este o caracteristică ‘natural’ a ființei umane, datorită ‘gregarismului’ ei.” Disciplina este modalitatea prin care actorii sociali stimulează asocierea, o controlează, o dezvoltă, sau prin care ei reprimă acțiunile ce pot submina asocierea dintre indivizi.”, *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁹⁰ “Pornind de aici, Durkheim enunță legea diviziunii sociale a muncii ca lege a socialității omenești prin următoarea formulă: cu cât tipul uman colectiv este mai pronunțat într-o societate, iar diviziunea muncii mai rudimentară cu atât regulile de reglementare a relațiilor interumane sunt mai represive; invers, pe măsura ce se diferențiază tipul colectiv și se dezvoltă tipurile individuale, iar diviziunea muncii se extinde, reglementarea raporturilor interumane își pierde caracterul represiv și îmbracă forma restitutivă (‘reparații’, prin despăgubirea victimei)”. Durkheim, 1899–1900, pp. 65–80 apud Ion Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

In the seventh paradigm of J. Baudrillard (“The consumption of signs”), Ungureanu develops an answer and thus describes a form of negative sociality. In contemporary society, people consume signs instead of satisfying their human needs: “What is meant in the traditional society by satisfying a need, whether elementary or derived, simply becomes in the consumer society the consumption of signs in which the object is no longer valued by its usefulness or by its worth for use, but is arranged in the context of meaning, in what J. Baudrillard calls social logic or sign logic”²⁹¹.

The eighth paradigm explains the strong correlation between socialization and both sociality and sociability processes. Based on Robert K. Merton’s theoretical approach, Ungureanu argues that by socialization individuals become part of different human organization forms (sociality). Alternatively, the efficiency of socialization influences the sociability degree of individuals. The final paradigm of the chapter “Law of sociability” tries to synthesize the variables of sociability starting from Stefan Odobleja’s cybernetic thinking.

ANATOMY OF SOCIETY: STRUCTURALITY

In the introduction section of this chapter, Ungureanu defines the structure of society. It is similar to a scheme of society and is “a total of constant relations, relatively unchanged, through which the social life manifests itself”²⁹². The scientific anatomy of society cannot be possible without the existence of an important function of society’s structure: to provide stability and predictability. The paradigms of society anatomy are linked, the author tries to highlight the complementarity between them instead of their differences.

The first paradigm of A. Comte (“The law of material force’s preponderance”) defines society as a form of condensed social forces: material, moral and intellectual force:

“... society is possible because of ‘social condensation of individual forces’, in a word, because of sociality ...”²⁹³.

The purpose of the social forces’ concentration is the survival of society. The intellectual and moral forces are volatile, Comte argues, and in order to comprehend the anatomy of society the scientist should focus on material forces. Moreover, intellectual and moral forces are results of the decomposed material force.

²⁹¹ “Ceea ce se înțelege prin satisfacerea unei nevoi, elementare sau derivate, în societatea tradițională, devine, în societatea de consum, pur și simplu consumul de semne, în care obiectul nu mai este valorificat prin utilitatea lui, nici prin valoare de întrebuințare, ci prin „aranjarea” într-un context de semnificații, adică în ceea ce J. Baudrillard numește logica socială sau logica semnelor.”, Ion Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59.

²⁹² “o totalitate de relații constante, relativ invariante pe care și prin care se manifestă viața socială propriu-zisă”, *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁹³ “... societatea este posibilă ca urmare a „condensării sociale a forțelor individuale”, într-un cuvând, datorită socialității”, *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.

The decomposition of material force in intellectual and moral ones led to a typology of social rationality. Intellectual force is characterized by a “technical” spirit, while moral force by an “aesthetic” spirit. Generally, the disjunction of social rationality is one of the modern sociology research subjects.

In the second paradigm of this chapter (“The law of Community and the paradox of society”), Ungureanu presents an extension to Comte’s law. The paradigm author F. Tonnies discovers a typology of social structures: community and society. A community is based on organic will (which corresponds to ‘aesthetic’ spirit) and a society on the reflexive will (related to ‘technical’ spirit).

In the next paradigm of Spencer (“The law of integration and differentiation of society”), a typology of the society’s structural components is described by the criteria of differentiation and integration. Vilfredo Pareto introduces the idea of a functional relation between society’s structural components. In “The cycle of mutual dependency” paradigm (V. Pareto), Ungureanu highlights that every part of society has an important influence on social structure. Comte has assumed that only the material forces influence social structure. Also, Pareto explains that every part of society’s structure is in a dependency relationship, all the components can have an important influence upon others in a cycle.

The next paradigm of T. Parsons argues that between structural parts exists an informational exchange with energetic and control dimensions.

Further, in the “Law of sociological parallelism”, the paradigm of Dimitrie Gusti, Ungureanu strengthens the idea of the structural parts’ dependency with Gusti’s concept of parallelism. Gusti argues that a social unit consists of four frames (cosmic, biological, psychological, and historical) and four manifestations (economic, spiritual, political, and judicial). The frames and manifestations (components of the society’s structure) are correlated rather than being in a causality relation.

The paradigms of G. Zapan and P. Andrei extend Gusti’s discoveries. The ‘surface’ and ‘substratum’ concepts (P. Andrei) nurture Gusti’s theory of frames actualization by human activities. Also, P. Andrei highlights that the social process is a differentiating process. Parts of society exist because of a permanent differentiating process.

I. Ungureanu finishes the chapter with Thomas theorem. Every part of society’s structure is a form of people activity’s regulation. As long as people define these regulations (components of the social structure) as real, social system will continue to exist:

“Furthermore, the historical dimension of the structure of society makes possible its transformation, the ‘transient’ nature of social forms and, in fact, all the structures of society, from the economic ones to the institutional and cultural structures, are under constant construction and reconstruction because they exist objectively only through the practical social work of humans and social groups”²⁹⁴.

²⁹⁴ “Mai mult decât atât, dimensiunea istorică a structuralității societății face posibilă transformarea ei, caracterul „trecător” al formelor sociale, și, în fapt, toate structurile societății,

SOCIAL STRUCTURES: CLASSES, STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

The third chapter explores the sociological problem of social stratification: what are its components? What are the types of relations between their parts? In chapter two of the book, Ungureanu analyses society parts at a macro-level, following in the third chapter to introduce the reader in a micro-level of social anatomy analyses.

Firstly, social structure is a component of the societal structure and it refers to “the capacity or the quality of the human being to associate, or belong to a social group”²⁹⁵.

The first paradigm of Max Weber explains why classes are a “group with maximum societal significance”²⁹⁶ and how they produce social order by interaction with social status. Society is structured hierarchically on the levels of classes:

“This (class structure) obviously corresponds to the activity and rational relationship ‘of purpose’. As the activity determined by the rationale of the purpose is again similar, even if it is not identified with economic activity, it means that class structures are determined by the economic order of a society”²⁹⁷.

And status groups:

“The status criterion is, as Weber stated, the respective privilege ‘claim for social consideration’ and the privilege arises from a way of life, a type of education or professional prestige”²⁹⁸.

The next paradigm of Dahrendorf (“The social conflict pluralism”) is an example of using in the correct way the notions of status and classes for explaining the social process in a developing society. Dahrendorf answers the question of why communism did not emerge in the United States?

After “The social conflict pluralism” paradigm, Ungureanu begins the discussion about an essential process of social structure: social mobility. Before presenting its principles, typology and laws in the P. Sorokin paradigm, Ungureanu

începând cu cele economice și terminând cu structurile instituționale și culturale, sunt într-o permanentă construcție și reconstrucție întrucât ele există în mod obiectiv doar prin activitatea socială practică a indivizilor umani și a grupurilor sociale”, *Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁹⁵ “capacitatea sau calitatea ființei umane de a se asocia, de a aparține unor grupuri sau grupări sociale, *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁹⁶ “grupurile cu semnificație societală maximă”, *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁹⁷ “Aceasta (structura de clasă) corespunde, evident, activității și relației raționale ‘de scop’. Cum activitatea determinată prin raționalitatea scopului este iarăși asemănătoare, chiar dacă nu se identifică cu activitatea economică, înseamnă că structurile de clasă sunt determinate de ordinea economică a unei societăți”, *Ibid.*, p. 138.

²⁹⁸ “Criteriul statusului este, așa cum preciza Weber, privilegiul respectiv ‘pretenția pentru o considerație socială’, iar privilegiul se naște dintr-un mod de viață, dintr-un tip de educație sau din prestigiul profesional”, *Ibid.*, p. 142.

demonstrates the existence of a “negative” social mobility, by M. Eminescu’s thinking:

“In a social and national environment corrupted by foreign influence and domination, elements that adapt passively, easily and quickly to the corrupt social environment will be promoted in the social hierarchy”²⁹⁹.

Eminescu explains that in a conquered country the elite will be ‘selected’ by negative criteria (positive ones are knowledge, ability, and work). A country governed by negatively selected elites will be on the underdevelopment path.

The social stratification’s study domain researches the relation between the component groups of a hierarchical structured society. Using the paradigm of “The Social imitation” (G.Tarde), Ungureanu demonstrates through a theoretical analysis that imitation is an important cultural relation in a stratified society.

In the second half of the 21st century, the Western countries raised the question whether education is an important variable of growth for an individual’s vertical mobility:

“When transition between positions at the same level of the social hierarchy, mobility is horizontal, but when levels are different, we are dealing with vertical mobility, which can be ascending (social climbing) or descending (social sinking)”³⁰⁰.

The paradigm “Paradox of Anderson and the devaluation of diplomas” (R. Boudan) offer an answer: desynchronization between social structures and the increase in education accessibility will produce diploma inflation. The importance of education’s role in social mobility still persists in contemporary society. In this context, Ungureanu presents the law of social intelligence growth by the Spiru Haret paradigm. If a society has organic elites (positively selected) then intelligence will grow double geometric:

“What is the factor that determines the multiplier effect of smart growth? The maximum intelligence of society, represented by individuals with superior intelligence who broaden the average intellectual field of society and raise its level ...”³⁰¹.

The last paradigm of this chapter is called "The law of the requisite hierarchy" (A. Aulin). Ungureanu argues that hierarchy is a necessity of society’s survival, but a high amount of hierarchy can block society.

²⁹⁹ “Într-un mediu social și național corupt prin influență și dominație străină vor fi promovate în ierarhia socială elementele care se adaptează pasiv, ușor și repede mediului social corupt”, *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³⁰⁰ “Când trecerea se face între poziții de la același nivel al ierarhiei straturilor sociale, mobilitatea este orizontală, dar când nivelurile sunt diferite avem de a face cu mobilitatea verticală, care poate fi ascendentă (social climbing) sau descendentă (social sinking).”, *Ibid.*, p. 163.

³⁰¹ “Care este factorul care determină efectul de multiplicare al creșterii inteligenței? Inteligența maximă a societății, reprezentată de indivizi cu inteligență superioară care largesc câmpul intelectual mediu al societății și-i ridică nivelul ...”, *Ibid.*, p. 186.

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

The latter chapter of the book is shorter because the study of social change and revolution is not as developed as the others. In the introduction, Ungureanu defines the essential concepts of society's evolution study area: social and societal evolution, social development, modernization, progress, revolution, and social change.

The first three paradigms of this chapter are related to a particular structural change: progression of society. In the first paradigm of A. Comte, Ungureanu states that modernity is different from the other historical époque by the increasing rationality in society. Rationality is specific for economic action. From this perspective, capitalism is the cause of the evolution of modern rationality. The emergence of capitalism was explained by M. Weber in the birth of Protestant religion. The Protestant religion has supported the capitalist spirit of bourgeoisie. Therefore M. Weber demonstrates in his paradigm, that the modernization of Occident civilization is an effect of the birth of Protestant religion. In the third paradigm of the chapter, H. Mendras explains how social innovation (*e.g.*, the spirit of capitalism) can spread across society.

The issue of social development was raised by Ungureanu through W.E. Moore, J. H. Steward and E.R. Service paradigms. The first identifies 10 evolutionary curves. The second explains their diversity through the principle of multilateralism. Any society has a different evolution path from the others. The principle of phylogenetic discontinuity of progress (E. R. Service) points that every evolutionary path has the potential to be a source of social innovation.

The next concept analyzed is social development. W. W. Rostow proposes a social model of economic development. No society is isolated. Therefore, the social development of one society can be influenced by its interaction with another. These ideas were explained through the paradigm of Constantin Dobrogeanu Gherea and Eugen Lovinescu, who analyzed the evolution of modern Romania. Modernization is an instrument of social development. Ungureanu exposes the positive and negative consequences of this instrument in W. Moore's paradigm.

Structural changes in society can suddenly occur through a revolution. In the paradigm of J. C. Davies, Ungureanu detailed a principle for the start of a revolution: relative deprivation.

The last paradigms of the book analyses the concept of social change. In the "cultural gap" paradigm (W. F. Ogburn). Ungureanu illustrates the process of change within the components of the company. A social innovation that has emerged in one part of society will be delayed in another part of it. In the latest paradigm of the book, P.A. Sorokin argues why social change is imminent and its variations are limited.

CONCLUSIONS

The book mirrors the thinking of a true scientist. By reading Ion Ungureanu's masterpiece, you have access to the mind of a sociologist for whom objectivity, lucidity, clarity and accuracy are moral norms.

Ion Ungureanu managed to organize all theoretical sociology in 260 pages. Thus, the book presents the “core” of sociology, and the essence of this science. Compared to other sociology textbooks, Ion Ungureanu does not confine himself to presenting the main sociological trends (functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, etc.). He succeeds to give autonomy for every paradigm to a sociological trend and thereby turning every paradigm into a possible new sociological study field. In addition, the book brings to the fore the Gustian fundamental idea: society must be studied interdisciplinarily. Sociology integrates other social sciences because only in this way it can study society as a whole. Some sociology paradigms derive from scientific domains such as economics, psychology, or socio-biology.

Sociology is in a constant paradigm competition. Ungureanu demonstrates that there is no universal sociological paradigm, but only a dominant one. From this perspective, each paradigm is valid and has potential for development. The paper of the Romanian sociologist is becoming an act of national conscience. He shows that sociology in Romania can excel by developing its own inherited paradigms, such as those of Eminescu (“The negative social selection”) or Gherea (“The orbitation law”).

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