

## A SHORT ANALYSIS REGARDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY OF ROMANIANS FROM THE HARGHITA-COVASNA AREA

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### ABSTRACT

*This paper aims to address the subject of social security of the Romanians that live in the Harghita-Covasna area. The purpose is to identify if the security of Romanian people is threatened, to what extent and by whom. First, the paper addresses the concept of social security, with references to other related topics, followed by a discussion on the statistics' dynamics for both Romanian and Hungarian communities. The article also tries to detect the causes of the identified oscillations; consequently, we will reveal the causes that led to the decline of the local Romanian community and its connection with the active involvement of "Hungarians and Hungary". For this inquiry we will use mass-media articles, statistical data, and/or researches undertaken by institutions or specialized personnel in the field.*

**Keywords:** security, societal security, identity, abandon, assimilation.

### CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

#### Societal security

According to sociologist Adela Șerban, the concept of societal security refers to: "a relational reality, and the word security does not designate only a social fact, that of being put at shelter from any danger, but also a sense of confidence and peace that emerges from the absence of danger. Security, like health, is not only a feature of a state of affairs, but also a state internalized by a human subject, whether individually or collectively"<sup>134</sup>.

The societal security is an umbrella type of concept that includes the state's efforts to make a deal with the new threats towards the social security. Societal

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<sup>134</sup> "o realitate relațională, iar cuvântul securitate nu desemnează numai un fapt social, acela de a fi pus la adăpost de orice pericol, cât și un sentiment de încredere și de liniște pe care îl dă cuiva absența pericolului. Securitatea, ca și sănătatea, nu este numai o caracteristică a unei stări de fapt, ci și o stare interiorizată de către un subiect uman, fie el individual sau colectiv" in Adela Șerban, *Securitatea societală: fundamente teoretice*, București, Editura Valahia, Colecția Euxin, 2008, p. 54.

security is the ability of a society to maintain the identity of its individuals intact, despite the possible threats or social change<sup>135</sup>. In other words, societal insecurity sets in when the society feels threatened in terms of its identity<sup>136</sup>. The term of *societal security* was first introduced by Barry Buzan in his work “People, States and Fear” in 1991 and it had the purpose of connecting the state security with the human security<sup>137</sup>. Social security responds to “the security needs of organic type of communities”<sup>138</sup>, where by “organic community we mean a naturally cohesive community, based on data and natural availabilities”<sup>139</sup>.

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver defined social security as:

“a particular form of collective security, the object of which is to maintain elements of societal and ethno-symbolic cohesion, specific to human communities. A safe societal space means a space in which the constitutive values, purposes and collective meanings are protected, but also the internal solidarity and the social power that support them”<sup>140</sup>.

Although social security is closely related to other sectors of the security studies, as it aims and seeks to ensure the protection of all communities, it is distinguished by the simple fact that it

“identifies individuals as members of a social group. Society means identity, the way of self-understanding of communities and individuals who identify themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct, however at the same time they intertwine with explicitly political organizations concerned with act of governance”<sup>141</sup>.

Through the idea of social security an emphasis on the identity phenomena, gender relations and social cohesion was put. As Adela Șerban argues, the concept of social security appeared because there has always been:

“an organic need of human communities to defend their right to exist and their tendency to be in a way is structurally their own. That's why we think we can state,

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<sup>135</sup> Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993, p. 23.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> Adela Șerban, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>138</sup> “nevoilor de securitate ale comunităților omenești de tip organic”, *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>139</sup> Prin “comunitate organică înțelegem o comunitate încheată în mod natural, pe baza unor date și disponibilități firești”, *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> “drept o formă particulară a securității colective, al cărei obiect îl constituie menținerea elementelor de coeziune societală și etno-simbolică, specifică comunităților omenești. Un spațiu societal sigur înseamnă un spațiu în care sunt protejate valorile constitutive, scopurile și sensurile colective, dar și solidaritatea internă și puterea socială care le susține”, *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>141</sup> “identifică indivizii ca membri ai unui grup social. Societatea înseamnă identitate, modalitatea de auto-înțelegere a comunităților și a indivizilor care se identifică drept membri ai unei comunități. Aceste identități sunt distincte, dar în același timp se întrepătrund cu organizațiile explicit politice preocupate de guvernare”, in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 171–172.

without a risk of error, that the need for social security and, implicitly, the concern for its assurance are historical constants of humanity”<sup>142</sup>.

The organising concept in the societal sector is *identity*. When we open the subject of societal insecurity, we are talking about how different communities define the perceived threats on their survival as a community that owns a national identity. Thus, the societal security refers to:

“large identity groups which are self supporting themselves; the empirical content varies both in time and space. In contemporary Europe, these groups are mainly national, but in other religious regions or racial groups have more relevance. The subject could be understood as the «security of the identity»”<sup>143</sup>.

According to Bill McSweeney, the collective identities are the result of a political negotiation between a few actors. Rogers Brubaker argues that there are three such actors between which a particular interaction is created, a subject that should be taken into account from a societal security perspective: between the nation-state, the national minority, and the national minority's external homeland<sup>144</sup>.

## THE IDENTITY

A final aspect that needs to be reviewed is identity. Montserrat Guibernau believes that:

“Identity is a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes who a person is and how he or she socially and psychologically identifies. (...) The defining elements of identity are continuity in time and differentiation from others, two foundations of national identity”<sup>145</sup>.

In other words, collective identities are "related" to the idea of power. Montserrat Guibernau argues that, for millions of people, the nation is in fact an

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<sup>142</sup> “o necesitate organică a comunităților omenești de a-și apăra dreptul la existent și tendința lor de a ființa într-un mod care le este structural propriu. De aceea credem că putem afirma, fără riscul de a greși, că nevoia de securitate societală și, implicit, preocuparea pentru asigurarea sa sunt constante istorice ale umanității”, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>143</sup> “(..) grupuri identitare mari care se auto-susțin; conținutul empiric al acestora, variază atât în timp cât și în spațiu. În Europa contemporană, aceste grupuri sunt în principal naționale, însă în alte regiuni grupurile religioase sau rasiale au mai multă relevanță. Conceptul ar putea fi înțeles și «ca securitate a identității»”, in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *Securitatea – un nou cadru de analiză*. (trad.) George Jigla. s.l., CA Publishing, 2010, p. 172.

<sup>144</sup> Lucian Ștefan Dumitrescu, *Managementul securității naționale/internaționale contemporane. Raport de cercetare postdoctorală: Identificare și securitate identitară în Târgu-Mureș. Spre un model cantitativ de analiză a securității identitare la nivel regional*, București, 2015, p. 10.

<sup>145</sup> “Identitatea este o definiție, o interpretare, a sinelui, care stabilește cine este și unde se află o persoană din punct de vedere social și psihologic. (...) Elementele definerii ale identității sunt continuitatea în timp și diferența față de ceilalți, ambele elemente fundamentale ale identității naționale” in Guibernau, 2013, p. 10, apud. Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

extension to the familial group, and the only political community in which they really matter. Therefore, the idea of belonging generated by collective identities is an important antidote to loneliness, alienation, and social insignificance<sup>146</sup>.

In the professor's vision, the national identity has five dimensions, first of which she names the cultural part of the national identity, which explains why identity cannot exist outside an institutional environment. For Guibernau, the cultural dimension refers to national symbols, beliefs, and traditions which, once internalized, become a constituent part of the nation. The second dimension is the psychological one, which refers to the emotions generated by certain historical events. The third dimension is the territorial one. It concerns the territory that was imagined and simultaneously internalised as home. The historical dimension gives a community a sense of resilience over time, pride, and uniqueness. The final dimension of the national identity is the political one, which relates to citizenship and, at least in theory, guaranteed loyalty towards the state<sup>147</sup>.

## THE NATION

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde argued that in Europe, societal security is mainly about nations, or more precisely nations as ethnic groups or minorities<sup>148</sup>. Further, the link between the nation and the "imagined community" will be addressed in short. The "imagined community" is based on Benedict Anderson's idea of "invented community" and Smith's idea of "lateral ethnicity":

"For Anderson, the imagined community is the basis of the nation state. In other words, the state is based on a false community in which, Anderson highlights, tradition is nothing more than an ideological imaginary. As ideological, lateral constructs, such communities are easily constructed through the vectors of secular or ecclesiastical authority that define the political nation. True, for Anderson, all nations are invented, the distinction between political and organic nations does not exist. Anderson omits what Anthony Smith calls vertical ethnicities. Unlike lateral ethnicities, created from the top down by political command, vertical ethnicities are organic, with an ancient basis of common traditions"<sup>149</sup>.

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<sup>146</sup> Lucian Ștefan Dumitrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Japp De Wilde, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>149</sup> "Pentru Anderson, comunitatea imaginată reprezintă baza statului național. Cu alte cuvinte, statul se întemeiază pe o falsă comunitate în care, arată Anderson, tradiția nu ar fi altceva decât un imaginar ideologic. Fiind construite ideologice, laterale, astfel de comunități sunt ușor de înregimentat prin vectorii autorității laice sau bisericești, cele care definesc națiunea politică. Este adevărat, pentru Anderson, toate națiunile sunt inventate, el neavând acces la distincția dintre națiuni politice și națiuni organice. Anderson omite ceea ce Anthony Smith numește etniile verticale. Spre deosebire de etniile laterale, create de sus în jos, prin comandă politică, etniile verticale sunt demotice, organice, cu o bază străveche de tradiții comune" in Radu Baltasiu (coord.), Gabriel Săpunaru, Bulumac Ovidiana, *Slăbirea comunității românești din Harghita-Covasna – raport de cercetare*, București, Editura Etnologică, Colecția de Studii Sociologice, 2013, p. 15.

## THE NATION AND THE STATESMAN

Simion Mehedinți, one of the most respected intellectuals of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Romania, stated that:

“The first duty of the statesman is to ensure the permanence of his nation, linking it as closely as possible to the national territory”<sup>150</sup>.

Also, he synthesized the statesman’s duty in only three words: restorer, keeper and renovator of the land<sup>151</sup>.

## THREATS TO COMMUNITY MYTHS, RITUALS AND SYMBOLS

The reference object of the societal sector is the collective identity. Aiming to be a particular field, it is actually more difficult to establish some clear boundaries between the existential threats and those less serious, which may be a serious challenge. The collective identities have an inner dynamic and a conservative nature, which transforms the menaces toward this sector to be perceived as a danger of not being oneself anymore, as threats to the concrete identity<sup>152</sup>.

The threats to societal security are mainly related to migration, horizontal and vertical competition. The latter appears especially where projects about political integrity or secessionists projects are undertaken, whereas the horizontally competition may occur at any level. Many of the local conflicts are linked to the vertical competition between nation-states and minority-nations and have as trigger an element that refers to the idea of minority<sup>153</sup>.

To understand the idea of “we” one must go back to the definition of society, a community united by its collective identity. Applying the concept of security to this definition, one can observe that societal security ensures the affirmation of group identity and social cohesion. Thus, the main risks and threats to the societal security are those related to language, religion, traditions, symbols, collective memory, etc. These are in fact the components that determine that they belong to a specific community. For Buzan, these kinds of threats come from within the state rather than outside of it. However, the exterior threats that are not totally excluded<sup>154</sup>.

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<sup>150</sup> “datoria cea dintâi a omului de Stat este să asigure trăinicia națiunii sale, legând-o cât mai strâns de teritoriul național” in Simion Mehedinți, *Opere Complete*, Vol. I, *Geographica*, Partea a doua, Biblioteca Enciclopedică, Fundația Regală pentru Literatură și Artă, București, 1943, p. 318.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>152</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp De Wilde, *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 17.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>154</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (2nd ed.), London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 123.

## STATISTICAL DYNAMICS

According to data provided by the National Institute of Statistics, in 2011, in Harghita there were 39,196 Romanians out of a total of 310,867<sup>155</sup>, which means that the percentage of Romanians was 12.6%<sup>156</sup>. In Covasna, out of 210,177 people, only 45,021 were Romanians<sup>157</sup>, i.e., 21.42%<sup>158</sup> of the total population. Therefore, in the two counties, the Romanian community became a “local minority”<sup>159</sup>. When we say local minority, or dominated, we mean “the population that is a majority nationally but is a minority locally”<sup>160</sup>.

A comparative analysis of the data concerning the nationality structure of Covasna's population shows that in 2011, compared to 2002, the Hungarian ethnic population decreased by 7%, while the Romanian ethnic population decreased almost twice as much, by 12%<sup>161</sup>. For Harghita, the data is clearer: the Romanian population decreased while the Hungarian population increased. Bishop Andrei of Harghita and Covasna warned in 2019 about the regional depopulation of Romanians, stating that the number decreased in only four years by 30,000 (from 81,000 to 50,000). The disappearance from the registers of the Orthodox diocese of 37% of the faithful could mean the biggest demographic collapse in the country recently recorded<sup>162</sup>.

According to the 2011 census, when Romania's population was 20,121,641, the Hungarian community in Romania was 1,259,914 and represented 6.2% of the country's population. Most Hungarians were in Harghita<sup>163</sup>, where 84.09%<sup>164</sup> of the population was Hungarian, and in Covasna, where Hungarians made up 73.14%<sup>165</sup>

<sup>155</sup> INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.2. Populația după etnie – macroregiuni, regiuni de dezvoltare, județe și categorii de localități”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 20, 2021.

<sup>156</sup>  $39.196 \times 100 / 310.867 = 12,6\%$ .

<sup>157</sup> INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.2. Populația după etnie – macroregiuni, regiuni de dezvoltare, județe și categorii de localități”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 20, 2021.

<sup>158</sup>  $45.021 \times 100 / 210.177 = 21,42\%$ .

<sup>159</sup> Radu Baltasiu (coord.), Gabriel Săpunaru, Ovidiana Bulumac, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>160</sup> “populația care este majoritară în plan național, dar minoritară în plan local”, *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> Lazăr Lădăriu, “Concluziile unui recensământ sau cine pe cine deznaționalizează”, 2012, in *Condeiful Ardelean*, Available at: <http://www.condeifulardelean.ro/articol/concluziile-unui-recensamant-sau-cine-pe-cine-deznationalizeaza>, Accessed on March 13, 2020.

<sup>162</sup> Iulia Drăghici Taraș, “Exodul românilor din Covasna și Harghita provoacă îngrijorare”, 2019, in *Covasna Media*, Available at: <https://covasnamedia.ro/stirea-zilei/exodul-romanilor-din-covasna-si-harghita-provoaca-ingrijorare>, Accessed on November 4, 2020.

<sup>163</sup> INS, “Rezultatele Recensământului 2011: Vol. II. Tab.10. Populația după etnie și limba maternă – județe”, 2011, Available at: <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesionala/>, Accessed on October 11, 2020.

<sup>164</sup>  $261.417 \times 100 / 310.867 = 84,09\%$  (din populația Harghitei este de etnie femeie de etnie maghiară).

<sup>165</sup>  $153.728 \times 100 / 210.177 = 73,14\%$  (din populația Covasnei este de etnie femeie de etnie maghiară).

of the county's population. In ten years, from 2002 to the 2011 census, the Hungarian community in Romania managed to record a decrease of only 0.4%, remaining the largest ethnic minority in Romania<sup>166</sup>.

Therefore, while the Romanian population has decreased with approximately 37% in the last four years, Hungarians have decreased by only 0.4% in a decade. We should ask ourselves if there is any connection between the Romanian demographic decline and the idea of societal insecurity.

### **THREATS TO THE IDENTITY OF ROMANIANS IN HARGHITA- COVASNA: A NEW TYPE OF HUNGARIAN REVISIONISM?**

Mircea Stratulat defined revisionism as the set of “revengeful actions that continue the interwar revisionist policy”. He defined neo-revisionism as the Hungarian state’s attempt to remove the areas where ethnic Hungarians are in the majority from the influence of the Romanian state. For instance, the neo-revisionist attitude is characterized by:

“the imposing autonomy, the self-government and the segregation in every fields of activity (administration, economy, education) to exit from the Romanian jurisdiction (or Yugoslav and Slovak) the areas where the Hungarian minority has a majority. (...) A specific form of Hungarian neo-revisionism (less common in the practice of interwar revisionism) is Hungary’s intention to “defend” the Hungarians in its neighbouring countries”<sup>167</sup>.

This type of “defense” of the Hungarian minority is done as we have already seen on several levels. The economic manner of “intervention and defense” firstly intended to focus on the demographic level and on the second place, indirectly expressed, but also much needed, the religious, educational, administrative ones of the Hungarian community from the Harghita and Covasna area. What may be supportive for some can become isolating for others.

To get an overall idea of the degree of societal insecurity that Romanians in the two counties may feel, we will try to underline the effects of the measures presented above towards the identity of their community, as it is a key aspect in the

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<sup>166</sup> Ziarul Financiar, 2012, “Maghiarii și romii, cele mai numeroase minorități etnice din România”, Available at: <https://www.zf.ro/eveniment/maghiarii-si-romii-cele-mai-numeroase-minoritati-etnice-din-romania-9200543>, Accessed on November 4, 2020.

<sup>167</sup> “acțiuni revanșarde care continuă politica revizionistă interbelică”, iar prin neorevizionism înțelege încercarea maghiară de a scoate zonele unde etnicii maghiari sunt majoritari de sub influența statului vizat. De pildă, neorevizionismul caută ca prin “impunerea autonomiei, autogovernării și a separatismului în toate domeniile de activitate (administrație, economie, învățământ, etc.) să scoată de sub jurisdicția României (ori a Iugoslaviei și Slovaciei) zonele unde minoritatea maghiară deține pondere în rândul populației. (...) O formă specifică de exprimare a neorevizionismului maghiar (mai puțin întâlnită în practica revizionismului interbelic) o constituie pretenția Ungariei de a-și asuma “apărarea” minorităților maghiare din țările vecine” in Mircea Stratulat, *Revizionism și neorevizionism ungar*, București, Editura Globus, 1994, p. 7.

societal paradigm. Our main interest is to identify to what extent we may analyze a vertical competition in the case of the nationalities which are undertook in this analysis. Thus, we will try to seek the effects of the Hungarian applied ethnopolitics, and to discuss the extension of the Hungarian sphere of influence.

### CONCRETE ACTIONS IN THE FIELD

The Hungarian community in Romania benefits from a permanent support from the Hungarian state, but it also receives constant attention, funds and advantages on ethnic criteria from the Romanian state, all due to the intense activity of the non-governmental organizations that represent its interests (among which the most influential is called the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania). However, it should be noted that this NGO has received constant and consistent funding from the Romanian state both as a non-governmental organization and as a political party. The documents show that this party started in 2000 with public funding of 389,000 lei and reached almost 21 million lei in 2010, over 18 million lei in 2014, reaching 32 million in 2020<sup>168</sup>. Its public funding has increased 53 times in the last 14 years. To these amounts, we can add the 7.3 million RON spent exclusively on the rehabilitation of the monuments of the Hungarian community in Covasna and Harghita. The money was allocated by party president Kelemen Hunor when he was head of the Ministry of Culture, from 2009–2011<sup>169</sup>.

More serious than the overfunding is the lack of similar actions for the Romanian community in this area. Let us see a relevant comparison: between 2011 and 2014, the Ministry of Culture allocated 25.2 million lei for the rehabilitation of Hungarian monuments in Harghita and Covasna, while for the Romanian monuments, however, it was allocated only 112,600 lei<sup>170</sup>. In other words, in less than 3 years, the Hungarian community has received 22 times more funding from the Romanian state alone than the Romanian community. The issue of the. This

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<sup>168</sup> Mădălina Mihalache, “UDMR, ventuză bugetară cu statut dublu”, January 27, 2021, in *Jurnalul*, Available at: <https://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/udmr-ventuza-bugetara-cu-statut-dublu-865252.html>, Accessed on: June 27, 2021.

<sup>169</sup> Moara lui Gelu, “U.D.M.R. – afacere de milioane de euro din fonduri publice”, 2014, Available at: <https://moaralugelu.blogspot.com/2014/04/udmrafaceredemilioanedeeurodin.html?m=1>, Accessed on February 27, 2021.

<sup>170</sup> Dan Tanasă, “EXCLUSIV. În patru ani, peste 14,3 milioane de lei de la Cultură pentru renovarea conacelor secuiești din Covasna și Harghita. VEZI ce sumă RIDICOLĂ au primit monumentele românești”, 2015, in *DanTanasa.ro*, Available at: <https://www.dantanasa.ro/exclusiv-in-patru-ani-pest-143-milioane-de-lei-de-la-cultura-pentru-renovarea-conacelor-secuiesti-din-covasna-si-harghita-vezi-ce-suma-ridicola-au-primit-monumentele-romanesti-documente/>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.

Dan Tanasă, “EXCLUSIV. UDMR, o afacere de milioane de euro anual din fonduri publice DOCUMENTE”, 2016, in *DanTanasa.ro*, Available at: <https://www.dantanasa.ro/exclusiv-udmr-o-afacere-de-milioane-de-euro-anual-din-fonduri-publice-documente/>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.

Ziare.com, “Câți bani au primit partidele de la stat luna trecută: PSD e campion detașat, cu peste 16 milioane de lei”, 2019, Available at: <http://www.ziare.com/politica/partid/cati-bani-au-primit-partidele-de-la-stat-luna-trecuta-psd-e-campion-detasat-cu-pest-16-milioane-de-lei-1567726>, Accessed on February 24, 2021.



aspect brings to the table the concept of the “abandoned society”<sup>171</sup> by its own elite, which has a serious consequence: the drastic decrease of the Romanian population in the area.

In the same time, the Hungarian state does not neglect the Magyar community in Romania. It invests heavily in the area through various cultural and economic associations, etc., among which the Pro Economica Foundation and Communitas are the most famous. In 2019, Hungary, through the Pro Economica Foundation, invested more than 70 million euros<sup>172</sup> in the study area to support the development of agriculture. Although in theory this money can be accessed by anyone, regardless of nationality, one of the mandatory conditions is to speak Hungarian. For this reason, only 8% -10%<sup>173</sup> of the beneficiaries were Romanians, the rest being Magyar, obviously. And this was just one of many examples of the sources of funding received by the Hungarian community in this area. But there are many more domains funded, such as education, sport, culture, religion, and so on.

Another level of the field actions initiated by the Budapest government is the symbolic one. For instance, the year of 2018 was declared “The year of Hungarian families abroad”<sup>174</sup> and the 2019 was declared “The year of Hungarian children abroad”<sup>175</sup>. All these actions had the purpose of enforcing the national identity in the Hungarian communities, regardless the state they live in.

## THE EFFECTS

The societal security of the Romanians in the studied area is affected on the one hand by the over-developed support that the Hungarian community receives either from the Hungarian or the Romanian state, through the intervention of political parties. However, societal security is also affected by the absence of

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<sup>171</sup> Radu Baltasiu, Ovidiana Bulumac, *Istorie socială. Actualitate și problematică*, București, Editura Universității din București, 2017.

<sup>172</sup> Info Mureș, “Ungaria investește zeci de milioane de euro în Mureș, Harghita și Covasna”, 2019, in *Info Mureș*, Available at: <https://stiri.infomures.ro/economie/ungaria-investeste-zeci-de-milioane-de-euro-in-mures-harghita-si-covasna/>, Accessed on February 20, 2021.

<sup>173</sup> G4media, “60 de milioane de euro de la Budapesta pentru aproape 5000 de fermieri din Ținutul Secuiesc/În ciuda avertismentelor MAE, Fundația Pro Economica anunță că marți va fi desemnat primul proiect câștigător în categoria mari investiții”, 2019, Available at: <https://www.g4media.ro/60-de-milioane-de-euro-de-la-budapesta-pentru-aproape-5000-de-fermieri-din-tinutul-secuiesc-in-ciuda-avertismentelor-mae-fundatia-pro-economica-anunta-ca-marti-va-fi-desemnat-primul-proiect-castiga.html>, Accessed on February 20, 2021.

<sup>174</sup> Punctul.ro, “Un miliard de forinți pentru programul Anul familiilor maghiare de peste hotare”, 2018, Available at: <https://www.punctul.ro/un-miliard-de-forinti-pentru-programul-anul-familiilor-maghiare-de- peste-hotare/>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

<sup>175</sup> Hiradu.ro, “Potápi: începe anul tematic dedicat copiilor maghiari de peste hotare”, 2019, Available at: <https://hirado.hu/2019/02/12/potapi-incepeanultematicdedicacopiiormaghiaridepeste-hotare/?source=hirkereso>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

support and concrete action from the Romanian state. In the short term, the most important consequences of the above are emigration and assimilation of Romanians. In the long run, the pressure on the identarian element will lead to a decrease in the number of Romanians and eventually to their disappearance from the two counties.

## EMIGRATION

Threats to societal security can be understood through the evolution of migration. Overall, the population of Harghita and Covasna seems relatively more fixed in the territory, but if we could extrapolate the results of the research conducted by CESPE in Toplița in 2012–2013, we could show that more than half of the Romanian population is affected by emigration<sup>176</sup>. Older Hungarian quantitative studies show that the Romanian population has twice the migration coefficient of the Hungarian population<sup>177</sup>. We understand from this that in terms of actual emigration and the desire to emigrate, the Magyars are less affected than the Romanians<sup>178</sup>.

## ETHNIC SUBSUMPTION: ASSIMILATION OF ROMANIANS THROUGH MIXED MARRIAGES

The *ethnic subsumption* is another factor one should take into consideration, due to the fact that it leads to weakening the structural identity of Romanians, which inhabit the area in question. Through ethnic subsumption we understand:

“the willingness of Romanian speakers to 'give away' their identity, especially through marriage. The phenomenon takes the form of ethnic dissolution where the Romanian community is already weakened, being incapable of demographic and social resistance, etc”<sup>179</sup>.

Earlier studies on the subject show that Romanians:

“(...) have a double coefficient of ethnic subsumption, *i.e.*, willingness to cross the border of their own identity through marriage”<sup>180</sup>.

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<sup>176</sup> Centrul European pentru Studii în Probleme Etnice al Academiei Române, *Toplița – starea comunității. Raport parțial preliminar*, 2013, Ms., p. 11.

<sup>177</sup> Csata István, Kiss Tamás, *Perspective demografice în județul Harghita. Prognosticul divizării regionale a populației de etnie maghiară, romă și română*, s.a., Ms. p. 43.

<sup>178</sup> Radu Baltasiu, *Direcții de presiune cu relevanță demografică. Situația demografică în Harghita și Covasna. Resuscitarea biopoliticii maghiare în centrul României*, 2019, Ms, p. 5.

<sup>179</sup> “(...) disponibilitatea vorbitorilor de limbă română de a-și “dărui” identitatea, în special prin căsătorie. Fenomenul ia forma dizolvării etnice acolo unde comunitatea românească este deja slăbită, fiind incapabilă de concentrare demografică, socială etc.” in Radu Baltasiu, Gabriel Săpunaru, Ovidiana Bulumac, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>180</sup> “(...) au un coeficient dublu de subsumare etnică, adică de disponibilitate de a trece frontiera propriei identități prin căsătorie”, *Ibid.*, p. 66.

According to the 2002 census, Romanian women are more likely to “give away their identity”<sup>181</sup> through marriage, in comparison to Hungarian and Roma women. Most mixed marriages are those in which the husband is Hungarian, and the wife is Romanian. Thus, the number of marriages between a Hungarian man and a Romanian woman is about 14 times higher<sup>182</sup> than the number of marriages between a Romanian man and a Hungarian woman. Also, the number of marriages between a Hungarian man and a Romanian woman is 50 times<sup>183</sup> higher than that between a Hungarian man and a Roma woman. These statistics demonstrate that the Hungarian men are preeminently looking for connections with Romanian women, essentially because Romanian women are more willing to create multicultural marital commitments, while Roma ethnical women are less interested in mixed marriages.

### A WORRYING PROGNOSIS

According to the 2011 census, in only two of the nine municipalities and towns in Harghita the Romanians are the majority of the population, particularly Toplița (68%) and Bălan (58%). However, considerable decreases from 2002 to the 2011 have been recorded, of 3 and 6% (Toplița: 71.10% and Bălan: 64.81%). In the rural areas of Harghita the majority of the population is also Hungarian: in 49 out of the 58 localities Hungarians represent more than 80% of the population. We note that Romanians represent 31 of the 58 communes, less than 1% of the local population. Simultaneously, there are fewer Romanians than Roma, from which we can deduce that Romanians living in the countryside are the ethnic group most likely to disappear, either because of emigration or assimilation. If the numbers continue to fall in the 31 communes with less than 1% Romanians, by the next census the Romanians will disappear completely.

According to the same 2011 census, in the urban area of Covasna, Hungarians hold most of the population in four of the five municipalities and towns. Compared to the 2002 census, the Hungarian population has decreased slightly but does not exceed 2% on average. The only town where Romanians are in the majority is Întorsura Buzăului, where the decrease recorded is twice as large from one census to another, i.e., about 4% (95.90% in 2011 compared to 99.18% in 2002). In Covasna, out of the 40 communes analyzed, in only five Romanians are in the majority. Hungarians, on the other hand, are in the majority in 33 of the 40 communes (percentage score 12.5% to 82.5%).

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<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>182</sup> Own calculations based on data provided by: INSE, 2002, “Vol. IV. Tab. 29. Nuclee familiale pe tipuri, după etnia persoanelor care le alcătuiesc, pe medii de rezidență”, Available at: <https://insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t29.pdf>, Accessed on April 4, 2021.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

In other words, there are about 7 times more Hungarian majority municipalities than Romanian ones. Moreover, in 27 of the 33 communes inhabited predominantly by Hungarians, they represent more than 80% of the population. Another aspect that highlights the fact that Romanians are the ethnic group more prone to disappear from the study area is the number of communes where Romanians have percentages below 10%: 27 in number, while Hungarians have only 4 (the number of communes where Romanians are below 10% is four times higher than the Hungarian ones). The number of communes where Romanians are less than 1% is twice as high as those where Hungarians are less than 1%. That being said, it is plausible that until the next census, those 6 communes in which Romanians represent just 1% of the population, to be 100% settled by Hungarians.

## CONCLUSIONS

Societal insecurity refers to threats that affect the cultural reproduction of a social group. This type of insecurity 'dilutes' the sense of belonging to a larger collectivity. In other words, societal insecurity takes the form of distrust in public institutions. It also creates a sense of social injustice and a feeling of abandonment. Myths, symbols, and rituals make up the collective identity. They must be protected and guaranteed by certain state institutions. To talk about social justice, people must first trust these institutions. Finally, for this mechanism to work, institutions must gain people's trust. The case of the Romanian community in the Harghita – Covasna area is illustrative of this perspective.

This study concluded that the societal security of the Romanians in the Harghita – Covasna area is threatened by the active involvement of the Hungarian state. However, the societal security of Romanians is even more affected by the non-involvement of the Romanian state in solving the problems faced by Romanians.

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