Romania – layers of collective identity in the 19th and the 20th centuries – an outline

- (second part) -

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The Second Renaissance. Two social types. Two modernities

The Second Renaissance took place in two stages, that could be called „heroic" and „critical" (Bădescu, 2003). At a certain moment both were coming to exist in parallel and to become two major organizing paradigms: the *synchronist* and the *critical* or *conservative thought*.

The „heroic culture" is the answer of Romanian society to the urgency/provocation of "reentering" its history: recovering the social space, the national territory, the right to engage in trade, to have a state - as well as to its own European identity. The effort was started by the Revolution of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 in Wallachia, to be continued by the *Transylvanian School* and at its peak by the 1848 revolutionaries. The ideal type of the "heroic" intellectual is Ion Heliade Rădulescu.

Heliade Rădulescu is convinced that the Romanian people has a "messianic role" (Bădescu 2003) but at the same time he employs a very technical approach regarding the process of social development through education and through promoting a local (national) bourgeoisie. What the nation needed was not an indoctrinated, but an educated youth, i.e., independent, self-sustaining individuals, that would in turn be able to liberate the country from its economic dependency on scientific rather than doctrinaire bases: "See to it that every youth leaving school, the academies, the university, should have a training that allows them to sustain themselves and be independent. Create more technical schools in every district, for it is they alone that bring forth the national bourgeoisie; and the nation which has no workers, artists, merchants from among its own, that nation perishes" (Heliade 1916: 267). The existence of a national bourgeoisie thus became a necessary condition for the nation's survival. Once autonomous, the decisions the country would make on its way to modernization were its own responsibility, and this made thorough knowledge of Romania's history and of its social traditions imperative: "In stepping forward we must remember our starting point; progress cannot be accomplished without safeguarding the wealth already gathered, be it material, spiritual, or moral. … Again, with the laws and changes the foreigners started imposing on us, and which the demagogues and anarchists keep praising, the Romanian will lose his very name of Romanian" (Heliade 1916: 11).

The second renaissance brings two new social types: the ideologue and the specialist (Badescu 2003). Both are somehow different of the ordinary people. They are to introduce the

Romanian people on the path of development. The ideologue is a revolutionary, keen to *synchronize* the Romanian space with the *new ideological teachings from Paris* on reason, politics and society from upside down. Important enough, there was not always a clear-cut distinction between these social types. Some of the revolutionaries were pretty far away from the *ideologue* model of the French Revolution whenever not *reason* as such was the main referential but the ordinary people and the protection of the nationality: even if Nicolae Balcescu, one of the leaders of the 1848 movement in Romania was highly influenced by the French Revolution, he was far from the utopian *communal* order of the French Revolution. He, and other revolutionaries professed the need for *national unity* as the most important ingredient of civil liberty: "without nationality the republic will be another form of despotism" (Al. Papiu Ilarian, **Istoria românilor din Dacia superioară. Schiţa tomului III,** ed. De dr. Ştefan Pascu, Sibiu, 1943, p.157, apud G.D. Iscru, 1988, p. 250).

In Transylvania the 1848 Revolution took a dramatic turn for it had to have a strong national defensive stance against the annexation of Transylvania by the Hungarian Revolutionary Government. The social ideal of the Hungarian revolution was almost entirely subordinated to this matter. Between 1848 and 1849, the huzsars killed 30 000 civilians of Romanian ethnicity and destroyed about 240 villages. During the fights with the army of Avram Iancu which was defending the Apuseni Mountains other 10 000 Romanians were killed. This compulsive subordination of Revolution to an unrealistic objective (Hungarians were 1/3 of the total population of Transylvania at most) made the task of the Russian and Austrian Empires to liquidate both movements much easier (data from the speech of the historian Petre Ţurlea in the Parliament of Romania, on March 16, 1999, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=2961&idm=1,12&idl=1, consulted on February 2009)

Further on, Transylvania saw the unfolding of the last major national movement in 1892-1894, known under the name of the Transylvanian Memorandum. Almost all the Romanian elite of the province, as well from Hungary was involved. And when the Hungarian authorities took an unusual hard stance, closing the Romanian schools and arresting or harassing the petitioners, the Romanian Government – under the hard pressure of its own public opinion – had to intervene in Vienna in order to alleviate the situation. The Memorandum marked the fully maturation of the Romanian political movement, united since 1881 under the National Romanian Party. Interestingly enough, the Memorandum Movement did not question the opportunity of Dualism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, except the problem of the elementary civil rights for the Romanians under the concept of an extended autonomy inside the Austrian Monarchy.

In the meantime, in what had become the Kingdom of Romania (since 1881)there emerged the cultural paradigm of *critical thought* (Junimea) delivered one of the first world class theories on development, highly resourceful to this day.

Critical thought and the theory of "form without substance" (Titu Maiorescu)

It was in his 1868 article "Against the Present-Day Direction in Romanian Culture", published in *Junimea*'s magazine *Convorbiri Literare* ("Literary Conversations"), that Maiorescu for the first time undertook a severe analysis of Romanian society and of its hasty modernization: "Judging by the statistics of outer forms, today Romanians seem to possess almost the

entire Western civilization. We have politics and science, we have journals and academies, we have schools and literature, we have museums, conservatories, we have a theater, we even have a constitution. But in reality all these are dead productions, pretenses without foundation, ghosts without bodies, illusions without truth, and thus the culture of the Romanian's upper classes is null and void, and the abyss separating us from the people below grows deeper every day" (Maiorescu 1973 [1868]: 168).

With remarkable precision, Maiorescu detected the intention behind this excess of forms in the intellectuals' "vanity of showing foreign peoples at any cost, even by disregarding the truth, that we are their equals in terms of civilization. This is the only explanation for the vice that seeped into our public life, and that is the lack of any solid foundation for the outer forms that we keep receiving" (Maiorescu 1868: 164). Moreover, the society which all these
outer forms of civilization entered had simply not been prepared by anything in its history to receive them, Maiorescu argued. This, then, constituted the basis for the enunciation of his theory of *form without substance*:

"Steeped in Oriental barbarianism until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Romanian society started to awake from its lethargy around 1820, perhaps seized only then by the contagious movement by which the ideas of the French Revolution had reached even the outer geographic extremities of Europe. Attracted to the light, the Romanian youth undertook this extraordinary emigration towards the fountains of French and German science, which has kept growing to this very day and which has brought part of the luster of foreign societies to free Romania. Unfortunately, only the outer luster! For, unprepared as our youths were and still are, dazzled by the great phenomena of modern culture, they only assimilated the effects, but did not grasp the causes, they only saw civilization's shallower forms, but did not see through to the deeper historical foundations which with necessity produced those forms and without the prior existence of which they could not even have lived. And thus, limited by a fatal superficiality, their hearts and minds inflamed by too light a fire, the young Romanians did and do come back to their homeland with the decision to emulate and reproduce the appearences of Western culture, in the belief that they would thereby also at once attain the literature, the culture, the arts, and above all, liberty in a modern state" (Maiorescu 1973 [1868]: 163).

"A people's powers, be they material or moral, have a limited quantity at any given time. The Romanians' national wealth has a fixed figure today; their intellectual energy is also of a certain amount. You cannot get away with gambling this sum of powers, the capital of a people's cultural enterprise. The time, the wealth, the moral strength and the intellectual swiftness you use for a futile creation, and all the more for a bad creation, are forever lost for the necessary and the true one. They cannot both succeed, precisely because the source of a nation's powers is not unlimited, but is limited by its very nature. But if you lack a thousand modest, diligent students, national industrialists and workers, good poets and writers, and real scientists, the reason is because the limited powers your people possesses for them are used up by ignorant teachers, no-good clerks, academics, secretaries, honorific members, cultural associates, journalists, athenians, conservatorists, pseudo-poets, canvas-hangers at the 'living artists exhibition', and so on and so forth. You have one marble block only: if you use it for a caricature, what else is left for sculpting a Minerva?" (Maiorescu 1973 [1874]: 5).
The verdict that Maiorescu ultimately gave was a radical one: "Form without substance is not only of no use, but it is downright pernicious, because it destroys a powerful cultural means" (Maiorescu 1973 [1968]: 170).

The critical thought and the positive classes (Mihai Eminescu)

Using the criterion of productive work, which had at an earlier point led Titu Maiorescu to characterize the large peasant mass as the only "real class" in Romanian society, Eminescu in his turn spoke of a "positive class", therefore a productive one, making up the "real country ". This particular social group and the "parasitical elements" out of which the superimposed layer had emerged increasingly defined themselves in terms of the relationship entertained with each other, and thus entered into a process of class formation, while the "legal country", a metaphorical term with the help of which Eminescu described the liberal institutions, provided the juridical apparatus necessary for creating and justifying this polarized structure as well as the resulting economic exploitation:

"The land, in its constitutive parts, evolves toward dissolution and anarchy. And things could indeed hardly be otherwise. Just like the worker's role is to produce useful objects, the role of administration is a concrete and valuable work, just like any other. By the power awarded it by state authority, an administration is supposed to dispose of any impediments to a country's intellectual and economical development […]. But the present administration and the elements making it up constitute by themselves a permanent impediment to our development […]. On the one hand, the economic exigencies of an allegedly civilized state increase daily and require an ever-growing amount of work in order to be met, on the other hand, the physical degeneration of the worker's race and the disappearance of the instruments of his work eliminate the very possibility of work. Parallel to these two general evils, which create constantly growing gaps, we note that the frontier points are being opened in order to let in entire flocks of foreigners who come to supplant a people which perishes by the ineptness of its sons" (Eminescu 1881c: 76ff.).

"Every constitution, as a state's fundamental law, has as its correlate a particular class on which it is based. The correlate of the Western states' constitutions is a rich and cultivated middle class, a class of patricians, of industrial manufacturers – who see in the constitution the means of representing their interests in line with their significance […] Where are *our* positive classes? The historical aristocracy – it always has to be historical in order to be important – has almost disappeared, there exists no positive middle class, the gaps are filled by foreigners, the peasant class is too uncultivated, and, although it is the only positive one, no one understands it, no one represents it, no one cares about it" (Eminescu 1876: 59).

The key factor in this diagnosis is represented by Eminescu's insight that cosmopolitanism (in its liberal variant), although acting as a global design, was rooted in the local history of the Western societies which elaborated it.

The ideology it sought to export to underdeveloped countries by means of rational models of capitalist organization was therefore a success story, but one that consciously ignored the historical realities which it confronted in the Eastern European periphery. Social revolutions such as had taken place in 1848 all over Europe were a "luxury" which small states, whose political or economic independence was constantly threatened, could not afford. Hence, advocating individual liberties in such a context could only act (as it already had) to the detriment of state power. Eminescu thus pleaded against a contractualist state, against individualism, free trade, and strictly formal modernization, and for a state representing the entire nation (instead of just separate individuals), for safeguarding nationality, and for protectionism.

These analyses led him to distinguish between two types of "civilization", the economic and the political: "The precondition for state civilization is economic civilization. Introducing the

forms of a foreign civilization in the absence of its economic correlate is sheer wasted work. But this is what our liberals did. Instead of taking a look at society's essential ill, they were concerned with the accidental and meaningless ones" (Eminescu 1877: 30).

Eminescu on misery. Misery as the high cost of peripheralization

Mihai Eminescu is one of the few theoreticians that succeeded in analyzing the nature of Romania's „social misery" by offering a set of determinant factors and direct effects. One of the main causes that greatly contributed to the profound moral degradation is the "usurary practice" (a state of constant exploitation sustained by landholders that has direct and negative effects over the peasants and the 19th century Romanian middle-class).

According to Eminescu, this type of usury is responsible for the corruption of peoples' verticality by inducing them to commit an increased number of crimes and felonies. In fact, it is all reduced to a conceptual triangle or a vicious circle between the people of justice, the usurarian ones (that bribe the first category) and the victims (that must obey the faulty verdicts and speculative policies). This is the mechanism through which the conscience of rightfulness suffers alteration up to the highest levels due to the inefficient institutional policies and lack of reliability, reaching even "the most elevated social classes in terms of culture, status or fortune" (Eminescu: 1998, p. 25). The increased bureaucracy and a legal system hard to understand that suffers one too many legislative changes are bound to negatively influence the citizen's moral sense of purpose. Continuing on the same line, Mihai Eminescu manages to highlight by the instrumentality of his sociological theory the fact that "a great deal of the ones that find themselves imprisoned are nothing else but the sure victims of the usurary practice and of the promiscuity derived from it" (idem).

Interpreting statistical data trough a nationalist lens, Eminescu states that the increased number of taverns, opened mainly by the Jewish people settled on Romanian territory, has a negative or even a destructive impact over the citizen's moral and financial state. Although this type of discourse was blamed in his time, we can sustain that the objectivity of such a theory cannot be touched. That is because Eminescu also embraces the critical type of analysis when it comes to the imitative behavior adopted by the Christian Romanian elites ("the exploitation of the peasant's misery is made in the same way even by the Christian landholders" (Eminescu: 1998, p. 29) that follow a single principle: the higher the misery, the higher the extortion through scandalous interest rates.

From the same critical perspective, the Romanian theoretician banns the immoral conduct by saying: „We have to know about the peasant's exploitation in Moldavia that reached its peak through usurary means and exhilaration in order to understand why he is unable to evolve, why he is moving backwards; because he appears in front of us as a depressed idiot, with no life and no pleasure for life" (Eminescu: 1998, p. 29)

In addition to the factors remarked above, Eminescu also adds the freedom regime which, in his opinion "succeeds in exploiting in the most usurary form the greatest socio-economical class, the agrarian population, its ruin doing nothing else but damaging the statehood, fiscal incomes and national welfare in genera" (Eminescu: 1998, p. 31).

The discovery of the main causes for the "spiritual misery" that continues to spread all around determines a highlight of the series of effects that appear at the societal level: emigration, low marriage rate, high mortality rate, high level of criminality etc. The Romanian emigration in Bulgaria or Serbia for example is due to the agrarian rule in 1864, a law that instead of helping the peasant to develop a better quality of life, did nothing but worsened the poverty

and misery; the constant line of work exploitation and moral frazzling determines the Romanian peasant to emigrate, in search of a better modus Vivendi. "This type of migration proves the misery state in which the agrarian population or the poor urban one find themselves, a true conviction of the actual state of things." (Eminescu: 1998, p. 31).

Modernity after the First World War. The third renaissance

Greater Romania is the "organic end" of the first two renaissance cycles. From now, state frontiers overlap with the boundaries of national ethnicity. The intellectual discourse was freed from the national imperative, so that the interwar period was prolific in producing different projects aimed at modernizing society and the state. Some of the doctrines thus produced were reconsidering the role of Orthodox faith in politics, others promoted various relationships between capital, labor, society, and the state.

There was an inflorescence of answers to the provocation of modernizing the society. We will take into account only two of them, the national peasant doctrine of Virgil Madgearu (one of the leaders of the National Peasant Party) and the corporatist doctrine of Mihail Manoilescu (one of the most respected European economists in the interwar period). The main concern is the "rural issue" – how to link technology, politics and the urban classes and economics with the interests and needs of the peasants. Almost 80% of Romanians lived in the countryside and were the main GDP contributor but only a fraction of the national revenue returned to the countryside. Therefore, *internal integration* was the main issue of modernity for the Romanian society at that time.

Neoserfdom of the peasantry was the most crippling cost the Romania had to pay for her modernization between 1864 – when the capitalist reform of the land has started and 1918 – when the main national cycle ended with the forming of Greater Romania. Neoserfdom meant a newer and much powerful enslavement of the peasantry by foreign speculative capital with the aid of the modern institutions. Given the integration of Romania as a periphery in the logic of the world system as the Turkish domination subsided after 1829 (the second cesure, changing the peripheral axis), the foreign capital did not produce industrial facilities but raided the easier opportunities by speculating the need for luxury of the land owners. In order to do this the speculative capital strongly encouraged the modernization of the infrastructure of the state – the law and the roads, in order to efficiently export the agricultural products and let the speculative credit circulate at ease.

On the peasant doctrine of development (Madgearu)

Madgearu considered that within his multidirectional model of transition from feudalism to capitalism as illustrated by the dissimilar developments in England, Denmark, France, and the European South-East, the specific evolutions of the agrarian countries were linked by the particular relation in which they stood with the capitalist world-economy, and which was inherent in their very backwardness. Analyzed on the basis of Romania's example, "specific evolution" in Eastern Europe – a concept which Madgearu explicitly employed – was given by (1) the contrast between neoserfdom and the liberal state institutions, (2) the limited role of commercial capital in the development of liberal structures, (3) exploitation of the State through the political oligarchy, (4) the parasitarian and artificial character of the national industry, (5) the coexistence of "industrial feudalism" with a nascent industrialism, and (6) the

direct transition from commercial to finance capitalism without passing through the industrial "stage" (cf. Madgearu 1936 [1925b]: 98f.).

For Madgearu, agricultural evolution could not be explained on the basis of a unilinear and teleological process of transition from feudal exploitation to capitalist wage labor. Rather, its mode of labor control was a function of the relations of production which the allocation of land had made it possible to enforce: "*The legal abolition of feudal relations of property and work becomes a reality only if the land transformed into private property does not remain a means of domination and exploitation, if the 'emancipated' peasants are not compelled to engage their work and their cattle on boyar property. Otherwise the legal form contradicts the real substance*" (Madgearu 1936 [1922]: 24)169.
The immiseration of the peasantry and the technical regress of agricultural exploitation had then been the direct consequences of neoserfdom, i.e., of the form which emancipation had taken.

The property of the land has to become "a work property" [*proprietate de muncă*] and not an "instrument of exploitation against the peasant" in order to ease the condition of the peasant and to fully integrate the rural economy with credit and technology. The work property is fully configured to produce a decent life for the peasant families and to facilitate the economic progress of the agriculture with the help of the newly designed rural credit. The new rural credit was to be developed according to the natural cycle of the crops and cattle.

On the corporatist doctrine (Manoilescu)

Manoilescu argued that industrialization was the condition *sine qua non* of every country's development, since it was only through industry that the enhancement of a country's economic purchasing power could lead to more advantageous international exchanges (Manoilescu 1929: 91). Placing *labor productivity* at the center of his analysis, the Romanian economist contended that, contrary to the tenets of classical economic theory, human labor was qualitatively unequal and differentiated with respect to the amount of skill it required and the productivity it supplied, so that labor quality, not labor quantity (as for Adam Smith) was decisive in determining the value of goods exchanged on the world market: "*La quantité de travail humain mise en branle (déclanchée) serait un signe de supériorite pour une branche de production! C'est au contraire l'économie de travail qui est un critérium. Ce n'est pas le maximum de travail, mais le maximum de productivité de ce travail humain, qui devrait être signe de toute supériorité économique*" (Manoilescu 1929: 332).
For Manoilescu, therefore, a correct labor theory of value would have to take into account not only the profitability, but also the productivity of labor. While the classical economic theories revolved around Ricardo's concept of comparative advantage, according to which a country should concentrate on the production of those goods in which it had the smallest disadvantage on the world market, Manoilescu insisted that economic operations were generally advantageous if their labor productivity was higher than the national average, which was always the case for industrial activities when compared to agricultural ones. A displacement of forces of production toward industry would thus always lead to higher productivity, whereas renouncing industrialization in favor of a specialization in agricultural exports, as the free trade doctrine implied, would lead to dependency: "*Les théories qui, sous prétexte de division du travail et de spécialisation de la production recommandent aux nations d'employer leur nouvelles forces et l'excédent de leur population à des activités inférieures d'une productivité faible, sont les théories du regrès et de la déchéance nationale*" (Manoilescu 1929: 184). Profitability, the *individual gain* of the capitalist entrepreneurs

behind such unequal exchanges, should then be clearly distinguished from productivity, the total *national gain* achieved in a branch of production. The ideological implications of postulating a necessary identity between individual and national gain, Manoilescu observed, were particularly detrimental to agricultural countries, where the high revenues of capitalists joined the country's inherent low productivity in keeping down the national gain.

Manoilescu's doctrine on corporatism is centered on the *social functionality* of the different *occupations* (not classes) which should be *vertically integrated* to produce a *functional political order*, i.e. an order *serving the national interest*.

Although Manoilescu acknowledged his debt to the model of corporatist organization that Emile Durkheim elaborated as a solution to anomie (Durkheim 1967), his own approach added to the social and economic components of the corporatist conception a cultural and political dimension – corporatism, for its Romanian theoretician, was "the political form which our nationalism acquires" (Manoilescu 1933: 8). Nevertheless, on more than one occasion, he distanced himself from the concrete forms which corporatism took in other parts of Europe, stressing that "pure" corporatism did not involve a subordination of economic corporations to state authority, as was the case in fascist Italy (cf. Manoilescu 1937: 31), but amounted to an "integral" conception of human society, the nation, and national goals with respect to social, economic, and political dimensions.

"*The transformation of our national economy has occurred exclusively under the impact of the private interests of the foreign or the local bourgeoisie. The true national interests have not only not been determinant, but they have not even been exactly known, because, throughout the nineteenth century, we guided ourselves by means of the false and tendentious science of the West*"
(Manoilescu 1942: 83)

In a radical break with both Marxist and Weberian criteria for the definition of social classes according to *class interest*, the Romanian corporatist thus emphasized *functionality* – understood in terms of historical responsibility and social duty – as a decisive feature, on account of which Romania's bourgeoisie could and should be brought "before the nation's court of justice" (Manoilescu 1942: 119). From the corporatist perspective which he espoused and which he viewed as a resurgent aspect in the 1930s European reversion to mercantilist practices and to communal, neo-corporate forms of social organization, the functions and "missions" of the bourgeoisie could only be measured by the extent to which they had been implemented in the "integral service of the nation" (Manoilescu 1942: 117), i.e., from the perspective of the local history in which they were embedded.

On the third cleavage: the Communist repression

As if foreshadowing the doctrine of limited sovereignty drafted in 1968 by the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brejnev, the stipulations of the Constitution from September 27, 1952, transformed the People's Republic of Romania into the 16th union republic. "The alliance with the great Soviet Union, its support and honest brotherly help ensures the independence, the state sovereignty, the development and the flourishing of the People's Republic of Romania".[1] The fundamental law did not anticipate a future situation, but set the framework for an actual situation that was being more and more

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[1] The Official Buletin, nr. 1/September 27, 1952.

clearly put forward ever since the last half of the 1940s. The cultural, political and social costs deriving from the trudge on an unnatural pathway, and with no meaning to a semi-peasant people, will be presented in a nutshell below.

Under the close surveillance of the Komintern headquarters from Moscow, a systematic plan of destruction of the national identity was put into practice. The elimination from the political life of the historical parties, the abolition of the monarchic institution, the control over the financial and industrial network through stabilization, namely nationalization, the cultural ethnocide and the disintegration of peasant property were just some of the many methods of crippling the identity of a people through the enforcement of new landmarks, senses, directions, in their great majority utopian ones, disconnected from the mental map of the autochthonous community.

The political component

The order No. 50,000 S, emitted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on February 27, 1947, constituted the starting point of the wave of abusive arrests that sweep the post-war Romanian political stage, thus cleansed of any undesirable and "reactionary" elements. In this document, which legitimizes the action of severing the historical parties, together with their forefront politicos, the ones who were to profit from the precarious economic situation of a country barely out of a war and afflicted with a two-year drought are presented: the great *speculators and the reactionary political agitators*. "The reactionary political instigators deploy their activity in the town and cities, but especially in the villages, with the aim of sabotaging the measures of economic stimulation taken by the government, in order to instill a state of alarm among the population, up to the upheaval of public order and compromising the good relations among great allies. Most of the instigators are to be found in the National Peasant Party (P.N.Ţ.) Maniu[2] rank-and-file members, National Liberal Party (P.N.L). Brătianu and P.S.D.I."[3] The "occupants" of institutions and the representatives of the new order labeled the liberals and national-Christians as "Fascists", "Hitlerists", "legionnaires". In fact, all citizens hostile to the new regime fell under the incidence of these labels. The criminal legislation that regulated the crimes against the state had a profound stereotypical bias. The criteria that placed an act in the specific area of a certain crime were not rigorous, but vague, as for the same crime there were various frameworks. Here are some so-called valid reasons to be imprisoned: "the sabotaging of government actions", "propaganda against the government", "instigation against the government".

The Communist program of was structured on a few clear directions. The mass arrests of opposition leaders, with the aim of smothering the manifestations of the opposition, was the first step. The subsequent objective was to exclude the socialists and liberals from the Tătărescu government. It was followed by the attempt to bring the Romanian economy to the verge of collapse by excessively raising wages and prices, without regard for work productivity. The imprisonment of the leaders of historical parties in 1947 targeted the frightening of that majority population segment that had an attitude of opposition against the changes announced by the Communists and the dismantling of the political resistance carried

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[2] Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Brătianu, respectively, were the main leaders of the democratic opposition in WWII Romania.

[3] ANIC, Iuliu Maniu Fund, file nr. 73/1947-1948, f. 81-82 apud Dumitru Şandor, 2008, *The Arrest Waves of 1947* from the Archives of Totalitarianism, Nr. ¾, edited by the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism.

on by the National Christian Party (Maniu) and the National Liberal Party (Brătianu). Notwithstanding the frightened population from certain areas of Romania, where the local people, for fear of being arrested, has ceased to sleep in their homes and took refuge in the woods and at relatives, in order areas, such as Mureş county, for instance, the people's state of mind was good. It was later said that if they had known of the arrests, the local people would have opposed them even with their lives. By arresting the inter-war political elites, the supporters of Greater Romania, which was a national political reality between the two World Wars, were eliminated.

The cultural component

Reactionary – this was the main cliché that supported the discourse[4] strategy of the Komintern regarding the Romanian people. "For the Komintern, the Romanian people was composed mainly of peasants, fundamentally reactionary by nature, incapable of progress, of revolutionary fight, of revolution." (Ungheanu 1999, 35) It was the moment when a new people was forged, molded by the senses of a new culture, for the beauty of a peasant nation crushed the confines of the conceptual stream within the logics of the Komintern. As the revolution represented, in the Kominternist view, the pinnacle of citizen manifestation, a virtuous political activity that the Romanian people proved incapable of sustaining, the forerunners of proletarian culture began the process of rewriting national history. This came as a horrendous blow, as the innate capacity of a peasant people to spark revolutions engendered a new direction in the Romanian historiography, namely the Marxist-Leninist filter of history reading and interpretation. Thus, some of the Romania's main historical moments such as Tudor's 1821 Revolution was turned into a mere riot. The same happened to Horea's Revolution, rightfully named "revolution" by Densuşianu in 1884. Illustrative for this new orientation in the Romanian historiography is the overemphasis placed on the role of Slavs and Scythians in the birth and formation of the Romanian people. Also, the preoccupation of the czar for the Christians within the borders of the Ottoman Empire was overly stressed. In the given circumstances, the "ingratitude" of the Romanian people towards Russia was equated with heresy. Nevertheless, the collective memory, as a significant layer in the scaffolding of national identity, together with language, religion, culture and tradition, suffered a deep wound, and the landmarks that facilitated social interaction were progressively erased. "It [Romanian culture] was thrown into the ovens and prisons of an intolerant political ideology, in order to clear the way for a «new» culture." (Ungheanu 1999, 26). The statuary group that depicted Ferdinand the Unifier, together with the cultural meaning it held, was thrown into the fire of oblivion, as meticulously planned and desired.

The heralds of the Komintern announced everywhere the reactionary character of Romanian culture. "Whosoever reads the ideological opuses of Leonte Răutu, Mihail Roller, Z. Ornea,

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[4] Foucault shows how discourse, an intertwining between knowledge and power, establishes everything there is to say about any subject, and that is an ensemble of assumptions and unwritten laws that regulate what is to be desired in a certain domain, but also the accepted behaviors in an area of activity. The discourse cannot be separated from power, stresses Foucault, and it does not belong just to one social class – if he had said that power is concentrated in the hands of a certain social class, it would have been clear that the discourse is pure ideology (and is it really not?) –, but it is a strategic ground that gives rise to the manifestation of the relations of inequality between the powerful and the powerless. Power is not a negative force that represses or destroys. It generates reality, the rituals regarding truth, which is not universal and atemporal, but mundane and, just the falsity, it is produced by people. The veracity of the discourse depends less on what is said and more on says it, when and in what circumstances.

Ileana Vrancea will have a hideous picture of a people that produces right-wing monsters. It is of course false. But it is a falsity that must be denounced." (Ungheanu 1999, 37) Naturally, the representatives of a reactionary culture that defied the Lilliputian scope of the proletarian culture were the naysayers of the new life philosophy, forged in the smitheries of the Komitern. As "detractors" they had to be suppressed, either imprisoned, or condemned to civilian death. They were labeled as "anti-Marxists", "Fascists", "Hitlerists" only for being guilty of feeling, thinking and behaving in an authentic Romanian fashion. For attempting to make the ineffable character of the local values intelligible, thus helping nuance the identity profile of the Romanian nation, and for sustaining its right to differentiation, the inter-war cultural elite was decimated, either physically or spiritually.

National identity is corny and deemed hostile to the order projected by the new pilots. It was fashionable to be Communist, Stalinist and internationalist. "If you had the unfortunate idea to be first and foremost Romanian and only then Communist, you were through with the world, regardless of what social class you belonged to." (Avram 1999, 54) For the courage of thinking as a Romanian, the "fascist" and "anti-Marxist" Blaga[5] is condemned to civilian death. Thus, devoid of one of the axiological vectors of Romanian thought, it is hoped that Transylvania will stop thinking as part of the Romanian nation. Without "spiritual benchmark" and "rally center", Romania's Mittelpunkt trudged on the path of creating a new identity. Gheorghe Brătianu, the new landmark in Romanian historiography after Iorga's assassination, who stood steadfast against the insidious ideological mapping pushed by Hungarian and Soviet revisionism, is labeled as "antipatriotic" and stigmatized as "Hitlerist" and "Fascist" by Leonte Răutu and other representatives of the wave of proletarian culture. The "Fascist" Nicolae Iorga, the "wholesome man of Romanian culture" (Noica), Mihai Eminescu[6], described by the new culture as the "obsolete herald of the great land-owners", are outlawed.

By expelling Iorga and Eminescu it was not fascism that was forbidden, contends Mihai Ungheanu „ (...) but an independent Romanian perspective on the world and its modern condition'' (Ungheanu, 1999, 52). As a consequence of the essentialist discourse forged by the proletkult's agents, the national identity gets contorted. This is how millenary representations, significances and teachings that have given light to the Romanian people's path were crushed, along with its sentinels, that is the cultural elite. Consequently, „(...) the cultural life of post-war Romania was deprived of vital meanings and working instruments''(Ungheanu, 1999, 52). At that moment, one people's important significances and representations for its orientation in time and space, along with those necessary for its understanding of life and world, were configured by foreigners[7]. The new identities, simple value masks that disfigure one people's cognitive profile, were pervaded with the proletkult's categories.

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[5] Through the education reform of 1949, the academic departments of Romania are cleansed of legitimate professors and filled with allogeneic elements. Blaga falls victim to the academic cleansing.
[6] Of Eminescu, with "proletarian anger", in Flacăra magazine, nr. 3 from January 23, 1949: "We are among the very few people who have the ill fortune to have our major poetic figure prisoner, with all its genius, to a reactionary life perspective."
[7] During World War II in Romania were no more than 1000 communists. In 1931, the ethnic composition of the Communist Party was the following: 26% Hungarians, 23% Romanians, 18% Jews, 10% Russians (http://wapedia.mobi/ro/PCR). In 1930 the ethnic composition of Romania was 72% Romanians, Hungarians 8%, Jews 4%, Russians 2,3%. (*Spatiul istoric si etnic romanesc* [*The Ethnic and Spiritual Space*], Ed. Militara, Bucuresti, 1992, XLI-d)

The social-economic layer

Being on a electoral campaign in the countryside, Petru Groza was giving comfort to his potential voters in the following manner: "We are not making kolkhozes as the historical parties are scaring you. Unlike the above mentioned character, Engels and Lenin have already noticed the principle of socialist transformation of the agriculture as one of socialist order's main base. The transition to the new type of property was to be made in accordance to the „principle of free consent'', whilst the peasants were presented simultaneously the advantages of „cultivating the land in common''. The socialist property, identitarian source for the „new kind of men'', was the pivotal idea of the socialist state. „ It (the socialist property) should have allowed the power to control all society's economic, social and politic leverages in an authoritarian and exclusivist manner''(Avram, 1999, 31).

According to Marx, Lenin and Stalin, the peasantry was reactionary by definition, so it could have been reeducated and monitored only by imposing it a new identity, shaped through the socialist property. In the peasant world, private property has always been a source of social solidarity and an identity layer. Outlawing it was similar to poisoning a vital spring of social harmony. „The total war against the peasantry must aim at forming a social organism that is unitary and fully controllable. The normal development of the Romanian society was to be stopped by destroying the links between individuals, the civil society in general, through the state terrorism which was represented by <revolutionary justice> and the secret police'' (Avram, 1999, 35-36). Compelling a predominantly agrarian country to get industrialized suddenly and completely and forcing it to embrace a less familiar development direction is an attempt to unbalance it both economically and socially. Romania's process of industrialization and the introduction of the socialist property model have been equivalent to narrowing the individual autonomy. „The socialist property has been the economic means for the citizen's enslavement, whilst the political means of its enslavement has been the unique leading party''(Avram, 1999, 68).

Endowed with a number of privileges and illustrating „the superiority of communist agriculture'', the first agricultural collective farms were inaugurated on the 24th of July 1949. Thus, the concerted effort of unweaving a society that consisted mostly of small and medium agricultural owners had begun. The Romanian village has been the agora of class struggle. Collectivization „(...) has negatively affected the entire peasantry, destroying the individual property and damaging the whole agriculture"(Avram, 1999, 44). During collectivization, the underlying principle of the 1848 Revolution was forgotten: „Only a peasant-owner, who loves his land, will love his country, too.[8]"

Peasant world's economic elites have been beheaded. Being labelled „chiaburi'' (well-off or kulaks), the most skillful and hardworking agricultural owners have had to cope with a series of evil consequences. For they have owned 24, 81 percent of the whole agricultural surface and had a developed conscience regarding private property, the well-offs have been the hardest opponents of the social and economic plan tailored and implemented by the new elite. On the 3-5 of March 1949 were established the economic and political criteria that differentiated the wealthy peasant from the poor or halfback one. „ (...) if he owns land in the region, if he has other means of production, how many, what kind of means of production, the cultures' type, how much he yields and how much he brings to the market, whether he

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[8] M. Kogălniceanu, Texte social-politice alese, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1967, p. 306.

exploits foreign labor or not, whether or not he is exploited by others, family size and so on'' (Avram, 1999, 186).

The abovementioned criteria have never been completely met. Arbitrary choices and political criteria have prevailed. In fact, anyone could potentially be a well-off. According to the circular of the Executive Committee of the Regional Craiova's People's Council any landowner can be categorized well-off (kulak), if he displays a hostile attitude towards the new regime. Soon, the power to include citizens in the kulak (well-off), halfback or poor peasant category is delegated to local authorities, thus encouraging arbitrariness. *,,The inclusion on the kulak lists has been made as reprisals against those who did not want to join the party. (...) During the whole collectivization process, social labeling remained a privilege of the local authorities. (...) Through the local authorities' decision anyone could be labeled kulak, not only the political opponent, but also the honest and hard working householder, who, through his own effort, has supported his family''* (Avram, 1999, 192-193-194). Kulak's political rights have been restricted and similarly, their economic opportunities. This social category's taxes have been raised and its quotas doubled. Poor peasantry was considered the ,,ally of the urban working class''. Party activists, presidents of People's Councils, army officers and informants have been especially recruited from poor peasantry.

The peasantry has always displayed a hostile attitude towards collectivization. Regardless of the category in which he has been included, the Romanian peasant has never been willing to give up ,,the land, the tools and the cattle'' that have always defined his ,,reactionary'' way of life. The infringement of the law, peasantry's riots and partisan fights are all proofs of the strong dislike that the Romanian peasantry nursed for collectivizations. Collectivization, the process that has crumbled the national identity by abolishing the peasantry's traditional way of life, ended in April 1962, although the fencing endeavour of private property continues between 1962 and 1965. ,,In a country that refuses to surrender, its roots had to be destroyed, and the Romanian roots were represented mainly by peasantry …" (Avram, 1999, 47).

Part II

On the Jewish matter in the 19th century

Short historiography

The ,,Jewish problem" represents one of the most discussed topics, especially in the 19th century, linked to important issues such as statehood, independence, socio-economic policies and legislative matters. In order to fully understand the actual causes for the outburst of such a conflict, we must go back in time and search throughout the entire history of the Jewish settlement in the Romanian countries. Despite the fact that the local Jewish history is not entirely clear, certain aspects are known and deserve to be highlighted. The accusations of anti-Semitism brought to the Romanian public discourse by the foreign powers, leaders of the Israeli population or ethnic organizations acknowledge a great deal of public debates and continuous governmental shifts.

There are a few key-moments in history in which the Jewish population chose to settle on Romanian territory. Historically speaking, the first Jews dated on Romanian grounds are the ones brought by the Roman armies on Dacia's territory, a fact proven by the discovery of coins and archaeological sources (Gudea:199-202). The second one took place during the 14th and 16th centuries, when the Aşkenazi Jews left Western Germany, Hungary and Poland, a movement doubled, according to Giurescu (Giurescu: Ist ro, vol II, p81), by the one of the Sephards (Spanish Jews) from the Ottoman Empire. Another wave of Jewish population immigrated into Romania due to the 16th century Ukrainian pogroms. Summing up, by the year 1740, whole Jewish communities are found settled in cities like Alba-Iulia, Bacău, Roman or Galați (*Galatz/Kalas)*.

At the dawn of the 19th century, alongside the harshness and socio-political difficulties Jews were up against, Galicia, Moldavia and Transylvania face an exponential growth of Jewish inhabitants. This is the moment referred to as the beginning of the „Jewish issue" (Giurescu: Ist românilor, vol III, p409).

Some statistical data

Transylvania
- The very first census in Transylvania, done in 1779, at the end of Maria Theresa's reign, revealed 221 Jewish families (with 461 small children).
- The next census, ordered by Emperor Joseph II, revealed a number of 394 Jewish families (with 2,094 members). If we consider Transylvania, in its present form, the number of the Jewish people was up to 6,884.
- Shortly after the 1848Revolution, the Austrian census (concerning the year 1850-1851) revealed a number of the Jewish population that exceeded 15,000 Jewish inhabitants in the province. The reason of this increase is to be found in the massive immigration from the West and the North (Galicia, Bukovina and Hungary) to the more favorable economic and social conditions offered by the Great Principality.
- After the inauguration of the Empire's dualist structure in 1867, the Jewish population increased from 23,536 in 1869 to 60,074 persons in 1910. If we consider Transylvania in its present form, the number of the Jewish people was up to 223,082 (Gyémánt: p. 13-41; 219-230).

Moldavia

- The very first census that revealed a number of 1,300 Jewish families was taken by the military authorities from the Russian occupation army during the war with the Turks in 1774.
- In the year 1785, the census revealed a number of 175 Jewish families, a reduced figure resulted from the expulsions made by the new authorities. After the official measures taken were no longer that restrictive (1791), the number again increases to 554 families.
- A strong immigration wave (from Poland and Russia, both ruled by strong repressive anti-Jewish measures) in the first half of the 19th century is backed by the statistical data: the Jewish population reaches 79,164 individuals in 1838.
- At the time of the Revolution (1848), in over 60 small cities and villages, the Romanian population was outnumbered by the new majority, the Jews, a phenomenon continued until the year 1860. The main causes were the low mortality rate (lower

than the one of the Romanians'), strict dietary prescriptions (religious bases) and the increasingly early marriages.
- Result: at the end of the 19th century, the number of Jewish individuals doubled, reaching 269,015 - 4,5% of the total population (Carol Iancu: p. 143).

Jewish emancipation

The primary concern outlined in the 18th and 19th centuries by the Jewish communities (all across Europe, not just the in Romanian case) was their emancipation, i.e., gaining full civil rights a process that proved to be a slow and twisted one in Wallachia and Transylvania. A first step towards this direction was made by the Emperor's initiative regarding the Edict of tolerance for Hungary. For the right to participate to free trade operations, free admission in public schools or even creating their own educational system, the Jewish community, in exchange, was to officially adopt the Latin, German or Hungarian language and German names. Mihai Eminescu is the one that draws attention at the time upon the fact that the Edict was viable only in the actual Prussian territory and not in the attached areas. Its effects in the rest of the world were only visible. In fact, Jewish emigration proceeded from the Western countries towards the Eastern ones based on two things: Jewish repression, almost inexistent in the new territories (doubled by important gains in the matter of the civil rights) on the one hand; and, on the other, the Western countries were governed by ideas like the division of labor (an equation in which "unproductive elements" were easily disposed of).

Once the liberal government was in office, a political program based on Western liberal ideals concerning the emancipation of the Jews was taken into consideration. On this grounds, Jews accepted and took active part in the 1848 Revolution. But, on the contrary, after the Revolution was repressed, in Hungary and Transylvania, until the 1860s, a number of rights gained in the past was revoked (including the one referring to the purchase of properties). After the inauguration of the Empire's dualist structure in 1867, Jewish emancipation was resolved in a liberal manner through a law leading to the constant increase of Jewish population in the controlled territories. In June 1848, the Proclamation of Islaz in Wallachia supported „Jewish emancipation and political rights for the compatriots that belong to other religious beliefs" (art. 21).
After the Unification of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, Alexander Joan Cuza made the first steps towards emancipation. Jews were allowed to hold public functions and starting from 1864, the Communal Law guaranteed the right to participate as candidates at municipal elections. Moreover, article nr. 7, written in the new Civil Code, stated that "the individual naturalization of the Jews was possible after 10 years of residency in the country" (article revised 25 years later – the new beneficiaries were only those of Christian confession).

Anti-Semitic discourse - reasoning

The elements shown above plus the constant demographic majority in most Romanian cities of Moldavia and Transylvania and the reduced number of marriages per 1000 inhabitants enabled a special socio-economical situation in which the influence and control over the important mechanisms was on the Jews' side. This was shown by the monopoly position they held on the most profitable economical sectors (Eminescu, 1998), which later on led to a "usurary practice" that affected the national industrial potentiality. The public discourses that

treated the Jewish issue were nothing else but an attempt to highlight the need for initiatives and policies of national economical protection (through the internalization of the profit thus realized), a need in times of international confusion. At the Peace Congress of Berlin (1878), the Great Powers conditioned Romania's independency recognition on the modification of the 7th article of the Romanian Constitution. In other words, Romania was asked to guarantee the enforcement of civil rights to all inhabitants regardless of ethnicity or religion. This involvement of the foreign powers in the internal affairs of the Romanian State subsequently led to numerous government shifts. In the end, the citizenship granted to the Jewish people was approved and stated in the national laws, and not by collective means (as requested), but on an individual basis.

A few words on religion and secularization

Uniatism in Transylvania

The birth of the Romanian Church as an institution (2nd and 3rd century) precedes the first Romanian state forms of organization and so the relation between the Church and the people takes place without the need of mediation or support from the political-administrative institutions. „The Romanian Church was categorically not a Church of the superimposed layer, but a State-Church and an official one and the historical background did nothing but to relieve. In Transylvania there was never a Romanian aristocracy because of two things: noble's conversion to Catholicism and the process of magyarization. The people was the only thing that remained the same and so the Church embraced it with its devotion, sharing its tide, bumps and humiliation. It is interesting to notice that as the Romanian Transylvanian boyars left the Orthodox rule and suffered a magyarization process, so did the ones in the Romanian Old Kingdom, developing unorthodox French tendencies. Only the people remained faithful to the Church because, in fact, it remained faithful to itself." (Stăniloae, 1942: 1)

Judging by its organic data, Romania belongs from a religious point of view to the Orthodox world, Orthodoxy being nothing else but a significant ingredient in the Romanian national identity. In the Orthodox sphere of influence, the Church became the most important guarantor in matters of preserving language and ethnicity (Păcuraru, 1994, Manuilă, 1921, Pipiddi, 2001: 151).

Historically speaking, a certain a number of minority groups belonging to different religious confessions (Catholic, Jewish, Armenian, Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian) were able to organize their religious life, practice their faith freely by gaining ruler's support. Cumulated, these confessions never crossed 12% from the total Romanian population figures.

The Romanian Church between State, Empires and Foreign Hierarchical Forefront

Starting from the state formation of the three Romanian Countries (Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania) up to the Church's autocephaly in 1864, the hierarchical forefront of which all the autochthonous halidoms depend to were abroad.

"The states' political recognition in those times were concomitantly with the ones made from the hierarchical ecclesiastic point of view and the foreign policy rivalry extends into the religious area. Only after the autochthonous ruling formation, the specific ecclesiastic hierarchy could have been established, even though its cultural source remains an exterior one. " (Stahl, 1972: 187)

Up to the 19th middle century, the prerogatives regarding the assignment or revocation of the religious hierarchs fall under the heading of the same political cores. These are responsible (directly or just by using their influence) for the political shifts at the head of the three Romanian Countries, altering the link between the foreign hierarchs and the Church's corpus.

Between the 14th and 16th centuries, the Romanian states reach a moment of stability and both political and religious consolidation. In the 17th century, the monastical development started in the previous centuries was carried on by the numerous "ctitories" of monasteries or churches (build with the efforts of a boyar who is constantly reminded in the religious manifestations) and the flourishing financial status. During this development, the monasteries financially supported by boyars and lords fulfilled a crucial cultural role (precious manuscripts transcript, translated or printed).

Started in the 13th century as a result of the intensive political relations between the Romanian boyar families and religious hierarchs with political position inside the Ottoman Empire, the medieval practice of the "monasteries' rendering" knows its peaks in the 17th century. The rendering simply refers to the monasteries' transition under the authority of Constantinople and Jerusalem Patriarchies alongside with the same shift at the greatest monasteries from Athos or Christian East.

Following the hegumens' and foreign monks' abuses in the rendered monasteries and the increased number of Romanian monks chased away, Matei Basarab decided in 1639 to restore the autonomy of 22 Wallachian monasteries and to forbid the rendering practice in the future. Although the Ecumenical Patriarchate confirmed voivode's decision by passing on a similar decree two years later, in 1611, monasteries' rendering continued. (Păcuraru, 1994: 223, 267-269)

In the 17th century, the private "ctitories" habit was mentaned up until the twilight of the Phanariot regime (Bulat, 1938). "Such a church or monastery ctitored by a private person is to become his possession (alongside with the future descendents, both woman or man). (…) In some cases, these monasteries are to be considered as patrimonial possessions that could be easily sold or bought, donated or transmitted by will. Such a peculiar issue is, for us nowadays, rather strange considering that the private owning of a church is no longer present in our habits."(Bulat, 1938: 181).

In 18th century and the first part of the 19th, the rendered Romanian monasteries are thought of as simple income sources. The churches are no longer taken care of; the number of monks is reduced; the ctitor's will is fully ignored. Through the separation of the Ottoman Empire and the closeness with the West, the habit of rendering monasteries became unsuited with the new Romanian political reality. Moreover, by its economical consequences, such a practice turned into an important barrier that stands in front of the country's modernization and development. In Wallachia, the area of the rendered monasteries' land possessions summed up 28% of country's total agrarian extension and in Moldavia 23% (Ciocoiu, 2009).

In 1860, as an effect of the hegumens' lack of payments consisted of false lease contracts, Kogălniceanu (prime-minister of the Principalities at that time) decreed that the leases were to be made under state control (Ciocoiu, 2009). In 1863, the government sets Romanian as the church primary language, measure followed by the forfeit of the assets and estates of all monasteries in Romania. This was a reply-action to the Ottoman Porte's decision of relief from taxation. The first article stated that: "all monasteries' assets and estates on Romanian territory are and will remain in the property of the state." The new gained lands were afterwards parceled out and given to the peasants according to the agrarian law of 1864.

To put an end to the foreign influence in naming the hierarchs, Alexander Joan Cuza assumed through the 11th may 1865 law the right to name the Bishops and Metropolitan bishops. The law became invalid after seven years when the political authorities were forced to replace it in 1872 with The Canonical Law of the Orthodox Church (which stated that the Bishops and

Metropolitan bishops were to be chosen by the Synod members) due to the local hierarchs' and Ecumenical Patriarchate.

The pressures and the meddling of the political factor in hierarchs' naming continued in an informal way until 1918, creating a constant clerical instability (name shift at only 2 years between) (Enache, 2005). Once the Patriarchate was instated after the World War, the hierocracy succeeded in regaining its stability.

The Russian Domination

In the last decades of the Phanariot regime, the influence of the Tsarist Empire in Romanian's religious life was obvious (Păcuraru, 1994: 404). The imperial authorities encouraged imposing Russian hierarchs or Russian-named hierarchs in Moldavia, a measure followed by the assertion of the Church Slavonic language (Buzilă, 1996: 53). Starting in 1788, the Synod of the Russian Church overrules the authority of the Romanian Orthodox Church and Patriarchate of Constantinople and appoints in Moldavia bishops and vicars confirmed by the empress Ekaterina II, "disregarding the local customs and the protest of the Constantinople Patriarch" (Buzilă, 1996: 53).

Between 1806 - 1812 and during the Russo-Turkish War, Wallachia and Moldavia are under Russian military occupation. Once Bessarabia (the eastern side of Moldavia) is attached to the Tsarist Empire in 1812, the russification campaign intensifies: "All Russian and Russophile (Gavril) hierarchs which pastorate in Bessarabia served the Tsarist regime with ardour and devotion, as high officials and faithful citizens of the Empire. About no person can we state that identified himself with the Bessarabian soul and aspirations, when each other's purpose was that the whole crowd would speak and feel like a Russian does, a son of the pravoslavnic church with which the Empire was to identify itself, even if, temporarily, they were permitted to pray in their first language." (Buzilă, 1996: 46)

The russification process followed up by the replacement of the burned-out Romanian cult books with Slavonic ones, the closure of the only eparchial typography that published books in Romanian, the full shutdown of 340 Romanian churches solely in a bishop's mandate, the identitary aggression regarding linguistically matters by fabricating a new language called "the Moldavian language" (reiterated by Vorornin's communist regime in today's Republic of Moldavia).

Bessarabia becomes once again a Romanian territory from 1918-1940 and 1941-1944, but after the World War II is reattached to the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The birth of the Romanian Church as an institution (2nd and 3rd century) precedes the first Romanian state's forms of organization and so the relation between the Church and the people takes place without the need of mediation or support from the political-administrative institutions. „The Romanian Church was categorically not a Church of the superimposed layer, but a State-Church and an official one and the historical background did nothing but to relieve. In Transylvania there was never a Romanian aristocracy because of two things: the noblemen's conversion to Catholicism and the process of magyarization. The people was the only thing that remained the same and so the Church embraced it with its devotion, sharing its tide, bumps and humiliation. It is interesting to notice that as the Romanian Transylvanian boyars left the Orthodox rule and suffered a magyarization process, so did the ones in the Romanian Old Kingdom, developing unorthodox French tendencies. Only the people remained faithful to the Church because, in fact, it remained faithful to itself." (Stăniloae

1942: 1). Judging by its organic data, Romania belongs from a religious point of view to the Orthodox world, Orthodoxy being nothing else but a significant ingredient in the Romanian national identity. In the Orthodox sphere of influence, the Church became the most important guarantor in matters of preserving language and ethnicity (Păcuraru, 1994, Manuilă, 1921, Pipiddi, 2001: 151).

Annex

Confruntarea unora dintre cele mai active panidei în istoria Europei moderne și contemporane: pangermanism și panslavism în secolele XIX-XX.

Map 1. From the point of view of geopolitics, in 19th and 20th centuries, Romania was located in the middle of two important "Panideen" (ideologies with the force of organizing large spaces, shaping the collective identities – the so called "mental maps". Haushofer, 1931): pangermanism and panslavism . The map nr. 1 illustrates the encounter of this two panideas and the direction of their expansion in Europe.

Map 2. At the intersection between the two panideas, the borders were highly volatile. Most of today's borders in Eastern Europe are less than 50 years old. The whiter the borders, the newer (Foucher, 1991).

Map 3. Areas of the main religions in Europe

Map 4. Status of Romanian principalities among the Great Powers until Independence (1878)

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